Citation : 2013 Latest Caselaw 5757 Del
Judgement Date : 13 December, 2013
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Date of decision: 13th December, 2013.
+ RFA 529/2013 & CM No.18073/2013 (for condonation of 33 days
delay in re-filing the appeal)
M/S VARUNA INTEGRATED LOGISTICS
PVT. LTD. ........Appellants
Through: Mr. S.R. Parashar, Mr. S.S. Parashar
and Mr. Anand Parashar, Advocates.
Versus
M/S GOEL ROAD CARRIERS & ANR ..... Respondents
Through: None.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW
RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW, J.
1. The appeal impugns the judgment and decree dated 24 th June, 2013 of
the Court of the Additional District Judge (ADJ)-III, Rohini Courts, Delhi of
dismissal of Suit No.234/2011 filed by the appellant/plaintiff on the
preliminary issue framed of limitation.
2. The appeal came up before this Court first on 2nd December, 2013,
when the counsel for the appellant/plaintiff pegged his case on Article 68 of
the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963. However, the appellant/plaintiff
along with the memorandum of appeal had not filed a copy of the plaint to
show that the case as pleaded was within the ambit of said Article. A
perusal of the Trial Court judgment did not show the counsel for the
appellant/plaintiff to have before the Trial Court urged Article 68 of the Act.
In the circumstances, the Trial Court record was requisitioned and the
appeal posted for today for hearing on admission.
3. A perusal of the Trial Court record shows the appellant/plaintiff to
have on 25th May, 2011 instituted the suit, pleading:
(i) that the appellant/plaintiff is carrying on transport business;
(ii) that the respondent/defendant No.1 is a transport broker
providing trucks to various transport companies;
(iii) that the respondent/defendant No.2 M/s Hindustan Unilever
Ltd. is a contract client of the appellant/plaintiff and the
appellant/plaintiff carries goods / consignments of respondent No.2 to
various destinations;
(iv) that the appellant/plaintiff approached the respondent/
defendant No.1 for delivering consignment of respondent/defendant
No.2 to Delhi;
(v) that the respondent/defendant No.1 provided truck No.HR-38-
H2012 to the appellant/plaintiff for transporting the goods of the
respondent/defendant No.2;
(vi) that the value of the goods of the respondent/defendant No.2 so
booked for transportation was Rs.17,00,423.53 paise;
(vii) that the consignment was booked vide Goods Consignment
Note dated 22nd January, 2008 of the appellant/plaintiff;
(viii) that the respondent/defendant No.1 failed to deliver the
consignment to the respondent/defendant No.2 due to the alleged theft
in the truck and a First Information Report (FIR) bearing No.14/2008
of Police Station Alipur, Delhi was lodged in this regard;
(ix) that out of 1029 cartons, only 490 were recovered;
(x) that the invoice value of 539 undelivered cartons was
Rs.8,90,697/-;
(xi) that the appellant/plaintiff also got registered FIR No.32/2008
against the respondent/defendant No.1 under Section 406 I.P.C. at
Police Station Ranipur, Haridwar, Uttrakhand;
(xii) that the appellant/plaintiff many times approached the
respondent/defendant No.1 for settling the claim of the
appellant/plaintiff but the respondent/defendant No.1 did not settle
inspite of assurances;
(xiii) that the appellant/plaintiff came to know about the quantity of
the lost cartons, after FIR No.14/2008 was got lodged and
accordingly the consignment was got released by the
appellant/plaintiff from the Court of Metropolitan Magistrate vide
order dated 29th May, 2008;
(xiv) that the cause of action accrued to appellant/plaintiff for the
first time on 29th May, 2008 when the appellant/plaintiff came to
know about the quantity of the cartons so recovered by the police in
FIR No.14/2008 and thereafter when the appellant/plaintiff requested
the respondent/defendant No.1 to settle the claim but the
respondent/defendant No.1 did not.
Accordingly, the suit for recovery from the respondent/defendant
No.1 of Rs.8,90,697/- with interest was filed.
4. A perusal of the Trial Court record further shows that when the suit
first came up before the ADJ on 26th May, 2011, the counsel for the
appellant/plaintiff was asked to satisfy, as to how the suit was within time.
It was pointed out to him that in the entire plaint, neither date of theft nor
the place of theft had been mentioned and the appellant/plaintiff appeared to
have concealed material facts to wriggle out of the law of limitation. The
suit was adjourned to enable the appellant/plaintiff to furnish better
particulars.
5. No such particulars were furnished and dates were taken from time to
time. Thereafter, only copy of FIR No.14/2008 of Police Station Alipur was
filed and again adjournments were taken from time to time.
6. Ultimately, the learned ADJ vide the impugned judgment/order
dismissed the suit, finding/observing/holding:
(a) that the appellant/plaintiff had also placed on record copy of
FIR No.32/2008 lodged by it on 28th January, 2008 at Police Station
Ranipur against the respondent/defendant No.1;
(b) thus, the cause of action had arisen to the appellant/plaintiff at
least on 28th January, 2008, when FIR of theft/misappropriation of
consignment was lodged against the respondent/defendant No.1;
(c) that as per Article 10 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the period of
limitation for compensation against carrier for losing or injuring the
goods, is three years from the date when the loss or injury occurs;
(d) that since the appellant/plaintiff came to know about theft or
misappropriation of the goods at least on 28th January, 2008, even if
the period of three years is counted therefrom, the suit filed on 25th
May, 2011, was barred by time;
(e) that the judgments cited by the counsel for the
appellant/plaintiff are not applicable;
7. Though the counsel for the appellant/plaintiff has not argued any
further, but again a perusal of the Trial Court file shows that the judgments
relied upon by the counsel for the appellant/plaintiff and which were held to
be not applicable, pertained to Article 68 supra of the Schedule to the
Limitation Act.
8. The said Article 68 in part VI titled "suits relating to movable
property" of the Schedule to the Limitation Act provides a limitation of
three years for a suit for specific movable property lost, or acquired by theft,
or dishonest misappropriation or conversion, commencing from the date,
when the person having the right to possession of the property first learns in
whose possession it is.
9. On a bare reading of the said provision, it appears that the suit to
which the said Article can apply, has to be a suit for recovery of specific
movable property and not a suit for recovery of value thereof, as the subject
suit was. However, in the judgments relied upon by the counsel for the
appellant/plaintiff before the Trial Court, are found to be the following
judgments:
(I) Champalal Vs. Ramchander AIR 1976 Rajasthan 75, where
relying on K.S. Nanji and Co. Vs. Jatashankar Dossa AIR 1961 SC
1474, it was held that a person having the right to possession of a
movable property wrongfully taken from him by another, can file a
suit to recover the said specific movable property or for compensation
therefor within three years from the date, when he first learns in
whose possession it is;
(II) Lodna Colliery Co. (1920), Ltd. Vs. Bholanath Rai AIR 1954
Calcutta 233, where also a suit for damages for coal wrongfully taken
away was held to be governed by the equivalent Article to the
Limitation Act of the year 1908;
(III) K.S. Kanji & Co. Vs. Jatashankar Dossa AIR 1956 Patna 526
to the same effect;
(IV) Jaganji Vs. Bandan AIR 1930 Allahabad 397, where a suit for
recovery of money in lieu of specific movable property, was in view
of earlier judgments, held to be a suit for specific movable property,
though expressing a doubt qua the said proposition;
(V) K.S. Nanji and Co. Vs. Jatashankar Dossa AIR 1961 SC 1474
supra;
(VI) Sankar Dastidar Vs. Shrimati Banjula Dastidar (2006) 13
SCC 470 laying down that though Article 68 is for recovery of
specific movable property but since Article 91 providing for a suit for
compensation for wrongfully taking or detaining any specific
movable property lost or acquired by theft or dishonest
misappropriation or conversion, is three years beginning from the
date, when the person having the right to possession of the property
first learns in whose possession it is, the principle of Article 68,
applies to money claims also in lieu of such property.
10. Thus, it has to be accepted that Article 68 has been correctly invoked
by the counsel for the appellant/plaintiff and the learned ADJ is in error in
holding that the judgments relied upon by the counsel for the
appellant/plaintiff, were not applicable. The learned ADJ appears to have so
held without even going through the said judgments.
11. However, for Articles 68 or 91 to apply, there has to be a plea as to on
what date, the plaintiff first learnt in whose possession the property is.
There is no such plea in the plaint in the present case. The suit is claimed to
have been instituted within three years of 29th May, 2008, which is pleaded
to be the date of the order by which the goods recovered were ordered to be
released to the appellant/plaintiff. No date has been given on which date the
appellant/plaintiff first learned that the goods whose value was claimed,
were in wrongful possession of the respondent/defendant No.1. In fact,
there is no plea even to the effect that the goods, though claimed by the
respondent/defendant No.1 to have been stolen from it in transit, were found
to be in respondent / defendant No.1‟s possession only. Rather, the pleas
are that the respondent/defendant No.1 merely provides and „provided‟ the
truck to the appellant/plaintiff for transporting the goods. The question of
the respondent/defendant No.1 thus being in possession of the goods for the
purposes of transit, would not arise, as once the truck had been provided by
the respondent/defendant No.1 to the appellant/plaintiff and the
appellant/plaintiff was carrying the goods of the respondent/defendant No.2
therein, the goods would be deemed to be in possession of the
appellant/plaintiff only. The observations made by the learned ADJ on the
very first date when the suit was listed, of the appellant/plaintiff having
concealed facts to get over the limitation, is thus found to be apposite.
12. A perusal of the order dated 29th May, 2008 of the Metropolitan
Magistrate found on the Trial Court record, though refers to recovery of
goods, does not show from whom the goods were recovered. The FIR
No.14/2008 lodged by the respondent/defendant No.1 is also of having
provided the truck to the appellant/plaintiff and having gone missing. FIR
No.32/2008 dated 28th January, 2008 of Police Station Ranipur, Haridwar,
Uttrakhand lodged by the appellant/plaintiff on 22nd January, 2008, is also
of apprehension that Mr. Jatin Goel proprietor of the respondent/defendant
No.1 having in conspiracy with the driver, misappropriated the goods.
There is not a single document to show that some of the goods were
recovered from the respondent/defendant No.1 or as to when the
appellant/plaintiff learnt thereof.
13. The counsel for the appellant/plaintiff during the hearing argued that
the appellant/plaintiff learnt of the recovery from the respondent/defendant
No.1 on 28th May, 2008. However, in the absence of any pleading neither in
the plaint nor in this appeal, no cognizance of such oral submission can be
taken. In fact, the counsel is also unable to tell, as to when the application
for release of goods on which the order dated 29th May, 2008 was made,
was filed. No copy of such application has also been filed.
14. There is thus no merit in this appeal, which is dismissed; however the
appeal having been dismissed without issuing notice to the
respondent/defendant No.1, no costs.
Decree sheet be drawn up.
RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW, J.
DECEMBER 13, 2013 bs
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