Delhi High Court
Court On Its Own Motion vs Sh. Vinod Kumar Jain on 22 October, 2013
Author: S.Ravindra Bhat
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Reserved on: 12.04.2013
Pronounced on: 22.10.2013
+ CONT. CAS. (CRL.) 8/2011
IN THE MATTER OF
COURT ON ITS OWN MOTION
IN RE.:
SH. VINOD KUMAR JAIN ......Contemnor
Through : Sh. G.L. Rawal, Sr. Advocate
with Sh. Alok Aggarwal and Sh. Praveen
Kapur, Advocates, for Contemnor.
Sh. Pallav Saxena, Advocate, for Punjab and
Sind Bank.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S. RAVINDRA BHAT
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUDERSHAN KUMAR MISRA
MR. JUSTICE S. RAVINDRA BHAT
%
1. These contempt proceedings arise from an order of this Court
dated 02.02.2011 passed in Co.Pet. 115/1991 in the matter of
Elephanta Oil & Vanaspati Industries Ltd., by which this Court took
suo moto cognizance of the certain accusations made against Mr.
Vinod Kumar Jain (hereinafter "the contemnor").
2. Before addressing the charge of contempt, a background of the
facts that led to the accusation and the charge is important. Mr. Jain
CONT. CAS. (CRL.) 8/2011 Page 1
was the Director of Elephanta Oil & Vanaspati Industries Ltd.
(hereinafter "the company"), a private limited company incorporated
on 24th October, 1969, (though subsequently converted into a Public
Limited Company from 29th May, 1970) for the setting up of a project
for manufacture of Hydrogenated Vegetable Oils (Vanaspati) and
Refined Oils, with an installed capacity of 50 TPD, located in the
outskirts of Ghaziabad, Uttar Pradesh. While the company performed
well till 1980, its performance deteriorated sharply during the year
1981, as it also started to incur losses. This eventually led to the
suspension of manufacturing activities from October, 1983.
3. Subsequent changes in the export policy did not assist matters,
with the company's net worth getting eroded 24 times by 1986, by its
(the company's) own admission in its additional objections in C.P. No.
115/1991, dated 17.01.2000. Accordingly, the company became a sick
unit and thus, a reference was made to the Board for Industrial and
Financial Reconstruction (BIFR) under Section 15(1) of the Sick
Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985, which was
registered by the BIFR on 17th May, 1988.
4. Concurrently, the Punjab Sind Bank (hereinafter "PSB"), one of
the company's secured creditors (and mortgagee of the companies'
properties bearing No. A1, A3 & A3/1, Industrial Area, Meerut Road,
Ghaziabad, UP, hereafter "the Ghaziabad property") filed two
recovery suits against the company in liquidation: the first being Suit
No. 2147/1986 for recovery of `4,50,76,141.84/- with interest and
costs, filed on the file of this Court and later transferred to the Debt
CONT. CAS. (CRL.) 8/2011 Page 2
Recovery Tribunal, Delhi (registered as OA No. 341/1995), and the
second, Suit No. 2194/1986 for recovery of `8,16,58,516.84/- with
interest and costs, again filed on the file of this Court and later
transferred to the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Delhi (registered as OA
No. 1250/1995).
5. The controversy leading to the present contempt proceedings
arises in respect of the company's two applications, C.A. Nos. 562-
63/2008 in C.P. No. 115/1991. In the liquidation proceedings before
the High Court, by an order dated 13th March, 2008, this Court had
issued a sale proclamation for sale of the Ghaziabad property as well
as for the plant and machinery in the premises. This sale was to be
conducted on 29th May, 2008. However, this order of 13th March 2008
was recalled by an order of 27th May, 2008 on the basis of the two
applications (CP Nos 562-63) filed by Mr. Jain, as an ex-director of
the company in liquidation. That order, in its operative part, noted as
follows:
"27.5.2008
Present: Mr. G.L. Rawal, Sr. Advocate with Mr.
Kuljeet Rawal for the petitioners.
Mr. S.K. Luthra for official liquidator.
Co.A.No.562-63/2008 in the matter of Elephanta Oil &
Vanaspati
I have heard learned counsel for the applicant/ex-
management and Mr. Luthra on behalf of the O. L. It is
submitted by learned counsel for the applicant that the
order dated 13.3.2008 had been passed in chambers
without notice or information to the ex-management. By
CONT. CAS. (CRL.) 8/2011 Page 3
that order sale proclamation had been issued for
29.5.2008. The applicant came to know of the same upon
noticing the proclamation as published in the
newspapers. Mr. Rawal, learned senior counsel argues
that till date the liability of the company qua the secured
creditors is not ascertained, inasmuch as, the
proceedings filed by Punjab and Sind Bank before the
DRT are still pending. There is no ascertained debt of the
said bank. So far as the claim of the workmen is
concerned, it is the case of the ex-management that a
memorandum of' settlement has already been arrived at
with them. Mr. Rawal further submits that the property
proposed to be auctioned is extremely valuable and there
will be no necessity of selling the said valuable assets of
the company to meet the eventual liability that the
company may have to be discharged. He further submits
that the Court has already directed sale of steel drums of
the company and they are likely to fetch substantial
amount, since prices of stainless steel have gone up in the
market substantially.
Last but not the least, Mr. Rawal submits that the
applicant is not only willing to meet whatever expenses
the office of the official liquidator and/or the secured
creditors have incurred on account of publication etc. of
the sale proclamation/advertisements by the official
liquidator/secured creditors in its entirety, they are also
willing to deposit, with the official liquidator, amounts as
may be directed by this Court to show the bona fide and
seriousness of the ex-management to meet its liability, if
any, and to revive the company.
Considering the aforesaid submissions and
subject to the condition that the applicant makes an
account deposit by 1 a. m. on 29.5.2008 with the official
liquidator vide a pay order of Rs.2 lakhs. drawn in
favour of Official Liquidator towards the expenses
incurred in the publication of the sale proclamation, and
further deposits an amount of Rs. 1.5 crore within two
CONT. CAS. (CRL.) 8/2011 Page 4
months with the O.L., the order dated 13.3.2008,
issuance of sale proclamation is recalled. Applications
stand disposed of.
Applications stand disposed of.
May 27, 2008
VIPIN SANGHI, J"
6. Mr. Jain had averred in the application- C.A. No.562/2008, in
paragraphs 5, 6 and 10 as follows:
"XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX
5. It is not out of place to mention that till today there is
no ascertained claim, though no doubt, Punjab and Sind
Bank claims to be secured creditor and have filed
application before the Ld. DRT and same is being
contested..............
XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX
6. Applicant respectfully submits and say that no
ascertained amount is there much less
payable................
XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX
10. It is evident that there is no ascertained amount ..."
7. Based on these averments in the application, and the consequent
statements made by counsel appearing for Mr. Jain, disputing the debt
due to the PSB and the order of 27th May, 2008 that recalled the order
of sale, subsequently, PSB filed an application, Co.Appl.755/2008 for
the recall of the order of 27th May, 2008 (recalling the order of 13th
March, 2008) which was allowed by the learned Single Judge. PSB
CONT. CAS. (CRL.) 8/2011 Page 5
filed an application (Co.Appl.1112/2008) seeking suo motu initiation
of contempt proceedings against Mr. Jain, for false statements made in
paragraphs 5, 6 and 10 quoted above as the deponent in those
applications. The learned Single Judge agreed with this view, and
concluded at paragraph 17 as follows:
"XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX
17. I am of the prima facie opinion that Mr. Vinod
Kumar Jain by making false, misleading and mischievous
statements and submission before this Court has
interfered with and/or attempted to interfere with the
administration of justice and has also prejudiced the due
course of judicial proceedings.
XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX"
8. The learned Single Judge based this opinion (which are also the
reasons provided in PSB's application for initiation of contempt
proceedings) on the following facts: first, the annual returns of the
respondent company for the financial years 1998-99, 2000-01, 2002-
03, and 2003-04 admit the claims of PSB, as shown below:
i) Financial Year 1998-1999:-
UNSECURED As at 31.03.1999 As at 31.03.1998
LOANS (Rs.) (Rs.)
Punjab & Sind
Bank, New Delhi
ABLC Account 7,99,98,398 7,99,98,398
Cash Credit 4,50,76,141 4,50,76,141
Account
Sundry Loan 1,07,39,582 1,07,39,582
Account
CONT. CAS. (CRL.) 8/2011 Page 6
ii) Financial Year 2000-2001:-
UNSECURED As at 31.03.2001 As at 31.03.2000
LOANS (Rs.) (Rs.)
Punjab & Sind
Bank, New Delhi
ABLC Account 7,99,98,398 7,99,98,398
Cash Credit 4,50,76,141 4,50,76,141
Account
Sundry Loan 1,07,39,582 1,07,39,582
Account
iii) Financial Year 2001-2002:-
UNSECURED As at 31.03.2002 As at 31.03.2001
LOANS (Rs.) (Rs.)
Punjab & Sind
Bank, New Delhi
ABLC Account 7,99,98,398 7,99,98,398
Cash Credit 4,50,76,141 4,50,76,141
Account
Sundry Loan 1,07,39,582 1,07,39,582
Account
iv) Financial Year 2002-2003:-
UNSECURED As at 31.03.2003 As at 31.03.2002
LOANS (Rs.) (Rs.)
Punjab & Sind
Bank, New Delhi
ABLC Account 7,99,98,398 7,99,98,398
Cash Credit 4,50,76,141 4,50,76,141
Account
Sundry Loan 1,07,39,582 1,07,39,582
Account
CONT. CAS. (CRL.) 8/2011 Page 7
v) Financial Year 2003-2004:-
UNSECURED As at 31.03.2004 As at 31.03.2003
LOANS (Rs.) (Rs.)
Punjab & Sind
Bank, New Delhi
ABLC Account 7,99,98,398 7,99,98,398
Cash Credit 4,50,76,141 4,50,76,141
Account
Sundry Loan 1,07,39,582 1,07,39,582
Account
9. Secondly, in W.P.(C) 2974/1996, while questioning an order of
the AAIFR passed on 19th April, 1996, Mr. Jain had admitted the
indebtedness of the company towards the PSB to the tune of `12.68
crores in the following terms:
"8. It submitted that the Punjab and Sind Bank has
filed suits in Delhi High Court against the company for
Rs. 12.68 crores in the year 1986.
XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX
11. That in these circumstances, when the petitioner
company, its shareholders, State of UP., New Bank of
India & other creditors were ready and willing to put the
Industrial Unit into production merely on the rigid
attitude by the Punjab & Sind Bank and that too when the
petitioner company was ready and willing to pay the suit
amount, the order passed by AAIFR and BIFR are
contrary to the essence and spirit of the aim and object
which have been sought to be achieved enacting Sick
Industrial Act, 1985.
CONT. CAS. (CRL.) 8/2011 Page 8
(emphasis supplied)"
10. Thirdly, that this liability had also been admitted again in
paragraph 7 of the additional objections filed by Mr. Jain dated 17 th
January, 2000 in CP No. 115/1991, which stated as follows: "In 1981,
liability of the company towards the PSB was Rs. 262 lacs and in 1986
the liability of PSB alone was Rs. 12.68 crores and for which suit was
filed by PSB (including interest thereon)." Finally, in the settlement
proposal dated 11th October, 2000, to settle the debt due, a similar
admission was made in the following terms:
"17. After the hearing dated 17.7.89 before the BJFR,
the Management of the company started negotiation with
the Senior Officer of the bank and thereafter the
negotiation was finalised on 27.9.89 and on the request
of the bank the company had given a letter addressed to
the Branch Manager of PSB which contained details of
the undertaking reached with the bank. In the said
understanding the amount of liability was determined Rs.
12.89 crores, as the bank was adamant for an amount not
less than the suit amount and in order to arrive at the
said figure the cut off date was taken 1984 and the dues
in 1984 were Rs. 6.84 crores though the cut off date
should have been taken of 1981 (when the company
started making loss) and the dues be taken at Rs. 262
lacs."
11. Accordingly, based on these prior admissions of the debt due,
and the subsequent averments that no ascertainable debt was due,
which led to the recall of the sale order, the learned Single Judge
issued, suo motu, criminal contempt notice to Mr. Jain under the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
CONT. CAS. (CRL.) 8/2011 Page 9
12. Consequently, on 16th July, 2012, a memorandum of charge was
issued against Mr. Jain, on the basis of the contempt notice, and the
order sheet was signed by Mr. Jain. The Charge read as follows:
" MEMORANDUM OF CHARGE
XXXXXX XXXXXXX XXXXXX
2. That you moved an application registered as
C.A.No. 562/2008 in C.P. No 115/1991 wherein you
averred that there is no ascertained amount due or
payable to Punjab & Sind Bank and that there is no
ascertained claim against Elephanta Oil & Vanaspati
Industries Ltd.;
3. That in the annual returns of Elephanta Oil &
Vanaspati Industries Ltd., pertaining to the financial
years 1998-99 till 2003-04, amount payable to Punjab &
Sind Bank is indicated and that Punjab & Sind Bank is
shown as a creditor of Elephanta & Vanaspati Industries
Ltd.;
4. That you filed WP (C) NO. 2974/1996 challenging
the order dated 19th April, 1996 passed by AAIFR in
which writ-petition it was admitted that Elephanta Oil &
Vanaspati Industries Ltd. is in debt to Punjab & Sind
Bank in sum of ` 12.68 crores;"
13. The framing of charges was recorded by this Court in its order
of 16.07.2012, but it was noted that the "contemnor need not be
present in Court till his presence is specifically ordered."
Subsequently, Mr. Jain's presence was required by the Court by its
order dated 14.01.2013 "to answer the charges". The matter came up
for hearing on 05.02.2013, when Mr. Jain was present in Court. The
charges were read over in open court by the Court to Mr. Jain.
Thereafter, after due deliberations and consultations with his counsel,
CONT. CAS. (CRL.) 8/2011 Page 10
Mr. Jain entered a plea of guilt (simply, the statement reads: "I plead
guilty to the charges"), which was recorded in writing separately, and
where Mr. Jain was identified by his advocate, Mr. Praveen Kapoor
(Enrolment No. D-1531/1995), and a copy of Mr. Jain's Voter Identity
Card (No. ARE0030528) was taken on the record of this Court.
Consequently, in view of the plea entered, the Court bound Mr. Jain to
appear in Court for further hearings and also required the furnishing of
a surety for his appearance in the Court. He complied with the order,
furnished a bail bond and surety bond, which were accepted by the
Registrar.
14. It was argued that the contemnor, Mr. Jain is genuinely
repentant and tenders his unqualified apology for his conduct. Mr.
Rawal, Senior counsel, argued that though in the affidavit in answer to
the contempt proceeding, Mr. Jain had sought to explain his conduct,
yet, by reason of his plea of guilt, recorded by the Court, he expressed
unconditional apology. The contemnor had unreservedly purged his
contempt, and therefore, the Court should be lenient and not impose a
jail sentence. Mr. Rawal also stressed that Shri Jain is of advanced age
and is suffering from a number of ailments. It was also submitted that
the contemnor is 68 years old and had undergone a liver surgery in
1993, and that he was also operated for LAP - Cholecystectomy +
Adhesiolysis under GA in February 2010. Counsel submitted that the
contemnor is willing to pay the fine which may be imposed, and also
abide by any other order which the Court may in its discretion require
him to comply with.
CONT. CAS. (CRL.) 8/2011 Page 11
15. The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, from which the Court draws
its power to punish instances of contempt defines criminal contempt in
Section 2(c) as follows:
"(c) "Criminal contempt" means the publication
(whether by words, spoken or written, or by signs, or by
visible representation, or otherwise) of any matter or the
doing of any other act whatsoever which:
(i) Scandalizes or tends to scandalize, or lowers or tends
to lower the authority of, any court, or
(ii) Prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with, the
due course of any judicial proceeding; or
(iii) Interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or
tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in any
other manner;"
Section 13 reads as follows:
"13. Contempts not punishable in certain cases-
Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the
time being in force, no Court shall impose a sentence
under this Act for a contempt of Court unless it is
satisfied that the contempt is of such a nature that it
substantially interferes, or tends substantially to interfere
with the due course of justice."
16. The Supreme Court in Chandra Shashi v. Anil Kumar Verma,
(1995) 1 SCC 421 expressed its views on the issue stating that:
"8. To enable the courts to ward off unjustified
interference in their working, those who indulge in
immoral acts like perjury, pre-varication and motivated
falsehoods have to be appropriately dealt with, without
which it would not be possible for any court to administer
justice in the true sense and to the satisfaction of those
who approach it in the hope that truth would ultimately
CONT. CAS. (CRL.) 8/2011 Page 12
prevail. People would have faith in courts when they
would find that
"satyamev jayate" (truth alone triumphs) is an
achievable aim there; or
"yatormastato jaye" (it is virtue which ends in victory) is
not only inscribed in emblem but really happens in the
portals of courts.
9. The aforesaid thoughts received due support from
the definition of criminal contempt as given in Section
2(c) of the Act, according to which an act would about be
so if , inter alia, the same interferes or tends to interfere,
or obstructs or tends to interfere, or obstructs or tends to
obstruct the administration of justice. The word
"interfere", means in the context of the subject, any
action which checks or hampers the functioning or
hinders or tends to prevent the performance of duty, as
stated at p. 255 of Words and Phrases (Permanent
Edition.), Volume 22. As per what has been stated in the
aforesaid work at page 147 of Volume 29 obstruction of
justice is to interpose obstacles or impediments, or to
hinder, impede or in any manner interrupt or prevent the
administration of justice. Now, if recourse to falsehood is
taken with oblique motive, the same would definitely
hinder, hamper or impede even flow of justice and would
prevent the courts from performing their legal duties as
they are supposed to do.
XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX"
17. This case falls squarely within the third limb of that definition,
as interfering with the administration of justice, through false
averments wilfully made to the Court. The fact that Mr. Jain, in his
affidavit to the Court in C.A. Nos. 562-3/2008 in C.P. No. 115/1991
specifically misled the Court (which is clear from the contrary
admissions made in previous statements to the Court, and in the
CONT. CAS. (CRL.) 8/2011 Page 13
settlement proposal), in order to recall the order of sale of 13 th March,
2008 and frustrate the rights of the secured creditor, PSB by misusing
and abusing the process of this Court is clear. The false and
mischievous statements made, after having admitted liability before,
in order to mislead the Court are an archetypal instance of criminal
contempt. Indeed, Mr. Jain has entered a plea of guilty on the charges
levelled against him, and thus the question of proving the charges
beyond reasonable doubt does not arise, but the nature of the
statements made, and the attendant circumstances clearly inform the
gravity of the offence that had occurred in this case.
18. The Supreme court had noted, far back, in Rizwan-ul-Hasan
and Another v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1953 SC 185, that:
"11.....................the jurisdiction in contempt is not to
be invoked unless there is real prejudice which can be
regarded as a substantial interference with the due
course of justice and that the purpose of the court's
action is a practical purpose and it is reasonably clear on
the authorities that the court will not exercise its
jurisdiction upon a mere question of propriety.
XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX"
The question, here, was not only of propriety, but rather, open denial
of liability made to interfere with the administration of justice. Indeed,
this sentiment - specifically as to the seriousness of making false
statements before the Court - was echoed by the Supreme Court in
Dhananjay Sharma v. State of Haryana and Ors., (1995) 3 SCC 757,
in the following words:
CONT. CAS. (CRL.) 8/2011 Page 14
"39. .............................The swearing of false
affidavits in judicial proceedings not only has the
tendency of causing obstruction in the due course of
judicial proceedings but has also the tendency to impede,
obstruct and interfere with the administration of justice.
The filing of false affidavits in judicial proceedings in any
court of law exposes the intention of the concerned party
in perverting the course of justice. The due process of law
cannot be permitted to be slighted nor the majesty of law
be made a mockery by such acts or conduct on the part of
the parties to the litigation or even while appearing as
witnesses. Anyone who makes an attempt to impede or
undermine or obstruct the free flow of the unsoiled
stream of justice by resorting to the filing of false
evidence, commits criminal contempt of the court and
renders himself liable to be dealt with in accordance with
the Act. Filing of false affidavits or making false
statement on oath in Courts aims at striking a blow at the
Rule of Law and no court can ignore such conduct which
has the tendency to shake public confidence in the
judicial institutions because the very structure of an
ordered life is put at stake. It would be a great public
disaster if the fountain of justice is allowed to be
poisoned by anyone resorting to filing of false affidavits
or giving of false statements and fabricating false
evidence in a court of law. The stream of justice has to be
kept clear and pure and anyone soiling its purity must be
dealt with sternly so that the message perculates loud and
clear that no one can be permitted to undermine the
dignity of the court and interfere with the due course of
judicial proceedings or the administration of
justice......................."
19. In the present case, PSB, the secured creditor, had duly
followed the process of law by filing suits before this Court in respect
of its dues in 1986, and after several rounds of litigation, having
achieved an order of sale from this Court in 2008, after a period of
CONT. CAS. (CRL.) 8/2011 Page 15
approximately twenty years. At this point, and after having suffered an
adverse order against him, Mr. Jain wilfully, and with a clear intention
to provide contradictory and false facts to the Court in order to further
obstruct the due administration of justice, i.e. in allowing the Court to
exercise its powers in order to vindicate PSB's rights, made false
depositions. Such statements clog the judicial process, and while
individually may seem small in respect of the entire matter of
liquidation of the company, are cumulatively, as a trend, highly
detrimental to the Court's ability to administer its powers as provided
under the law. There cannot be any two opinions that such conduct is
calculated and meant to undermine the authority of the courts and
erode the rule of law. To allow such wilfully false statements to
remain as they are, without the use of the contempt powers of this
Court, would render the sanctity of ensuring the presentation of true
facts before the Court redundant. In Advocate-General, State of Bihar
v. Madhya Pradesh Khair Industries 1980 (3) SCC 311, the Supreme
Court held that abuse of the process of court, calculated to hamper the
due course of judicial proceedings or the orderly administration of
justice, is contempt of court. Where the conduct is reprehensible as to
warrant condemnation, then the Court essentially should take such
contempt proceedings to their logical end. There cannot be mercy
shown by the Court at the cost of injury to the institution of the justice
system. These observations were reiterated in Kalyaneshwari v. Union
of India, (2012) 12 SCC 599.
CONT. CAS. (CRL.) 8/2011 Page 16
20. The Court is conscious of the fact that Mr. Jain has entered a
plea of guilt, and admitted to his unlawful actions. While this, no
doubt, does form a relevant mitigating factor in determining the
adequate sentence to be awarded, it cannot, by itself, deny the gravity
of the offence of making false and misleading statements before the
Court. This was recorded by the Supreme Court in M.Y. Shareef and
Anr. v. The Hon'ble Judges of the High Court of Nagpur [AIR 1955
SC 19], while explaining the requirements of genuine apology that:
"17. The proposition is well settled and self-evident that
there cannot be both justification and an
apology....................... Again an apology is not a
weapon of defense to purge the guilty of their offence;
nor is it intended to operate as a universal panacea, but it
is intended to be evidence of real
contriteness......................................"
Again the Supreme Court noted in LD Jaikwal v. State of Uttar
Pradesh, (1984) 3 SCC 862 that:
"We do not think that merely because the appellant has
tendered his apology we should set aside the sentence
and allow him to go unpunished. Otherwise, all that a
person wanting to intimidate a Judge by making the
grossest imputations against him has to do, is to go
ahead and scandalize him, and later on tender a formal
empty apology which costs him practically nothing. If
such an apology were to be accepted, as a rule, and not
as an exception, it would in virtually be tantamount to
issuing a 'licence' to scandalize courts and commit
contempt of court with impunity."
Or, as the Court quipped,
CONT. CAS. (CRL.) 8/2011 Page 17
"We are sorry to say we cannot subscribe to the 'slap-say
sorry-and forget' school of thought in administration of
contempt jurisprudence ..."
21. In a similar vein, the Supreme Court later remarked in Murray
& Co. vs Ashok Kr. Newatia & Anr. AIR 2000 SC 833, that:
"27....................The learned Advocate appearing for
the respondent made a frantic bid to contend that the
statement has been made without releasing the purport of
the same. We are, however, not impressed with the
submission and thus unable to record our concurrence
therewith. It is not a mere denial of fact but a positive
assertion and as such made with definite intent to pass off
a falsity and if possible to gain advantage. This practice
of having a false statement incorporated in an affidavit
filed before a Court should always be deprecated and we
do hereby record the same. The fact that the deponent
has in fact affirmed a false affidavit before this Court is
rather serious in nature and thereby rendered himself
guilty of contempt of this Court as noticed hereinbefore.
This Court in our view, would be failing in its duties, if
the matter in question is not dealt with in a manner
proper and effective for maintenance of majesty of Courts
as otherwise the Law Courts would lose its efficacy to the
litigant public......................................."
22. A litigant's proclivity to depose falsely and contumaciously and
then, on being caught, seek forgiveness, has to be closely scrutinized,
in the context of his plea for leniency in a criminal contempt action.
Whether the contrition is bona fide, and not merely a feint to escape
penalty is a dilemma that the Courts would resolve, looking at the
overall conduct of the individual. Here, in the settlement proposal
dated 11th October, 2000 and the averments in the affidavit of 17 th
January, 2010 (in CP No. 115/1991), categorically admitted that in
CONT. CAS. (CRL.) 8/2011 Page 18
1991, liability of the company towards the PSB was `262 lakhs and in
1986 the liability of PSB alone was `12.68 crores (including interest)
and for which suit was filed by PSB. These averments and affidavits
were known to Mr. Jain; despite these, he made false averments in the
affidavit, calculatedly to mislead the Court and stall the sale. He was
successful in doing so. Upon being caught, he initially and
unabashedly denied allegations of misconduct; later, he somersaulted
from his position, admitted guilt and begged mercy. This behaviour
does not inspire any confidence in the Court that his latter apology is
bona fide or genuine; if he was contrite, Mr. Jain should have admitted
his guilt in the very first instance, and not allowed the proceedings to
go further to framing of charges.
23. In view of the above discussion, the Court is not inclined to
accept the contemnor's apology. Having regard to the overall
conspectus of circumstances, Mr. Jain is convicted of criminal
contempt as charged, and sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment
for one month. His bail and surety bonds are cancelled. He shall
surrender and serve his sentence forthwith. The criminal contempt
proceedings are closed, in the above terms.
S. RAVINDRA BHAT
(JUDGE)
SUDERSHAN KUMAR MISRA
(JUDGE)
OCTOBER 22, 2013
CONT. CAS. (CRL.) 8/2011 Page 19
