Devender Kumar Yadav vs Govt. Of Nct Of Delhi And Anr.
2012 Latest Caselaw 2170 Del

        *       IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

%                                            Judgment reserved on: 13.03.2012
                                             Judgment pronounced on: 30.03.2012

+       W.P.(C) 8731/2011

        DEVENDER KUMAR YADAV                                                        ..... Petitioner


                     versus

        GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI AND ANR                                            ..... Respondents

Advocates who appeared in this case:
For the Petitioner            : Ms Jyoti Singh, Sr. Adv. with Ms Saahila Lamba
For Respondent                : Mr Shariq Mohammad, Adv.

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE BADAR DURREZ AHMED
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V.K.JAIN

V.K. JAIN, J.

1. This writ petition is directed against the order dated 31.05.2011 passed by

the Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi (hereinafter

referred to as the Tribunal) whereby OA No. 97/2010 filed by the petitioner, was

dismissed. The brief facts giving rise to filing of this petition are as follows:

An advertisement was issued by Delhi Police in the year 2007 for filling up 2536

vacancies in the cadre of Constable (Executive) Male. The petitioner, who applied

for the said post was successful in Physical Endurance and Measurement Test,

written test and interview and was declared as provisionally selected subject to

verification of character and antecedents. In his application form, the petitioner

had disclosed that he had been involved in a criminal case registered vide FIR No.

32, dated 07.03.2006. Yet another FIR No. 149 dated 04.09.2007 was registered

against the petitioner at Police Station Farukh Nagar, Gurgaon on 04.09.2007.

Registration of both the criminal cases was disclosed by the petitioner in the

Attestation Form filled up by him on 03.11.2007. Since both the criminal cases

registered against the petitioner were pending trial, his appointment to the post of

Constable (Executive) Male was kept in abeyance. Subsequently, the petitioner

was acquitted in both the criminal cases and accordingly he, by an application

dated 18.09.2008, requested that he may be allowed to join Delhi Police as

Constable (Executive). The Screening Committee of Delhi Police noticing the

involvement of the petitioner in the said criminal cases found him unsuitable for

appointment, despite the fact that he had been acquitted in both the cases. A show-

cause notice was issued to the petitioner proposing cancellation of his candidature

and the candidature of the petitioner was cancelled on 23.12.2008. OA No.

483/2009 was filed by the petitioner challenging the aforesaid order passed by the

respondents. The Tribunal, vide order dated 11.08.2009, quashed the said order

and remanded the matter to the respondents to consider the reply submitted by the

petitioner to the show-cause notice and to then pass appropriate orders. Pursuant to

the directions of the Tribunal, the case of the petitioner was considered and rejected

by a speaking order dated 15.10.2009. The order dated 15.10.2009 was challenged

vide OA No. 97/2010 which came to be dismissed by the Tribunal on 31.05.2011.

2. It is an admitted position that the involvement in the criminal cases was duly

disclosed by the petitioner in the Application Form as well as the Attestation Form.

Therefore, this is not a case of a person trying to obtain appointment to a public

office by playing a fraud or by concealing a material fact. This is also an admitted

case before us that neither the advertisement published in the newspapers nor the

terms and conditions on which appointments were sought to be made by the

respondents, disqualified a person involved in a criminal case, from applying or

being appointed to the post of Constable (Executive) Male in Delhi Police. Hence,

it cannot be said that merely on account of his involvement in the criminal cases

and despite acquittal in those cases the petitioner was per se ineligible for

appointment to the post of Constable (Executive) Male in Delhi Police.

3. The minutes of the Screening Committee, whereby the petitioner was held

unsuitable for employment in Delhi Police, inter alia, read as under:-

"The Committee under the chairmanship of Shri Qamar Ahmed, Joint CP/Hqrs. including Shri L. C. Jain, LA to CP/Delhi as members met on 06.11.2008 to examine the suitability of candidate Devender Singh Yadav (Roll No.900503) in detail keeping the nature of his involvement, gravity of offence, judgment of the Court and also the grounds of acquittal.

Keeping in view the aforesaid facts, the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India dated 04.10.1996 in Civil Appeal No.13231 of 1996 (arising out of SLP (C) No.5340 of 1996 DAD vs. Sushil Kumar), the Committee recommended as follows:-

FIR No.32/2006, u/s 325/506 IPC, P.S. Farrukh Nagar, Gurgaon, Haryana.

FIR No.149/2007, u/s 323/325/34 IPC, P.S. Farrukh Nagar, Gurgaon, Haryana.

(In both the cases, Shri Davender Singh Yadav has been acquitted by the Court).

In FIR No.32/2006, u/s 325/506 IPC, the accused has been acquitted because the main witness has not supported the prosecution case qua the fact that the injuries on his person were caused by the accused. The main witness turned hostile & was declared so.

In FIR No.149/2007, u/s 323/325/34 also the main witness did not support the prosecution story. He was declared hostile by the prosecutor. The Hon'ble Court recorded that benefit of doubt would go in favour of the accused and the accused were acquitted accordingly.

The candidate Shri Davender Singh Yadav had two criminal cases to his discredit. In both the cases there were allegations of use of violence and force. It shows that he has the propensity to use force at slightest provocation. Accordingly, he is not considered suitable for employment in Delhi Police and hence the Committee is of the opinion that he is not fit for police service."

4. It would thus be seen that the Screening Committee held the petitioner to be

unsuitable for appointment as a Constable (Executive) in Delhi Police solely on the

ground that in the FIRs, which were registered against the petitioner, there were

allegations of use of violence and force, which indicated that he had the propensity

to use force at the slightest provocation. Since the allegations of use or force and

violence which were the subject matter of FIR No. 32/2006 registered under

Section 325/506 and FIR No. 149/2007 registered under Section 323/325/34 of IPC

registered at Police Station Farrukh Nagar, Gurgaon, could not be established

during the criminal trial to which the petitioner was subjected and admittedly no

independent inquiry was held by the respondents to verify those allegations, the

question which comes up for our consideration in this case is as to whether the

petitioner could have been held unsuitable to be employed in Delhi Police solely on

account of those very unsubstantiated allegations, particularly when the offences,

which were the subject matter of the said FIRs cannot be said to be heinous crimes

or offences involving moral turpitude.

5. It cannot be disputed that an employer, before appointing a person, is entitled

to assess his suitability for the job on offer and for this purpose, the employer can

also take into consideration the antecedents, including past misconduct, if any, of

the candidate. It also cannot be disputed that no person, despite his selection has an

indefeasible right to be appointed to a post. It would, however, be difficult to

dispute that in the matters relating to public employment a person who is found

eligible and is duly selected in the recruitment process cannot be denied

appointment arbitrarily and without a valid justification for such a denial. It is

difficult to say that a person, accused of committing an offence can be denied

appointment to a public office, even when the allegations did not constitute a

heinous offence and could not be substantiated during the trial, to which he was

subjected.

6. In Commissioner of Police & Others v. Sandeep Kumar: (2011) 4 SCC

644, the respondent before the Supreme Court, while replying to Clause 12(a) of

the application form whereby he was asked as to whether he had been arrested,

prosecuted, kept in detention or bound down, fined or convicted by Court of law

for any offence, replied in the negative and thereby he made a false statement in the

application form. The respondent in that case had applied for the post of Head

Constable (Ministerial) in 1999. He had already been acquitted on 18.1.1998,

pursuant to his compromise with the injured in the case which was registered

against him under Section 325/34 of Indian Penal Code. However, while filling up

the attestation form, after he had qualified for the post, the respondent disclosed his

involvement in the criminal case, as also his acquittal based on the compromise.

The candidature of the respondent having been cancelled he filed an OA before the

Tribunal, which was dismissed. The Writ Petition filed by him was allowed by this

Court. Dismissing the appeal filed by the Commissioner of Police and Others, it

was held by the Supreme Court that cancellation of the candidature of the

respondent was illegal. The Supreme Court noted that the incident had happened at

a time when the respondent would be about 20 years old and observed that at that

age young people often commit indiscretions, such indiscretions can often be

condoned and therefore the approach should be to condone minor indiscretions

made by young people rather than to brand them as criminals for the rest of their

lives. The Court felt that probably while filling up the application form the

respondent had not disclosed his involvement in the criminal case out of fear that if

he did so, he would automatically be disqualified. The Court was of the view that

since the offence alleged against the respondent was not a serious offence like

murder, dacoity or rape, a more lenient view should be taken in the matter.

7. In Civil Appeal No. 7106/2011 Ram Kumar v. State of UP And Others

decided on 19.8.2011, the appellant before the Supreme Court, while applying for

the post of a Constable had submitted an affidavit stating therein that no criminal

case had been registered against him. It was on a report submitted by Jaswant

Nagar Police Station in District Etawah that his involvement in a criminal case

registered under Section 324/323/504 IPC came to be known. On receipt of the

aforesaid report the selection of the appellant was cancelled on the ground that he

had submitted an affidavit stating wrong facts and concealing correct facts and

therefore his selection was irregular and illegal. The appellant filed a Writ Petition

before the Allahabad High Court challenging the cancellation of his selection. The

Writ Petition was dismissed holding that since the said appellant had furnished

false information in his affidavit, the case was squarely covered by the decision of

Supreme Court in Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan And Others v. Ram Ratan

Yadav: (2003) 3 SCC 437. The Supreme Court noted that the appellant had been

acquitted since the sole eye witness had stated during his examination in the Court

that someone from the crowd had hurled abuses and in the scuffle he had got

injured when he fell and his head hit a brick platform. Allowing the appeal,

Supreme Court set aside the order passed by the learned Single Judge and the

Division Bench of Allahabad High Court and directed that the appellant be taken

back in service though he would not be entitled for any back wages for the period

he had remained out of service.

8. In Government of NCT of Delhi & Anr. v. Robin Singh 2010 (4) JCC

2821, a Division Bench of this Court was called upon to consider as to whether the

pendency of a criminal proceeding or a conviction or a criminal proceeding which

has already been terminated either in conviction or acquittal can be a justified

ground to dismiss a Government servant from service or deny entry into

Government service. In the above case, the respondent before this Court submitted

an application on 10.11.2007 for appointment to the post of Sub-Inspector

(Executive) in Delhi Police. He was provisionally selected subject to his being

medically fit and his character and antecedents being verified. While filling up the

Attestation Form, the respondent, though required to disclose, withheld the

information that a criminal case was pending against him in a Court of law. While

considering the question as to when a Government servant can be removed from or

prohibited entry in Government service, this Court was of the view that it would be

a serious violation of the Constitutional right of a citizen to be fairly treated in the

matter of public employment, if trivial offences committed by them would justify,

denial of employment to them. In this regard, the Court, inter alia, observed as

under:-

"Now, a man can be booked for the offence of over-speeding and perhaps may be convicted for parking his motor vehicle in a non-parking area. Would this man be of a character, compelling in public interest and for public good, not to induct him in public service? The answer would be in the negative. As against that, a man has committed murder or has broken into a departmental store and stolen cash. Would this man be of a character, compelling in public interest and for public good, not to induct him in public service. The answer would be in the affirmative.

We have a clue; of offences being grave, serious and involving a moral turpitude justifying public employment not being given. These would certainly not justify the offender being inducted into public service. None would disagree that convicted and fined for parking a car in a no-

parking area or convicted for over-speeding would attract the de minimis principle, but the problem would be in cases closer to the borderline. For therein would lie the problem as to in which side of the boundary line should they be categorized. That apart, as generically understood, offences involving moral turpitude can be classified with reference to the act being one which shocks the moral conscience of the society in general and this can be determined with reference to the motive of the offender i.e. whether the motive which led to the act was a base one or alternatively whether on account of the act having been committed the perpetrator could be considered to be of a depraved character or a person who was to be looked down upon by the society."

With respect to the case before it, the following view was taken by this

Court:-

"What is the gravamen of the allegation constituting the act committed by the respondent which was treated as voluntarily causing hurt is not known to us. What was the nature of insult heaped upon the complainant which attracted the offence punishable under Section 504 IPC and what was the act which attracted the crime of criminal intimidation is also not known. But from a trinity of the three i.e. the alleged offence punishable under Section 323 IPC, Section 504 IPC and Section 506 IPC we can safely presume that the allegation against the respondent was of abusing the complainant and threatening to beat him followed by simple beating.

All these offences are non-cognizable and needless to state are bailable. No moral turpitude, as generically understood, is involved. The acts do

not shock the moral conscious of the society and with reference to the motive do not evidence a person with depraved character. The offences are not of the kind which would justify dismissal or removal from service, if the respondent had committed the same if in service.

Thus, being charged with the said offences, of which the respondent has ultimately been acquitted, would not be a bar and cannot be treated as a bar to seek public employment and on being successful at the entrance exam, to be denied the same.

The last issue which we need to discuss is, whether the respondent should be denied employment in the Police department. It was urged by learned Counsel for the petitioner that persons who have a brush with criminal law, even if they are acquitted, are undesirable elements to be inducted as Police Officers. As stated above, there are no guidelines available with the petitioner to declare as to who is undesirable element to prohibit his induction in Delhi Police.

The respondent was born on 21.05.1987. The age of the respondent when he was made an accused in the Non-Cognizable Report would be 19 years. The trivial offence of what he was charged of, in which he has been acquitted, cannot make him a criminal of a kind where public interest requires his non-induction in the Police force and that too as a Sub-Inspector (Executive) and that means his duties would be clerical and not with arms and surely not on the streets requiring him to deal with public. Assuming that the petitioner did the acts of which he was accused of, the same is a trivial brawl which he had in the village. Some fist blows with choicest abuses in tandem were hurled at the victim."

9. In Commissioner of Police v. Naveen Kumar Mandiwaandl WP(C)

7808/2011 decided on 2.11.2011, the respondent before this Court was appointed

to the post of Constable (Executive) Male in Delhi Police. While he was working

with Delhi Police, it came to the knowledge of the department that he was facing

trial in a case registered under Section 143/341/323 IPC and this information had

not been disclosed by him while submitting the application for appointment to the

aforesaid post. Consequently, his services were terminated by the Commissioner

of Police, Delhi. The OA filed by him, having been allowed by the Tribunal, the

matter reached this Court by way of a Writ Petition filed by the Commissioner of

Police, Delhi. It was noted by the Court that the case against the petitioner had

resulted in a compromise leading to his acquittal. Considering that the offence

alleged against him was not serious nor had he been convicted for that offence and

following the decision of Supreme Court in Sandeep Kumar (supra), the Writ

Petition challenging the order of the Tribunal was dismissed by this Court.

In GNCT of Delhi And Another v. Dinesh Kumar WP(C) 5510/2010 and

GNCT of Delhi And Another v. Subhash Chand WP(C) 5510/2010 decided on

11.11.2010, one of the respondents before this Court was issued a letter of

appointment to the post of Constable (Executive) whereas the other respondent was

issued a letter of offer for appointment to the post of Sub-Inspector (Executive).

The final appointment however, was denied to both of them on the ground that one

of them viz. Dinesh Kumar was an accused in a case registered under Section

307/323/324/34 IPC whereas the other one was accused of having committed

offence punishable under Section 321/341 IPC. Dinesh Kumar, FIR against whom

was registered on 4.7.2006 was acquitted on 15.9.2008 whereas Subhash Chand

one FIR against whom was registered in the year 1999 and the other in the year

2003 was acquitted pursuant to a compromise with the complainant. Relying upon

its earlier decision in Robin Singh (supra), this Court held that as far as Subhash

Chand was concerned, considering the nature of the offences alleged to have been

committed by him, coupled with his young age at the time of the alleged

commission of offences, he would not be barred from getting public employment.

Regarding Dinesh Kumar noticing that two witnesses had turned hostile and the

acquittal was on merits, the Court was of the view that the order passed by the

Tribunal directing Commissioner of Police to give employment to him called for

no interference.

In Delhi Police And Another v. Omveer Yadav WP(C) 12899/2009 decided

on 19.4.2010, the respondent before this Court was selected for appointment as

Constable (Executive) in Delhi Police. His candidature was however, cancelled on

the ground that he was involved in a criminal case registered under Section 392/34

IPC in which he was discharged by the Magistrate on 24.11.2006. Despite his

having disclosed these facts in the application form the cancellation of candidature

was challenged by the respondent before the Tribunal which quashed the

cancellation and directed the Delhi Police to appoint the respondent, if he was

otherwise found fit. It was contended before this Court that a person who was

accused in a case of robbery could not be permitted to work in Delhi Police. It was

also contended that the respondent was not identified by the complainant probably

on account of undue pressure from him. The petitioner before this Court relied

upon the decision of Supreme Court in Delhi Administration And Others v. Sushil

Kumar: (1996) 11 SCC 605 and R.Radhakrishnan v. Director General of Police

And Others: AIR 2008 SC 578. Considering that the alleged involvement in that

case was under Section 304/324/34 of IPC, the case of Sushil Kumar (supra) was

distinguished. As regards the case of Radhakrishnan (supra), it was distinguished

noticing that while submitting the application he had concealed the fact that he had

been involved in the criminal case whereas the respondent before this Court had

not concealed any material fact. In Government of NCT of Delhi And Another v.

Jai Prakash WP(C) 3566/2010 decided on 24.5.2010, the respondent before this

Court, while applying for employment with Delhi Police had disclosed that a case

had been registered against him under Section 32/33 of the Forest Act, 1927 read

with Section 379 of IPC and was in progress. On acquittal in the aforesaid case,

the respondent informed the authorities accordingly. The acquittal was on account

of the prosecution failing to establish its case through cogent or direct evidence.

However, the candidature of the respondent as Sub-Inspector in Delhi Police was

cancelled, after his case had been examined by a Screening Committee constituted

by Commissioner of Police, Delhi. In recommending cancellation of the

candidature of the respondent, the Screening Committee relied upon the decision of

Supreme Court in Sushil Kumar (supra). The cancellation of candidature was

challenged by the respondent before the Tribunal which held in his favour.

Dismissing the Writ Petition filed by the Government of NCT of Delhi against the

order of the Tribunal, this Court inter alia held as under:

Mere involvement in a criminal case or registration of FIR is not a proof of involvement in a criminal offence unless the trial court, which is the only competent forum to record a finding as to the guilt of an accused in a criminal offence, delivers the verdict holding one guilty of the offences.

Insofar as the benefit of doubt and hostility of witnesses are concerned, these are the aspects, which will not be material or relevant to record a finding by the administrative authorities as to involvement of the person in criminal activity or his being guilty of committing the crime. What is allowed to the administrative authorities is to adjudge the suitability of a person but not in the manner that whatever recorded on judicial side by the court of criminal jurisdiction should be overreached and overridden by taking a definite view or reading between the lines in the judgment to arrive at a finding of guilt. It is trite in law that if the acquittal by a trial court is not challenged by the prosecution in higher forum by making

an appeal against the acquittal, the decision of the trial court acquitting the accused stands final and cannot be questioned or interpreted otherwise by administrative authority, which is coram non judice in the circumstances.

10. In Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh: (2008) 10 SCC 450, Supreme

Court reiterated that an accused is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty. It

was observed that an acquittal in the criminal trial only bolsters the presumption of

innocence which is available to every person accused of committing a criminal

offence.

Recently, in Government of NCT of Delhi And Another v. Daulat Ram

WP(C) 734/2012 decided on 10.2.2012, the respondent before us, who was

provisionally selected for the post of Constable (Executive) in Delhi Police was

denied appointment on the ground that he had been involved in a criminal case

registered under Section 323/341/324/325 read with Section 34 of IPC, which had

resulted in his acquittal based on a compromise. Noticing that the involvement in

the criminal case had been disclosed by the respondent not only in the attestation

form but also in the initial application form submitted by him and relying upon the

decisions of Supreme Court in Sandeep Kumar (supra) and Ram Kumar (supra),

this Court upheld the view taken by the Tribunal that the petitioners were not

justified in denying appointment to the respondent.

11. The learned Counsel for the respondents has placed reliance on

Commissioner of Police v. Ranvir Singh WP(C) 6518/2011 decided on

20.12.2011. In the aforesaid case the respondent before this Court was accused of

offences punishable under Section 332/353/186/285/506 read with Section 34 IPC

and Section 25 of Arms Act, 1959. He was provisionally selected for appointment

as Sub-Inspector (Executive) in Delhi Police but was later denied appointment on

account of his involvement in the criminal case. The Tribunal, however, quashed

the order cancelling the candidature of the respondent. Noticing that the case of the

respondent had been examined by the Screening Committee formed by

Commissioner of Police, which had given detailed reasons in support of the view

taken by it. This Court held that the petitioner was fully entitled to consider the

factum of charge against the respondent and therefore the order passed by the

Tribunal was liable to be set aside. A perusal of the speaking order passed by the

Screening Committee in that case would show that the respondent Ranvir Singh,

when checked at the place of incident, was found in possession of a pistol which

indicated that he was the person who had fired. It was also noticed that the case

against the respondent was registered on 30.5.2008 after he had already submitted

the application form on 12.11.2007 and attestation form on 28.3.2008 and this

information was not conveyed by him to DCP/4th Battalion, though he was required

to indicate the same to him. In this regard, the Screening Committee referred to the

instructions mentioned on the forms whereby the candidate was required to

communicate to DCP/4th Battalion in case he was arrested/detained/convicted

subsequent to submission of the forms and failure to do so was to be deemed to be

suppression of factual information. This case, therefore, is clearly distinguishable

on facts. The respondent before this Court is not involved in a case under the Arms

Act, there is no allegation of his having been found in possession of a fire arm or a

prohibited arm and there has been no suppression of any material fact on his part,

since involvement in the criminal case was duly disclosed by him. We would also

like to note that this decision was rendered by the same Bench which had rendered

the decision in Naveen Kumar Mandiwaandl (supra) case.

The learned Counsel for the respondent has also relied upon Gokul Ram

Meena v. Government of NCT of Delhi And Others: 177(2011) DLT 471 (DB).

In the aforesaid case, a criminal case under Section 143/341/323/354 IPC had been

registered against the petitioner before this Court, who had been provisionally

selected for appointment to the post of Constable (Executive) Male in Delhi Police.

He was convicted under Section 143 of IPC but acquitted of other charges. The

candidature of the petitioner having been cancelled, he filed an OA before the

Tribunal challenging the order of cancellation of his candidature. The OA having

been dismissed, he filed the aforesaid Writ Petition against the order passed by the

Tribunal. The contention before this Court was that the petitioner had been

acquitted in respect of the charges other than the charge under Section 143 IPC

whereas he had been given benefit of probation under Section 143 of IPC and

therefore cancellation of his candidature was illegal. Relying upon the decision of

Supreme Court in Sushil Kumar Singhal v. The Regional Manager, Punjab

National Bank: 2010 (IV) LLJ 297 (SC), this Court held that despite benefit of

probation having been given to the petitioner, there was no reason to uphold his

contention. It would thus be seen that the petitioner in the above referred case was

convicted of rioting. On the other hand, the respondent before this Court has not

been convicted for commission of any offence and has been acquitted on the

ground that the prosecution had failed to prove the charge against him. This

judgment therefore does not apply to the facts of the case before this Court.

12. As noted earlier, the petitioner before this Court had duly disclosed his

involvement in the criminal cases. No fresh case was registered against him after

he had filled up the attestation form on 3.11.2007. Hence, there was absolutely no

concealment on the part of the petitioner. Hence, it cannot be said that the

appointment was obtained by him by playing fraud or by concealment of some

material fact. The acquittal of the petitioner in the criminal case was not a

technical acquittal since he was not acquitted on account of some legal defect such

as want of a statutory sanction or prosecution being barred by limitation. A perusal

of the judgment whereby the petitioner was acquitted on 2.8.2008 would show that

the material witness viz. injured-cum-eye witness Virender was examined by the

prosecution. He, however, stated that the injuries to him were not caused by the

accused person in the Court, which included the petitioner Davender. The

petitioner was therefore given benefit of doubt and acquitted of the charges for

which he was prosecuted. A perusal of the judgment dated 11.4.2008 whereby the

petitioner was acquitted in the second case registered against him would show that

the complainant and injured Ram Avtar was duly examined as PW-1. He,

however, stated that the injuries were sustained by him when he was trying to

pacify 3-4 persons, who were fighting with each other. He maintained that the

accused Devender was not the person, who had caused injuries to him. It was

therefore held by the trial Court that the prosecution had failed to discharge the

burden placed on it and the accused therefore deserved acquittal. Such acquittals,

where the material witnesses are produced during trial, but, they do not support the

case of the prosecution, to our mind cannot be said to be technical acquittals. We

cannot accept the contention that only a case, where the accused is acquitted

despite material witnesses supporting the case of the prosecution on merits, would

be a case of acquittal other than technical acquittal. We cannot presume that a

witness, who does not support the case of the prosecution is necessarily doing so in

collusion with the accused, in order to save him from punishment, despite his

actually having committed the offence, with the commission of which he is

charged. It may be true in some cases, but may not necessarily be so in each case.

What has to be seen in such cases is as to whether the material witnesses were

examined or not. If they are examined, but do not support the prosecution and

consequently it is held that the charge against the accused does not stand proved,

that would not be a case of technical acquittal. We would like to note here that no

independent inquiry was held by the respondents to verify the truthfulness or

otherwise of the allegations which were made against the petitioner in the FIRs that

were registered against him.

The Screening Committee which considered the case of the petitioner had no

material before it which could give rise to an inference that the petitioner had

actually committed the offences for which he had been prosecuted. As noted

earlier, there is a presumption of innocence attached to an accused in a criminal

case and the onus is on the prosecution to prove the charges leveled against him.

Acquittal of the accused, after trial, only strengthens and reinforces the statutory

presumption, which is otherwise available to him. We, therefore, hold that the

view taken by the Screening Committee was not based on some legally admissible

material and therefore cannot be sustained in law. The case of the petitioner before

us is squarely covered by the decisions of Supreme Court in Sandeep Kumar

(supra) and Ram Kumar (supra) as well as by the decisions of this Court in Robin

Singh (supra), Naveen Kumar Mandiwaandl (supra), Dinesh Kumar (supra),

Omveer Yadav (supra), Jai Prakash (supra) and Daulat Ram (supra). In fact the

case of the petitioner, before us stands on a much stronger footing than the cases of

Sandeep Kumar (supra), Ram Kumar (supra), Robin Singh (supra) where the

persons concerned had concealed their prosecution. His case stands on a better

footing than the case of Subhash Chand, who was prosecuted under Section 307 of

IPC and Omveer Yadav, who was alleged to have committed offence under Section

392 of IPC.

For the reasons stated hereinabove, the impugned order dated 31.5.2011

passed by the Tribunal cannot be sustained and the same is accordingly set aside.

The respondent is directed to issue an appointment letter to the petitioner within 08

weeks subject to his otherwise being fit and completing all necessary formalities

and requirements. The petitioner would be entitled to seniority as well as pay and

allowances from the date he joins the service.

V.K.JAIN, J

BADAR DURREZ AHMED, J

MARCH 30, 2012 Bg/vn