Delhi High Court
M/S. Gulati Trading Company vs Shri Man Mohan Verma & Anr. on 13 August, 2014
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ RC. REV. 274/2013 & CM No. 11657/2013 (stay)
% 13th August, 2014
M/S. GULATI TRADING COMPANY ......Petitioner
Through: Mr. Pawan Kumar Singh, Advocate
VERSUS
SHRI MAN MOHAN VERMA & ANR. ...... Respondents
Through: Mr. Ajay Kumar Gupta, Ms. Surbhi
Gupta, Advocates
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VALMIKI J.MEHTA
To be referred to the Reporter or not?
VALMIKI J. MEHTA, J (ORAL)
1. This rent control revision petition is filed under Section 25-B(8) of the
Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') against
the judgment of the Additional Rent Controller dated 31.1.2013 by which
the leave to defend application filed by the petitioner has been dismissed and
the bona fide necessity eviction petition under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act
has been decreed with respect to the tenanted premises comprising of one
shop situated at the ground floor in the property bearing no. 3468-3470, Gali
Bajrang Bali, Chawri Bazar, Delhi - 110006 as shown in red colour in the
site plan annexed along with the eviction petition.
2. The case of the respondents/landlords was that the original tenant Sh.
Hansraj Gulati carrying on the business under the name and style of M/s.
Gulati Trading was let out the suit premises by Sh. Bhagwan Dass, the
grandfather of the respondents/landlords. The grandfather, Sh. Bhagwan
Dass executed a Will in favour of his son Sh. Shibbo Mal on 13.12.1974.
On the death of Sh. Bhagwan Dass i.e on 30.12.1974, the Will became
operative whereby Sh. Shibbo Mal became the owner and during his life
time Sh. Shibbo Mal partitioned the property amongst his four sons and two
daughters. The daughters of Sh. Shibbo Mal relinquished their shares in
favour of the brothers vide a registered relinquishment deed and the property
was partitioned between the four brothers by way of a registered partition
deed on 17.6.1998. The respondents/landlords by virtue of the partition
deed became the owners of the suit premises. The suit premises is pleaded
to be required for the needs of both the respondents inasmuch as the
respondent no. 1 was doing a business of brokerage of iron goods and
respondent no. 2 was doing a business of a property dealer, but as they were
having no premises from where to do their business i.e on account of lack of
a commercial property for doing business, they had to entertain their clients
on the first floor of their residential property which caused disturbance to
their family life. The suit premises were also required for the son of the
respondent no. 1 who is a hardware engineer of computer and works on
contract basis and who wants to start his own business of computer
hardware.
3. The petitioner filed his leave to defend application raising the main
contention that the respondents were not the owners/landlords of the suit
property. It is only this issue which was mainly argued before this Court.
Besides the aspect of ownership, bonafide need was challenged on the
ground that respondents owned about 20-24 shops in a property no. 3441,
Chawri Bazar, Delhi 110006 and these shops were sold and which if not sold
would have been an alternative suitable accommodation. The eviction
petition was also said to be barred by limitation in terms of Article 67 of the
Limitation Act, 1963.
4. So far as the aspect of whether the respondents are owner/landlords of
the property, the Additional Rent Controller in the impugned judgment notes
that the suit property is mutated in the house tax records of the Municipal
Corporation of Delhi in the name of the respondents/landlords who were
also paying the house tax of the property. The Additional Rent Controller
thereafter rightly notes that the petitioner/tenant from time to time tendered
rent not only to the grandfather of the respondents but also to the father of
the respondent. To the father of the respondents, the rent was tendered by
way of money orders, copies of which were also filed. Qua the grandfather,
the rent was deposited in the court of an Additional Rent Controller and of
which copy of the challan was filed. Petitioner/tenant had also paid the rent
by a cheque of Rs.5190/- in favour of the father of the respondents. In view
of the aforesaid aspects, the Additional Rent Controller has rightly held that
the respondents are the owners/landlords of the property. I may note that
once the father of the respondents and the grandfather of the respondents
were accepted as landlords, then, by virtue of Section 116 of the Evidence
Act, 1872 petitioner is estopped from challenging the ownership of the
grandfather, the father and now the respondents.
5 (i) Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that respondents were not
the owners of the suit property but the suit property belonged to one Smt.
Aanchal Verma and it was stated that Smt. Aanchal Verma has received the
property from Sh. Gopi Nath who was the son of one Smt. Pastho Dukhtar.
Smt. Pasto Dukhtar became the owner through her father Sh. Lakhmi Chand
who was said to be the actual owner of the property.
(ii) Learned counsel for the petitioner in support of this argument also
places reliance upon an interim order dated 7.6.2010 passed by a court
hearing a probate petition filed by Smt. Aanchal Verma in which the present
respondents are respondents, and as per which interim order, the respondents
have been restrained from selling or disposing of the suit property.
(iii) This argument urged on behalf of the petitioner is misconceived
because the order which is relied upon by the petitioner is only an interim
order passed in a probate petition and the interim order cannot establish that
the probate petition has achieved finality in favour of Smt. Aanchal Verma.
Also title of a property is not decided in a probate petition. Also, it is noted
that the petitioner had tendered rent to both, the father and the grandfather of
the respondents, and therefore, since father and the grandfather of the
respondents were landlords, petitioner is estopped from questioning the title
of the respondents as also of their father and grandfather. Even if we look at
the position in a worst case scenario, the only effect of any probate
proceedings against the respondents succeeding would mean that Smt.
Aanchal Verma will be entitled to get possession of the suit property from
the respondents who will obtain the same pursuant to the eviction decree
passed in the present eviction petition, however, for a future event of any
judicial proceedings being decided in favour of Smt. Aanchal Verma, and
that also when we do not know, it cannot for the present be held that the
respondents are not entitled to file the eviction petition.
This argument of the petitioner that the respondents are not the
owners/landlords of the suit property is therefore rejected.
6. The second argument which was urged on behalf of the
petitioner/tenant was that respondents/landlords owned about 20-24 shops in
a property no. 3441, Chawri Bazar, Delhi 110006 and which premises
should be taken as an alternative suitable accommodation, however, the
Additional Rent Controller has rightly rejected this argument noting that
respondents/landlords have stated that they have no concern with this
property no. 3441, Chawri Bazar, Delhi 11000, and that the petitioner/tenant
has not filed any document to prima facie support the plea that the property
no. 3441, Chawri Bazar, Delhi 110006 had belonged to the
respondents/landlords at any point of time. Therefore, mere bald assertions,
made without any basis, cannot create a triable issue. The second argument
urged on behalf of the petitioner/tenant is also therefore rejected.
7. The third and final argument urged on behalf of the petitioner/tenant
was that the bonafide necessity petition is barred by limitation. I have really
failed to understand this argument because there is no limitation period with
respect to filing of a bonafide necessity petition as per the catena of
judgments passed not only by this Court but also by the Supreme Court.
Bonafide necessity is a continuous cause of action. This third argument is
therefore without any substance and is hence rejected.
8. I may note that counsel for the petitioner/tenant sought to raise certain
arguments of which there was no mention at all in the leave to defend
application, and hence this Court has not allowed such arguments to be
raised on pleas which have not been taken in the leave to defend application
inasmuch as the Supreme Court in the case of Prithipal Singh Vs. Satpal
Singh (dead) through LRs (2010) 2 SCC 15, has held that a leave to defend
application can only be filed within 15 days and there cannot be a
condonation of delay of even for one day in filing of the leave to defend
application i.e only the period of 15 days is permitted to raise all grounds
with supporting documents in the leave to defend application and courts
cannot consider arguments and documents which are not mentioned in the
leave to defend application. Once the issues and documents which are now
sought to be raised are not those happening after the 15 days period
prescribed to file leave to defend application, and the facts, events,
documents and circumstances are those of prior to the expiry of the 15 days
period of filing of the leave to defend application, the same cannot be
considered. Accordingly, arguments beyond pleadings are not permissible
and are rejected accordingly.
9. In view of the above, there is no merit in the petition, and the same is
therefore dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
AUGUST 13, 2014 VALMIKI J. MEHTA, J
godara
