Delhi High Court
Raj Bahadur vs State on 21 July, 2014
$~23
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ CRL.M.C. 3141/2014
RAJ BAHADUR ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. Pawan Sharma, Advocate
versus
STATE ..... Respondent
Through: Mr. P.K. Mishra, APP with SI Ramesh
Chand, PS Kamla Market
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUDERSHAN KUMAR MISRA
% SUDERSHAN KUMAR MISRA (ORAL)
Crl.M.C. No.3141/2014
1. The Petitioner is a Police Official. He has filed this petition under
Section 482 Cr.P.C. impugning the order passed by the learned Additional
Sessions Judge, Saket Court, New Delhi on 10.07.2014 on appeal filed by
the State cancelling the bail granted to the petitioner on 18.06.2014 by the
trial court.
2. An FIR No. 130/2014 was registered at Police Station, Kamla Market
under section 419/420/365/392/412/120-B IPC on the complaint of one
Rishi Chander Yadav on 22.04.2014. On the basis of the aforementioned
complaint, the Petitioner was arrested. Thereafter on 18.06.2014 bail was
granted to the Petitioner by the Metropolitan Magistrate. Later, on the basis
of this bail, Vasudev Prasad, a co-accused, was also granted bail on
01.07.2014. The State then moved for cancellation of the Petitioner's bail on
05.07.2014. On 09.07.2014, the Additional Sessions Judge cancelled the
bail of the Petitioner. Aggrieved by this, the petitioner has come before this
Court.
3. It is the case of the Petitioner that on 01.07.2014, when bail was
granted to the co-accused, Vasudev Prasad, keeping in view the previously
granted bail to the petitioner, the court had noted, "Accordingly on the
ground of parity, the application is allowed", and therefore, the petitioner
and the co-accused were placed on a similar footing by the Court. Counsel
for the petitioner further argues that, since the petitioner and the co-accused
were treated as similarly placed by the Court; and the bail order of Vasudev
Prasad remains in force and has not been cancelled by the Court, it should
therefore, logically follow that the petitioner's bail should also not have
been cancelled, by applying the same ground of parity which was applied by
the Court while granting bail to Vasudev Prasad in the first instance.
4. I do not agree. Counsel has taken a rather simplistic view of the
matter. I find that he is choosing to treat the conclusion of the court below
that Vasudev Prasad was being granted bail, "on the ground of parity", as an
absolute certificate accorded by that court that both the petitioner, as well as
Vasudev Prasad, were identically situated, i.e., their role and surrounding
circumstances, were identical. However, even the slightest examination
would show that this is not so. A glaring difference is that unlike the co-
accused, Vasudev Prasad, the petitioner happens to be a police official, who
has allegedly also misused his official position; and for this reason, it cannot
be presumed that the two were identically situated merely because the court
below has used the aforesaid expression whilst considering the case of the
co-accused, Vasudev Prasad, vis-à-vis bail already having been granted to
the petitioner. It cannot be deemed to have changed the relevant factual
circumstances; and the points of difference between the position of the
petitioner and that of Vasudev Prasad. Perhaps what the trial court intended
was that since the petitioner had already been granted bail, then, keeping in
mind the fact that the allegations against the petitioner were obviously more
severe since they demonstrated a police official's involvement in the crime;
and that too by misusing his official position, the grant of bail to such a
person would naturally entitle the co-accused, Vasudev Prasad, also to bail
because not only was the latter accused of similar offences, but there was no
issue of misuse of his official position in his conduct. Under the
circumstances, the mere fact that Vasudev Prasad was granted bail because
the petitioner, Raj Bahadur, had been granted bail earlier, cannot mean that
whilst considering the question of cancellation of Raj Bahadur's bail, the
fact that Vasudev Prasad is on bail, entitles Raj Bahadur to continue on bail.
5. The aforesaid facts and circumstances, in which both the petitioner,
and the co-accused, Vasudev Prasad, came to be granted bail by the court
below, shows that it is a situation where the converse cannot be taken as
true, i.e., simply because, after the petitioner was granted bail, Vasudev
Prasad was also granted bail on the ground that the petitioner was on bail,
does not mean that since bail of Vasudev Prasad, which was granted later,
remains in place, therefore, the petitioner was also entitled to continue on
bail, and that the same could not have been cancelled. On the contrary, if
the bail order to the co-accused Vasudev Prasad is based on the bail initially
granted to the petitioner, Raj Bahadur; then the cancellation of bail of Raj
Bahadur, for any reason, may well form the basis for re-examination of the
bail order of Vasudev Prasad also.
6. The petitioner's bail was cancelled on 10.07.2014, and since then 11
days have passed, and yet the Petitioner has not surrendered before the
Court. The conduct of the Petitioner is unbecoming of a Police Official.
Being a serving officer, the Petitioner is well versed with the consequences
of cancellation of bail, and he should have surrendered immediately.
7. In response, and in an attempt to justify this conduct, counsel for the
Petitioner contends that the Petitioner will surrender before the Court if the
impugned cancellation is held to be sustainable in law by this Court. This
approach does not commend itself for the reason such an approach means
that so long as the appellate court has not pronounced on his appeal
impugning the cancellation of his bail, the petitioner can presume in his
own favour that the impugned order is illegal and ignore it.
8. I have repeatedly endeavoured to bring home this aspect to counsel
for the petitioner; that the petitioner was under a bounden duty, not only in
terms of the original order enlarging him on bail, but also keeping in view
the fact that he is a police officer, to have surrendered forthwith on
cancellation of bail, and that no law permits him to act otherwise, merely
because he feels that the grounds on which the court has cancelled the bail
are not sustainable in law. Counsel cited no precedents or law to the
contrary and states that he would be satisfied with any reason that may be
recorded rejecting his instant application, whereafter the petitioner will
surrender. Of course, I have also put to counsel as to why the same logic
may not be applied by him vis-à-vis any order that may be passed by this
Court also, i.e. if the petitioner still remains dissatisfied with the grounds
upon which his current application is dismissed, he may again take the same
position that he is not obliged to surrender till he has the same tested further.
In taking the approach, he has on this aspect of the matter, counsel appears
to have lost sight of the fundamental fact that so long as the impugned order
cancelling bail has not been either stayed or set aside, it remains in force and
must be obeyed, irrespective of any objections the person affected by it may
have.
9. Consequently, looking to all the circumstances, I do not feel it
appropriate to interfere with the impugned orders passed on 10.07.2014
cancelling the bail of the petitioner, Raj Bahadur.
10. Counsel for the State also points out that despite the cancellation of
his bail, the petitioner is not participating in the investigation, and that
therefore, non-bailable warrants have been issued for the arrest of the
petitioner.
11. Significantly, the petitioner is not even present in Court today. In
response, counsel for the petitioner states that the petitioner shall surrender
today itself.
12. The petition, along with the application for stay, is dismissed
accordingly.
SUDERSHAN KUMAR MISRA
Judge
JULY 21, 2014
rd
