Citation : 2014 Latest Caselaw 946 Del
Judgement Date : 21 February, 2014
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
%
Date of Decision: 21.02.2014
+ Crl Appeal no.459/2010
TEJ SINGH @ TEJA ....Appellant
Through: Mr. Mohit Bhardwaj, Adv.
Versus
STATE ....Respondent
Through: Mr. Feroz Khan Ghazi, APP
Crl Appeal no.700/2010
RAJINDER ....Appellant
Through: Ms. Alpana Pandey, Adv. with
appellant in person
Versus
STATE ....Respondent
Through: Mr. Feroz Khan Ghazi, APP
Crl Appeal no.701/2010
VIJAY KUMAR ....Appellant
Through: Ms. Alpana Pandey, Adv. with
appellant in person
Versus
STATE ....Respondent
Through: Mr. Feroz Khan Ghazi, APP
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V.K.JAIN
JUDGMENT
V.K.JAIN, J. (Oral)
In the night intervening 13/14.04.2004, the dead body of a person aged
about 25-26 years was found on the Service Road behind Ambedkar College
Park in the jurisdiction of Police Station Shahdara. The information in this
regard was recorded at Police Station Shahdara vide DD no.40A which was
given to Inspector N.P. Singh, SHO of the aforesaid police station for
investigation. He reached the spot, and seized the dead body. An FIR under
Sections 302/201 of IPC was registered on the basis of endorsement made by
the SHO on the copy of the DD No.40A. A label of "RL Tailor, Kailash
Nagar, Delhi-110031" was found stitched on the pant which the deceased was
wearing. On the inquiries being made with R.L. Tailor, Kailash Nagar, it came
to be known that the deceased, who used to get the clothes stitched from the
said tailor was residing in some nearby locality.
On 15.4.2004, Bhagwandin Yadav identified the dead body to be of
Maharajdin Yadav. He told the Investigating Officer that the deceased
Maharajdin Yadav was using mobile phone number 9810580501. When the
details of the aforesaid mobile phone were scrutinized, it came to be known
that the last call from the said mobile number was made to another mobile
number 9811425733. When the call details of mobile number 9811425733
scrutinized, it was found that the last call from the aforesaid mobile phone was
made to mobile number 9811425733. The call details of mobile No.
9811425733 revealed that the last call from the said phone had terminated on
mobile No. 9811335789. The user of mobile phone number 9811335789,
when contacted, informed that the mobile phone number 9811425733
belonged to the elder brother of Vijay who was residing in Loni. On the basis
of the aforesaid details, a person whose name initially came to be known as
Vijender Kumar @ Fauji was apprehended. The brother of deceased
Maharajdin also told the police that his brother was working at a shop and
living as paying guest with a neighbouring shopkeeper Mahender Prasad and
that on 13.4.2004 when Maharajdin Yadav left the house, Mahender Prasad
had also accompanied him. On inquiry being made at the shop of Mahender
Prasad, it came to be found that on 13.4.2004 at about 1.30 pm, a person aged
about 50 years came to his shop, handed over the keys of the safe in the shop
and took a carton kept in the safe on the pretext that Mahender had asked for
the said carton. On this information Virender Kumar was formally arrested
and his confessional statement was recorded.
2. This is also the case of the prosecution that during the course of
investigation, the dead body of the deceased Mahender was recovered from
Yamuna river near the police station New Friends Colony.
According to the prosecution, the appellant - Vijay got recovered
Rs.23,000/- from his house and on 18.4.2004, the appellant - Virender @
Fauji got recovered a mobile phone instrument from his house.
The appellant - Virender @ Fauji refused to join TIP on 23.4.2004 and
thereafter he was identified by the witness Prem Singh and Amit Kumar. It
was also revealed during investigation that the name of Virender @ Fauji was
also Tej Singh @ Teja.
This is further the case of the prosecution that on 29.4.2004, the
appellant - Rajinder while in judicial custody got the mobile phone of
deceased Maharajdin Yadav recovered from his house.
All the three appellants were prosecuted under Section
364//328/392/302/201/120B/411/419 of IPC.
3. Vide charge dated 03.11.2004, the appellants Vijay Kumar was
charged under Section 120B of IPC read with Section 364, 302 and 201
thereof abducting Mahender Prasad and Mehrajuddin Yadav and committing
their murder in the night of 13/14.4.2004 and disposing of their dead bodies in
order to conceal the evidence of the crime and screening them from legal
punishment. He was also charged under Section 120B read with Section 392
of IPC for committing robbery of Rs.90,000/- from the shop of Mahender
Prasad. The appellants - Tej Singh @ Teja and Rajinder were charged under
Section 364/302/201 read with section 34 thereof for committing the murder
of the aforesaid two persons and disposing of their bodies with a view to
conceal the evidence of the crime and screening themselves from legal
punishment. Appellant Vijay was further charged under Section 392 IPC read
with Section 34 for committing robbery of Rs.90,000/- from the shop of
Mahender. The appellant - Rajinder was also charged Section 411 of IPC for
receiving or retaining the mobile phone instrument of deceased Mahender
Prasad knowing or having reason to believe the same to a stolen property. The
appellant - Vijay was also charged under Section 411 for receiving or
retaining the amount of Rs.23,000/-, alleged to have been recovered from his
house knowing or having the reasons the same to be stolen property.
4. Vide impugned judgment dated 24.2.2010, the appellants were
convicted under Section 120B of IPC read with Section 420 thereof for
cheating PW3 Prem Singh by inducing him and were also convicted for the
substantive offence punishable under Section 420 of IPC. They were
acquitted of rest of the charges. Vide impugned Order on Sentence dated
25.2.2010, all the three appellants were sentenced to undergo RI for seven (7)
years each and to pay fine of Rs.3,000/- each and in default to undergo SI for
six months each for the offence under Section 120B of IPC read with Section
420 thereof for cheating PW3 Prem Singh, by inducing him. For the
substantive offence punishable under Section 420 of IPC, the appellants Tej
Singh and Rajinder were sentenced to undergo RI for seven years each and to
pay a fine of Rs 3,000/- each or to undergo RI for six months each in default.
The appellant Vijay was sentenced to undergo RI for six months for the
substantive offence punishable under Section 420 of IPC and was further
sentenced to pay a fine of Rs 1,000/- or to undergo RI for three months in
default.
5. The first contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is that
none of the appellants was charged for being a party to a criminal conspiracy
to cheat PW3 Prem Singh nor were they charged for the substantive offence
punishable under Section 420 of IPC and therefore their conviction under the
said sections is bad in law.
6. Section 222 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1908 to the extent
it is relevant provides that where a person is charged for an offence and the
facts are proved which reduce it to a minor offence, he may be convicted of
the minor offence although he is not charged with it. The illustration to the
said Section reads as under:
"(a) A is charged, under section 407 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860 ), with criminal breach of trust in respect of property entrusted to him as a carrier. It appears, that he did commit criminal breach of trust under section 406 of that Code in respect of the property, but that it was not entrusted to him as a carrier. He may be convicted of criminal breach of trust under the said section 406.
(b) A is charged, under section 325 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), with causing grievous hurt. He proves that he acted on grave and sudden provocation. He may be convicted under section 335 of that Code."
Moreover, I find that neither PW-3- Prem Singh nor PW-7 - Amit
Kumar has stated that the carton/ box which Tej Singh took from them
contained cash amounting to Rs 90,000/- or any other amount in cash. Since
the carton, according to the witnesses, had been duly taped, there is no way
they could have seen cash, if any, kept in the said carton. Therefore, neither
the deposition of Prem Singh nor the deposition of Amit Kumar makes out a
case of cheating by the appellant Tej Singh to the extent of Rs 90,000/- or
some other amount in cash. In these circumstances, while defending
themselves during the course of trial, the appellants could not have even
thought of the meeting a charge of cheating Prem Singh to the extent of Rs
90,000/-.
7. Under Section 211 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the charge
should state the offence with which the accused is charged and should contain
other particulars specified in that Section. The purpose of framing a charge
primarily is to put the accused to notice regarding the offence for which he is
being tried. For want of requisite information of the offence and details
thereof, the accused should not suffer prejudice nor should there be failure of
justice on this account.
8. It is not permissible in law to punish the accused for a less grave
offence if the ingredients of the less grave offence are completely different
and distinct from the grave offence with which he has been charged. In other
words, the accused should have been charged with a grave offence which
would take within its ambit and scope the ingredients of a less grave offence.
Usually, the offence of grave nature includes in itself the essentials of a lesser,
but cognate offence. In the normal course of events, the question of grave or
less grave offence would arise in relation to the offences falling in the same
clause. For instance, there are classes of offences like offences against human
body, offences against property and offences relating to cheating,
misappropriation, forgery, etc. If a person has been charged for instance under
Section 302 of IPC, he can be convicted for offence punishable under Section
304 of the Penal Code since the two offences are cognate offences and the
ingredients of the offence under Section 304 of IPC are included in the
offence under Section 302 thereof. Similarly, if a person has been charged say
under Section 325 of IPC for causing grievous grievous hurt to a person he
can be convicted under Section 323 thereof for causing simple hurt. But
where the grave offence and the less grave offence fall in different classes, it
would be difficult to say that a person charged with a grave offence falling in
one class can be convicted for a less grave offence which falls in some other
class.
The offences punishable under Sections 299 to 377 of the Code fall in
Chapter XVI of IPC, under the class "Of Offences Affecting the Human
Body" and there is further sub-classification of the offences affecting the
human body. On the other hand, the offence punishable under Section 420 of
IPC falls in Chapter XVII of the Code under the class "Of Offences Against
Property". Therefore, an offence against property such as cheating cannot be
considered to be less grave offence qua the offence punishable under Section
302 of the Penal Code which falls in an altogether different class, for the
purpose of conviction with the aid of Section 222 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure.
9. The expression "cognate offences" indicate similarity and common
essential features between the offences and they are primarily based on
difference of degree. The lesser offence is stated to be related to a greater
offence when it shares several of the elements of the greater offence and is of
the same class or category. Therefore, where the offences are cognate
offences with commonality in their features and evidence is produced which
would justify conviction for a cognate but less grave offence, the court would
be entitled to punish the accused for the less grave offence since no prejudice
is suffered by him on account of such conviction.
10. In Shamsaheb N. Multani Vs. State of Karnataka 2011 (5) SCC 577,
the Hon'ble Supreme Court inter alia observed that although the expression
"minor offence" is not defined in the Code of Criminal Procedure, it can be
discerned from the context that the test of minor offence is not merely that the
prescribed punishment is less than the major offence. The two illustrations
provided in the section would bring the above point home well and only if the
two offences are cognate offences, wherein the main ingredients are common,
the one punishable among them with a lesser sentence can be regarded as
minor offence vis-à-vis the other offence.
11. In Bimla Devi & Anr. Vs. State of Jammu & Kashmir (2009) 6 SCC
629, the appellants before the Apex Court were charged under Section 302 of
IPC but were convicted under Section 306 & 498A thereof. The Apex Court,
however, set aside the order of their conviction on the ground that they had
not been charged with the offences for commission of which they were
convicted.
In Shamsaheb N. Multani (supra), the appellant before the Apex Court
was charged under Section 302 of IPC but was convicted under Section 304B
thereof. Noticing that the composition of the offence under Section 304B of
IPC was vastly different from the formation of the offence of murder under
Section 302 of IPC, it was held that the former cannot be regarded as minor
offence vis-à-vis the latter. The position, however, would be different when
the charge also contains the offence under Section 498A of IPC. During the
course of the judgement it was observed that if the prosecution fails to make
out a case under Section 302 of IPC but the offence under Section 304B of
IPC is made out, the Court has to call upon the accused to enter on his
defence in respect of the said offence and without affording such an
opportunity a conviction under Section 304B of IPC would lead to real and
serious miscarriage of justice.
In Makkhan & Ors. Vs. Emperor AIR 1945 Allahabad 81, the
appellants were charged under Section 395 of IPC. They were acquitted of
the said charge but were convicted under Sections 458 & 323 of the Indian
Penal Code; setting aside the conviction, the High Court noted that before a
person can be convicted for a minor offence, the major and the minor offences
must be cognate offences which have the main ingredients in common, and a
man charged with one offence which is entirely of a different type from the
offence which he is proved to have committed, cannot in the absence of a
proper charge be convicted of that offence, merely on the ground that the facts
proved constitute a minor offence. The Court was of the view that where the
facts are not put to the accused in detail, in the charge, it is impossible to hold
that it had not occasioned a failure of justice, as it is not known what
explanation the accused might have given if the facts were properly put to
him.
In Vazhambalakkal Thomachan Vs. State of Kerala 1978 Crl.LJ 498,
the accused was charged under Section 302 of IPC. Being aggrieved from his
conviction he filed an appeal. When the High Court found that the charge
under Section 302 of IPC did not stand prove the learned Public Prosecutor
relying on Sections 221 & 222 of the Code of Criminal Procedure pressed for
a conviction of the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 411 of
IPC on the ground that there was acceptable evidence that of the stolen
property having been recovered from the place pointed out by the appellant.
Rejecting the contention, the High Court held that the prosecution had no
case, at the commencement of the trial that the appellant had committed
robbery or theft or any other cognate offence. The High Court was of the
view that the accused charged with one offence which is entirely of a different
type from the offence which is proved to have been committed cannot, in the
absence of a proper charge be convicted of that offence merely on the ground
that the facts proved constituted a minor offence.
12. Under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Court is
mandatorily required to explain the circumstances appearing in evidence
against an accused to him so as to enable him to explain such circumstances.
However, in the case before this Court, it was not put to the appellants that
they had induced PW3 & PW7 to deliver a sum of Rs.90,000/- to them by
misrepresenting to them that the packet containing the said amount was
required by deceased Mahendra Prasad. The appellant, therefore, got no
opportunity to offer their explanation, if any, with regard to the aforesaid
circumstances.
13. A perusal of the charges framed against the appellants would show that
none of them was charged for being a party to the criminal conspiracy to
cheat PW3 Prem Singh by inducing him to part with a parcel which as per the
case of the prosecution contained Rs.90,000/-. None of them was charged
with the substantive offence punishable under Section 420 of IPC for cheating
Prem Singh by inducing him to deliver a parcel containing Rs.90,000/- to
them. In fact, in none of the charges there was any reference to any sort of
cheating or inducement qua PW3 Prem Singh. In the absence of any charge
of being a party to the criminal conspiracy to cheat Prem Singh or the charge
for the substantive offence punishable under Section 420 of IPC by cheating
and inducing PW3 Prem Singh to part with a carton/box containing cash, the
appellants had no occasion or opportunity to defend themselves against the
aforesaid charges. While defending themselves in respect of the charges
framed against them, they could not have anticipated conviction under
Section 120B read with Section 420 thereof or for the substantive offence
punishable under Section 420 of IPC for cheating PW3 Prem Singh by
inducing him to part with parcel containing cash of Rs.90,000/-.
14. Section 464(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to the extent it is
relevant provides that no, sentence or order by a Court of competent
jurisdiction shall be invalid merely on the ground that no charge was framed
or on the ground of any error, omission or irregularity in the charge, unless, in
the opinion of the Court a failure of justice has in fact occasioned thereby.
Sub-section (2) of the said Section, inter alia, provides that if the court of
appeal is of the opinion that the failure of justice has, in fact, been occasioned
on account of omission in the charge, it can order that a charge be framed and
that the trial be recommenced from the point immediately after framing of the
charge.
15. The appellants, in my view, were seriously prejudiced on account of
their conviction, without their having been charged either for being a party to
the criminal conspiracy to cheat Prem Singh or for the substantive offence of
cheating Prem Singh and the said prejudice has resulted in a failure of justice.
In determining whether any error, omission or irregularity in framing the
relevant charges has led to the failure of justice or not, the Court must inter
alia have regard to the fact that every accused has a right to a fair trial, where
he is aware of what he is being tried for and what case the prosecution has set
out against him.
16. Since the appellants could not have been convicted with the aid of
Section 222 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the next question which
arises for consideration is as to whether the court should in this case, order
framing of an independent charge under Section 120B read with Section 420
thereof and/or for the substantive offence under Section 420 of IPC and then
direct re-trial from the stage of framing of the charge. The learned counsel
for the appellants submit that the offence under Section 420 of the IPC is
triable by a Magistrate and the maximum punishment prescribed in the Indian
Penal Code is imprisonment up to seven (7) years and appellants Rajinder and
Vijay have already remained in custody for more than seven (7) years. As far
as appellant Tej Singh is concerned a perusal of his nominal roll would show
that as on 7.3.2011, he had spent six (6) years ten (10) months and five (5)
days in custody excluding of the remission earned by him which at that time
was four (4) months and seventeen (17) days. Thus, inclusive of remission he
also spent more than seven (7) years in custody.
In these circumstances it would be gross injustice to the appellants if
they are subjected to a fresh trial after framing a charge under Section 120B
read with Section 420 thereof and/or under Section 420 of the Indian Penal
Code.
17. For the reasons stated hereinabove, the appeals are allowed and the
impugned judgment and order on sentence are hereby set aside. The bail
bonds of the appellants are discharged.
One copy of this order be sent to the concerned Jail Superintendent for
information & necessary action.
LCR be sent back along with a copy of this order.
FEBRUARY 21, 2014/rd V.K. JAIN, J.
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