Crescent Exports Ltd. vs Madhuri Vali
2013 Latest Caselaw 1956 Del

$~15

*      IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

+      RFA 162/2013
                                             Decided on 30th April, 2013

       CRESCENT EXPORTS LTD.                 ..... Appellant
                    Through: Mr. Anand Nandan, Adv.

                          Versus

       MADHURI VALI                                    ..... Respondent
                          Through:    Mr. K. Gangadharan, Adv.

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE A.K. PATHAK


A.K. PATHAK, J. (ORAL)

1. Notice could not be issued to the respondent since process fee was

returned under objections, however, respondent has appeared through her

counsel.

2. A perusal of order dated 4th April, 2013 shows that appellant's

counsel submitted that he would be pressing only for grant of time to vacate

the suit premises, however, when the matter has been taken up today learned

counsel submits that appeal is being pressed on merits.

3. Arguments heard.

4. Trial Court has passed a decree of possession against the appellant-

defendant on an application under Order 12 Rule 6 of the Code of Civil

Procedure, 1908 (CPC, for short), filed by the respondent-plaintiff. As

regards suit for damages/mesne profits as well as counter claim of

respondent for recovery of certain amounts same is still subjudice before the

trial court.

5. Respondent filed a suit for possession and recovery of `1,85,000/-

towards arrears of rent and occupation charges besides future mesne profits

against the appellant. It was alleged in the plaint that respondent had let out

the suit property comprising of four bed rooms with attached bathrooms,

drawing-dining, kitchen and servant quarter on the top floor of C-39, 2nd

Floor, Greater Kailash - I, New Delhi more particularly shown in red and

green colour in the site plan to appellant vide registered Lease Agreement

dated 3rd July, 2007, for a period of 24 months. An agreement for

maintenance charges was also executed on the same day. Both the

agreements were co-extensive and co-terminus. Suit property was let out on

a monthly charges of `30,000/- as rent and `27,500/- towards fittings and

fixtures excluding electricity and water charges. Subsequently, a

rectification deed was signed between the parties whereby Clause 7 of the

lease deed dated 3rd July, 2007 was rectified and it was agreed that the lease

period would be extended upto 36 months with lock-in period of 22 months

with further stipulation that after expiry of lock-in period the lease may be

terminated by either party with two months' notice of termination. Lock-in

period expired on 3rd May, 2009. Since respondent was no more interested

in continuing the lease after expiry of lock-in period, tenancy was

terminated vide legal notice dated 8th October, 2009 whereby appellant was

called upon to vacate the suit premises on expiry of two months of receipt of

legal notice.

6. As regards arrears of rent, damages and mesne profit are concerned,

the facts are not reproduced herein since the only question involved in this

appeal is regarding possession.

7. In the written statement, appellant did not dispute the lease agreement.

It was alleged that lease agreement was for a period of 24 months and

thereafter, it could have been extended for another period of 24 months with

the mutual consent of both the parties. Respondent agreed to continue with

the appellant as a tenant, thus, appellant became a statutory tenant.

Appellant violated the terms of lease and did not provide essential services.

As per the lease agreement, monthly rent was `30,000/- however appellant

had been paying a sum of `25,000/- every month as advance credit for

furnishing the flat. It is alleged that appellant was entitled to refund of this

amount. Execution of maintenance agreement dated 3rd July, 2007 was

denied. Respondent alleged that rectification deed dated 3 rd July, 2004 did

not get materialised, inasmuch as, was not even registered, therefore, was

nonest in the eyes of law. Terms of original lease deed dated 3rd July, 2007

could not have been rectified by an unregistered rectification deed. Lease

deed between the parties expired with effect from 2 nd July, 2009. However,

respondent continued to accept rent even after expiry of lease, thus,

appellant became statutory tenant. Appellant also filed counter claim for

recovery of alleged advance credit of `25,000/- per month, reimbursement

of security charges, electricity charges, repair charges etc. As already stated

herein above, the disputes regarding damages, mesne profits and refund of

amounts as involved in the suit and/or counter claim, have yet to be

adjudicated in the pending suit, thus, have not to be considered in this

appeal, which is only in respect of the decree of possession passed under

Order 12 Rule 6 of the Code.

8. From the facts narrated hereinabove, it is clear that relationship of

landlord and tenant between the parties is not in dispute and is an admitted

fact. Rent of the suit property being more than `3,500/- is also not in

dispute. Denial about Maintenance Agreement pursuant whereof `27,500/-

was to be paid is of no consequence for the purpose of this appeal since rate

of rent of `30,000/- per month as stipulated in the admitted lease agreement

is not in dispute, thus, rent of the suit property being above `3,500/- stands

established and admitted. The notice issued by the respondent to appellant

is also not in dispute, inasmuch as, the same was duly replied by the

appellant. That apart, appellant has admitted in its written statement that

lease period expired on 2nd July, 2009, that is, after two years. It is the own

case of appellant that rectification deed was inconsequential being an

unregistered document. Thus, in my view, trial court has not committed any

error in passing a decree of possession under Order 12 Rule 6 of the Code in

favour of the respondent.

9. In a suit for possession plaintiff has to prove the existence of landlord-

tenant relationship between the parties; rent of the premises being more than

`3,500/- per month so as not to attract the provisions of Delhi Rent Control

Act, 1958 and termination of tenancy by efflux of time or by a valid notice

send by the plaintiff to defendant under Section 106 of the Transfer of

Property Act, 1882. Judgment rendered by a Single Judge of this Court in

Atma Ram Properties Pvt. Ltd. Versus Pal Properties Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. 2002

(62) DRJ 623 may be referred to with advantage on the above propositions

of law. In Sky Land International Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Kavita P. Lalwani 191

(2012) DLT 594 a Single Judge of this Court held that landlord is entitled to

a decree order 12 Rule 6 CPC if the above referred three ingredients are

satisfied from the pleadings, documents or otherwise, in a lis between the

landlord and tenant. In this case, all the above-referred ingredients are duly

attracted so as to make the respondent entitled to a decree straightway under

Order 12 Rule 6 of the Code.

10. Order 12 Rule 6 of the Code envisages that where the admissions of

fact have been made either in the pleading or otherwise, whether orally or in

writing, the Court may at any stage either on the application of any party or

of its own motion and without waiting for the determination of any other

question between the parties, make such order or give such judgment as it

may think fit, having regard to such admissions. The object of Order 12

Rule 6 of the Code is to enable the party to obtain a speedy judgment at least

to the extent of the relief to which, according to the admissions of fact by

defendant, the plaintiff is entitled to. The whole object of incorporating the

procedure of Order 12 Rule 6 CPC is to grant a quick relief to commercial

litigants whenever the Court finds any legally enforceable admission, the

Court will help the litigants to get quick relief. Merely because issues have

been framed in the case is no ground for rejecting an application under

Order 12 Rule 6 for passing judgment on such admissions. In Parivar Seva

Sansthan vs. Veena Kalra AIR 2000 Delhi 349 a Division Bench of this

Court has held that the use of the expression "any stage" in the said rule

itself shows that the legislature's intent is to give it widest possible meaning.

Thus merely because issues are framed cannot by itself deter the Court to

pass the judgment on admission under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC. In Uttam

Singh Duggal & Co. Ltd. versus United Bank of India & Others (2000) 7

SCC 120, in the context of Order 12 Rule 6 of the Code, Supreme Court has

held thus "the object of the Rule is to enable the party to obtain a speedy

judgment at least to the extent of the relief to which according to the

admission of the defendant, the plaintiff is entitled. We should not unduly

narrow down the meaning of this Rule as the object is to enable a party to

obtain speedy judgment. Where the other party has made a plain admission

entitling the former to succeed, it should apply and also wherever there is a

clear admission of facts in the face of which it is impossible for the party

making such admission to succeed.

11. Learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon the judgment titled

Puran Chand Packaging Industrial P. Ltd. Versus Sona Devi & Anr. 154

(2008) Delhi Law Times 111 (DB) to contend that admission has to be in

unequivocal and unambiguous terms before a decree under Order 12 Rule 6

of the Code can be passed placing reliance on such admission of a fact. I

have perused the aforesaid judgment and find the same to be in the context

of different facts. In the said case, plea of waiver was taken in view of the

acceptance of rent even after issuance of notice. That apart, certain material

facts were in dispute. In this case, admissions of the appellant with regard to

landlord-tenant relationship; rent being more than `3,500/- and lease period

having come to an end, inasmuch as, service of notice are unequivocal and

unambiguous, sufficient enough to exercise the jurisdiction under Order 12

Rule 6 of the Code.

12. For the foregoing reasons, appeal is dismissed with cost of `25,000/-

(Rupees Twenty Five Thousand Only) payable to the respondent.

A.K. PATHAK, J.

APRIL 30, 2013 ga