Anand Swaroop Vohra vs Bhim Sen Bahri & Ors
2012 Latest Caselaw 3713 Del

*     IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

%                           Judgment reserved on:30.05.2012
                           Judgment delivered on:01.06.2012

+                 C.R.P. 777/1999


      ANAND SWAROOP VOHRA                ..... Petitioner
                 Through: Mr. Vishal Jain, Adv.

                  versus

      BHIM SEN BAHRI & ORS.                      ..... Respondents
                   Through:           Mr.J.P.Sengh, Sr.Adv. with
                                      Ms.Gurkamal, Adv.

      CORAM:
      HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE INDERMEET KAUR

INDERMEET KAUR, J.

1 The impugned judgment is dated 20.05.1998; eviction petition

filed by the landlord Anand Swaroop Vohra under Section 14-C of the

Delhi Rent Control Act (DRCA) had been dismissed.

2 Record shows that an eviction petition had been filed by the

landlord against his tenant Bhim Sen Bahri. His case was that he has

retired as an employee of the Central Government i.e. Area Manager

Canteen Store Department, Ministry of Defence on 30.04.1987; the

premises which are the subject matter of dispute (ground floor of

property bearing No. 65/11, New Rohtak Road, New Delhi) had been let

out to the aforenoted tenant for a residential purpose and was being used

by him accordingly. Contention is that the he along with his brother G.S.

Vohra (respondent No. 2) are the joint owners of this property; his

brother was also an employee of the Central Government and he had

retired from the Ministry of Food and Supply in 1982; he has shifted to

the first floor of the building; their third brother Anil Kumar Vohra

along with his wife and son was also residing on the second floor; after

the retirement of the present petitioner Anand Swaroop Vohra, he

started living with his brother on the first floor as there was no other

accommodation available with him; his family comprised of himself, his

wife and two daughters; elder daughter was 25 years of age and younger

daughter was undergoing a B.Ed. qualification. On the first floor, where

the other brother with his family are living there are only three bed

rooms, one dining room and one drawing room which is an insufficient

accommodation for their families; their sister who is living abroad also

visits them often; the petitioner along with his family has only one room

and a kitchen on the barsati floor; accordingly grounds under Section

14-C of the DRCA had been pleaded.

3 The tenant had denied these submissions. Contention was that the

premises had been let out for residential-cum-commercial purposes and

the ground under Section 14-C of the DRCA which is only for a

residential purpose was not available to the landlord. Further contention

being that there are in fact five bed rooms on the first floor and the two

bed rooms on the second floor are also lying vacant. Further submission

being that the petitioner Anand Swaroop Vohra has not retired from the

Central Government; accommodation available with the petitioner is

even otherwise sufficient.

4 Oral and documentary evidence was led. PW-1 had come into the

witness box and proved Ex. PW-1/2 which was his retirement order; his

pension order was proved as Ex. PW-1/3; he had on oath deposed that

on the first floor, there were three bed rooms, one store, one study room

where his brother (other co-owner) G.S. Vohra and the family of Anil

Vohra are residing. The accommodation presently available with him is

only one bed room on the first floor with an improvised kitchen on the

barsati floor; contention being that his wife has to cook in this open

space in the improvised kitchen; accommodation available with his is

highly insufficient.

5 Per contra, two witnesses had been examined on behalf of the

tenant. RW-1 is the son of the tenant; his contention was that they were

living in the disputed premises since the year 1959; the draftsman RW-2

has proved the site plan.

6 Before dealing with the aforenoted contentions, relevant would it

be to extract the provisions of Section 14-C of the DRCA which inter-

alia reads as follows:-

"14-C. Right to recover immediate possession of the premises to accrued to Central Government and Delhi Administration employees.- (1) Where the landlord is a retired employee of the Central Government or of the Delhi Administration, and the premises let out by him are required for his own residence, such employee may, within one year from the date of his retirement or within a period of one year from the date of commencement of the Delhi Rent Control (Amendment) Act, 1988 whichever is later apply to the Controller for recovering the immediate possession of such premises (2) Where the landlord is an employee of the Central Government or of the Delhi Administration and has a period of less than one year preceding the date of his retirement and the premises let out by him are required by him for his own residence after his retirement, he may, at any time within a period of one year before the date of his retirement, apply to the Controller for recovering the immediate possession of such premises.

(3) Whether the landlord referred to in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) has let out more than one premises, it shall be open to him to make an application under that sub-section in respect of only one of the premises chosen by him."

7 Proceedings under Section 14-C can be initiated by a landlord

who is in the service of the Central Government or of the Delhi

Administration and the premises are required by him for his own

residence; the landlord has to plead and show that after his retirement or

is likely to retire within one year from his employment with the Central

Government or of the Delhi Administration, the premises are bonafide

required by him; the need must be real and genuine. Section 14-C thus

classifies two categories of the landlords who seek immediate

possession of the premises; the first category is of those who are retired

employees of the Central Government or of Delhi Administration and

the second category consists of those landlords who are likely to retire

and have a period of less than one year preceding the date of their

retirement. Such class of landlords are entitled to immediate possession

of the premises let out by them if they are able to show that the premises

are required bonafide for their own residence.

8 Present petition has been filed within one year from the date of

the amendment i.e. of the incorporation of Section 14-C which was

added into the Statute w.e.f. 01.04.1988; the documentary evidence Ex.

PW-1/2 and Ex. PW-1/3 also evidence the fact that the petitioner has

retired from the service of the Central Government and he is drawing a

pension.

9 The ARC vide his judgment and decree dated 20.05.1988 had

dismissed the eviction petition; it was held that the premises are not

required bonafide by the landlord; the accommodation already available

with him on the first and second floor of the disputed premises is

sufficient; on this ground alone, the petition was dismissed.

10 Arguments have been addressed at length by learned senior

counsel appearing for both the parties. Written submissions have also

been filed by both the parties.

11 Record has been perused. The landlord Anand Swaroop Vohra

has on 22.01.2005 during the pendency of this revision petition died; his

brother G.S. Vohra (admittedly a co-owner) has also died during the

pendency of this petition on 05.12.2005; this eviction petition has been

pursued by their widows namely Smt. Satya Vohra and Rukmani Vohra;

both of them are in their late 70‟s; they are suffering from old age

ailments and feeble health; there is no dispute to the factum that the

husbands of both the aforenoted ladies namely Satya Vohra and

Rukmani Vohra have retired from Government service; at the time when

the eviction petition was instituted by Anand Swaroop Vohra which was

on 11.04.1989, the cause of action under Section 14-C of the DRCA was

admittedly available to him; the fact that he has died during the

pendency of the eviction petition does not in any manner make any

difference to the pendency of these proceedings and the submission of

the tenant that the eviction petition under Section 14-C of the DRCA has

become infructuous carries no weight. The bonafide need of the landlord

has to be examined as on the date of institution of the proceedings. The

Apex Court in (2004) 5 SCC 772 Shakuntala Bai and Others Vs.

Narayan Das and Others had inter alia held as follows:

"........ The bona fide need of the landlord has to be examined as on the date of institution of the proceedings and if a decree for eviction is passed, the death of the landlord during the pendency of the appeal preferred by the tenant will make no difference as his heirs are fully entitled to defend the estate."

In this case, the eviction petition had been filed under Section 14

(1)(e) of the DRCA; the Apex Court had noted that merely by reason of

death of the original landlord, bonafide need would not come to an end

and the eviction suit was liable to be continued. In 155 (2008) DLT 681

Dharam Pal Gupta Vs. Anand Prakash a Bench of this Court had noted

that where during the pendency of the revision petition which had taken

eight long years, the father of the landlord had died because of the

progress of the litigation at a snail‟s pace, it would be unfair that a

defendant‟s trial should de-novo start again and the petition cannot come

to an end merely because of this event which has taken place in this

intervening period.

12 Thus this Court is in agreement with the learned senior counsel

for the petitioner that the date of filing of the eviction petition is the

relevant date for deciding the controversy between the parties;

admittedly as on date of the filing eviction which was on 10.04.1989

(which was an eviction petition under Section 14-C of the DRCA);

Anand Swaroop Vohra had retired as a Government servant from the

Central Government and he was drawing pension; this fact finding

returned by the ARC is even otherwise not in challenge as no cross-

appeal/objections have been filed by the tenant. The retirement order of

Anand Swaroop Vohra and his pension order Ex. PW-1/2 and Ex. PW-

1/3 had been proved before the ARC. Present eviction petition was filed

within one year from the date when this provision was introduced.

Eviction petition under Section 14-C of the DRCA was fully

maintainable on this count. The right which had accrued to the erstwhile

landlord namely Anand Swaroop Vohra under Section 14-C of the

DRCA which was a special right for a special class of landlords and

which right was available to him on the date of institution of the

petition, would continue in favour of his legal representative who is his

widow. Proceedings would not abate.

13 Next submission of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner

is advanced upon a judgment reported as 155 (2008) DLT 658 Ranjit

Kumar Chopra Vs. Virinder Khosla to support an argument that where

the premises are lying locked and sealed for a long period of time as is

so in the instant case such a tenant cannot be permitted to take

advantage of the technicalities of law and should not be allowed to

pervade the rule of law; justice demands that such a tenant who has a

palatial house of his own and tenanted premises have been kept under

his lock and key only for some kind of a perverted pleasure should not

be permitted to further retain the premises; it would otherwise amount to

a travesty of justice. For the same proposition, reliance has also been

placed upon 156 (2009) DLT 760 P.C. Jain & Others Vs. J.K. Son.

14 This submission has force. The Rent Control Act is a piece of

social legislation which has been enacted to protect tenants from

frivolous eviction petitions but at the same time justice also has to be

meted out to the landlord and a balanced approach must be maintained.

RW-1 (Om Kumar, the son of the original tenant Bhim Sen) in his

cross-examination has admitted that he is one of the co-owners of

property No. 59/27, Prabhat Road, Karol Bagh; he has admitted the

photographs Ex. RW-1/P-1 to Ex. RW-1/P-2 which are photographs of

the aforenoted property and a perusal of these photographs show that

this building which has been described in the words of the learned senior

counsel as a „palace‟ appears to be no short of it. The original tenant

Bhim Sen has expired and the petition is now being contested by his

legal representatives primary of whom is Om Kumar, (the son who was

also present in Court at the time of hearing). He has admitted that he is

the owner of the property and is presently residing there. It is also not in

dispute that there was another property which had also been created by

Bhim Sen (the original tenant) which is property bearing No. 11/35,

Punjabi Bagh, which is now owned by his second son namely D.K. Bali;

photographs of this property Ex. RW-1/P-3 to Ex. RW-1/P-4 have also

been proved in the version of RW-1 who has admitted that this property

belongs to his brother D.K. Bali; this is also a beautifully structured two

floor house. This being the admitted factual position, the submission of

the learned counsel for the petitioner that the eviction petition is liable to

be decreed under Sections 14 (1)(h) and 14 (1)(hh) of the DRCA also

carries weight.

15 In this context, a Bench of this Court in 155 (2008) DLT 658

Ranjit Kumar Chopra Vs. Virinder Khosla while considering the factual

matrix of a petition filed by the landlord under Section 14 (1)(e) of the

DRCA where there was a categorical submission that the tenant was

keeping the premises locked and was only occasionally using them, the

Court had disregarded this fact that the petition had been filed under

Section 14 (1)(e) of the DRCA and had ordered eviction under Section

14 (1)(h) of the DRCA. The observations made therein are relevant and

read as under:-

"The intent and purpose of Rent Control Legislation was to see that the because of shortage of accommodation in a city like Delhi, the tenants are not made to shuttle from one house to other. The purpose was not to give a tool in the hands of tenants to exploit the landlords. That is why, the legislation categorically provided under Section 14(1)(h) that if the tenant acquires the residential accommodation, the landlord has a ground for his eviction. It is settled law that merely non mentioning of the provisions of law, is not a fatal defect and the Court can take note of correct

provision of law and give relief. Despite the fact that the landlord had not mentioned provisions of Section 14(1)(h), I consider that it was a fit case where learned ARC should have given benefit of Section 14(1)(h) to the landlord and should have ordered eviction because the tenant had acquired a farm house in Ludhiana for his own and his family's requirements and had been keeping the premises in question under his lock and key just for his visits to Delhi."

16 The present premises (as noted supra) is a ground floor of

property bearing No. 65/11, New Rohtak Road, New Delhi. This is on a

130 square yard plot; the first floor and the second floor are with the

landlord where the families of three brothers i.e. Anand Swaroop Vohra,

G.S. Vohra and Anil Vohra are residing; it is an admitted fact that the

families of Anand Swaroop Vohra and G.S. Vohra are residing in these

premises; dispute has been raised by the tenant about the residence of

Anil Vohra. Be that as it may, even assuming that Anil Vohra is not

residing there, families of the other two brothers comprise of themselves

and their wives. Unfortunately the two brothers have died. They have

two widows and each of the two brothers have two adult children.

Anand Swaroop Vohra has two married daughters who visit him often

with their husbands and their children. The other brother and co-owner

G.S. Vohra also has two children, one son and one married daughter. It

is also not in the dispute that both the widows Satya Vohra and Rukmani

Vohra are in the evening years of their life being more than 70 years of

age and it is but obvious that they are suffering from accompanying old

age ailments which includes difficulty in climbing up to the first floor;

accommodation available with the landladies as on date is on first and

the second floor; all these are admitted facts. Petition had been

dismissed only for the reason that the bonafide need of the landlord has

not been established. Accommodation presently available on the first

floor (as is evident from the site plan) (Ex.RW-2/1) is five rooms; there

is one room on the second floor. Requirement of the Staya Vohra

(widow of the petitioner) is one room for herself, one guest room for her

two visiting married daughters, one drawing cum dining room and one

kitchen. The widow of the other co-owner namely Rukmani Devi is

also admittedly a resident of the first floor; her requirement is also the

same. No doubt the eviction petition has been filed by Anand Swaroop

Vohara (deceased husband of Satya Vohra) but the need of Rukmani

Devi (widow of the other co-owner and already living in a portion

thereof) cannot be ignored. The fact that both the ladies are aged more

than 70 years and suffering from age old ailments including knee and

joint pains and cannot climb the first floor (which is the only

accommodation presently available with them) are also facts which can

neither be overlooked and nor brushed away. For the sake of argument

even presuming that the need of Rukmani Devi is not to be looked into,

are cannot loose sight of the fact that the demised premises are on the

ground floor; these premises alone can serve the need of the widow

Satya Vohra i.e. her need to set up her residence on the ground floor of

her house in her sunset years. Her need is a bonafide and a genuine

need. In fact it would be highly unfair to deny to such a landlord the

comfort and convenience of her residence on the ground floor merely

because of a recalcitrant tenant who has locked the premises and is

admittedly living at 59/27, Prabhat Road, Karol Bagh in a property

owned by him. His other brother D.K. Bali is also the owner of the two

storeyed house at 11/35, Punjabi Bagh. All these facts have been

admitted by RW-1 in his cross-examination. This litigation has even

otherwise expansed over a period of three decades; nothing more is

required to be said about the rigmaroles in which a litigant is caught in

fighting for her right.

17 In this background the submission of the respondent that the

proceedings filed by Anand Swaroop Vohra have abated; on his death as

the requirement of Section 14-C of the DRCA stands frustrated is an

argument without merit.

18 The second submission of the learned counsel for the respondent

is that the premises had been let out for a residential-cum-commercial

purpose and not for a residential purpose alone and this is evident from

the order passed the then ARC on 14.02.1992 in E.P. No. 240/1970

(titled as Bhim Sen Bahri Vs. G.S. Vohra) and as such the present

petition under Section 14-C of the DRCA (which is for a residential

purpose alone) would not be maintainable is again an argument without

merit.

19 Record shows that the present eviction petition under Section

14-C of the DRCA had been filed on 11.04.1989; it was summarily

rejected by the ARC on 14.02.1992 holding that the petition is not

maintainable against which the civil revision was also dismissed in

limine on 27.04.1992. The Apex Court on 21.07.1994 had allowed the

petition holding that the petition under Section 14-C of the DRCA was

maintainable and the matter had been remanded back to the Rent

Controller wherein the petition was decided and has now finally come

up before this Court. Thus this argument of the respondent that the

premises had not been let out for a residential purpose is an argument no

longer available to him; it is accordingly rejected.

20 The last submission of the learned counsel for the respondent is

bordered on an argument that subsequent events would have no

relevance; submission being that it is the case of the petitioner himself

that it is on the date of institution of the petition that the rights of the

parties crystallize and no subsequent events can be looked into

thereafter.

21 In VIII (2007) SLT 629 = 2007 (2) RLR 481, Carona Ltd. vs.

Parvathy Swaminathan and Sons, the Supreme Court had considered the

impact of subsequent events on an eviction decree and had held as

under:

"37. In our judgment, the law is fairly settled. The basic rule is that the rights of the parties should be determined on the basis of the date of institution of the suit. Thus, if the plaintiff has no cause of action on the date of the filing of the suit, ordinarily, he will not be allowed to take advantage of the cause of action arising subsequent to the filing of the suit. Conversely, no relief will normally be denied to the plaintiff by reason of any subsequent event if at the date of the institution of the suit, he has a substantive right to claim such relief."

22 Cause of action was admittedly available to the landlord on

08.01.1988 when this eviction petition was filed. Events which have

occurred during the pendency of the revision petition i.e. the fact of the

death of the landlord; the fact that over this period of 25 years when this

litigation remained pending the widow of the landlord had aged and

reached the sunset years of her life; are changes of nature which have

occurred over the passage of time and over which no one has control;

these cannot be ignored.

23 Alternate submission of the learned senior counsel for the

petitioner being that in the other eventuality if this Court is of the view

that the petition under Section 14-C of the DRCA has to die for one

reason or the other, the same petition can be converted into a petition

under Section 14-D of the DRCA which is a right available to a widow

to seek eviction of a tenant under the same summary procedure as is

contained for a landlord under Section 14-C of the DRCA; further

submission being that all the essential ingredients of Section 14-D of the

DRCA stand proved. For this proposition reliance has been placed upon

1995 Supp (3) SCC 172 V. Rajaswari Vs. Bombay Tyres Intl. Ltd.;

contention being that in this case which was an unfortunate case of the

landlord having filed an eviction petition under Section 14 (1)(e) of the

DRCA on which she could not succeed; the Apex Court in its wisdom

had converted the eviction petition into a petition under Section 14-D of

the DRCA and the essential ingredients of Section 14-D of the DRCA

having been made out, had decreed the petition under Section 14-D of

the DRCA. However since this Court has held that the right to continue

the eviction petition under Section 14-C of the DRCA can be availed of

by the widow of the landlord, this arguments need not now be answered.

24 It can thus safely be summed up that this beneficial legislation

which has been engrafted under Section 14-C of the DRCA for the

benefit of a retired employee of the Central Government or of the Delhi

Administration or a person who is on the verge of retirement would also

be a benefit which must enure in favour of his legal representative; this

would only be his right to continue the litigation which had been

initiated by the deceased which in this case was more than a quarter of a

century ago i.e in the year 1988. Needless to state that this right is only a

right to continue the litigation; the necessary ingredients encompassing

Section 14-C of the DRCA would still have to be proved. In this

context, the word "own residence" as occurring in Section 14-C also

gains relevance. The word "own" residence in fact appears in all the

sections i.e.. Sections 14-B to 14-D; this word "own" necessarily

implies an individual need i.e. the need for one‟s self; this self is

however not restricted to the landlord/landlady himself/herself; it

necessarily encompasses those family members who were dependent

upon him for their need for accommodation. A Bench of this Court in

AIR 1990 (Del) 290 P.P. Kapur Vs. Union of India had the occasion to

expound upon the expression „own residence‟ in the context of Section

14-D of the DRCA. The observations returned therein are relevant and

read as under:-

"The use of the expression 'own residence' must mean residence of the landlady with such person without whom she cannot be expected, in normal circumstances, to live. In a sense, Section 14-D is wider than Section 14(1)(e). Whereas under Section 14(1)(e) it is only the requirement of the members of the family, other than the landlord, which are to be taken into consideration but for the purpose of Section 14- D what is to be seen is the requirement of the widow who may need a companion, who may be an old friend, relative or a trusted servant, without whom it is not possible for her to reside alone. A widow may be able to set up residence only if she has other person's to live with her. A widow, in this country, needs social as well as emotional security plus she may have obligations towards her near and distant relations, without whom she cannot live. It will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case as to who are the other persons whose residence in the premises is to be regarded as the need or requirement of the landlady herself, while applying the provision of Section 14-D".

25 On the same analogy, in the facts of the instant case also, the

word „own residence‟ as appearing in Section 14-C must necessarily

include the widow of the original landlord.

26 Sections 14-B to 14-D have been incorporated in Chapter III of

the DRCA is a summary procedure available only to a special class of

landlord; it is a uniform procedure for disposal of all applications under

this Chapter for a classified class of landlords. These sections intend to

provide a home to a landlord/landlady who has become homeless for

one reason or the other. Pleas available to a tenant (under such a class)

to defend his case are also limited pleas.

27 In this context, the Apex Court in AIR 1998 SC 1639 M/s

Rahabhar Productions Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Rajendra K.Tandon has inter-alia

held as under:-

Concentrating on Section 14C alone and not travelling to other cognate Section, namely, 14A, 14B and 14D, a tenant while seeking permission of the Controller to defend the eviction proceedings, under Section 25B of the Act, can legitimately raise the plea, for example, that the landlord has either not retired or was not likely to retire from service within one year of the initiation of proceedings or that the landlord, after retirement, has taken up employment elsewhere or has been given any other lucrative assignment including the facility of a "Quarter" or an assignment commensurate with his earlier status and, therefore, may say that the landlord does not require the premises for his own occupation. The tenant may also indicate that the landlord, in order to augment

his income after retirement, wanted only to let out the premises again on higher rent and to save sufficient portion of rental earnings, the himself had chosen or might chosen to live in a tenanted accommodation on cheaper rent. These pleas (may be, many more such pleas, as human ingenuity knows no bounds) would definitely touch the "bona fides" of the landlord and, therefore, cannot be denied to a tenant on the ground that the landlord, having retired from service or likely to retire, has to be presumed to require the accommodation for his own occupation.

27. Integrating these two factors together, namely, the right of the landlord to recover immediate possession and the right available to a tenant to raise pleas in defence to indicate that the premises, in spite of retirement of likely retirement of the landlord, are not required by him, what emerges out is that while the landlord has to establish his "requirement", which means "real" and not "feigned", the tenant can show that it is not so.

28 In Busching Schmitz Private Limited vs. P.T. Menghani, (1977)

2 SCC 835, the Supreme Court while dealing with the scope of Section

14-C of the Act had inter-alia held:-

"...... Needless to state, therefore, if an application is filed under Section 14-B or 14-C or 14-D, the tenant's right to contest the application is narrowed down and is restricted to the parameters of the respective sections. He cannot widen the scope of his defence by relying upon Section 14(1)(e).

31. The Court thus restricted the defence of the tenant to the parameters of Section 14C and placed a further restriction that the tenant cannot widen the scope of his defence by relying upon Section 14(1)(e).

The legal position relating to eviction in proceedings by a

landlord under Section 14-C was thus summarized as under :

(1) Proceedings under Section 14C can be initiated by a landlord who was in the service of the Central Government or Delhi Administration and has retired from service or is likely to retire within one year of the initiation of proceedings, but the retirement or likely retirement of the landlord does not give rise to a presumption that the premises are bona fide required by him. The landlord has also to plead and show that after retirement or likely retirement, no fresh assignment has been taken up or is likely to be taken up by him with the facility of a residential "Quarter".

(ii) Possession can be recovered by the landlord only for real, genuine and bona fide need and not for "feigned" need.

(iii) Proceedings under Section 14C can be contested only when leave to contest is granted by the Rent Controller; whether leave would be granted or refused would depend upon the nature of pleas raised of circumstances shown by the tenant in his affidavit filed before the Rent Controller.

(iv) Section 25B does not place any restriction on the right of the tenant to raise pleas in defence within the parameters of Section 14C, namely, that he can plead and prove that notwithstanding the retirement or likely retirement of the landlord, the premises are not required by him for his own residence. No plea regarding the size of the landlord's family or the tenant's own family, whether it was likely to increases with son's marriage or decrease with daughter's marriage, can be raised by the tenant nor can be raise any plea as to the extent of accommodation or floor area or comparative hardship of partial eviction etc. as these are considerations which are not relevant under Section 14C. If, however, the landlord is already in occupation of his own house, part of which is in occupation of a tenant (as in the instant case) or where whole of the hose, owned by the landlord, is in his personal occupation and he makes an application for eviction of a tenant occupying

another house, the need of the landlord, with reference to his family strength and the extent of accommodation, at his disposal, will have to be examined vis- a-vis his requirement.

(v) Expeditious enquiry need be held or else the landlord, if he has already retired from service will be literally on the "street" during the pendency of the proceedings which, undoubtedly, take long to conclude particularly as one party, namely, the tenant, is inherently interested in delayed disposal. If the tenant was allowed to contest Section 14C application also with that attitude, giving him the liberty to place all possible obstacles to retard the pace of the proceedings, legislative intent of providing immediate possession of the house to a retired, or likely to retire landlord, would be frustrated".

29 In this case the record in fact shows that the Rent Controller had

dismissed the eviction petition filed in the year 1988 on 14.02.1992;

revision petition against this petition was dismissed by the High Court

on 27.04.1992. The appeal was preferred before the Apex Court and the

matter was remanded back to the trial Court for disposal of the case in

accordance with law. Eviction petition was dismissed by the ARC on

18.08.1998. Revision petition was filed in the High Court on

07.09.1998. During the pendency of this revision petition, the original

tenant Bhim Sen died; petition was dismissed in default on 08.09.2004.

Anand Swaroop Vohra died on 22.01.2005; the co-owner G.S. Vohra

also expired on 05.12.2004; the legal representatives of both Anand

Swaroop Vohra and G.S. Vohra were brought on record on 21.08.2006

pursuant to an application under Order 22 Rule 3 of the Code; on the

same date, the revision petition which had been dismissed in default on

08.09.2004 had also been restored. This litigation has thus spread itself

over for almost 25 years; to say the least, it has progressed at a snail

pace. In this factual scenario, the right which was available to the

original landlord to contest the revision petition is a right which must

continue to his legal representatives as well. Petition would not abate.

30 The bonafide need of the landlady has also clearly been

established. As noted supra, the accommodation presently available with

Satya Vohra is one room and a common drawing-cum-dining room

which she is sharing with Rukmani Devi (widow of other co-owner).

Both the ladies have two married children; Satya Vohra has two married

daughters who along with their children and husbands visit her often;

Rukmani Devi has one married daughter and one son. Old age ailments

are hard facts qua both the ladies; the accommodation on the ground

floor which is presently lying locked with the tenant is the suitable need

for Satya Vohra; she cannot be denied the same; she is the best judge of

her requirement; her requirement and need is to stay on the ground floor

in the later years of her life; she cannot climb stairs; the accommodation

available with the tenant on the ground floor is three rooms, a kitchen

and toilet which is the only suitable and alternate residential

accommodation which the landlady has at present; the accommodation

on the first and second floor is almost impossible to access for this

senior citizen who has a weak fraling health; this accommodation is

even otherwise falling short; PW-1 had specifically averred that his wife

was sharing the drawing-cum-dining room with the family of Rukmani

Devi who also has two adult children of whom one is a married

daughter; the need to have an independent space and live according to

her own life style in these circumstance can in no manner be said to be

not a genuine need; it can in no manner be termed as malafide; it

necessarily is an honest, genuine and a bonafide need. Petition must

succeed on all counts.

31 Eviction petition stands decreed. Petition disposed of.

INDERMEET KAUR, J JUNE 01, 2012 A