Subhash Chand Khera & Ors vs Rajesh Verma
2014 Latest Caselaw 267 Del

*       IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
                                               Date of Decision: 15.01.2014
+       RC.REV. 18/2014

        SUBHASH CHAND KHERA & ORS.             ..... Petitioners
                    Through: Mr. K.R. Chawla with Mr. Sunil
                             Verma, Advocats.

                          Versus

        RAJESH VERMA                                        ..... Respondent

                          Through:      None

        CORAM:
        HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAJMI WAZIRI

%       MR. JUSTICE NAJMI WAZIRI (Open Court)

1. This petition impugns an order dated 09.10.2013 of the Rent Controller allowing a petition by the respondent-landlord under Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 („the Act‟ for short); as a consequence of which the petitioners have been directed to vacate the tenanted premises.

2. The facts leading of the order are that the petitioners are the legal heirs of Mr. Ghanshyam Dass who was leased out the premises in 1962 by one Mr. Sudershan Lal Bajpai. The latter sold the premises to the respondents who in turn filed the eviction petition on the ground of bona fide need. The leave to defend was granted to the tenants. The said order was passed after appreciation of evidence in a full trial. The eviction order has been challenged primarily on two grounds i.e. (i) that the Court had gone beyond the pleadings and (ii) decision of a case cannot be based on grounds

outside the pleadings of the parties, i.e. only the case pleaded can be taken into cognizance by a Court1. The learned counsel for the petitioner contends that: "Only the owner-landlord can maintain the suit for eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement. Therefore, the landlord is required to prove the ownership apart from landlordship2".

3. For the first ground, the petitioner contends that the evidence does not prove the following i.e.:

"That the accommodation for the petitioner in the said house is on the Ist floor. The children of the petitioner are studying in a school and stairs leading to the said floor are very steep each steps is about 9-10 inches high which causes great paid to the petitioner, his wife and children and they cry while coming and going down through the stairs.

The accommodation of the petitioner is very meagre. The petitioner requires said accommodation for himself, his wife and children."

This averment has been denied by the tenants. This Court notices that in the evidence tendered by the respondent/landlord the hardship being faced by him and his family has been reiterated in terms of the aforesaid. During his cross examination, the landlord deposed that:

"it is also correct that I am also residing with my family on the first floor of the suit property... It is correct that the height of steps i.e. 9-10 inches is not shown in Ex. PW1/A. I only suffer with the problem of my knees. It is incorrect to suggest that I am not suffering from the problem of my knees. It is also correct that my brother and his family is residing on the second floor of the said

1. Trojan & Co. Ltd. Vs. Rm. N.N. Nagappa Chettiar, 1953 SC 235

2. Sheela Vs. Firm Prahlad Rai Prem Prakash, 2002 (I) RCR 351

property and my another brother is also residing on the third floor of (sic) said property. It is incorrect to suggest that neither my father nor my brothers are dependent upon me for the purpose of residence and for commercial premises."

In view of the aforesaid pleadings and evidence, this Court is unable to see how the impugned order has gone beyond the pleadings.

4. As regard the second ground that only the owner/landlord can maintain a suit for eviction on the ground of bona fide need, the very same judgment Sheela Vs. Firm Prahlad Rai Prem Prakash (surpa) relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, discusses the concept of ownership apropos rent control legislation. It holds that:

""ownership" is a relative term the merit whereof depends upon the context on which it is used. In Rent Control Legislation, the landlord can be said to be owner if he is entitled in his own legal right, as distinguished from for and on behalf of someone else, to evict the tenant and then to retain, control, hold and use the premises for himself. What may suffice and hold good as proof of ownership in a landlord-tenant litigation probably may or may not be enough to successfully sustain a claim for ownership in a title suit."

The said judgment also relied upon the dicta in M.M. Quasim v.

Manoharlal Sharma 1981 (3) SCC 36 which held that:

"an „owner-landlord‟ who can seek eviction on the ground of his personal requirement is one who has

a right against the whole world to occupy the building in his own right and exclude anyone holding a title lesser that his own."

5. This Court notices that the eviction order took into consideration that on 02.03.2005 an order disposing off the appeal was passed, on a compromise between the parties, in which the present petitioners (tenants) had accepted the present respondent as their landlord, and that all the legal heirs of Shri Ghanshyam Dass Khera were admitted as joint tenants of the said landlord. Thereafter, they paid monthly rent to the landlord as joint tenants. Therefore, this argument too cannot be a basis for impugning the eviction order.

6. In addition to the above, the impugned order has considered that the premises have been purchased from Shri Sudershan Lal Bajpai against sale consideration and the sale deed was executed in favour of Shri Ram Dass Verma, the Attorney of the owner. Mr. Sudershan Lal Bajpai had admitted that he was the owner of the premises and had sold it for Rs.31,000/- and had duly transferred legal possession of the suit property while the tenants were occupying the suit premises.

7. The learned Trial Court reasoned that all that the petitioner was required to show was that he had a right more than the tenants; however, since the tenants had already admitted to the eviction petitioner being their landlord, nothing more requires to be proved apropos his locus standi to file the eviction petition. As regards the bona fide requirement, the tenants have neither pleaded nor established the availability of any other property as being sufficient alternate accommodation. The respondent‟s contention that the adjoining property bearing House No. 9/2258, admittedly owned by the

landlords‟ mother, would be sufficient for the purposes, is untenable. The property of another person, howsoever close in degree of relationship, cannot be considered as an alternate suitable accommodation of the landlord. This Court is of the view that the son cannot lawfully impose himself upon his parents‟ property which, they may be using for their own purposes.

8. The landlord has made out a case on the basis of the evidence. He has been able to show that the premises were required for his bona fide use as well as for his family members dependent upon him which includes his brothers; that this was the only property available to him in which they could be accommodated. It is settled law that it is not for the tenant to dictate terms or to determine as to how else a landlord could adjust himself without giving possession of the tenanted premises. While deciding the question of bonafides of the requirement of the landlord, it is quite unnecessary to make an endeavour as to how else the landlord could have adjusted himself 3. When a landlord shows a prima facie case a presumption that the requirement of the landlord is bona fide and not to the contrary (Sarla Ahuja vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd.).

9. From the aforesaid discussion, it is clear that no case has been made out by the petitioner/tenant for interfering with the impugned eviction order. This Court is also mindful of the fact that the premises were leased out in 1962. Now, after almost 51 years, the family of the landlord has grown, as contended in the eviction petition, thus leading to their requirement for additional space, while correspondingly the accommodation available to them has not increased proportionately. The eviction petition was filed in

3. Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. 1998 (8) SCC 119

June, 2009. Now after five years the petitioners‟ children, who were then said to be 14 and 11 years, would have turned 19 and 16 years old along with the children of the petitioner‟s younger brother i.e. his nephews, who would now be 12 and 8 years old.

10. The requirement for additional space has been duly dealt with in the impugned order and a conclusion in favour of the landlord is based on evidence and sound reason. There is no ground made out for interference with it in these proceedings. The impugned order does not suffer from any infirmity. Therefore the petition is dismissed as being without merit.

NAJMI WAZIRI (JUDGE) JANUARY 15, 2014/acm