Delhi High Court
Delhi Sikh Gurudwara Management ... vs Jathedar Kuldip Singh Bhogal on 12 September, 2012
Author: A.K.Sikri
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ LPA No.606 of 2010
LPA No.607 of 2010
Reserved on: 23rd August, 2012
% Pronounced on: September 12, 2012
1. LPA No.606/2010
DELHI SIKH GURUDWARA MANAGEMENT
COMMITTEE & ORS. . . . APPELLANT
through : Mr. K.T.S. Tulsi, Sr. Advocate
along with Mr. Raj Kamal and
Mr. Gaurang Vardhan,
Advocates.
VERSUS
MOHINDER SINGH MATHARU . . .RESPONDENT
through: Mr. Gurbaksh Singh along with
Ms. Richa, Advocates.
2. LPA No.607/2010
DELHI SIKH GURUDWARA MANAGEMENT
COMMITTEE & ORS. . . . APPELLANT
through : Mr. K.T.S. Tulsi, Sr. Advocate
along with Mr. Raj Kamal and
Mr. Gaurang Vardhan,
Advocates.
VERSUS
JATHEDAR KULDIP SINGH BHOGAL . . .RESPONDENT
through: Mr. Gurbaksh Singh along with
Ms. Richa, Advocates.
CORAM :-
HON'BLE THE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW
A.K. SIKRI (Acting Chief Justice)
1. The appellant in both these appeals, is the Delhi Sigh Gurudwara
Management Committee, which is held to be a „public authority‟
within the meaning of Section 2(h) of the Right to Information Act,
2005 (hereinafter referred to as the „RTI Act‟) by the learned Single
Judge vide impugned judgment dated 22.7.2010, which is a common
judgment in both the cases. Section 2(h) of the RTI Act reads as
under:
"2(h) "public authority" means any authority or body or
institution of self-government established or constituted, -
(a) by or under the Constitution;
(b) by any other law made by Parliament;
(c) by any other law made by State Legislature;
(d) by notification issued or order made by the appropriate
Government, and includes any-
(i) body owned, controlled or substantially financed;
(ii) Non-Government Organization substantially financed,
directly or indirectly by funds provided by the
appropriate Government."
2. Though Section is published in the Bare Act in the aforesaid
manner, there is little difference in the publication in Official
Gazette as far as its placement of the provision is concerned. Since
it has significant bearing on the interpretation sought to be suggested
by the counsel for the parties, we reproduce the provision published
in the Official Gazette as well which reads as under:
"2 (h) "public authority" means any authority or institution of
self-government established or constituted -
(a) by or under the Constitution;
(b) by any other law made by Parliament;
(c) by any other law made by State Legislature;
(d) by notification issued or order made by the appropriate
Government,
and includes any-
(i) body owned, controlled or substantially financed;
(ii) non-Government organization substantially financed,
directly or indirectly by funds provided by the appropriate
Government."
3. Submission of Mr. K.T.S. Tulsi, learned Senior Counsel appearing
for the appellant, was that in Section 2(h) of the RTI Act, the words
"and includes any" occurring after Section 2(h)(d) have to be read
conjunctively and, therefore, even if a body fell within the definition
of a public authority under Section 2(h)(a) to (d), such a body would
have to be substantially financed "directly or indirectly by funds
provided by the appropriate Government". In other words, there
cannot be any disjunctive reading of the later portion of Section 2(h)
and that it had to be read as one continuous whole. On this basis, it
is argued that the appellant which may have been established by a
law made by the Parliament is not a public authority, since it did not
receive funds "directly or indirectly" from any appropriate
Government.
4. In support of this argument, the learned counsel has relied upon
various judgments laying down the principle of interpretation of
statute and stressed that when the word "and" is incorporated instead
of word "or" before the words "includes any". It has to be read
conjunctively, meaning thereby, disjunctive meaning should be
permissible only if the word "or" was used by the Legislature.
These judgments are:
(i) State (Delhi Administration) Vs. Puran Mal, (1985) 2
SCC 589;
(ii) Paras Ram Vs. State of Haryana, (1999) 5 SCC 662;
(iii) J. Jayalalitha Vs. Union of India, (1999) 5 SCC 138;
(iv) The State of Bombay Vs. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala,
AIR 1957 SC 699;
(v) Pooran Singh and Anr. Vs. State of M.P., AIR 1965
SC 1583;
(vi) Rajesh Kumar and Others Vs. Dy. CIT and Others,
(2007) 2 SCC 181;
(vii) Sahara India (Firm) Lucknow Vs. Commissioner of
Income Tax, (2004) 14 SCC 151;
(viii) The Star Co. Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax
(Central) Calcutta (1970) 3 SCC 864
(ix) Hyderabad Asbestos Cement Product And Anthers Vs.
UOI, (2000) 1 SCC 426.
5. Though there cannot be any dispute or quarrel about the proposition
laid down upon the aforesaid judgments touching upon the
interpretation of the words "and" "or", we are afraid, insofar as
present case is concerned on the plain reading of the provision,
nothing turns thereupon. In the first instance, we may point out this
interpretation as highlighted by Mr. Tulsi is on the basis of text
published in the Bare Act, which is private publication. However,
the authenticated version would be the one published in the Official
Gazette, which is the official version. Reading of Section 2(h) of the
RTI Act as contained in the Official Gazette would make it clear that
the words "and includes" are not part of Clause (d), but they are
placed separately, independently and away from Clause (d) of
Section 2(h) of the RTI Act. The learned Single Judge has,
therefore, rightly interpreted this provision in the following manner:
"11. A comparison of the two ways of depicting Section 2(h)
makes it clear that in terms of the „official‟ version, which is
therefore the reliable one, the words "and includes" is not
joined to clause (d) but starts in a new line from the left
extreme margin. The categories of bodies or institutions or
authorities covered by Sections 2(h) (a), (b), (c) and (d) are
therefore "stand alone" authorities or bodies. The words "and
includes" beginning in a fresh line from the left margin is
intended to indicate another set of bodies which may not fall
within the categories of Section 2(h) (a), (b), (c) and (d).
12. This Court is unable to accept the submission made by
Mr. Tulsi that the words "and includes" is not meant to be
read disjunctively and, therefore, although a body may fall
within the Section 2(h), (a), (b), (c) and (d) it would
nevertheless have to satisfy the requirement of being "directly
or indirectly" substantially financed by the appropriate
Government. There is no scope for reading the provisions in
the manner suggested by Mr. Tulsi.
xxx xxx xxx
14. As regards the words "and includes", they are disjunctive
and indicative of a separate set of entities. The discussion in
the recent judgment of this Court in Krishak Bharti
Cooperative Ltd. v. Ramesh Chander Bawa 2010 (V) AD
(Del) 405 may be usefully referred to. There the question
was whether a multi-state cooperative society is a „public
authority‟ within the meaning of Section 2(h)(d)(i) of the
RTI Act. It is in that context that in para 13, it was observed:
"13. Before embarking on a more detailed
analysis it is necessary to recapitulate the law
concerning interpretation of the conjunctive "and
includes". The expression "and includes"
connotes that those entities which answer the
description following those words need not fall
within the definition of entities that precede those
words. The word "includes" is generally
understood in statutory interpretation as enlarging
the meaning of the words or phrases in the body
of the statute. In CIT v. Taj Mahal Hotel (1971)
3 SCC 550 the Supreme Court was considering
whether the word "plant‟ in Section 10 (2) of the
Income Tax Act 1922, include sanitary pipes and
fittings in a building as well? Section 10(5) had
defined „plant‟ to include "vehicles, books,
scientific apparatus, surgical equipment
purchased for the purpose of business." The
Court held:
"The word "includes" is often used in
interpretation clauses in order to
enlarge the meaning of the words or
phrases occurring in the body of the
statute. When it is so used, those
words and phrases must be construed
as comprehending not only such
things as they signify according to
their nature and import but also those
things which the interpretation clause
declares that they shall include."
6. Even otherwise, if we read the provision in the manner suggested by
Mr. Tulsi, in certain case, it may lead to absurd results inasmuch
Clause (d) of Section 2 of the RTI Act would apply to sub-Clause
(ii) as well, viz., NGO which would mean a Non-Government
Organization constituted by Notification issued by the appropriate
Government. Such a situation is clearly far from contemplation.
7. We are of the opinion that Section 2(h) of the RTI Act is in two
parts: an authority or body or institution of self-Government
becomes "public authority" if it is established or constituted in any
manner provided in Clause (a) to (d). Once it falls under any of the
aforesaid four categories, there is no further or additional
requirement at all and such an authority or body or institution of
self-Government will be treated as "public authority". This becomes
clear from the reading of four clauses, as such a body to become
public authority is either constituted by or under the Constitution or
by or under the law made by the Parliament/State Legislature or by
Notification issued or made by the appropriate Government. They
are, thus, having either constitutional/statutory character or
Governmental flavour because of their constitution by the
appropriate Government.
8. In the second category, some more bodies are sought to be included
by the incorporation of the words "and includes any". These are
included Clauses (i) and (ii). The requirement for these bodies is as
under: viz.,
(i) Body owned, controlled or substantially financed;
(ii) Non-Government Organization substantially financed,
and both should be directly or indirectly by funds
provided by the appropriate Government.
Thus, if it is a body either owned by the appropriate Government or
controlled by the appropriate Government or substantially financed
directly or indirectly by the appropriate Government, it would
become public authority. Any of the aforesaid requirement is
sufficient, viz. either ownership or control or substantially financed.
When it comes to the NGO, obviously such an NGO not be owned
or controlled or substantially financed by the appropriate
Government directly or indirectly by funds provided by the
appropriate Government.
9. Once we read the definition of "public authority" in Section 2(h) of
the RTI Act in the aforesaid manner, obvious conclusion would be
that the appellant is a "public authority" as it is constituted by the
Act of the Parliament. Undeniably, the appellant is a statutory body
under Delhi Sikh Gurdwaras Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the
„DSG Act‟). It is constituted under Section 3 of the DSG Act. It is
not a body made under any law, but a body made by the aforesaid
law. The learned Single Judge as rightly pointed out that there is a
distinction between the use of the words "by any law made by
Parliament" and "by or under the Constitution". The Parliament
has consciously not used the words "by or under" in sub-clause (b)
of Section 2(h). In other words, once the body is established or
constituted by the law made by Parliament, it would be a "public
authority‟ under Section 2(h)(b) of the RTI Act.
10. We are in agreement with the aforesaid view. We, thus, hold that
once it is found that an authority or body or institution of self-
Government is established or constituted in any manner prescribed
in Clause (a) to (d) of Section 2(h) of the RTI Act, then there is no
further requirement of such a body to be either owned or controlled
or substantially financed by an appropriate Government.
11. We, thus, do not find any merit in these appeals, which are
accordingly dismissed.
ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE
(RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW)
JUDGE
SEPTEMBER 12, 2012
pmc
