Madhu vs State Of Nct Of Delhi
2012 Latest Caselaw 1744 Del

*            HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

+         Bail App. No.347/2012 & Crl. M.A. 3207/2012

                                Date of Decision : 14.3.2012
MADHU                                      ...... Petitioner
                            Through: Mr.Tanveer Ahmed Mir,
                                     Adv.
                            Versus

STATE OF NCT OF DELHI                ......     Respondent
                            Through: Ms. Jasbir Kaur, APP
CORAM :
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V.K. SHALI

V.K. SHALI, J. (Oral)

1. This is an application for grant of anticipatory bail in

respect of case, bearing FIR No.167/2011 under Sections

498A/304B/34 of the Indian Penal Code by P.S.: Defence

Colony, New Delhi. The FIR had been registered on

29.12.2011.

2. The facts of the case are that the daughter of one Shri

Sohan Lal, named Pinki @ Gauri, had been married to

the son of the petitioner, named, Rahul Verma in

accordance with Hindu customs and rites on 23.2.2011.

The allegations are that she was subjected to cruelty with

a demand of dowry immediately after one month of the

marriage. The demand of dowry and harassment had

been attributed to her husband, Rahul Verma and

parents-in-law. The present petitioner is the mother-in-

law of the deceased. On account of this harassment and

cruelty, the deceased had gone to her parents' house

wherefrom she was taken back by her husband and

ultimately the father was intimated by the brother-in-

law of the deceased that she has been taken to

Moolchand Hospital where she was declared dead.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Tanveer Ahmed

Mir, has very vehemently argued for the grant of

anticipatory bail to the petitioner/Mother-in-law of the

deceased. The main argument of the learned counsel for

the petitioner is that even if the FIR is taken on its face

value, there are no allegations with regard to the

demand of dowry and consequently subjecting the

deceased to the cruelty which may be said to be

proximate to the date of death of the deceased. It is

alleged that one of the ingredients for invoking Section

304-B of the IPC is the proximity of time between the

demand of dowry and the date of death.

4. In addition to this, learned counsel has referred to a

judgment of this Court in case titled Smt. Inderjit

Kaur -vs- The State (NCT of Delhi), 2005 (81) DRJ

735 in support of his submisisons. It has been

accordingly contended that the petitioner deserves to be

granted anticipatory bail and she is also prepared to join

the investigation.

5. The second point, which has been canvassed by the

learned counsel for the petitioner is the ill-health of the

petitioner. It has been contended that the petitioner is an

old woman and is suffering from osteoarthrosis of both

knees and various other ailments, because of which her

movement is almost confined to the bed and she is

hardly able to move. This problem is further compounded

by the fact that she is an obese and, therefore, it is

contended that assuming, though not admitting, if the

petitioner is not granted bail, she has such a precarious

health condition that in Jail, she would require assistance

of two persons who would have to lift her. In support of

this contention, learned counsel has also placed reliance

on a judgment of the Apex Court in case titled as Suresh

Chandra Ramanlal -vs- State of Gujarat and

another, (2008) 7 SCC 591 where the anticipatory bail

was granted to a person, purely on account of the

accused being obese who was bed-ridden due to

osteoarthritis below knee, lumbar canal stenosis,

osteoporosis, diabetes, etc. Placing reliance on the said

judgment, it has been contended that the position of the

petitioner is akin to that of the petitioner in the reported

judgment and, therefore, the petitioner be released on

bail.

6. The learned APP has vehemently opposed the grant of

bail to the petitioner on the ground that the case is still

at the threshold and, therefore, the grant of anticipatory

bail to the petitioner is likely to create hurdles in the

investigations. In addition to this, it has been stated that

by virtue of Section 113B of the Evidence Act, a

presumption can be drawn against the petitioner that the

death in the instant case is a dowry death. It is,

therefore, contended that it is not a fit case for the grant

of anticipatory bail.

7. I have carefully considered the respective submissions

made on behalf of the parties. There is no dispute about

the fact that the victim had died in less than a year's

time from the date of her marriage. The father of the

deceased has made definite allegations not only against

the husband and the father-in-law but also against the

petitioner, who happened to be the mother-in-law. It is

stated by the father of the deceased that immediately

after one month of the marriage, the demands for dowry

subjecting the deceased to cruelty were being received

by them. The deceased had come to her father's house

but she was taken back by her husband on 29.6.2011.

She ultimately died in November, 2011. Therefore, the

argument advanced regarding lack of proximity does not

seem to be convincing at this stage. The very fact that

the death has taken place in the same year in which the

marriage has taken place, is in itself is proximate to the

date of death. Apart from this, the question of proximity

of time of death and the demand of dowry is not only to

be seen in the light of the time gap in terms of months

and days. What has to be seen is the continuity and the

causation between the demand of dowry and the death.

In the instant case, in my view, prima facie, since the

case is at the threshold and the investigations are

underway, it will be practically scuttling the investigation

in case the anticipatory bail is granted to the petitioner

which will create hurdles in arriving at the truth.

Therefore, in my view, the ground of proximity between

the date of death and the consequent demand of dowry

does not impress me at this stage.

8. The other ground with regard to the health condition of

the petitioner, being a consideration for anticipatory bail,

would have certainly persuaded the Court to consider this

as a ground for release on bail, but at the same time,

one cannot lose sight of the fact that the deceased was a

young newly married girl who had just entered into a

new phase of life of matrimony, where she must have

dreamt something good in her life, whereas she has

taken here life perhaps for being subjected to demand of

dowry which needs to be investigated. I, therefore, feel

that the medical ailments at this stage cannot be a

consideration for grant of anticipatory bail, at least for

the time being, till the time the investigations are

completed by the Investigating Agency.

9. So far as the judgments, which have been relied upon by

the learned counsel for the petitioner are concerned,

both the judgments are distinguishable. The first

judgment is of our own High Court with regard to the

grant of anticipatory bail. No doubt, it lays down that

there must be proximity between the causation and the

demand of dowry but that certainly is not applicable to

the facts of the present case, as has been stated by him

hereinabove. With regard to the other case, the health

condition has been urged as a ground for grant of

anticipatory bail for offences committed under Sections

420/468/471, which certainly are not as grave as the

death of a person. Therefore, the facts of the two cases

are different when compared to the facts of the present

case.

10. In totality of the circumstances, I am of the view that

this is not a fit case where the petitioner deserves to be

enlarged on anticipatory bail. Hence, the application is

dismissed.

V.K. SHALI, J.

MARCH 14, 2012/tp