Delhi High Court
Ashwani Kumar vs Uoi And Ors on 10 January, 2012
Author: Badar Durrez Ahmed
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment delivered on 10.01.2012
+ W.P.(C) 9113/2011
ASHWANI KUMAR ... Petitioner
versus
UOI AND ORS. ... Respondents
Advocates who appeared in this case:
For the Petitioner : Mr A.K.Behera
For Respondent Nos.1 & 2 : Mr R.V.Sinha
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE BADAR DURREZ AHMED
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE V.K.JAIN
BADAR DURREZ AHMED (ORAL)
1. This appeal is directed against the orders dated 31.01.2011 and 23.03.2011
passed in OA No.3664/2009 and RA No.87/2010, respectively by the Central
Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi (hereinafter referred to as
„the Tribunal‟). The petitioner is aggrieved because the petitioner‟s said O.A. was
dismissed on the ground of it being barred by limitation. The Review Application
was also dismissed by virtue of the order dated 23.03.2011.
2. The facts in brief are that an order dated 13.07.2007 was passed whereby
penalty of reduction of pay by four stages below for a period of four years with
cumulative effect was awarded to the petitioner. The appellate authority by virtue
of its order dated 03.03.2008 reduced the penalty by directing the reduction of pay
by three stages and not by four stages. The revisional order was passed on
16.09.2008 whereby the penalty imposed by the appellate authority was
maintained. Admittedly, the O.A. was filed by the petitioner before the Tribunal
on 02.12.2009. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the starting
point of limitation should be taken as 07.10.2008, i.e., the date on which the
petitioner received the order passed by the revisional authority. Even if, we take
07.10.2008 as the starting point of limitation in this case, the OA has been filed
after 1 year and 25 days. The period of limitation prescribed under Section 21 of
the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, is one year. As a result, there is a delay of
1 month and 25 days which amounts to 55 days delay.
3. In the application for condonation of delay filed by the petitioner before the
Tribunal, the reasons given for the delay by the petitioner were that the petitioner‟s
father had become seriously ill soon after the Revision Petition of the petitioner had
been dismissed. The petitioner‟s father was allegedly suffering from various
troubles, including kidney and cardiac problems. It was also contended that there
was no other male member in the family to look after him and the petitioner could
manage to "snatch" some time only in the month of November, 2009 when he was
able to contact his advocate and was thereafter in a position to file the O.A. on
02.12.2009. The petitioner furnished certain medical certificates pertaining to the
illness of his father dated 20.01.2009, 04.06.2009 and 15.09.2009.
4. We find that the Tribunal has considered this aspect in detail and particularly
in paragraph 5 of the impugned judgment which reads as under:-
"5. In the instant case, applicant has stated he could not file
OA in time because his father had become seriously ill on
account of kidney trouble and cardiac problems, therefore,
he was busy attending to him. Perusal of the document
annexed by the applicant shows a Doppler test was
conducted on 20.1.2009 but everything was normal. He has
also annexed one report of ultrasound dated 4.6.2009 which
shows the father was having enlarged prostrate and another
report dated 15.9.2009 of Doppler which suggest kidney
disease but none of these documents show the father‟s
condition was so bad or that he was hospitalized due to
which applicant could not have filed the case. In any case,
his revision was decided in September, 2008 whereas the
tests have been conducted at a much later date, therefore, we
do not find any plausible ground to condone the delay."
5. The learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn our attention to a
decision of the Supreme Court in the case of N.Balakrishnan v.
M.Krishnamurthy, (1998) 7 SCC 123, which, according to him, laid down certain
guiding principles with regard to condonation of delay. However, we find that in
the very same judgment, in paragraph 9, the Supreme Court has made it clear that
sometimes length of delay is no matter and acceptability of the explanation is the
only criterion. The Supreme Court further observed that sometimes a delay of the
shortest range may not be condoned due to want of an acceptable explanation,
whereas in certain other cases, a delay of a very long range can be condoned
because the explanation is satisfactory. The Supreme Court observed that once the
court accepts the explanation as sufficient, it is the result of a positive exercise of
discretion and further that normally the superior court should not disturb such a
finding, much less in revisional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was
on wholly untenable grounds or was arbitrary or perverse.
6. In the present case, we find that the Tribunal has not accepted the
explanation sought to be given by the petitioner. The Tribunal has exercised its
discretion in a sound manner based on legal principles and has arrived at the
conclusion that the delay has not been sufficiently explained. We see no reason to
interfere with this view of the Tribunal which cannot, by any stretch of
imagination, be considered to be untenable, arbitrary or perverse. Consequently,
this petition is dismissed.
BADAR DURREZ AHMED, J
V.K.JAIN, J
JANUARY 10,2012/'sn'
