Delhi High Court
Union Of India vs Rishal Singh Etc. on 14 March, 2012
Author: Sunil Gaur
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Reserved on : February 09, 2012
Pronounced on : March 14, 2012
+
C.M. No.345-347/2010
In
Cross-objection No.4/1980
In
RFA 310/1979
Union of India ..... Appellant
Through: Mr.Sanjay Kumar Pathak and Mr.Surya
Nath Pandey, Advocates for LAC
versus
RISHAL SINGH etc. ..... Respondents
Through: Mr.I.S.Dahiya and Mr.Sunil Dahiya,
Advocates
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUNIL GAUR
ORDER
% 14.03.2012
1. There is delay of 2892 days in filing CM No. 345/2010 to seek
restoration of the cross objections by the respondents.
2. The appeal as well as the cross objections stood dismissed for
non-prosecution on 17th August, 1995. The reason put forth for the
manifestly inordinate delay is that upon the death of the first respondent
in the year 2001, counsel for the respondents/cross objectors was
apprised of it but the application for bringing on record the legal heirs of
the first respondent was not filed by the counsel and in March 2009, the
legal heirs of the first respondent learnt about it when they had known
that other similarly placed claimants have received higher compensation
C.M. No. 345-347/2010 in cross-objection No.4/1980 in RFA No.310/1979 Page 1
upon the decision of their appeal by this Court, then the applicants had
approached their counsel who due to his old age was unable to attend to
his professional work for the last few years and had no knowledge about
the decision in the appeals of the other similarly placed claimants. Thus
application for restoration of the cross objections was filed in December,
2009 along with the instant application.
3. In response to the instant application, it is disclosed by the
appellant that RFA No.186/1986 Nand Kishore Vs. Union of India of
the other similarly placed claimants stood decided on 11th July, 1998 and
it is unlikely that the applicants would not have learnt about it and since
sufficient cause is not shown, therefore, this application merits rejection.
4. After having heard learned counsel for the parties and upon
perusal of the material on record and the decisions reported in Ram
Sumiran vs. D.D.C., AIR 1985 SC 606; Yad Ram vs. UOI, 117 (2005)
DLT 622; Jayakrishna vs. State of Orissa, AIR 1976 Orissa 203;
O.P.Kathpalia vs. Lakhmir Singh, AIR 1984 SC 1744; Collector, Land
Acquisition, A.Nag & Anr vs. Mst. Katiji & Ors., AIR 1987 SC 1353;
State of Haryana vs. Chander Mani, AIR 1996 SC 1623; Standard
Pharmaceuticals Ltd. vs. Gyan Chand Jain & Anr., 97(2002)DLT 290;
Rati Ram vs. UOI, 143(2007)DLT 426; Nand Kishore vs. UOI,
73(1998) DLT 108, I proceed to deal with the instant application in the
light of the following pertinent observations made by the Apex Court in
its decision in Balwant Singh (Dead) vs. Jagdish Singh and Ors.,
(2010) 8 SCC 685:-
35. The expression "sufficient cause" implies the presence
of legal and adequate reasons. The word "sufficient"
means adequate enough, as much as may be necessary to
answer the purpose intended. It embraces no more than that
which provides a plentitude which, when done, suffices to
accomplish the purpose intended in the light of existing
C.M. No. 345-347/2010 in cross-objection No.4/1980 in RFA No.310/1979 Page 2
circumstances and when viewed from the reasonable
standard of practical and cautious men. The sufficient
cause should be such as it would persuade the court, in
exercise of its judicial discretion, to treat the delay as an
excusable one. These provisions give the courts enough
power and discretion to apply a law in a meaningful
manner, while assuring that the purpose of enacting such a
law does not stand frustrated."
5. In the instant matter, there is no convincing explanation for the
delay from the year 1995 till the first respondent had died in the year
2001. Not only this, it is highly unlikely that the applicants would not
know about the appeals of other similarly claimants being decided by
this Court in the year 1998. In this view of the matter, applicants cannot
get away by putting entire blame on their previous lawyer.
6. So far as the decisions relied upon by the applicants are
concerned, it would suffice to say that there is no strait jacket formula
which can be uniformly applied to condone the delay in such like
matters. There is paradigm shift in the interpretation of expression
„sufficient cause‟, as is evident in Balwant Singh (supra) when
considered, vis-à-vis the decisions cited.
7. The necessity of liberal interpretation of „sufficient cause‟ and the
balancing of the rights of the parties has to be seen within the concept of
reasonable time and proper conduct of the parties. The test to judge
whether or not a cause is sufficient is to see whether it could have been
avoided by the party by exercise of due care and attention. Instant case is
of gross negligence on the part of the applicants. The Limitation Act
mandates that application for condonation of delay filed belatedly should
be rejected unless sufficient cause is shown for the delay occasioned.
Unless applicant shows sufficient cause, such like applications cannot be
dealt with by showing undue leniency.
C.M. No. 345-347/2010 in cross-objection No.4/1980 in RFA No.310/1979 Page 3
8. Applying the basic rules governing judicial discretion to be
exercised in dealing with such like applications, I am of the considered
view that the reasons disclosed for the extra-ordinary delay of about
seven years and eleven months, i.e.2892 days, hardly constitutes a
sufficient ground to condone it. Therefore, the instant application is
dismissed and as a consequence thereof, accompanying application for
restoration of the cross-objection also stands dismissed as time barred.
Resultantly, application for substitution of the applicants as legal heirs of
the first respondent/ cross-objector also stands dismissed being barred by
time.
9. Accordingly, these three applications stands disposed of.
(SUNIL GAUR)
JUDGE
March 14, 2012
hk/pkb
C.M. No. 345-347/2010 in cross-objection No.4/1980 in RFA No.310/1979 Page 4
