Ram Kala & Ors vs Union Of India And Ors
2014 Latest Caselaw 7091 Del

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*         IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
%                                 Judgment delivered on: 23.12.2014

+         W.P.(C) 2780/2014

RAM KALA & ORS                                                .... Petitioners
                                  versus
UNION OF INDIA AND ORS                                       ..... Respondents

Advocates who appeared in this case:
For the Petitioner  : Mr Ravinder Sethi, Sr Advocate with Mr Rajiv Kr Ghawana,
                      Advocate.
For the Respondent : Mr Ruchir Mishra and Mr Mukesh Kr Tiwari
No.1/UOI.
For the Respondent
Nos.2 & 3.          : Mr Yeeshu Jain and Ms Jyoti Tyagi.
For the Respondent
No.4/DDA           : Mr Arun Birbal and Mr Sanjay Singh.

CORAM:-
HON'BLE MR JUSTICE BADAR DURREZ AHMED
HON'BLE MR JUSTICE I. S. MEHTA

                                JUDGMENT

BADAR DURREZ AHMED, J (ORAL)

1. In this writ petition, the point urged is that the acquisition

proceedings have lapsed because of the non-compliance of the mandatory

condition of making the declaration under Section 6 of the Land

Acquisition Act, 1894 within the stipulated period of one year from the

date of the publication of the notification under Section 4 of the said Act.

2. The petitioners in the present writ petition are 194 in number. 192

petitioners are individuals claiming the land in question. Insofar as the

petitioner Nos. 193 and 194 are concerned, they are the Resident Welfare

Associations of the entire area covered in respect of the said land. It may

be further pointed out that 123 out of 192 petitioners were parties to the

proceedings which culminated in the Supreme Court decision in Civil

Appeal No.4239/2007 decided on 21.03.2012 whereby the Section 17(4)

notification giving a go-by to the applicability of Section 5A of the said

Act was quashed. The remaining individual petitioners in the present writ

petition did not challenge the acquisition proceedings prior to the present

writ petition. We may also point out at this stage itself that insofar as all

the petitioners are concerned, there was no declaration under Section 6 of

the said Act prior to the one that is impugned in this writ petition and

which was made on 21.03.2013. In other words, in respect of the subject

lands, only one Section 6 declaration has been made and that was on

21.03.2013.

3. The further facts are that on 14.07.2000, the notification under

Section 4 of the said Act was published, inter alia, in respect of the

subject lands. Some 364 persons including 123 of the petitioners in the

present petition challenged the same by filing a writ petition bearing

W.P.(C) No.5276/2000 before this Court. On 12.09.2000, a „status quo‟

order was passed by this Court. That order continued till the dismissal of

the said writ petition (W.P.(C) No.5276/2000) on 09.07.2007. While

dismissing the writ petition, this Court had granted certificate for appeal

to the Supreme Court. As a result, Civil Appeal No.4239/2007 was

preferred by the petitioners of that writ petition. The said civil appeal was

filed on 23.08.2007 and the Supreme Court in its hearing on 10.09.2007

granted a stay of further proceedings. The said stay continued to operate

till 21.03.2012 when the said Civil Appeal No.4239/2007 was allowed. It

is thereafter, on 21.03.2013, that the impugned Section 6 declaration was

made.

4. It may also be pointed out that subsequent to the said declaration,

an award No.2/2013-14 was also made on 30.12.2013.

5. The present writ petition was filed on 30.04.2014 challenging the

entire acquisition proceedings on the ground that the declaration under

Section 6 of the said Act was barred by time. Reliance was placed on the

Constitution Bench decision of the Supreme Court in the case of

Padmasundra Rao and Ors. Vs State of Tamil Nadu: 2002 (3) SCC

533.

6. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents

submits that the petitioners were the subsequent purchasers/GPA holders

and, therefore, they had no locus standi to file the present writ petition

and they are not entitled to the declaration to the effect that the

acquisition proceedings have lapsed on account of the Section 6

declaration not having been made within the stipulated period of one

year. Insofar as the dates are concerned, to which we have referred to in

the earlier part of this judgment, there is no dispute. It is a matter of fact

that the Section 4 notification was issued on 14.07.2000 and that a period

of 59 days had elapsed between that date and the passing of the status quo

order by the High Court on 12.09.2000 in W.P.(C) No.5276/2000. It is

also an accepted fact that the interval of time between the dismissal of the

writ petition on 09.07.2007 and the granting of the stay order by the

Supreme Court was 62 days. In other words, a period of (59 days + 62

days) 121 days had elapsed after the publication of the notification under

Section 4 of the said Act on 14.07.2000, by the time the Supreme Court

granted the stay on 10.09.2007. Thereafter, the civil appeal, as pointed

out above, was allowed by the Supreme Court on 21.03.2012 and

consequently the time for making the Section 6 declaration once again

started to run. The Section 6 declaration, however, was made only on

21.03.2013 exactly one year after the judgment of the Supreme Court

dated 21.03.2012. In other words, if the total time period taken for

making the declaration under Section 6 is to be computed, it would

amount to 1 year and 121 days which is clearly beyond the stipulated

period of 1 year prescribed in Section 6 of the said Act. This very issue

was the subject matter of consideration in a batch of matters entitled

Sunil Goel and Ors. Vs The State and Ors.: WP(C) 3049/2013 and

other connected matters decided on 29.04.2014 by a Division Bench of

this Court. In similar circumstances, after taking note of the decision of

the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of

Padmasundra Rao (supra), this Court observed as under:-

"18. Having considered the submissions made by the learned counsel on both sides, we are of the view that the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioners ought to be accepted. This is so because the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Padmasundara Rao (supra) covers the present case on all fours. The very issue before the Supreme Court, as pointed out by us earlier, was

- whether, after the quashing of a declaration under Section 6 of the said Act, a fresh period of one year would be available to the State Government to issue another declaration under Section 6. This question has been answered by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Padmasundara Rao (supra) in the negative. In other words, when a Section 6 declaration is quashed, it does not give a fresh period of one year to the Government to issue another Section 6

declaration. The Section 6 declaration, after such quashing, if at all, can be issued only during the balance period".

7. It is clear that in that case where a Section 6 declaration was

quashed, it was held that it did not give a fresh period of one year to the

Government to issue another Section 6 declaration and that the Section 6

declaration, after such quashing, if at all, could be issued only during the

balance period. But, here, the facts are even better, inasmuch as there was

no Section 6 declaration in respect of the subject lands at all. The first

Section 6 declaration was made on 21.03.2013 which is far beyond the

prescribed limit of one year under Section 6 of the said Act. The

consequences of this would be that the acquisition proceedings

themselves have to be declared as having lapsed.

8. The contention raised by the learned counsel for the respondents

that the petitioners did not have the locus standi to maintain this writ

petition is not acceptable. This is so because 123 petitioners admittedly

were petitioners before the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No.4239/2007.

When the Supreme Court entertained their writ petition, the respondents

cannot now take the stand that they did not have any locus standi.

Furthermore, since the Section 6 declaration would be bad because of it

being beyond the period of limitation in respect of the 123 petitioners, the

same relief cannot be denied to the others in respect of the very same

Section 6 declaration. A similar view was taken by the Supreme Court in

Union of India and Ors Vs. Krishan Lal Arneja and Ors. (2004) 8

SCC 453 where the Supreme Court, in paragraph-37, noted as under:

"37. .....................................This apart, the very same notification being common is quashed at the instance of other writ petitioners. In this view, at this stage, the contention urged on behalf of the appellants that writ petition filed by a tenant was not maintainable, cannot be accepted".

9. Furthermore, reliance had also been placed by the learned senior

counsel for the petitioners on the decision of Smt Gunwant Kaur and

Ors Vs. Municipal Committee Bhatinda and Ors 1969 (3) SCC 769

wherein the Supreme Court held as under:

"17. It was urged by Mr.Hazarnavis on behalf of the Municipal Committee, Bhatinda, that the three appellants were purchasers of the lands claimed by them after the notification under Section 4 was issued and they had no right to challenge the issue of the notification. If, however, the notification under Section 4 was vague the three appellants who are purchasers of the land had title thereto to challenge the validity of the notification. The appellants have spent in putting up substantial structures considerable sums of money and we are unable to hold that merely because they had purchased the lands after the issue of the notification under Section 4 they are debarred from challenging the validity of the notification, or from contending that it did not apply to their lands".

10. Mr Sethi, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the

petitioners also submitted that the transfers or the alleged transfers in the

present case in favour of the petitioners were not violative of the Delhi

Land (Restriction on Transfer) Act, 1972, inasmuch as the transfers are

prohibited under the Act only in cases where the Section 6 declaration has

been made. In the present case, as pointed out above, no Section 6

declaration had been made prior to 21.03.2013 and all the transfers/GPAs

were executed much prior to the making of the said Section 6 declaration.

11. We are making it clear that in any event we are not concerned here

about the title to the lands in question. The limited scope of this writ

petition is whether the Section 6 declaration was made within the

stipulated period or not. There is no dispute that the Section 6 declaration

was made beyond the period of one year from the date of notification

having been published under Section 4 of the said Act. That, in itself, is

sufficient to declare that the acquisition proceedings have lapsed.

12. Consequently, the declaration dated 21.03.2013 bearing

No.F.10(29)/96/L & B/LA Vol.III under Section 6 of the Land

Acquisition Act, 1894 is hereby quashed insofar as the petitioners are

concerned. As a result, the notification dated 14.07.2000 being

notification No.F.10(29)/76/L & B/Vol.III/5326 under Section 4 of the

said Act insofar as the petitioners are concerned would be regarded as

having been lapsed. The award No.2/2013-14 made on 30.12.2013 is also

quashed.

13. The writ petition is allowed to the aforesaid extent. There shall be

no order as to costs.

                                          BADAR DURREZ AHMED, J




DECEMBER 23, 2014                         I. S. MEHTA, J
'dc'