Delhi High Court
Shri Harvinder Singh vs Shri Inder Deo Singh Thakur on 12 January, 2012
Author: Indermeet Kaur
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Date of Judgment: 12.01.2012
+ CM(M) No.1610/2010
SHRI HARVINDER SINGH ...........Appellant
Through: Mr.Nipun Bhardwaj, Advocate.
Versus
SHRI INDER DEO SINGH THAKUR ..........Respondent
Through: None.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE INDERMEET KAUR
INDERMEET KAUR, J. (Oral)
1. Order impugned is the order dated 01.10.1997 which was an
order passed by the Additional Rent Control Tribunal (ARCT)
endorsing the finding of the Additional Rent Controller (ARC) dated
20.5.1995 wherein the eviction petition filed by the landlord
Harvinder Singh Gulati under Section 14(1)(b) of the Delhi Rent
Control Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) had been dismissed.
2. Record shows that the landlord Harvinder Singh Gulati had
filed an eviction petition under Section 14(1)(b) of the DRCA i.e.
the E.P. No.248/1983 against Purshotam Jorabhai & Company
which was a partnership firm (hereinafter referred to as the
tenant). Contention was that the tenant was in tenancy of the
premises bearing No.2744, First Floor, Qutab Road, Delhi; this was
a petition initially filed under section 14(1)(a) and 14(1)(b) of the
DRCA; ex parte decree under Section 14(1)(b) of the DRCA had
been obtained by the landlord on 04.11.1985. Thereafter on an
application filed by one Inder Deo Thakur purported to be a
Receiver appointed of the aforenoted partnership firm in Suit
No.2A/81 titled as Chandrakant & Others Vs. Jayandra Bhai vide
order of the Civil Judge Sagar (M.P.) dated 26.6.1981 and being a
custodian of the court he had taken possession of all the properties
of the said partnership firm both movable and immovable including
the tenanted premises; contention being that he had appointed a
chowkidar namely Bala Dutt in the aforenoted premises to look
after the said premises; the chowkidar had left the premises
without any intimation and it was in these circumstances that the
ex parte decree had been obtained by the landlord; ex parte
decree dated 04.11.1985 was set aside. The judgment of the Civil
Judge, Sagar (MP) appointing Inder Deo Singh Thakur as a Receiver
had been proved as Ex.OW-1/1; this judgment had evidenced the
fact that the tenant firm M/s Purshottam Jorbhai & Co had been
dissolved and Inder Deo Singh Thakur has been appointed as a
Receiver. Record further evidenced that vide Ex.OW-1/4 to
Ex.OW-1/6, registered A.D. letters were duly sent to the landlord
informing him about the appointment of the Receiver which notice
was also duly published; it had also come on record that Bala Dutt
was appointed as chowkidar in the said premises. In these
circumstances the eviction petition filed by the landlord against a
tenant firm which had since stood dissolved and this fact having
well been informed to the landlord and he having also been
notified of the fact that the Receiver had been appointed of the
firm and he having filed the eviction petition without taking
necessary permission from the court was an illegality and in these
circumstances the eviction petition has been dismissed by the
impugned order i.e. by the court of the ARCT.
3. In AIR 1977 SC 2304 Everest Coal Co. Vs. State of Bihar the
Apex Court had noted that in such eventuality where a Court
Receiver has been appointed to take charge of the properties of
the respondent, it is incumbent upon the person suing to take
permission of the court; the Receiver being an officer/agent of the
court and failure to do so may make the lis fatal. Relevant extract
of the said judgment reads herein below as under:
"When a court puts a Receiver in possession of property,the
property comes under court custody, the Receiver being merely
an officer or agent of the court. Any obstruction or interference
with the court's possession sounds in contempt of that court. Any
legal action in respect of that property is in a sense such an
interference and invites the contempt penalty of likely
invalidation of the suit or other proceedings. But, if either be
ore starting the action or during its continuance, the party takes
the leave of the court, the sin is absolved and the proceeding may
continue to a conclusion on the merits. In the ordinary course, no
court is so prestige-conscious that it will stand in the way of a
legitimate legal proceeding for redressal or relief against its
receiver unless the action is totally meritocrat, frivolous or
vexatious or otherwise vitiated by any sinister factor. Grant of
leave is the rule, refusal the exception. After all, the court is not,
in the usual run of cases, affected by a litigation which settles
the rights of parties and the Receiver represents neither party,
being an officer of the court. For this reason, ordinarily the
court accords permission to sue, or to continue. The jurisdiction
to grant leave is undoubted and inherent, but not based on black
letter, law in the sense of enacted law. Any litigative disturbance
of the court's possession without its permission amounts to
contempt of its authority; and the wages of contempt of court in
this jurisdiction may well be voidability of the whole proceeding.
Equally clearly, prior permission of the court appointing the
Receiver is not a condition precedent to the enforcement of
the cause of action. Nor is it so grave a vice that later leave
sought and got before the decree has been passed will not purge
it. If, before the suit terminates, the relevant court is moved and
permission to sue or to prosecute further is granted, the
requirement of law is fulfilled. Of course failure to secure such
leave till the end of the lis may prove fatal."
4. In this factual context the impugned order dismissing the
eviction petition suffers from no infirmity. Dismissed.
INDERMEET KAUR, J
JANUARY 12, 2012
nandan
