Sunita vs State Nct Of Delhi
2012 Latest Caselaw 5429 Del

*             HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+                   BAIL APPN. No160/2012
                                          Date of Decision : 11.09.2012

SUNITA                                             ...... Petitioner
                               Through:     Mr. L.K. Verma, Adv.

                                versus

STATE NCT OF DELHI                                ...... Respondent
                               Through:     Mr. Sunil Sharma, APP
CORAM :
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V.K. SHALI

V.K. SHALI, J. (Oral)

1. This is an application for grant of regular bail filed by the petitioner, Sunita, the sister-in-law (Nanad) of the deceased in respect of FIR No.433/2009 under Sections 304-B/498-A/34 IPC registered by PS:Shahbad Dairy, Delhi.

2. The learned counsel has contended that the petitioner has been in custody since 17.5.2010 and the material prosecution witnesses have already been examined. It has been stated by him that so far as the parents of the deceased are concerned, they have not supported the case of the Prosecution. It has also been stated by him that the only ground, on the basis of which the bail has been denied to the present petitioner by the Trial Court, is the Dying

Declaration purported to have been made by the deceased, implicating the present petitioner, wherein it has been stated that the present petitioner had poured a mug of kerosene oil on the deceased while she was making tea on the gas stove, because of which she caught fire. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the material witnesses have been examined and there is hardly any chance of the Prosecution witnesses being tampered with or influenced, therefore, she, having already been incarcerated for more than 2 years, deserves to be enlarged on bail. Secondly, it has been contended that even if it is assumed that there is a Dying Declaration, purported to have been made by the deceased, even then the Dying Declaration, on the basis of which the said FIR has been registered, becomes doubtful on account of the fact that PW4, Surjeet, who is purported to have taken the injured to the hospital, has specifically stated that the deceased did not name the present petitioner as an accused person. On the contrary, it has been stated that the deceased had admitted to PW4 that she got burnt because of the accidental fire. Reliance has also been placed on the statement purported to have been made by the deceased to the Doctor, which has been recorded in the MLC that the deceased had stated that she got burnt on account of accidental fire. On the basis of these two statements attributed to the deceased, it has been contended by the

learned counsel that the Dying Declaration, on the basis of which the FIR has been registered against the petitioner, becomes doubtful and the petitioner may not be denied bail solely on the basis of the Dying Declaration of the deceased.

3. So far as the learned APP is concerned, he has vehemently contested the grant of bail. It has been stated by him that the deceased had made a categorical statement to the SDM, wherein she has stated that when she was making tea on the gas stove, her Nanad, i.e, the petitioner, had poured a mug of kerosene oil on her, because of which she caught fire. It has been stated that the husband of the deceased had tried to save her, but unfortunately he also died because of the burn injuries. It has been contended by the learned APP that an order of conviction can be passed solely on the basis of the Dying Declaration of the deceased and in the instant case, prima facie the Dying Declaration, purported to have been made by the deceased, cannot be doubted and, therefore, the bail may not be granted to the petitioner.

4. I have carefully considered the submissions made by the respective sides and have perused the contents of the Dying Declaration made by the deceased. In the said Dying Declaration, the deceased has very categorically and emphatically put the entire blame of having burnt on the present petitioner. She has specifically attributed that the present petitioner had poured a mug

of kerosene oil on her while she was making tea on the gas stove. The intensity of the fire was so grave that not only the deceased, but her husband also, who tried to save her, died in this process. The plea of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the parents of the deceased have turned hostile cannot form the sole basis of releasing the present petitioner on bail because if one considers the testimony of the father and his cross-examination, he has admitted that the petitioner and her family members were subjecting the deceased to cruelty, with a view to demand dowry. Therefore, at this stage by doing detailed analysis of the evidence, the Court will be embarking on appreciation of evidence which has to be essentially done by the Trial Court, and in case it is done by this Court, it will prejudice either of the parties. At this stage, only prima facie view is to be formed on the basis of the evidence which has been produced till date.

5. So far as the questions of influencing the witnesses or fleeing away from the processes of law are concerned, they pale into insignificance because the allegations as such themselves are very serious in nature, where a young woman has been a victim of dowry death and has died within 2 years' from the date of her marriage.

6. Having considered the submissions and gone through the evidence, I feel that prima facie it is not a case for extending the

benefit of bail to the present petitioner. Accordingly, the bail application of the petitioner is rejected, as being without any merit.

V.K. SHALI, J SEPTEMBER 11, 2012 tp