Citation : 2014 Latest Caselaw 919 Del
Judgement Date : 19 February, 2014
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ RSA No.41/1987
% 19th February, 2014
SHRI OM PARKASH SHARMA ......Appellant
Through: Ms. Shalini Kapoor, Advocate with
Ms. Promil Seth, Ms. Kriti Arora,
Advocates.
VERSUS
SHRI KRISHAN ...... Respondent
Through: Mr. S.K. Dubey, Advocate with Mr.
Rajmangal Kumar, Advocate.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VALMIKI J.MEHTA
To be referred to the Reporter or not?
VALMIKI J. MEHTA, J (ORAL)
1. This Regular Second Appeal has been filed against the
impugned judgment of the first appellate court dated 22.5.1987 by which the
first appellate court set aside the judgment of the trial court dated 1.10.1981.
Trial court by its judgment dated 1.10.1981 had decreed the suit for
possession of the appellant/plaintiff against the respondent/defendant with
respect to the suit property bearing no.25/59 (old no.25/50), Shakti Nagar,
Delhi admeasuring approximately 50 sq yds. Trial court held that the
appellant/plaintiff is the owner of the suit property inasmuch as he had
purchased the suit property by means of the sale deed Ex.PW1/1 dated
28.9.1978 executed by Mohd. Yusuf son of Aziza Begum. It is not in dispute
between the parties that Aziza Begum was the original owner of the
property. Trial court also disbelieved the case of adverse possession as set
up on behalf of respondent/defendant by holding that since the suit was filed
on 10.9.1979 the respondent/defendant had to show his hostile/adverse
possession before 10.9.1967, however, there was only testimony of
witnesses DW1, DW3 and DW7 to show that the defendant was in
possession of property whereas the electoral roll as well as the letters
exhibited as DW8/1, DW9/1 and DW10/1 did not show that the
respondent/defendant was in possession of the suit property on or before
10.9.1967.
2. The following substantial question of law was framed in this
case vide order dated 27.1.2014:-
"Whether the appellate court has committed a gross perversity and violation of the law of appreciation of evidence by holding that Mohd. Yusuf, from whom the appellant-plaintiff purchased the suit property, was not the son of Mst. Aziza Begum?"
3. Counsel for the appellant urged before me that the appellate
court has committed a clear cut perversity in unnecessarily ignoring the sale
deed in favour of the appellant/plaintiff and holding that Mohd. Yusuf who
sold the property to the appellant was not the son of Aziza Begum. It is
argued that the first appellate court has committed illegality/perversity in
holding that the document Ex.DC, which is only an electoral roll, as
conclusive proof of the fact that Mohd. Yusuf was not the son of Aziza
Begum merely because in the document Ex.DC, Mohd. Yusuf is shown as
son of Mohd. Yakub whereas Aziza Begum was the wife of Niaz Mohd as
per the Delhi Improvement Trust deed dated 26.8.1943 Ex.D1 inasmuch as
electoral rolls have sanctity for election and does not pertain to finality of
parentage.
4(i) On behalf of the respondent/defendant it was very strenuously
argued before this Court that Mohd. Yusuf who has purchased the suit
property by the sale deed Ex.PW1/1 is stated to be the son of Niaz Mohd and
resident of 2822, Mohalla Niaran, G.B. Road, Delhi whereas in the
agreement to sell Ex.PW1/3 Mohd. Yusuf son of Niaz Mohd shown to be
resident of 25/59, Shakti Nagar, Delhi and difference in addresses cast a
doubt on the identity of Mohd. Yusuf. It is further argued by placing
reliance upon Ex.DC that the address in this document of Mohd. Yusuf is
written as 2822, Gali Pipal Wali, Mohalla Niyarian, Delhi but that is not the
address of Mohd. Yusuf who entered into the agreement to sell, Ex.PW1/3,
and wherein the address is of the suit property. In sum and substance, it is
argued that Mohd. Yusuf who sold the property to the appellant/plaintiff was
a person who impersonated the real Mohd. Yusuf and the real Mohd. Yusuf
son of Aziza Begum never sold the suit property to the appellant/plaintiff. It
is also argued alongwith above stand, that Aziza Begum had no son called
Mohd Yusuf.
(ii) The second important argument which is urged on behalf of the
respondent/defendant is that whereas the suit for possession is with respect
to property bearing no.25/59, the respondent/defendant is occupying
property bearing no.25/50, and the appellant/plaintiff has behind the back of
the respondent/defendant got the number of the suit property changed to
No.25/59 in the municipal records and thereby it should be held that the
appellant/plaintiff is not the owner of the property bearing no. 25/50 which
is in possession of the respondent/defendant.
5. At the outset, I must mention that when a suit is filed on the
basis of title the initial onus of proof upon the plaintiff is only to show better
title than the person who is in possession and who does not claim ownership
of the suit property. Putting it differently, a person who only claims
ownership by adverse possession and not by purchase from the original
owner Aziza Begum, really being a trespasser should not be allowed to
illegally hold on to the suit property by pleading certain differences in
parentage and property numbers. I would also like to state that the very fact
that no person has come forward to claim ownership of the suit property as a
legal heir or son of Aziza Begum, there is no reason why this Court should
not accept Mohd Yusuf as the son of Aziza Begum inasmuch as the person
who has executed both the documents being the agreement to sell, Ex.PW1/3
and the sale deed Ex.PW1/1 is described as son of Niaz Mohd and Niaz
Mohd is the husband of the Aziza Begum as found in the deed executed by
the Delhi Improvement Trust, Ex.D1 and which document is filed and relied
upon by the respondent/defendant itself.
6. A conjoint reading of the documents being the agreement dated
26.8.1943/Ex.D1 by which Delhi Improvement Trust transferred ownership
of the suit property to Aziza Begum, agreement to sell Ex.PW1/3 dated
28.8.1957 showing Mohd Yusuf as the son of Niaz Mohd and the sale deed
Ex.PW1/1 dated 28.9.1978 again showing Mohd. Yusuf as son of Niaz
Mohd., in my opinion, are sufficient to hold that Mohd Yusuf who sold the
property to appellant/plaintiff was the son of Aziza Begum when the same is
taken with the fact that no one else has claimed to be the legal heir of Aziza
Begum for claiming ownership of the suit property and it is not as if the
respondent/defendant is claiming title to the property by purchase from
Aziza Begum or her legal heir(s). The first appellate court has therefore
committed a clear perversity in holding that the appellant/plaintiff failed to
prove that Mohd Yusuf who executed the agreement to sell Ex.PW1/3 and
the sale deed Ex.PW1/1 was not the Mohd. Yusuf who was the son of Aziza
Begum. The arguments which are urged on behalf of the
respondent/defendant are really arguments of desperation on small small
inconsequential issues of differences including in addresses of Mohd. Yusuf
being written as resident of 25/59 Shakti Nagar Delhi in the agreement to
sell Ex.PW1/3 and address of 2822, Mohalla Niaran, G.B. Road, Delhi in the
sale deed Ex.PW1/1. Difference of addresses may be for various reasons
however difference of addresses cannot invalidate documents of transfer of
title in a property once in the facts of the present case no one, much less a
person 'actually' called Mohd. Yusuf has come forward to claim that he is
the real Mohd Yusuf son of Aziza Begum and not the Mohd Yusuf who had
executed the agreement to sell Ex.PW1/3 and the sale deed Ex.PW1/1.
7. The argument urged on behalf of the respondent/defendant that
since in the sale deed Ex.PW1/1 the address of Mohd Yusuf is written as
2822, Mohalla Niaran, G.B. Road, Delhi and which is found also in Ex.DC
which is the electoral roll and since in Ex.DC Mohd. Yusuf is shown as son
of Mohd Yakub and not Niaz Mohd, this would show that Mohd Yusuf who
sold the property by the sale deed is a different Mohd Yusuf. This argument
however is without merit because no one pays too much attention to what is
mentioned in the electoral roll with respect to parentage inasmuch as
electoral roll is not meant for the purpose of deciding parentage but is only
for the purpose of exercising of a franchise by a person in elections. I
therefore reject the argument raised on behalf of the respondent/defendant
that Mohd. Yusuf who executed the sale deed was in fact the son of Mohd.
Yakub and not the son of Niaz Mohd.
8. Another argument which is urged on behalf of the
respondent/defendant is that Mohd Yusuf is not the son of Aziza Begum
because in the document Ex.D1 being the deed by which the Delhi
Improvement Trust transferred title of the suit property to Aziza Begum,
Aziza Begum's son is shown as one Muxte Nagar Allah and not Mohd.
Yusuf. Again this argument is without merit because the Delhi Improvement
Trust agreement in favour of Aziza Begum is of the year 1943, and surely
Mohd. Yusuf cannot only for that reason be held not to be the son of Aziza
Begum, inasmuch as, it is not written in the agreement Ex.D1 that Aziza
Begum had no other sons except Muxte Nagar Allah. At best Muxte Nagar
Allah would be one son of Aziza Begum, however that does not mean that
Aziza Begum would not have had either on the date of execution of the
agreement Ex.D1 in the year 1943 another son Mohd. Yusuf or that Mohd
Yusuf could well have been born subsequently. Accordingly, the argument
urged by the respondent/defendant in this regard that Mohd Yusuf should
not be held to be the son of Aziza Begum by virtue of the document Ex.D1
is therefore rejected.
9. The final argument which is urged on behalf of the
respondent/defendant is that the suit property had a number 25/50 and this
number has been changed behind the back of the respondent/defendant to
25/59 and therefore the suit property is 25/50 for which decree cannot be
granted to the appellant-plaintiff. Once again, this argument of the
respondent/defendant has no basis because it is after all a number given by
local municipal authority and that also on the basis of a lay out plan which
has changed the number of the property to 25/59 and really the suit for
possession was for property no.25/50 and which has become property
No.25/59, hence there is a valid decree qua property no. 25/59. There is no
requirement of any substantive law or procedural law that a municipal
authority, before changing a number of a property, is bound to issue a show
cause notice to the occupant of the property. In any case the argument is
really no argument because there is one property and it is for that property
that the disputes are there, and which is occupied by respondent, and which
has to be handed over to the appellant/plaintiff. This argument urged on
behalf of the respondent is also therefore rejected.
10. Therefore, on the one hand the appellant/plaintiff has proved
that Aziza Begum was the owner of the suit property; Aziza Begum was the
wife of Niaz Mohd; Mohd Yusuf who sold the property to the
appellant/plaintiff is described as son of Niaz Mohd; no one except Mohd.
Yusuf who sold the suit property to the appellant/plaintiff has come forward
to claim that he is Mohd. Yusuf son of Aziza Begum and not the Mohd.
Yakub who executed the documents being the agreement to sell Ex.PW1/3
and sale deed Ex.PW1/1; these aspects in my opinion are sufficient to
discharge the onus of proof upon the appellant/plaintiff to show that he is the
owner of the suit property, and more so in a case where the
respondent/defendant is a trespasser in the suit property and one who does
not claim ownership of the same by any title document.
11. In view of the above, substantial question of law framed is
answered in favour of the appellant/plaintiff by holding that the first
appellate court has committed a perversity in holding that the Mohd. Yusuf
who sold the suit property to the appellant/plaintiff was not Mohd. Yusuf
son of Aziza Begum. Also, it is held that the appellant/plaintiff validly
purchased the suit property from Mohd. Yusuf and was the son of Aziza
Begum by means of the documents being the sale deed Ex.PW1/1 and the
earlier agreement to sell Ex.PW1/3. The judgment of the first appellate
court dated 22.5.1987 is set aside. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial
Court dated 1.10.1981 will stand revived and the appellant/plaintiff is held
entitled to possession of the suit property bearing no.25/59, original
no.25/50, Shakti Nagar, Delhi and which is shown in red in the site plan
Ex.PW1/2. In view of the fact that the trespasser is unnecessarily holding on
to a suit property, I also award the appellant/plaintiff costs of Rs.50,000/-
and which costs shall be paid within a period of four weeks from today.
FEBRUARY 19, 2014 VALMIKI J. MEHTA, J. Ne
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