Smt Raj Rani Arora vs Smt Kailash Sharma
2012 Latest Caselaw 1348 Del

*     IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

%                                    Date of Judgment: 28.02.2012


+RC.REV. 49/2012, CM Nos.2034-2035/2012 & Caveat No.112/2012


      SMT RAJ RANI ARORA                     ..... Petitioner
                    Through:         Mr.Subhash Chand, Advocate.

                  versus


      SMT KAILASH SHARMA                      ..... Respondent
                   Through:          Mr.L.C.Chopra, Advocate.


      CORAM:
      HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE INDERMEET KAUR


INDERMEET KAUR, J. (Oral)

1. Impugned judgment is dated 08.11.2011; the eviction petition

filed by the landlord under Section 14-D of the Delhi Rent Control Act

(in short 'DRCA') had been decreed; this judgment was modified on

14.12.2011; modification was to the effect that in a petition under

Section 14-D of the DRCA no period of six months is required to be

awaited for the purpose of execution. Vide earlier order dated

08.11.2011, period of six months was to be awaited by the landlord

before he could get the decree executed.

2. Record shows that the present eviction petition has been filed by

the landlady-Kailash Sharma on the ground of Section 14(D) of the

DRCA; she is a widow. There is no dispute to this factual position. She

is the owner and landlady of the property bearing No. XV-372, Gali

Chandi Wli, Paharganj, New Delhi-110055 which had been let out to the

tenant in the year 1982 on a oral agreement. Premises comprise of two

rooms with cement sheets, latrine, bath room and verandah common on

ground floor of the premises. The family of the petitioner comprises of

herself, her son, his wife and two children i.e. five persons. The

petitioner and her family were living on the first floor of the premises

which consists of two small rooms, one big rooms, verandah, kitchen

and bath room; one room on the ground floor was also in their

occupation which is a store room. Two rooms on the second floor with

small bath room is also in their occupation. Contention of the landlady

is that she is suffering from Rheumatoid Arthritis and knee joint pains

and unable to climb stairs. Further contention being that she has

undergone an operation for hernia in 1990 and the accommodation

presently available is unsuitable and insufficient for their needs. The

premises which are with the tenant on the ground floor are accordingly

bonafide required by her for her residential purpose.

3. Application for leave to defend was filed. Relationship of

landlord and tenant was denied; it was denied that the premises are

required by the landlady for a bonafide need for herself and her family

members. Further contention being that a security of `50,000/- has been

given to the landlady which is liable to be refunded; further contention

being that there is a concealment of fact that the present property was

originally of 300 sq. yards and out of which 150 sq. yards had already

been sold by the landlady to one Rajeshwardass Verma; the need of the

landlady in these circumstances has not been made out to be bonafide.

4. Corresponding paras of the reply to the application seeking leave

to defend have also been perused. It was denied that any refundable

security of `50,000/- has been taken by the landlady or by her husband

at the time when the premises were let out; this submission made by the

tenant in his application for leave to defend has in fact admitted the

relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and as such the

objection raised in the trial court that there was no such relationship of

landlord and tenant is negatived by this submission itself. Landlady

also denied the contention that the premises originally comprised of 300

sq. yards out of which 150 sq. yards was sold to one Rajeshwardass

Verma; contention was that in May 1999, 62 sq. yards had been sold.

Present eviction petition has been filed on 27.4.2009 i.e. after more than

a decade.

5. This is by and large the case as set up by the tenant. No triable

issue appears to be arisen and this has been rightly noted by the trial

court. The tenant has in fact admitted that her husband Kishan Lal was

the original tenant who had paid a sum of `50,000/- as a refundable

security to the landlady. Water connection was also in the name of the

tenant. The landlady had also placed on record documents of title i.e.

the sale deed of the suit property showing that she is the owner of the

suit property. These facts were noted in the correct perspective; it was

rightly noted that an eviction petition under Section 14-D is not a suit

for title; the prima facie ownership and title of the suit premises had

been established by the landlady; she is landlady of the suit premises. It

is also not in dispute that the landlady is a widow. The only

requirement which was further sought to be proved by the landlady was

that she needed the premises for herself. It is not in dispute that the

landlady is a senior citizen aged about 80 years; she is living on the first

floor of the premises; it is also not in dispute that she is suffering from

Rheumatoid Arthritis, knee joint pains and she had undergone a hernia

operation. In this factual scenario her submission that she cannot climb

stairs to reach the first floor of the premises and the portion in

occupation of the tenant (which is on the ground floor) is more suitable

and thus bonafide required by her for her own accommodation has been

prima facie established. Medical record has also been filed to

substantiate her age and medical condition. It was in these

circumstances that the court had noted that no triable issue has been

raised by the tenant.

6. The object of Section 14-D is to assist a vulnerable and needy

section of the society to recover possession of suit premises as

expeditiously as possible and without the usual trials and tribulations.

What the landlady is required to prove under this Section is :

(i)- to show that she is a widow; (ii) premises are required by her

for her own residence. The Supreme Court in V.Rajaswari Vs. Bombay

Tyres International Ltd. reported in (1995) Supp (3) SCC 172 had

noted that an averment the fact that the landlady/widow is living with

her daughter or any other person is no ground to say that the premises in

question are not required for her residence. The Apex Court in order to

make this provision more reasonable had read into it that the need to

substantiate the request of the widow to recover possession of the

premises for her own residence should be bonafide; the word 'bonafide'

being missing from the provisions of Section 14-D, her need and request

for the premises even in the absence of a specific stipulation to that

effect should be read as a bonafide need.

7. The impugned order dismissing the application seeking leave to

defend thus suffers from no infirmity. Petitioner is without any merit;

dismissed.

INDERMEET KAUR, J

FEBRUARY 28, 2012 nandan