Citation : 2014 Latest Caselaw 3787 Del
Judgement Date : 20 August, 2014
$~23
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ CRL.M.C. 3647/2014
MAHENDER SINGH & ORS ..... Petitioners
Through Mr. B. S. Rana, Mr. V. K. Bhardwaj and
Mr. Tarun Gahlot, Advocates.
versus
STATE & ANR ..... Respondents
Through Mr. P. K. Mishra, Additional Public Prosecutor.
ASI Naresh Kumar, P.S. City Rohtak.
Mr. G. S. Rana, Advocate for complainant.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUDERSHAN KUMAR MISRA
% SUDERSHAN KUMAR MISRA, J. (Oral)
Crl.M.A. No.12564/2014
Exemption, as prayed for, is allowed, subject to all just exceptions. This application is disposed off.
Crl.M.C. No.3647/2014
1. This petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. seeks quashing of FIR No.145/2005 at police station City Rohtak, under sections 498-A, 406, 34 IPC, and all proceedings emanating therefrom, on the ground that the matter has been amicably settled between the parties.
2. Issue notice.
3. Mr. G.S. Rana, Advocate for the complainant, accepts notice.
4. The Investigating Officer, ASI Naresh Kumar, Police Station City Rohtak, is present and has instructed Additional Public Prosecutor for the Government of NCT of Delhi to appear in the matter. The Investigating
Officer identifies the parties.
5. It is stated that the aforesaid FIR came to be registered at the instance of respondent No.3, Poonam Bansal at City Rohtak (Haryana) on 24.03.2005, and thereafter the matter came to be transferred to Delhi for trial by the order of the Supreme Court dated 22.02.2011. It is further stated that the chargesheet in the matter has been filed. It is also stated that on 25.06.2013, a joint statement of respondent No.3 Poonam Bansal as well as the first petitioner Mahender Singh was recorded before the Metropolitan Magistrate, Mahila Court, West District, Delhi to the effect that both the parties have amicably settled all the disputes, and in terms whereof, the first petitioner had, inter alia, undertaken to pay an amount of Rs.5.75 lakhs to the said complainant towards all her claims in full. Other terms, including the undertaking of the parties to withdraw all pending proceedings against each other, were also recorded. A copy of the aforesaid joint statement has also been annexed to this petition.
6. Both counsel for the petitioner as well as respondent No.3, on instructions from their respective clients, submit that as on date, Rs.4.75 lakhs have been received by the complainant and the balance amount of Rs.1 lakh is to be paid today. The said amount of Rs.1 lakh has also been received by the complainant in Court today by way of a demand draft bearing 981326, dated 19.08.2014, drawn on Bank of Maharshtra, in favour of Poonam Bansal.
7. On 01.02.2014, the first petitioner Mahender Singh and the complainant Poonam Bansal have obtained a decree of divorce by mutual consent under Section 13 (B) of the Hindu Marriage Act from the court of Additional District Judge-01 (West), Tis Hazari Court, Delhi in HMA No.483/2013. A copy of the same has also been annexed to this petition.
8. Counsel for the parties further submit, on instructions, that all other proceedings that have been instituted by the parties against each other stand withdrawn, and that nothing further remains to be done.
9. Respondent No.3 / complainant has also filed an affidavit supporting the petition and giving her consent to the relief claimed thereunder. She specifically affirms her desire to bring these proceedings to an end. She also states that she has now received full amount envisaged under the settlement, and that nothing more is due.
10. Counsel for the State submits that looking to the circumstances, and where the matter primarily concerns a marital dispute which has now been settled; and since the complainant herself is not interested in supporting the prosecution anymore; no useful purpose will be served in continuing with the proceedings.
11. Under the circumstances, and looking to the decisions of the Supreme Court in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303, which has referred to a number of matters for the proposition that even a non- compoundable offence can also be quashed on the ground of a settlement agreement between the offender and the victim, if the circumstances so warrant; by observing as under:
"58. ....However, certain offences which overwhelmingly and predominantly bear civil flavour having arisen out of civil, mercantile, commercial, financial, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony, particularly relating to dowry, etc. or the family dispute, where the wrong is basically to the victim and the offender and the victim have settled all disputes between them amicably, irrespective of the fact that such offences have not been made compoundable, the High Court may within the framework of its inherent power, quash the criminal proceeding or criminal complaint or
FIR if it is satisfied that on the face of such settlement, there is hardly any likelihood of the offender being convicted and by not quashing the criminal proceedings, justice shall be casualty and ends of justice shall be defeated."
And also in Narinder Singh and Ors. v. State of Punjab and Anr.
2014(2) Crimes 67 (SC) where the Supreme Court held as follows:-
"29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings:
29.1 Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution.
29.2 When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure:
(i) ends of justice, or
(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court.
While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives.
29.3 Such a power is not be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by Public Servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender.
29.4 On the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves.
29.5 While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases.
29.6 Offences under Section 307 Indian Penal Code would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore is to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 Indian Penal Code in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307Indian Penal Code is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307 Indian Penal Code. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used etc. Medical report
in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the later case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them which may improve their future relationship.
29.7 While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and even the charge sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and to come a conclusion as to whether the offence under Section 307 Indian Penal Code is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be a ground to accept the
same resulting in acquittal of the offender who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved under Section 307 Indian Penal Code and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime."
I am of the considered opinion that the matter deserves to be given a quietus since the same has arisen out of a matrimonial dispute where the parties have now amicably settled everything. Furthermore, the complainant is also not interested in supporting the prosecution, the chances of its success are remote.
12. Consequently, the petition is allowed and FIR No.145/2005 at police station City Rohtak, under sections 498-A, 406, 34 IPC, and all proceedings emanating therefrom, are quashed.
13. The petition is disposed off.
SUDERSHAN KUMAR MISRA Judge AUGUST 20, 2014 dr
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