Citation : 2012 Latest Caselaw 4906 Del
Judgement Date : 22 August, 2012
* THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ RC. Rev. No.417/2012
Date of Decision: 22.08.2012
Shri Rajendra Kumar ...... Petitioner
Through: Mr. Anurag Abhishek, Adv.
Versus
Shri Vikram Singh ...... Respondent
Through: None.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.L. MEHTA
M.L. MEHTA, J. (Oral)
1. The present revision petition has been filed under Section 25 B(8)
of the Delhi Rent Control Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') read
with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) against the order
dated 21.02.2012 passed by the learned CCJ-cum-ARC wherein the
leave to defend application filed by the petitioner/tenant, being barred
by limitation, was dismissed and accordingly an eviction decree was
passed in favour of the respondent landlord.
2. The factual matrix of the case in brief is that a shop in premises
bearing No. WZ-B-17, Ram Dutt Enclave, Uttam Nagar, New Delhi was
let out by the respondent landlord to the petitioner tenant vide agreement
dated 03.03.2003 on a monthly rent of Rs.1,500/-. Thereafter, an
eviction petition was filed by the respondent against the petitioner under
section 14(1)(a) of the Act and the summons were served on the latter
on 16.12.2011. The leave to defend application was filed by the
petitioner on 21.02.2012 i.e. beyond the prescribed limitation period of
15 days. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted before the
learned CCJ-cum-ARC that the reason for such delay was that the
learned Predecessor of the Court had directed him to send the advance
copy of leave to defend application first and then to file it before the
Court, and hence the application could not be filed by him in time.
Dismissing the plea of the learned counsel for the petitioner, the learned
Trial Court observed that such plea was an afterthought and as such the
Court had no power to extend the period of limitation in filing the leave
to defend application and passed the eviction order.
3. The impugned order has been challenged by the petitioner on the
ground that the petitioner has not been afforded an opportunity to
present his case and it is within the power of this Court that if sufficient
cause is proved, the delay can be condoned in the interest of justice. It
has been further stated that the affidavit filed along with the application
for leave to defend was signed by the petitioner on 21.12.2011 and that
he was under the impression that the application has been filed within
time, but, due to default of the earlier counsel the petitioner's leave to
defend application was dismissed.
4. Section 25B of the Act, which provides for summary trial of
applications for eviction on the ground of bonafide requirement, is a
code in itself and the provisions of CPC have no applicability in
proceedings instituted under the said Section. Sub-section (1) of
Section 25 B clearly stipulates that the application for eviction shall be
strictly dealt with in accordance with the procedure specified in this
Section. There is no such thing as any inherent power of court to
condone delay in filing an application for leave to defend before
Court/Authority concerned, unless the law warrants and permits it, since
it has a tendency to alter the rights accrued to one or the other partly
under the Act. In Prithipal Singh Vs. Satpal Singh(Dead) through LRs.
2009(14)SCALE 672, the question of applicability of the provisions of
CPC for condonation of delay in filing leave to defend application was
raised before the Apex Court. While answering the question in negative,
the Apex Court held that Section 25B was inserted by the Legislature
for bonafide requirement of a certain classes of landlords, in which the
entire procedure has been stipulated. Section 25B itself is a special code
and therefore, Rent Controller, while dealing with an application for
eviction of a tenant on the ground of bona fide requirement, has to
follow strictly in compliance with Section 25B of the Act.
5. Moreover, the pleas taken by the learned counsel for the petitioner
before the Trial Court as well as this Court are flimsy and untenable.
Law protects the rights of the vigilant and not those of the ignorant. In
view of the above discussion, I find no illegality or perversity in the
impugned judgment which could merit interference by this Court. The
petition being without merit is hereby dismissed in limine.
M.L. MEHTA, J.
AUGUST , 2012 ss/awanish
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