Citation : 2013 Latest Caselaw 4961 Del
Judgement Date : 29 October, 2013
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of Decision: 29.10.2013
+ MAT. APP. (F.C.) NO.30 OF 2013 & CM 13301 OF 2013
SMT. VIBHA ..... Appellant
Through: Mr.Maninder Singh, Mr.Vivek
Chaudhary, Mr.Ajay Pipaniya, Mr.Rohit Arora,
Ms.Ekta Vats and Mr.Mandeep Singh, Advocates
versus
SH. RAMA NAND ..... Respondent
Through: Mr.Manoj Lohat, Mr.Y.P.Luckaria, Advocates.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S. RAVINDRA BHAT HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAJMI WAZIRI
% MR. JUSTICE S.RAVINDRA BHAT (Open Court)
1. The present appeal is directed against the order dated 9th May, 2013 of
the Family Court, disposing off GP no.12/2010. Those proceedings
have been initiated by the respondent (hereinafter referred to as
'grandfather'), for the custody of the minor child named Lakshay.
2. The brief facts of the case are that marriage between Late Anipal and
the present appellant/Vibha (hereinafter referred by her name)
solemnized on 07.12.1996. Out of the said wedlock, one male child
Lakshay was born on 14th August, 1998. Unfortunately, on the night
intervening 27th/28th August, 1999, Anipal committed suicide by
hanging himself. Lakshay is now 15 years of age.
3. Concededly, Vibha had exclusive custody of Lakshay till the
grandfather initiated the present proceedings under sections 7, 8 and
25 of the Guardianship and Wards Act, 1890 on 6th January, 2005.
This move was apparently triggered by Vibha's re-marriage on
23.12.2004.
4. In the petition, the grandfather alleged that since Vibha was a full
time employee working as a Teacher, she had no time to take
sufficient care for the welfare and benefit of her child-Lakshay. The
grandfather was of the opinion that Vibha's remarriage was likely to
affect the physical and emotional health of the child.
5. Vibha contested the proceedings. She is a post graduate Teacher
working with St. Anthony Girls Senior Secondary School, where she
continues to be employed. She denied the allegations about her
inability to take care of her minor son Lakshay and stated that her
conduct as a mother was beyond reproach and that Lakshay was hale
and hearty and happy child and that if any relief as sought for by the
grandfather, would be granted, its impact would not be in the larger
benefit and welfare of Lakshay.
6. After considering the submissions, the trial court took note of the
decision of the Supreme Court in Shyamrao Maroti Korwate v.
Deepak Kisanrao Tekam, 2010 (10) SCC 314 and summarized the
legal position which the Guardianship Court had to take into
consideration in the following manner:
"17. From the judicial precedents, for determining the welfare of the minor child, it need to be addressed the following guiding ingredients which are in brief enumerated herein below:-
(i) Where the child will be more happy.
(ii) Who is in a better position to look after the physical and
mental development of the minor.
(iii) Who can give more comfort.
(iv) In whose care the welfare of the minor is more secure.
(v) Who has the capacity to provide for a better education and
round the clock look after the child.
(vi) Who would be available by the side of the child when in
need.
(vii) Who would look after the emotional aspect, social setup, good education, career building and nurturing of the child as a good human being.
(viii) Where the child will have congenial atmosphere, healthy for his growth and overall development.
(ix) Where the child can be developed well, keeping in mind the ethos and as a better Indian citizen.
(x) Where he will develop as a proper human being having progressive attitude and not having constricted thoughts and outlook towards life.
7. The Family Court, thereafter, observed that the relevant circumstances
including the grandfather's allegations that he was better suited to be
the guardian and take care of the minor child. The Court rejected the
allegations about the unsuitability of Vibha on the ground that she
was facing criminal charges, noticing that the entire criminal
proceedings had been quashed by an order of the High Court under
section 482 Cr.P.C. on 25th October, 2010. The Court rejected the
second submission of the grandfather i.e. of Vibha's remarriage,
observing that marrying again is no anathema as long as the Court is
satisfied that the welfare and interest of Lakshya are subserved by
keeping him with the parent who has the custody of the minor child.
The Court observed in this respect that nothing at all has come on
record that either he is not treating the minor child properly or he is
ill-treating him or not taking care of him or not devoting time to him
or not accepted him as his son or is not looking after his welfare. The
natural corollary is that he must be taking care of the minor child
properly and without any kind of complaint. Thus by marrying
again, it cannot be said that respondent is incapable of taking care of
the minor child due to which the custody could be shifted.
8. The trial court similarly rejected the unsuitability of Vibha on the
ground that she was financially unsound, observing that she was
drawing Rs.45,000/- per month as salary as against the grandfather's
monthly income i.e. Rs.36,000/-. The Court most importantly stated
that the other sons of the respondent had separated from him and there
was hardly any other member who can look after Lakshay. The Court
took note of the progress reports of the child which were produced as
Ex.DW1/A. The learned Judge observed that Lakshay was healthy-
mentally and physically - and was excellent in academics. It was
accordingly concluded that disturbing the custody of the child at this
stage could do more harm than good and it would not be helpful for
his overall development and growth. When the Family Court had
interacted with the child, the child had shown total disinterest in
meeting with the petitioner. This, the Court noted however, would
not suffice, as far as overall development and growth is concerned.
The Court observed that it would be reasonably justified that he
should have some meetings with his grandfather.
9. After arriving at the above conclusion, the Court even while rejecting
all the submissions of the grandfather proceeded to grant visitation
rights to him by directing that he should have access to the child at
least once in a week preferably on Saturday between 10.00 am to 5.00
pm and that the grandfather should also be allowed to meet the child
in one of the major festivals in a year as per the convenience of the
parties.
10. The appellant/Vibha argues that after substantially concluding that the
grandfather i.e. the respondent did not prove the allegations, the Court
should not have exercised its discretion to grant visitation right. It
was submitted in this regard that the custody proceedings which
culminated in the impugned order in the instant case were initiated
more than five years after the death of Anipal and only after Vibha's
re-marriage. It was submitted that there is reason to suspect the
proceedings as having been fuelled by some kind of spite against
Vibha.
11. The learned counsel also emphasised the fact that the custody
proceedings were, along with the criminal proceedings initiated at the
behest of the respondent and it was only in 2010 that the High Court
quashed the criminal proceedings. It was further submitted that
having regard to the acrimonies which existed between the parties, the
visitation directions embodied in the impugned order, do not amount
to sound exercise of discretion. The learned counsel emphasised that
the court itself has recorded in the impugned order that upon
interaction, Lakshya had shown total disinterest in meeting his
grandfather. In these circumstances, the grant of visitation right was
not warranted.
12. The learned counsel for the respondent/grandfather, who moved the
petition, argued on the other hand that the impugned judgment does
not call for any interference. It is submitted that even though the
larger relief of custodial rights was claimed, the Guardianship Court
acted well within the limits of its jurisdiction to restrict the relief to
visitation rights only. The learned counsel submitted that even though
the custody might be with one or the other individual or spouse, the
right of the petitioner to claim visitation right cannot be denied. To
support this argument, the learned counsel relied upon the judgment
cited as Smt. N.Nirmala v. Nelson Jeyakumar (1999) 3 SCC 126.
13. The grounds disclose that as to the essential facts, there is no dispute.
The parents of Lakshya, the minor child were married in 1996; he was
born in 1998. In 1999, his father (Anipal) committed suicide.
14. The grandfather's relative inaction for the period between 1999 and
2005 is undeniable. Apparently, the proceedings which have led to
this appeal were triggered by Vibha's remarriage on 23rd December,
2004; three weeks later, the grandfather - on 6th January, 2005
initiated the present proceedings claiming custody of Lakshya.
15. The findings arrived at in the impugned order are clear enough as to
where the larger interest and welfare of the minor child lie. The Court
recorded that the grandfather apparently did not make any attempt till
initiation of the guardianship proceedings even to contact or support
his grandson. Furthermore, this Court is also of the view that the
relationship between the grandfather and Vibha were acrimonious as
is evident by the pendency of criminal proceedings initiated at the
behest of the grandfather till they were quashed by this Court in
exercise of its power under section 482, on 25th October, 2010. In
addition to this, when the learned Judge of the Family Court
interviewed the child, he expressed 'total disinterest in meeting with
the grandfather'. The Court's discretion or jurisdiction to direct
visitation right cannot be denied. It is one thing to say that the Court
is vested with the power to grant restricted relief when a larger relief
is claimed; in the context of the present case, yet what is an issue is
not the power but the appropriateness of the direction, contained in
para 34 of the impugned order.
16. As regards the acrimonious relationship between the grandfather and
Vibha, evidenced by the criminal proceedings, which lasted well over
a decade between 1999 and 2010, it could hardly form any ground for
doubting the quality of care that is provided by the latter i.e. the
mother of Lakshay. There is no material on record to establish that
the grandfather ever stepped forward to show interest in his
grandson's safe custody to initiate the proceedings for guardianship.
Neither the evidence nor the findings of the learned Judge testified to
his willingness to support the grandchild in any manner. Perhaps
having regard to the nature of the acrimonious relationship, the trial
court thought it fit to condone that lack of initiative. Yet that is a
crucial aspect which ought to have been taken into account by the trial
court.
17. This Court is aware of the fact that for the healthy development of any
child, interaction with his immediate relatives is essential. However,
in the facts of this case, after having concluded that the grandfather's
claim for custody was lacking in merit, since each of the contentions
put forward by him lack substance, and given further the finding of
the Trial Court - that minor Lakshay expressed disinterest in meeting
his grandfather; this Court finds no doubt that the directions impugned
in the present case ought not to have been issued. The findings which
have not been disputed by the respondent's grandfather clearly
established that the child is now at that crucial age where special care
needs to be exercised to safeguard his emotional equilibrium and
intellectual growth. Till date, Lakshay has been excellent in
academics. The mother who has care and custody in the
circumstances has by all accounts been discharging her duties
admirably despite the second marriage in taking care of the minor
Lakshay. Therefore, having recorded that the grandfather's petition
lacked merit, the trial court should not have directed the visitation
right to be given to him once a week. Such directions in the opinion
of this Court do not amount to a proper exercise of discretion.
18. In view of the forgoing discussion, the appeal has to succeed. The
directions contained in para 34 of the impugned order are hereby set
aside. The appeal is consequently, allowed.
S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J (JUDGE)
NAJMI WAZIRI, J (JUDGE) OCTOBER 29, 2013 RN
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