Citation : 2012 Latest Caselaw 2152 Del
Judgement Date : 29 March, 2012
* HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ CRL. M.C. No.2675/2004
CRL.M.C. No.2679/2004
Date of Decision : 29.3.2012
CRL.M.C. 2675/2004
M/S PEPSI FOOD P.LTD. ..... Petitioner
Through Mr. R.K.Virmani, Sr.Adv. with
Mr.Rajesh Batra, Adv.
versus
STATE & ANR. ..... Respondents
Through Ms.Jasbir Kaur, APP
CRL.M.C. 2679/2004
M/S PEPSICO INDIA HOLDINGS LTD ..... Petitioner
Through Mr.R.K.Virmani, Sr.Adv. with
Mr.Rajesh Batra, Adv.
versus
STATE & ANR. ..... Respondents
Through Ms.Jasbir Kaur, APP
CORAM :
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V.K. SHALI
V.K. SHALI, J. (Oral)
1. These are two petitions bearing No.2675/04 and 2679/04
filed by Ms/ Pepsi Food Pvt. Ltd. and M/s Pepsico India
Holdings Ltd., respectively under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for
quashing of a complaint under Section 16 of Prevention
of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, respectively.
2. Both these cases are taken up together as the facts and
the points of law raised in these two petitions for
quashing of the complaints and the consequent
proceedings are identical.
3. In Crl.M.C. 2679/04, a sample of „Lehar Pepsi Mango
Fruit Drink‟ was taken on 12.7.2002 from M/s Pearl
Drinks Ltd., B-42, Lawrence Road, Industrial Area, Delhi-
35. The said sample was analyzed by the Public Analyst
and it was found to be not conforming to the standards
because being fortified with Vitamin „C‟ the quantity of
Ascorbic Acid was less than the prescribed minimum limit
of 40 mgm/100 gms and thus in violation of Rule 40(3)
of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955. In
addition to this, the sample was also misbranded for
alleged violation of Rule 32(e) and 32A of the Rules.
4. The complaint against both the petitioners came to be
filed after obtaining the requisite sanction from the
Secretary Medical on 26.2.2004. The accused persons
had put in their appearance in response to the summons
having been issued to them and they exercised their
right under Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Food
Adulteration Act, 1954, accordingly, the second counter
part of the respective sample was sent to the Central
Food Laboratory (hereinafter referred to as „CFL‟), Pune
and a report was received. By virtue of Section 13(3) of
PFA Act as prayed, the report of the CFL supersedes the
report of the public analyst. According to the report of
CFL, the said sample was found conforming to the
standards, however, so far as the labeling of the sample
was concerned, it opined that the sample contravenes
Rule 32(e) of the PFA Rules inasmuch as, the batch
number was not mentioned on the label.
5. The petitioners filed the present petitions before this
Court for quashing of the complaint on number of
grounds. Mr.Virmani, learned senior counsel has
contended that the violation of Rule 32(e) of PFA Rules in
the instant case, could not have lead to the prosecution
of the petitioners on account of the fact that the Govt. of
NCT of Delhi had formulated a policy bearing no.F-
6(228)/85/ENF/PFA dated 29.9.1985 which was modified
vide order No. 5/07 dated 14.9.2007. It has been
contended that in the said policy it was envisaged that in
violation of Rule 32(e) of the Rules with regard to the
labeling on the container or a package, is only a technical
offence and in such case, the party affected must be
given, in the first instance a warning in writing drawing
its attention to Rule 32 with regard to the mentioning of
date, month and year of manufacturing on the label
affixed and only in the event of the said offence being
repeated after a written warning, the party should be
prosecuted.
6. The learned senior counsel has contended that according
to the report of the CFL, the Article of food in question
was found to be conforming to the standard prescribed
under the relevant Rules and the only violation which has
been opined by the report is with regard to the non
mentioning of the batch number on the label as required
under Rule 32(e) of the Rules and, therefore, the
respondents cannot continue with the prosecution of the
petitioners as the omission on part of the petitioners
tantamounts only to a technical offence. It is contended
that admittedly being a first violation, a notice of warning
was only required to be given. The learned senior
counsel has also placed reliance on the judgments of the
learned Single Judges of this Court where in similar
circumstances of violation of Rule 32(e) of the PFA Rules
for the first time, pertaining to the labeling, the
prosecution against the said parties have been quashed.
Reliance in this regard can be placed in case titled
S.S.Gokul Krishnan and Ors. Vs. State Thr. Food
Inspector Govt. of NCT of Delhi 2009 II AD (Delhi)
365, wherein it has been observed as under:-
"8. It is argued by the counsel for the
petitioners, that the said violation of Rule 32 by the petitioners, even if admitted for the sake of arguments, is admittedly a first violation and vide policy no.F6(228)/85/ENF/PFA decision was taken by the Department of PFA, Govt. of NCT of Delhi as far back as in 1985, that in case, the contents of the sealed packet or container conformed to the standard laid down under the PFA Rules, deficiency with regard to Rule 32 which pertained to the particulars of the labeling on the container or packets is only a technical offence. In such a case the party concerned be given a written warning drawing its attention to Rule 32 and in case the practice is repeated after a written warning, the party committing the offence second time should be prosecuted."
7. The learned APP has also placed reliance on the said
authority to contend that so far as the prosecution of the
petitioners for alleged violation of Rule 32(e) of the PFA
Rules is concerned, this could not be stopped in the
instant case by the respondents for the simple reason
that the report of the public analyst which was received
by the department found the article of food deficient not
only on account of not meeting the standards prescribed
under Rule 32 with regard to the labeling but also on
account of the fact that the article of food was found
deficient with regard to the other contents as prescribed
in case of mango drinks. Therefore, to contend that the
prosecution itself ought not to have been launched is not
an argument which is sustainable in the eyes of law,
however, so far as the continuance of the prosecution is
concerned, it has been contended that since the
petitioners have availed of the remedy by filing the
present petitions, the respondents did not want to take a
pre-emptive action by permitting the withdrawal of the
prosecution. The learned APP has left it to the Court
regarding quashing of the complaint.
8. I have carefully considered the submissions made by the
respective sides. I find merit in the contention of the
learned APP that under the facts of the present case,
there was no option but to initiate the complaint under
Section 7 read with Section 16 of the PFA Act because
sample of mango drink was not only deficient with regard
to the labeling but was also not meeting the requisite
standards prescribed under PFA Rules.
9. So far as the policy is concerned, that would be
applicable only in case the Public Analyst had opined that
the articles of food of which sample was taken did not
meet requisite standards of labeling prescribed under
Rule 32(e) of the Rules and that too when it was the first
offence. It is only in such circumstance that the
prosecution against such parties could not have been
initiated. But in the instant case, once the petitioner
exercised their right to have the second counter part of
the sample tested and a report of the CFL had been
received superseding the report of Public Analyst report
as per the mandate of Section 13(3), there is no reason
for continuance of the present complaint and it is ought
to have been taken back or withdrawn because this was
the first offence of labeling and the petitioners in terms
of the policy ought to have been warned. This was not
done by the respondent but there is no impediment in
Court giving the said benefit now to the petitioners.
10. The continuance of the proceedings against the
petitioners on account of violation of Rule 32(e) i.e. non
mentioning of the batch number on the label of the
article of food, being the first violation, is not justified as
per the policy, which was prevalent at the time when the
sample was taken. The purpose of the Prevention of
Food Adulteration Act, so far as the question of labeling
is concerned was not to prosecute the first time offender,
but only to bring it to the notice of the manufacturer that
they are required to confirm to certain basic standards
with regard to the date, year or the time of
manufacturing so as to enable the customer to take the
decision as to whether the product is worth consuming or
not. The judgments of our own High Court which have
been cited by the learned senior counsel wherein similar
circumstances of first offence pertaining to the violation
of Rule 32, the Court has given the benefit of circular to
those parties. Although, the circular stands withdrawn as
on date, but at the time when the offence is purported to
have been committed the circular in question was in
operation, therefore, I feel that the petitioners cannot be
denied the benefit of the said circular. I feel that the
prosecution against the petitioners cannot continue.
11. The learned senior counsel has made number of other
valid submissions especially, pertaining to the
manufacturing of the food article. In this regard, the
learned senior counsel has contended that the case of
the respondents is that the food article in respect of
which the sample was taken was manufactured by M/s
Devyani International Pvt. Ltd. It has been contended
that so far as the petitioners M/s Pepsico India Holdings
Ltd. and M/s Pepsi India Ltd. are concerned, they have
been impleaded as parties to the complaint only on
account of the fact that they are supplying the
concentrate in the form of drink articles or because they
owned the designing of the trademark on the pack. The
learned senior counsel has contended that assuming
though not admitting that both these petitioners are
supplying the concentrate or are the owners of the
trademark or the designing of the label, they cannot be
prosecuted under the PFA Act for the simple reason that
the manufacturer of the article of food is M/s Devyani
International Pvt. Ltd. and moreover, no prescribed
standard is prescribed under the Rule for the concentrate
which is being supplied by the petitioners. It is urged
that so far as the prosecution for an offence under PFA
Act is concerned, the owners of the trademark cannot be
prosecuted. Reliance in this regard has been on the
judgment of the Apex Court in case titled Pepsi Foods
Ltd. and Anr. Vs. Special Judicial Magistrate AIR
1998 SC 128.
12. In addition to this, it has also been stated that Rule 32(e)
of the Rules has already been struck down by the Apex
Court in case titled Dwarka Nath and Anr. Vs. MCD
AIR 1971 SC 1844. It has been contended since the rule
itself has been struck down by the Apex Court, the same
could not have been invoked at all in the prosecution of
the petitioners. Although, the submissions made by the
learned senior counsel seems to be convincing, however,
I leave these questions open as the complaint has been
quashed on the first ground itself. Therefore, I do not
consider it worthwhile and necessary to go into the
details of examination of these submissions.
13. For the reasons mentioned above, I feel that continuance
of the proceedings against the petitioners is the gross
abuse of the processes of law and therefore, both the
complaints and the consequent proceedings are quashed.
V.K. SHALI, J
MARCH 29, 2012 RN
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