Citation : 2014 Latest Caselaw 6598 Del
Judgement Date : 9 December, 2014
*IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Date of decision: 9th December, 2014
+ W.P.(C) No.7745/2014
FEDERATION OF INDIAN MINERAL
INDUSTRIES (FIMI) .... Petitioner
Through: Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, Sr. Adv.
with Mr. Anand Varma & Mr. Tarun
Patnaik, Advs.
Versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. ..... Respondents
Through: Mr. Akshay Makhija, CGSC with Mr.
Rohitendra Deb, Adv. for R-1.
Mr. Joseph Aristotle, Sr. Adv. with
Mr. M.B. Elakkumanan, Adv. for R-
3/State of Karnataka.
Mr. Kapil Dutta, Adv. for MCD.
AND
+ W.P.(C) No.7746/2014
M/S ORISSA MANGANESE & MINERALS LTD. .... Petitioner
Through: Mr. Parag Tripathi, Sr. Adv. with Mr.
Anand Varma & Mr. Tarun Patnaik,
Adv.
Versus
UNION OF INDIA & ANR. ..... Respondents
Through: Mr. Akshay Makhija, CGSC with Mr.
Waize Ali Noor and Mr. Kirtiman
Singh, CGSC for R-1/UOI.
W.P.(C) Nos.7745/2014 & 7746/2014 Page 1 of 20
CORAM:-
HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW
RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW, J.
1. These petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India have
been filed seeking a declaration, that the amendments to Rule 24A(6) of the
Mineral Concession Rules, 1960, brought about by the Notification dated
18th July, 2014 issued by the Ministry of Mines, Government of India and
whereby Sub-rule (6) has been substituted, are prospective in nature and
effect.
2. It is the case of the petitioners that:
(i) The grant and renewal of mining leases by State Governments,
including the period thereof, is governed by Section 8 of the
Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957
(MMDR Act) and under Sub-section (1) whereof, the maximum
period for which a mining lease will be granted shall not exceed
30 years and the minimum period shall not be less than 20
years; under Sub-section (2) thereof, mining lease is renewable
for a period not exceeding 20 years; under Sub-section (3)
thereof, if the State Government is of the opinion that in the
interest of mineral development, it is necessary so to do, it may,
for reasons to be recorded, authorize the renewal of mining
lease in respect of minerals not specified in Part A and Part B of
the First Schedule for a further period or periods not exceeding
20 years in each case; and, further vide Sub-section (4), no
mining lease granted in respect of minerals specified in Part A
and Part B of the First Schedule is to be renewed except with
the previous approval of the Central Government.
(ii) Vide Rule 24A(6) of the Rules (supra) as it existed prior to its
amendment (supra) w.e.f. 18th July, 2014, if an application for
renewal of mining lease is not disposed of by the State
Government before the date of expiry of the lease, the period of
that lease shall be deemed to have been extended by a further
period till the State Government passes order thereon.
(iii) The Supreme Court in Goa Foundation Vs. Union of India
(2014) 6 SCC 590 pronounced on 21st April, 2014 held that
Rule 24A (6) applies only to the first renewal under Section
8(2) of the MMDR Act and is not applicable to subsequent
renewals of mining lease under Section 8(3) of the MMDR Act,
as had been the practice earlier.
(iv) The Supreme Court subsequently in order dated 16 th May, 2014
in W.P.(C) No.114/2014 titled Common Cause Vs. Union of
India further held that notwithstanding the State Government
having not taken a decision on the applications filed for second
or further renewal of mining lease, the lessee, after the expiry of
the term of the first renewal cannot operate the mining lease till
the State Government forms an opinion in exercise of powers
under Section 8(3) of the MMDR Act for further renewal of the
mining lease.
(v) The Government of India vide Notification dated 18th July,
2014 substituted Rule 24A(6) till then existing as under:
"(6) If an application for renewal of a mining lease made within the time referred to in sub-rule (1) is not disposed of by the State Government before the date of expiry of the lease, the period of that lease shall be deemed to have been extended by a further period till the State Government passes order thereon."
WITH
"(6) If an application for first renewal of a mining lease made within the time referred to in sub-rule (1) is not disposed of by the State Government before the date of expiry of the lease, the period of that lease shall be deemed to have been extended by a further period of two years or till the State Government passes order thereon, whichever is earlier:
Provided that the leases where applications for first renewal of mining lease have been made to the State Government and which have not been disposed of by the State Government before the date of expiry of lease and are pending for disposal as on the date of the notification of this amendment, shall be deemed to have been extended by a further period of two years from the date of coming into force of this amendment or till the State Government passes order thereon or the date of expiry of the maximum period allowed for first renewal, whichever is the earliest:
Provided further that the provisions of this sub-rule shall not apply to renewal under sub-section (3) of Section 8 of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (67 of 1957)."
(vi) that the petitioner Federation of Indian Mineral Industries
(FIMI) in W.P.(C) No.7745/2014 was formed as an all India
body to promote the interest of mining, mineral processing,
metal making and other mineral based industries; applications
for renewal of mining leases (first, second as well as
subsequent) filed by mining leaseholders, members of the said
Federation to various State Governments are kept pending for
long periods of time and not disposed of despite compliance of
conditions precedent by the leaseholders; the mining
leaseholders have therefore continued the mining activities in
accordance with law and after obtaining all statutory clearances
for the continuance of mining operations.
(vii) Rule 24A(6) prior to its amendment provided for deemed
extension of the period of the lease to enable the leaseholders to
legally continue mining operations.
(viii) Continuance of mining operations without interruption is vital
for mineral conservation, development and scientific mining;
mining cannot be stopped or started without complicated
cumbersome procedures.
(ix) The delays in consideration and disposal of applications for the
first and subsequent renewals of mining leases is not on account
of mining leaseholders but on the part of the State
Governments.
(x) However as per amended Rule 24A(6), there is no extension of
the lease period in case of applications for second and
subsequent renewals under Section 8(3) of the MMDR Act and
extension of lease by two years only in case of applications for
first renewal under Section 8(2) of the MMDR Act.
(xi) The amended Rule 24A(6), insofar as it does not provide for
extension of lease till disposal of renewal application, is
unreasonable and arbitrary.
(xii) Though the rules provide for a time frame for disposal of
applications for grant of fresh mining leases, they do not
provide any time frame for disposal of applications for renewal.
(xiii) The amendment vide Notification dated 18th July, 2014 to Rule
24A(6) is prospective in nature and effect and has no bearing or
operation upon applications for renewal made prior to its
promulgation.
The petitions accordingly seek the reliefs of:
(a) Declaration that the amendment vide Notification dated 18 th
July, 2014 of Rule 24A(6) is prospective in effect and
operation.
(b) Alternatively, if the said amendment is held to be retrospective
in effect i.e. applicable also to applications for renewal pending
as on 18th July, 2014 then, quashing thereof as arbitrary,
unreasonable and violative of Article 20(1) of the Constitution
of India.
(c) "Appropriate writ, order or direction directing that the
Notification dated 18th July, 2014 provides for resumption of
mining operations during the pendency of applications under
Section 8(3) of the MMDR Act, 1957 upon the State
Government forming its opinion that the renewal of the leases
is in the interest of mineral development."
(d) Directing the Ministry of Mines, Government of India to frame
/ issue appropriate guidelines for disposal of applications for
renewal of mining leases within a stipulated time period.
3. The contents of W.P.(C) No.7746/2014 though preferred by a holder
of lease for six Manganese Mines in the State of Orissa, who is also a
member of the Federation which has preferred W.P.(C) No.7745/2014, are
identical.
4. Just like no cause of action for filing the petition has been pleaded in
W.P.(C) No.7745/2014 filed by the Federation, as indeed it could not have
been pleaded, no cause of action for filing W.P.(C) No.7746/2014 also has
been pleaded though by an individual mining leaseholder.
5. As far back as in Harishankar Bagla Vs. The State of Madhya
Pradesh AIR 1954 SC 465, a five Judge Bench of the Supreme Court,
dealing with the contention that the Textile Commissioner under Section 3
of the Cotton Textiles (Control of Movement) Order, 1948 had been given
unregulated and arbitrary discretion to refuse or to grant a permit, held that
the appellants having never applied for a permit and having made no efforts
to obtain one, could not be said to have been hurt in any way by any act of
the Textile Commissioner, to be entitled to challenge the same.
6. Another Five Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Central Bank of
India Vs. Workmen AIR 1960 SC 12 also held that it is not necessary for
the Courts to decide hypothetical questions which may arise in any future
reference (under the Industrial Disputes Act) that may be made under the
amended section and that the Courts do not give speculative opinions on
hypothetical questions - it would be contrary to principle, inconvenient and
inexpedient that opinion should be given on such questions - if and when,
they arise, they must arise in concrete cases - it would be extremely unwise
for the Courts to attempt beforehand to exhaust all possible cases and facts
which might occur to qualify, cut down, and override the operation of the
particular words when the concrete case is not before it.
7. Similarly, in State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Kartar Singh 1964 AIR SC
1135, it was held that "if the rule has to be struck down as imposing
unreasonable or discriminatory standards, it could not be done merely on
any a priori reasoning but only as a result of material placed before the
Court by way of scientific analysis ....... this can be done only when the party
invoking the protection of Article 14 makes averments with details to sustain
such a plea and leads evidence to establish his allegations--that where a
party seeks to impeach the validity of a rule made by a competent authority
on the ground that the rule offends Article 14, the burden is on him to plead
and prove the infirmity is too well established to need elaboration."
8. The Supreme Court in State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. K. Jayaraman
(1974) 2 SCC 738 held that to contend that a rule is invalid for violating
Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, relevant facts showing how it was
discriminatory ought to have been set out.
9. Yet again in Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Company Vs. Bharat
Coking Coal Limited (1983) 1 SCC 147, it was expressed that it is not open
to a Court to answer academic or hypothetical questions, particularly so
when serious constitutional issues are involved, as Judges are not authorised
to make disembodied pronouncements on serious and cloudy issues of
constitutional policy without battle lines being properly drawn. It was further
held that judicial pronouncements cannot be immaculate legal conceptions
and that no important point of law should be decided without a proper lis
between parties properly ranged on either side and a crossing of the swords.
10. The said sentiment holds good till date. In Kusum Ingots and Alloys
Ltd. Vs. Union of India (2004) 6 SCC 254, it was reiterated that vires of a
statutory provision cannot be challenged in vacuum and without any cause
of action.
11. Similarly, in State of Haryana Vs. State of Punjab (2004) 12 SCC
673, it was held that merely saying that a particular provision is legislatively
incompetent will not do; at least prima facie acceptable grounds in support
have to be pleaded to sustain the challenge; in the absence of any such
pleading, the challenge to the constitutional validity of a statute or statutory
provision is liable to be rejected.
12. We may sum up using the language of Hidayatullah, J., though in
minority in Sheoshankar Vs. State Govt. of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1951
Nagpur 68, that though it is possible to bring an action for declaration that a
particular statute or action under it is ultra vires or unconstitutional, it
depends on the fundamental fact that the declaration must not be sought on a
hypothetical state of facts and that the cause of action must disclose a real
injury already occasioned or about to be occasioned. A declaratory judgment
has been held to be neither an advisory opinion nor a decision of a moot
question because it must involve a real controversy in which the result
would be res judicata between the parties. It is not the exercise of judicial
power to write legal essays or to give advisory legal opinions. A Judge
never gives a decision until the facts necessary for that decision have arisen
because the imagination of Judges, like that of other persons, is limited and
they are not able to put before their minds all the complex circumstances
which they ought to have in their minds when giving a decision. The Courts
will not in abstract determine the constitutionality of a statute. Mandamus
cannot issue unless there is a demand and a refusal or some act or omission
is to be ordered. It is not to be expected that the Court will sit and examine
the constitutionality of a statute or the rules and notifications with a view to
finding out what is constitutional or what is not.
13. Of course, the well established rule regarding locus standi, that rights
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can be enforced only by an
aggrieved person (except in the case of a writ for habeas corpus or quo
warranto) has undergone a sea change in the context of writ petitions filed in
public interest as also noticed in Ghulam Qadir Vs. Special Tribunal (2002)
1 SCC 33.
14. However, these petitions have not been filed, as indeed could not have
been filed, in public interest.
15. We, in these circumstances, on 12th November, 2014 when these
petitions came up first, enquired so from the senior counsels appearing for
the petitioners. On request, the matters were adjourned to 21st November,
2014, giving liberty to the petitioners to file better affidavits.
16. We may also record that a reading of the petitions and the reliefs
claimed therein showed that the petitioners were also claiming that pending
decision of the State Government on applications for second and subsequent
renewals under Section 8(3) of the MMDR Act filed prior to the amendment
with effect from 18th July, 2014 of Rule 24A(6), the said mining
leaseholders should be allowed to operate their respective mining leases.
However upon our enquiring from the senior counsels for the petitioners on
12th November, 2014, whether not such a claim was contrary to the dicta of
the Supreme Court in Goa Foundation and in Common Cause (supra), the
senior counsels stated that they were confining / limiting the claim in the
petitions to applications under Section 8(2) of the MMDR Act for renewal
pending as on the date of amendment of Rule 24A(6) of the MMDR Act and
to cases where the applications under Section 8(3) of the MMDR Act for
renewal had been allowed and permission granted. On further enquiry, it
was informed that such permission had been granted only in three cases and
none of which related to the minerals specified in Part A and Part B of the
First Schedule to the MMDR Act and thus the previous approval of the
Central Government was not required.
17. The petitioners thereafter filed additional affidavits. The petitioner
Federation in W.P.(C) No.7745/2014 in its additional affidavit pleaded that
it has the locus standi to initiate and maintain the petition as in the past its
suggestions and representations have been accepted by the Supreme Court as
well as this Court in numerous proceedings regarding mining activities and
as it was also heard by the Supreme Court before cancelling the allocations
of Coal Blocks. It is further pleaded, that the State Governments are
implementing the amendment to Rule 24A(6) vide Notification dated 18 th
July, 2014 retrospectively and arbitrarily; the State of Jharkhand has vide
order dated 3rd September, 2014 suspended mining operations in all mining
leases within the State; that though renewal of mining lease has been given
by the said State to Tata Steel Ltd., a member of the petitioner Federation,
but the mining operations carried out during the pendency of the renewal
application have been declared as unlawful and it has been directed to
deposit Rs.3568.32 crores, even though the said operations were continued
as per the practice / interpretation then in vogue; that the State Governments
are also not allowing mining operations to be resumed inspite of having
taken a decision to grant renewal under Section 8(3) of the MMDR Act.
18. The petitioner in W.P.(C) No.7746/2014, instead of pleading any facts
qua its own mining lease, has made the same averments as made in the
additional affidavit of the Federation.
19. When the matter was taken up next on 21st November, 2014, we
enquired whether not the additional affidavit filed reinforced that the
petitioner in W.P.(C) No.7746/2014 has no cause of action whatsoever and
whether not the cause of action even if any as disclosed in the additional
affidavit of the Federation was of the three mining leaseholders and against
the State Government alone.
20. The senior counsels for the petitioners contended that the Notification
dated 18th July, 2014 impugning Rule 24A(6) had been issued at Delhi and
thus this Court would have jurisdiction. Attention was also invited to the
letter dated 20th October, 2014 of the Government of Jharkhand to Tata Steel
Ltd.
21. We are unimpressed. Firstly, there is no basis whatsoever in the
pleadings vis-a-vis the mining lease in favour of Tata Steel Ltd. Secondly,
the grievance if any with respect to the action of the Government of the
State of Jharkhand claiming Rs.3568.32 crores from Tata Steel Ltd. for
unauthorized mining pending application for their renewal of mining lease,
is personal and only to Tata Steel Ltd. and only against the State of
Jharkhand. This Court would not have territorial jurisdiction. We may add
that as disclosed by the petitioners themselves, the grievance is of only three
out of over 320 members of the petitioner Federation. The grievance cited is
against the State of Jharkhand only. It is thus also not as if a large number
of members of the Federation spread out over several States have a similar
grievance against each of their respective State Governments, for it to be
said that it is just and convenient that the matter be taken up by one High
Court only. Moreover, the three causes of action cited (and of which
particulars of only one are given) are against the State Government only and
which have nothing to do with the amendment to the Rule 24A(6),
notification whereof was issued at Delhi. If the person aggrieved is of the
opinion that the action of the State Government is violative of the Act and
the Rules, it is open to the said person / member of the petitioner Federation
to raise the issue in the concerned State High Court. Moreover, as already
observed hereinabove by us, there are no pleadings of any cause of action in
favour of the Federation, as indeed there cannot be and as far as petitioner in
W.P.(C) No.7746/2014 is concerned, it has inspite of opportunity not
disclosed any cause of action to have accrued to it.
22. Recently, in K.B. Nagur, M.D. (Ayurvedic) Vs. UOI (2012) 4 SCC
483 also it was held that it is a settled and deeply rooted canon of
constitutional jurisprudence, that in the powers of constitutional
adjudication, the Courts ought not to pass decisions on questions of
constitutionality unless such adjudication is unavoidable and that in this
sense the Courts have followed a policy of strict necessity in disposing of a
constitutional issue. It was further held that the Courts should confine their
decision as far as may be reasonably practicable, within the narrow limits
required on the facts of the case.
23. We are therefore of the opinion that no case for entertaining the
petitions particularly in this Court is made out.
24. For the sake of completeness, we may record that during the hearing
on 21st November, 2014 a compilation containing copies of following
judgments were handed over:
(i) Goa Foundation Vs. Union of India (2014) 6 SCC 590
(ii) Common Cause Vs. Union of India, Interim Order dated 16.05.2014 in W.P.(C) No.114/2014.
(iii) M/s Lithoferro Vs. State of Goa, judgment dated 13.08.2014 in W.P.(C) No.210/2014
(iv) ITO Vs. M.C. Ponnoose (1969) 2 SCC 531.
(v) Sri Vijayalakshmi Rice Mills Vs. State of A.P. (1976) 3 SCC
(vi) Soni Devrajbhai Babubhai Vs. State of Gujarat (1991) 4 SCC
(vii) Chairman, Railway Board Vs. C.R. Rangadhamaiab (1997) 6 SCC 623.
(viii) Kalpnath Rai Vs. State (1997) 8 SCC 732.
(ix) Shyam Sunder Vs. Ram Kumar (2001) 8 SCC 24.
(x) State of A.P. Vs. Ch. Gandhi (2013) 5 SCC 111.
(xi) Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Vatika Township Pvt. Ltd.
CA No.8750/2014.
but save for referring to paragraph Nos.27 and 28 of Goa Foundation
(supra) and paragraph No.10 of the Common Cause (supra) and which we
do not find having any applicability to the queries raised by us, relevance of
any other judgments has not even been argued.
25. The petitions are accordingly dismissed with costs of Rs.15,000/- each
payable to the respondent Union of India. This would however not come in
the way of the challenge as raised herein being raised in a properly
constituted lis before an appropriate Court / fora.
RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW, J.
CHIEF JUSTICE DECEMBER 09, 2014 „gsr‟
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