Citation : 2014 Latest Caselaw 6641 Del
Judgement Date : 10 December, 2014
*IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Date of decision: 10th December, 2014
+ LPA No.763/2014
STL GLOBAL LTD. ..... Appellant
Through: Mr. T.K. Ganju, Sr. Adv. with Mr.
Manish Kumar, Adv.
Versus
ORIENTAL BANK OF COMMERCE & ORS. ..... Respondents
Through: Mr. S.S. Lingwal, Adv. for R-2.
CORAM:-
HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW
RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW, J
1. This intra-court appeal impugns the order dated 29th September, 2014
of the learned Single Judge of this Court of dismissal of W.P.(C)
No.7354/2013 preferred by the appellant. We heard the senior counsel for
the appellant at length on admission and reserved judgment.
2. The writ petition from which this appeal arises was filed to:
(i) Direct the respondents No.1 and 2 Oriental Bank of Commerce
and United Bank of India to give to the appellant at the cost of
the appellant the certified copy of the complete file in respect of
the loan granted by the said Banks to the respondent No.3 RPS
Infrastructure Ltd.
(ii) Direct the respondents No.1&2 Banks to ensure the full
compliance of the terms and conditions of the sanction of the
loan.
(iii) Appoint any Government / Bank approved valuer and / or any
Local Commission to visit the land admeasuring 23504 sq. yds.
belonging to the appellant and adjoining land ad-measuring
13219 sq. yds. belonging to M/s Reckon Industries Ltd. (not a
party to the writ petition or to the appeal) situated at 12/6,
Milestone, Mathura Road, Faridabad with respect where to the
appellant and the said M/s Reckon Industries Ltd. had entered
into a Collaboration Agreement dated 22nd May, 2007 for the
respondent No.3 to raise construction thereon of a commercial
complex named as "RPS Oxy Park" and to report of the extent
and valuation of the construction carried out thereon.
(iv) To direct the respondents No.1&2 Banks to secure payment of
excess amount of the loan released to the respondent No.3 in
violation of the terms and conditions of the sanction of the loan,
by taking additional security from the respondent No.3.
(v) to save the land, rights and interest aforesaid of the appellant.
3. It is inter alia the case of the appellant / writ petitioner that:
(a) It had entered into the Collaboration Agreement aforesaid with
the respondent No.3.
(b) As per the terms of the said Collaboration Agreement, the
respondent No.3 was permitted to raise loan of upto Rs.100
crores on security of the land and to utilize the said loan for the
sole purpose of construction on the said land of a commercial
complex (project).
(c) On the basis of the aforesaid, the respondents No.1&2 Banks
sanctioned a loan of Rs.100 crores for the purpose of
construction by the respondent no.3 on the said land and the
appellant deposited the original title deeds in their favour with
respect to the said land in favour of the respondents No.1&2
Banks to secure the said loan.
(d) One of the terms of the sanction of the loan is that the Banks
will disburse the amount required from time to time only when
the respondent No.3 had already invested in the ratio of
100:176 on the project.
(e) Thus the respondents No. 1 and 2 Banks were required to
ensure the worth of the construction carried out on the land
before disbursement of the loan.
(f) The respondent No.3 used the loan for its other projects /
purposes and the Banks disbursed loan much in excess of the
amount spent by the respondent No.3 on the construction.
4. It appears that the learned Single Judge initially entertained the writ
petition; however upon the Banks filing an affidavit to the effect that the
amount of the loan disbursed was in terms of the sanction and not in excess,
the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition observing that the
statement of the Banks could not be readily doubted as it is expected that
they would have evaluated the construction at site before making such a
statement and that hence disputed questions of fact arise which could not be
entertained in a writ petition.
5. We have at the outset only enquired from the senior counsel for the
petitioner whether not the appellant, in the garb of this appeal and the writ
petition from which this appeal arises, was seeking either to enforce the
Collaboration Agreement with the respondent No.3 or whether not these
proceedings are intended to arm twist the respondent No.3.
6. The senior counsel for the appellant of course vehemently protested
and contended; i) that the construction on site is only 15% of the total
planned construction; ii) that the banks ought to have disbursed the entire
loan of Rs.100 crores only after satisfying themselves that the respondent
No.3 itself had already invested Rs.176 crores in the project and which the
respondent No.3 has not invested; and, iii) that the officials of the Banks are
in connivance with the respondent No.3.
7. The argument is purported to be matched by producing photographs
of the site showing little construction and by contending that more than 80%
of the construction planned is still left. It is further argued that the learned
Single Judge erred in holding that disputed questions of fact arise. It is
contended that there was / is no disputed question of fact inasmuch as loan
already disbursed by the Banks is a matter of record, the construction carried
out can be easily evaluated and if the same is not found to be in the ratio of
100:176, the appellant / writ petitioner would be entitled to the relief. It is
yet further contended that the respondents No. 1 and 2 Banks have been lax
in safeguarding their interest by disbursing loan without satisfying
themselves of the amounts spent by the respondent No.3 till then in the
project, feeling secure because of holding equitable mortgage of the land of
the appellant is worth much more than Rs.100 crores. Reliance in this
regard is placed on Gunwant Kaur Vs. Municipal Committee, Bhatinda
(1969) 3 SCC 769 where it was observed that what facts are in dispute and
what are admitted could only be determined after an affidavit in reply was
filed - instead the writ petition was dismissed in limine observing that
disputed questions of facts arise. It is further argued that there is no absolute
bar to entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India even
where disputed questions of fact are involved and it is only on a finding that
the said disputed questions of fact cannot be appropriately tried in a writ
petition, would the High Court be entitled to dismiss the writ petition on the
said ground.
8. We have further enquired from the senior counsel for the petitioner
whether not, the appellants by claiming the reliefs aforesaid are seeking to
renege from their agreement, of standing as guarantor to the loan sanctioned
and disbursed by the respondents No.1&2 Banks to the respondent No.3 and
as to how the writ petition would lie. It was pointed out that the case of the
appellants at best could be that the Banks having themselves violated the
terms and conditions of sanction on which loan was granted and in
consideration of which terms and conditions the appellant had agreed to
guarantee the said loan, the appellant as guarantor stood discharged. It was
yet further enquired as to how the question whether the respondent Banks
were entitled to recovery of the loan amount from the appellant as guarantor
or were required to seek their remedy against the respondent No.3 only
could be adjudicated in the writ petition.
9. The senior counsel for the appellant continued to highlight the
predicament in which the appellant had been placed i.e. on the one hand
construction on its land being held up and on the other hand it also having
become liable to the respondents No.1&2 Banks, all due to the respondent
No.3.
10. Though, if what is argued is correct, we have our sympathies with the
appellant but the writ petition, if otherwise is not maintainable, would still
not become maintainable on sympathetic grounds.
11. In our opinion, the learned Single Judge was correct in not entertaining
writ petition. Any decision in the writ petition, even if we believe the
agreements between the parties to be clearly stipulating what has been
contended before us, would necessarily entail adjudication of the correctness
of the action of the respondents No.1&2 Banks of disbursing the loan
amount i.e. whether the Banks took the precautions which they were required
to take before disbursing the loan amount and if not to what effect. It would
also require valuation of the work of construction carried out, in accordance
with the parameters prescribed therefor in the contracts. We fail to see as to
how the same does not raise disputed questions of facts. Undoubtedly the
counter affidavits have not been called as yet. However, in every case we do
not have to await the counter affidavits to gauge whether disputed questions
of facts arise. If we were to do that in a pedantic manner, the same would
add considerable unnecessary load to the docket of this Court, to the
prejudice of deserving cases. There has been a sea change in this regard
since the era in which Gunwant Kaur (supra) was pronounced. Here, the
battle lines have already been drawn between the appellant and respondent
No.3; else there was no need for the appellant to approach this Court.
12. Though the Supreme Court in ABL International Ltd. Vs. Export
Credit Guarantee Corporation of India Limited (2005) 10 SCC 495 has
held that merely because some disputed questions of facts arise for
consideration, same cannot be a ground to refuse to entertain a writ petition
in all cases as a matter of rule and that in appropriate cases a writ petition
against a State or an instrumentality of State arising out of contractual
obligation is maintainable but we find the adjudication of disputed question
of facts as arising in the present facts to be entailing issuance of a
commission for local enquiry / measurement / valuation and examination and
cross-examination of witnesses and all of which in our view is not feasible
under Article 226 and is best left to be done in a fact finding fora. Also, the
said disputes are not only contractual in nature but are not with the
respondents No.1 & 2 Banks, even if to be called an instrumentality of State,
only but are in the nature of tripartite disputes between appellant,
respondents No.1&2 Banks and the respondent No.3. The same also, in our
opinion are not to be entertained in writ jurisdiction.
13. The Supreme court, again in Godavari Sugar Mills Ltd. Vs. State of
Maharashtra (2011) 2 SCC 439, on a conspectus of case law on the subject,
held that normally a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India
will not be entertained to enforce a civil liability arising out of a breach of a
contract and that the aggrieved party will have to agitate the question in a
Civil Court. Similarly, in Kerala State Electricity Board Vs Kurien E.
Kalathil (2000) 6 SCC 293, it was held that interpretation and
implementation of a clause in a contract cannot be the subject matter of a
writ petition, being in realm of private law and that the fact that one of the
parties to the agreement is a statutory or a public body will not of itself
affect the principle to be applied. It was held that every act of a statutory
body need not necessarily invoke exercise of a statutory power. It was
further held in Godavari Sugar Mills Ltd that only where the lis has a public
law character or involves a question arising out of public law functions on
the part of the State or its authorities, is the access to justice by way of
public law remedy allowed.
14. There is no public law character or element in the dispute of the
petitioner with respondents No. 1 and 2 Banks. The actions of the
respondents No. 1 and 2 Banks with which the appellant is aggrieved are not
public functions. The dispute between the appellant and the respondents
No.1&2 Banks if any and the dispute certainly between the appellant and the
respondent No.3, are purely civil in character. It is not as if the respondents
No.1&2 Banks are alleged to have acted in contravention of any guideline of
the Reserve Bank of India with which they are bound. The disbursement /
sanction of loan by the respondent Banks to the respondent No.3 and of
which loan the appellant stood as guarantor was purely a private
arrangement, not in discharge of a public duties / functions of the
respondents No.1&2 Banks. The disputes arising therefrom thus cannot be
adjudicated upon in a writ petition. As aforesaid, if at all the appellant is
aggrieved from the disbursement by the respondents No.1&2 Banks of the
loan amount to the respondent No.3 in excess of that provided under the
terms of sanction and on the basis whereof the appellants stood guarantor,
the only remedy of the appellant is to notify the respondents No.1&2 Banks
that on its doing so, the appellant stands discharged from its liability as a
guarantor.
15. We also fail to see as to what action the respondents No.1&2 Banks
also can now take against the respondent No.3, even if they were to be of the
opinion that the respondent No.3 has wrongly got disbursed loan amount in
excess of its entitlement. As aforesaid, the entire loan amount is stated to
have been already disbursed. The appellant wants us to issue a direction to
the respondents No.1&2 Banks to seek security for the excess amount
withdrawn by the respondent No.3 from the respondents No.1&2 Banks.
We fail to see as to how in this jurisdiction such a direction also can be
issued. The only remedy of the respondents No.1&2 Banks, even if what the
appellants says is to be true, would be to recall the loan.
16. We are therefore of the view that the writ petition as well as this
appeal is totally misconceived. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.
However since the appellant claims to be already in the predicament
aforesaid for reasons not attributable to it, we are refraining from burdening
the appellant with costs of these proceedings.
RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW, J
CHIEF JUSTICE th DECEMBER 10 , 2014 „gsr‟
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