Citation : 2012 Latest Caselaw 446 Del
Judgement Date : 23 January, 2012
* THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment delivered on: 23.01.2012
+ I.A. No.4210/2010 in C.S. (OS). No.2405/2009
HARJYOT KAUR & ORS ...... Plaintiffs
Through Mr. Dhruv Mehta, Sr. Adv. with
Ms. Amrita Sanghi and Mr. Sameer
Abhyankar, Advs.
Versus
TODAY HOMES AND INFRASTRUCTURE PVT LTD
..... Defendant
Through Mr. Arvind K. Nigam, Sr. Adv.
with Mr. Rahul Sharma, Adv.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR JUSTICE MANMOHAN SINGH
MANMOHAN SINGH, J.
1. By this order I propose to decide the present application filed
by the defendant under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996 (hereinafter referred to as the Arbitration Act). The instant suit is for
recovery of Rs.1,43,22,000/-.
2. The facts of the case as per the parties are that Ludhiana
Improvement Trust (in short, called the "LIT") invited tenders from
eligible contractors for development of the project called as "City Centre
Ludhiana". Thereafter, the defendant was accepted and the bid was given
to the defendant and the same was confirmed through a Letter of Intent
dated 18.5.2005 and on that basis, an agreement was executed by the
defendant with the LIT on 24.5.2005.
3. As per the terms of the Concession Agreement dated
24.05.2005, the LIT granted and authorized the defendant to investigate,
study, design, engineers, procure finance, enter into joint ventures, to
construct, sell, lease license, operate and maintain the entire project and
facilities and also to enjoy the right, powers privileges, authorizations and
entitlement.
4. On the basis of the said Concession Agreement dated
24.5.2005, the defendant executed an agreement to sell with the plaintiffs
on 28.4.2006, for selling unit number GF-13 (C) on the ground floor of the
building to be constructed, admeasuring 1250 sq. ft. Super Area, which
was fully described in the schedule property, annexed with the agreement
to sell dated 28.4.2006. The total consideration paid to the defendant was
Rs.77,00,000/-, the details regarding the said payment is mentioned in para
6 of the plaint.
5. It is averred in the plaint that as per the agreement to sell, the
plaintiffs No.1 & 2 are the owners of 33% each respectively. Plaintiffs
No.3 & 4 are owners of 17% each of the Unit.
6. The payment of Rs.77,00,000/- was made in the following
manner to the defendant :
a. Cheque No.377376 dated 30.4.2006 for a sum of Rs.25,41,000/- drawn on Bank of Punjab by plaintiff No.1, Mrs. Harjyot Kaur.
b. Cheque No.642577 dated 28.4.2006 for the sum of Rs.25,41,000/- drawn on Canara Bank, by plaintiff No.2, Mrs. Prakash Kaur.
c. Cheque No.648071 dated 28.4.2006 for sum of 13,09,000/-
drawn on Canara Bank by plaintiff No.3, Mrs. Premdeep Bhinder.
d. Cheque No.651731 dated 28.4.2006 for sum of 13,09,000/-
drawn on Canara Bank by plaintiff No.3, Mrs. Premdeep Bhinder.
The above mentioned considerations were accepted by the
defendant as full and final towards the consideration of the said property.
7. According to the plaintiffs, as per clause 10 of the Agreement
dated 28.4.2006, the defendants were liable to give possession of the said
property on or before 31.12.2007 provided all payments were made as per
the agreement and the plaintiffs made all payments as mentioned above
and the same was acknowledged by the defendant.
8. The plaintiffs also state that as per the agreement, the plaintiffs
were liable to pay holding charges @ Rs.100 per sq. ft. if the plaintiffs
failed to take possession within 15 days, after the receipt of written notice
of possession. According to the plaintiffs, the defendant did not hand over
possession to the plaintiffs, though the defendant was supposed to hand
over possession of the said premises on or before 31.12.2007. In case, the
plaintiffs failed to pay the amount, then 24% p.a. would be charged from
them.
9. As per clause 57 of the agreement to sell, the defendant had
agreed to pay rent to the plaintiffs, in case the said premises has not given
in possession on or before 31.12.2007, the rent has to be equivalent to the
intending tenant i.e. M/s Liberty Retail Revolutions Pvt Ltd. However, the
defendant did not pay any such rent as agreed to the plaintiffs and also
failed to fulfill the contractual obligations and liabilities.
10. The plaintiffs visited the office of the defendant many times.
The representatives of the defendant gave false promises and evasive
replies. Despite various requests, the defendant did not give rent to the
plaintiffs as per Clause 57 of the agreement.
11. Therefore, the plaintiffs sent a legal notice date 22.12.2008 to
the defendant under Sections 433 & 434 of the Indian Companies Act,
1956. The defendant replied to the notice saying that it was not liable to
pay the rent/amount to the plaintiffs.
12. Hence, the plaintiffs filed the present suit for recovery of
Rs.77,00,000/- with interest 24% p.a. from the maturity date i.e. 28.4.2006
till date of filing of this suit which comes to a total of Rs.66,22,000/-.
Hence, the plaintiffs have claimed a sum of Rs.1,43,22,000/- along with
pendente lite and future interest @ 24% p.a.
13. After receiving the notice in the suit filed under Order
XXXVII CPC, the defendant filed the present application.
14. It is stated by the defendant that there was an agreement to sell
dated 28.4.2006 for sale of GF-13 (C) on the ground floor admeasuring
1250 sq. ft. Super Area in Ludhiana City Centre at Ludhiana.
15. The said agreement to sell also contains an arbitration clause as
per which the parties have agreed that any dispute arising or accruing in
respect of the agreement, the same shall be referred to arbitration in
consonance with the provision of the Arbitration Act.
16. It is further stated by the defendant that when there is an
arbitration clause between the parties, the Court has a duty to refer the
parties to arbitration, when the defendant has disputed the entitlement of
the plaintiffs to recover the said amount in the present proceeding.
Hence, the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain any suit, once an
application is filed under Section 8 of the Act.
17. It is also stated that the plaintiffs have booked a space in the
Ludhiana City Centre admeasuring about 1250 sq. ft. super built. It was
also stated that there was an arbitration clause in case any disputes arises
between the parties. Hence, the defendant has filed this present application
under Section 8 of the Arbitration Act and prays that this Court be pleased
to direct the parties to refer them to arbitration.
18. In reply, the plaintiffs state that the application filed by the
defendant is false and the defendant has suppressed facts from this Court.
The plaintiffs state that to enforce arbitration clause, there has to be a
dispute between the parties, but in the present case there is no dispute
regarding the payment of money and the same is acknowledged by the
defendant. Further, there is no dispute that the defendant failed to
complete the project in stipulated time. Hence, the plaintiffs are duly
entitled to recover the full amount paid. Thus, according to the plaintiffs,
there is no dispute at all and hence, there is no need for an application
under Section 8 of the Arbitration Act.
19. The plaintiffs also state that it is a settled principle of law that
even if an agreement stipulates resolution of dispute through arbitration,
still, existence of a dispute is a pre-requisite before invoking the arbitration
clause. In other words, the presence of a dispute is mandatory for
arbitration proceeding. Hence, the present application should be dismissed
on this ground alone.
20. The present suit filed by the plaintiffs is under Order XXXVII
CPC, a summary procedure, which is to recover the lawful amount
(admitted debt) due from the defendant. Hence, the application filed by
the defendant should be dismissed.
21. The plaintiffs also state that the Arbitration Act does not put
any impediment on the Civil Courts. The Courts have to indentify whether
there is indeed any actual issue involved to refer to arbitration. Moreover,
Section 8 is mandatory in nature, and onus lies upon the defendant to
prove that there is an actual dispute involved.
22. The suit filed by the plaintiffs is not for specific performance or
enforcement of rights. Hence, no question of arbitration arises. The
plaintiffs do not deny that there is an arbitration clause in the
agreement but their contention is that the defendant has failed to narrate
the exact ground for arbitral reference. Simply because the plaintiffs have
now asked for recovery of the amount, the, question of arbitration clause
does not arise in the absence of any dispute.
23. I have heard the learned counsels for the parties. As far as the
existence of agreement and the arbitration clause is concerned, there is no
dispute between the parties. The plaintiffs have also not denied the fact
that they are the signatories of the said agreement.
24. The contention of Mr. Dhruv Mehta, learned Senior counsel for
the plaintiffs is straight and simple. He submits that it is a suit for the
recovery of the amount which has been received by the defendant. As
there is no dispute about the amount received by the defendant, hence the
plaintiffs are entitled to recover the amount and the question of arbitration
proceedings does not arise. In support of his submissions, the learned
Senior counsel has referred the judgment of the Supreme Court passed in
the case of Sukanya Holdings Pvt. Ltd. vs. Jayesh H. Pandya and
Another; AIR 2003 Supreme Court 2252. The relevant para reads as
under:-
"15. The relevant language used in S. 8 is - "in a matter which is the subject matter of an arbitration agreement." Court is required to refer the parties to arbitration. Therefore, the suit should be in respect of "a matter" which the parties have agreed to refer and which comes within the ambit of arbitration agreement. Where, however, a suit is commenced - "as to a matter" which lies outside the arbitration agreement and is also between some of the parties who are not parties to the arbitration agreement, there is no question of application of S.8. The words „a matter‟ indicate entire subject matter of the suit should be subject to arbitration agreement."
25. The learned Senior counsel has further contended that the
present application is also not maintainable, as the defendant has failed to
file the original agreement, as required under the provisions of Section 8 of
the Arbitration Act.
26. Mr. Nigam, learned Senior counsel for the defendant, on the
other hand, has referred the pleadings of the case and has submitted that it
is the admitted position that the agreement to sell dated 28.04.2006 is a
tripartite agreement between the plaintiff, defendant and the LIT who
permitted the defendant to construct at the site and to receive
consideration for and on behalf of the LIT. As far as the obligations, if
any, arising out of the agreement dated 28.04.2006 are concerned, the
same cannot be enforced against the defendant, as the defendant has
already put Rs.125 crores in the construction of the project. However, due
to certain reasons, the said project has been stalled and today faces
majeure conditions.
27. Mr. Nigam refers Clauses-57 and 58 of the agreement which
are reproduced here as under:-
"57. In the event, the said building LUDHIANA CITY CENTER is not ready for possession for fit outs within a 31 st December, 2007 the company will be liable to pay the rent to the Intending Purchaser, from 31st December, 2007 till starts M/s. Liberty Retail Revolutions Ltd paying rent or the said tenant refuses to take on rent the said premises on any ground, the Company will be liable to arrange for a tenant with the consent of the buyer/Intending Purchaser on the same rent as agreed with M/s. Liberty Retail Revolutions Ltd.
58. In case of any dispute arising or accruing in respect of this Agreement, the same shall be referred for arbitration in consonance with the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, and the decision of the Arbitrator shall be binding upon both the parties. The Seat of Arbitration shall be Delhi."
28. Mr. Nigam submits that the amount received from the
plaintiffs, the details of which are mentioned in Clause-1 of the agreement,
is as per the terms and conditions of the agreement which is in existence
between the parties. He submits that as far as the filing of the original
agreement is concerned, the plaintiffs themselves have filed the original
agreement between the parties along with the plaint, therefore, the
objection raised by the plaintiffs is without any force. He has referred the
reply dated 11.12.2008 given by the defendant to the legal notice dated
22.10.2008 issued by the plaintiffs, wherein the defendant has specifically
mentioned that due to controversy which has been raised, the works have
been stopped and it is beyond the control of the defendant to complete the
project and there is no question of any claims being made by the plaintiffs
in this regard and further, there is an arbitration clause in the agreement to
sell, entered into between the plaintiffs and the defendant.
29. Mr. Nigam, learned Senior counsel has strongly relied upon
the order passed by this Court in the similar dispute of City Centre
Ludhiana decided in the petition filed under Section 11 of the Arbitration
Act for appointment of arbitrator, being Arbitration Application No.113 of
2008 filed by M/s Mapletree Property Pvt. Ltd. against the defendant
herein. The facts of that case are almost same as that of the present case.
In the said case also, there was a Memorandum of Understanding dated
04.05.2005 with the LIT and the LIT had put the defendant herein a
member of the Consortium in physical possession of the plot according to
the agreement executed on 24.05.2005 along with the power of attorney
dated 29.08.2005 executed by LIT in favour of the defendant herein. It
was alleged in the said suit that by an agreement dated 10.01.2006, the
Mapletree purchased the property measuring 1,50,000 sq. ft. area on the
lower ground floor of the building proposed to be constructed by the
respondents including the defendant herein. The said agreement recorded
total sale consideration of Rs.51,84,00,000/- out of which a sum of
Rs.15,55,20,000/- was paid by the Mapletree by way of two demand
drafts in favour of the then respondents No.1 to 4 and there was a clause
50 in the said agreement containing an arbitration clause which is similar
to the arbitration clause in the present suit, as the then respondents No.1 to
4 could not develop the said City Centre on account of the dispute having
arisen between the said respondents with LIT due to certain difficulties
including the change of Government in the State of Punjab.
Therefore, in view of the said agreement, the Mapletree had
filed the application for appointment of an arbitrator, as the respondents
(including the defendant herein) had failed to appoint the arbitrator. This
Court vide order dated 29.01.2010 allowed the said petition and appointed
the sole arbitrator for adjudication of the dispute between the parties.
30. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs has not disputed the facts
mentioned in the order dated 29.01.2010 which according to him are
similar, however, he states that still the dispute between the parties has to
be decided by the civil court as in other proceeding between the defendant
and LIT, the LIT has levelled serious allegations of fraud and malpractices
against the defendant herein, thus, in view of settled law the dispute
between the parties is not liable to be referred to the arbitrator. In support
of his submissions, the learned Senior counsel has referred the judgment of
the Supreme Court in the case of N. Radhakrishnan vs. Maestro
Engineers and others, reported in (2010) 1 Supreme Court Cases 72.
The relevant paras reads as under:-
"23. In our view and relying on the aforesaid observations of this Court in the aforesaid decision and going by the ratio of the abovementioned case, the facts of the present case does not warrant the matter to be tried and decided by the Arbitrator, rather for the furtherance of justice, it should be tried in a court of law which would be more competent and have the means to decide such a complicated matter involving various questions and issues raised in the present dispute.
24. This view has been further enunciated and affirmed by this Court in the decision of Haryana Telecom Ltd. vs. Sterlite Industries (India) Ltd.[ AIR 1999 SC 2354], wherein this court under para 4 observed :
"4. Sub-section (1) of section 8 provides that where the judicial authority before whom an action is brought in a matter, will refer the parties to arbitration the said matter in accordance with the arbitration the said matter in accordance with the arbitration agreement. This, however, postulates, in our opinion, that what can be referred to the Arbitrator is only that dispute or matter which the Arbitrator is competent or empowered to decide."
31. He submits that since there are serious allegations of fraud and
malpractices, the dispute can only be settled by the Court through
furtherance of detailed evidence by either parties and such a situation
cannot be properly gone into by the arbitrator.
32. Both the parties have also informed that so far as order dated
29.01.2010 is concerned, the same has been challenged by the LIT in the
Supreme Court by filing of a Special Leave Petition bearing SLP (Civil)
No.26173/2010 in which the Apex Court has issued notice and also passed
the order thereby staying the arbitration proceedings initiated by the
arbitrator appointed under the impugned order.
33. On the other hand, Mr. Nigam, learned Senior counsel for the
defendant has argued that the alleged allegations of fraud and serious
malpractices are not mentioned in the present case nor LIT is a party in the
suit. The said allegations of fraud and malpractices on the defendant are
yet to be determined by the Court, as raised by the LIT against the
defendant. In any case, he says, that the allegations of fraud even if raised
by the plaintiffs, can be decided by an Arbitrator in view of the Scheme of
the new Act. Thus, the application of the defendant under Section 8 of the
Arbitration Act is maintainable.
34. After having considered all the facts and circumstances, I am of
the view that since a similar case M/s. Mapletree Property Pvt. Ltd. vs.
M/s. Today Homes & Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. is still pending and the
order passed in the application under Section 11 of the Arbitration Act has
been stayed by the Apex Court, therefore, it would be appropriate to
postpone the present application till the time final orders are passed.
35. List on 16.04.2012 for awaiting the order in the case of
Ludhiana Improvement Trust vs. M/s Mapletree Property Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.
MANMOHAN SINGH, J.
JANUARY 23, 2012
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