Superior Exim Pvt Ltd vs Sita Ram Goel
2012 Latest Caselaw 4758 Del

$~30, 32 to 34 & 40

*         IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

                                                         Date of Decision: 14.08.2012

+         RC.REV. 401/2012
          SUPERIOR EXIM PVT LTD              ..... Petitioner
                          Through: Mr.Sanjay Jain, Sr.Adv. with
                                   Ms.Gurmeet, Advocate.
                    Versus

          SITAR RAM GOEL                                           ..... Respondent
                       Through:                       Mr. A.K. Singh, Advocate for Ms
                                                      Sujata Kashyap, Advocate

+         RC.REV. 403/2012
          SUPERIOR EXIM PVT LTD                       ..... Petitioner
                          Through: Mr.Sanjay Jain, Sr.Adv. with
                                   Ms.Gurmeet, Advocate.
                    Versus

          SITA RAM GOEL                                              ..... Respondent
                                           Through:   Mr. A.K. Singh, Advocate for Ms
                                                      Sujata Kashyap, Advocate

+         RC.REV. 404/2012
          SUPERIOR EXIM PVT LTD                       ..... Petitioner
                          Through: Mr.Sanjay Jain, Sr.Adv. with
                                   Ms.Gurmeet, Advocate.
                    Versus

          SITA RAM GOEL                                              ..... Respondent
                                           Through:   Mr. A.K. Singh, Advocate for Ms
                                                      Sujata Kashyap, Advocate

+         RC.REV. 405/2012
          SUPERIOR EXIM PVT TLD                       ..... Petitioner
                          Through: Mr.Sanjay Jain, Sr.Adv. with
                                   Ms.Gurmeet, Advocate.

RC Rev. Nos. 401, 403, 404, 405 & 406 of 2012                           Page 1 of 7
                                 Versus

          VEENA ASSOCIATES                                    ..... Respondent
                       Through:                 Mr. A.K. Singh, Advocate for Ms
                                                Sujata Kashyap, Advocate
+         RC.REV. 406/2012
          SUPERIOR EXIM PVT LTD                       ..... Petitioner
                          Through: Mr.Sanjay Jain, Sr.Adv. with
                                   Ms.Gurmeet, Advocate.
                    Versus

          URMIL ARORA & ANR                                   ..... Respondent
                       Through:                 Mr. A.K. Singh, Advocate for Ms
                                                Sujata Kashyap, Advocate

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.L. MEHTA


M.L. MEHTA, J. (Oral)

1. These revision petitions under section 25 B (8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (for short 'the Act') are directed against common order dated 3rd May, 2012 of Additional Rent Controller (ARC) whereby in the five eviction petitions filed by the landlord petitioner herein, the leave to contest applications of the tenants (respondents herein) were allowed.

2. The petitioner claims to be the owner of property bearing No. 2, Under Hill Road, Civil Lines, Delhi - 54 and the respondents its tenants in different portions therein. The eviction of the tenants was sought under Section 14 (1) (e) read with Section 25 B of the Act on the ground that tenanted premises are required for residence of its employees. The tenants sought leave to defend the eviction petitions on various grounds.

They have disputed the correctness of the site plan and have alleged that eviction petitions to be not maintainable, being for partial eviction of the tenanted premises. They also alleged the petitions being not filed by the competent and anuthorized persons as also there being no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. They also contended the tenanted premises to be let out for residential-cum- commercial purposes. However, the main contest was regarding the petitions being not maintainable under Section 14(1) (e) read with Section 25 B of the Act as the eviction was sought for the employees and not for any dependent family members of the owner/landlord. Appointment letters of the employees were also alleged to be forged and manipulated for the purpose of creation of paucity of accommodation for the need of the employees. It was alleged that in any case, the petitioner owned several other properties in that area. The details of some of those properties were also given by the tenants (respondents herein). It was alleged that these properties were, in any case, sufficient to meet the bonafide requirement, if any, of the petitioner.

3. In reply the petitioner controverted all the averments of the tenants and stated that the employees of the petitioner are dependent on it for social and economic welfare including their need of residential accommodation.

4. The learned ARC allowed the leave to contest applications observing the tenants having raised triable issues as regards maintainability of the eviction petitions under section 14(1)(e) read with Section 25B of the Act for the residence of the employees and as to whether the need so projected by the petitioner was bonafide. The ARC opined that there was also dispute regarding the site plan of the

tenanted premises as also other portions of the suit property and correctness of the same was itself a triable issue and which could not be decided without evidence. The contention having been raised by the tenants about the maintainability of the petitions, the ARC has listed the matter for arguments on maintainability.

5. The impugned order is assailed on the ground that the learned ARC erred in observing that the tenants raised triable issues. It was contended that the learned ARC erred in opining that the eviction petitions of the tenanted premises for the residence of the employees of the petitioner were not maintainable under Section 14 (1) (e) read with Section 25B of the Act. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner in support of his contentions in this regard relies upon the Single Bench decision of this Court in Chuni Lal Vs. University of Delhi, 1970 R.C.R. 742. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner also contends that a landlord under Section 2 (e) of the Act means any person who is entitled to receive rent and that word 'person' would include a corporate body. He further contends that section 22 of the Act providing for eviction of the premises for the employees, is in addition to the remedy which is available to a landlord under Section 14 of the Act.

6. Having heard the learned Senior counsel and on going through the records including the impugned order, I could no persuade myself to agree with the submissions and contentions of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner. Before adverting to his contentions, it may be noted that the instant revision petitions are under Section 25B (8) of the Act and the powers of this Court in revision are limited unlike that in the appellate matters. In this regard, it is settled that this Court would not

interfere in the revision petitions unless there is a gross irregularity or material irregularity or non exercise of jurisdiction by the Rent Controller. This Court in the case of Kasturilal Nandraj Vs. Bakshi Ram, Vol. XIX (1981) DLT 329 held that in the revision petitions, this Court will not interfere unless there is gross irregularity committed by the Rent Controller or there is great injustice being caused to any party.

7. There is no dispute that that the word 'person' would ordinarily include juristic entity. The question for consideration before this Court is as to whether there was any triable issue made by the tenants in their application for leave to defend. It is noted above that the learned ARC while opining that there are triable issues raised by the tenants, has also posted the matter for hearing on the question of maintainability of the eviction petitions under Section 14 (1) (e) read with Section 25B of the Act. Though, it will not be desirable for this Court to comment as to whether the petitions would be maintainable under these provisions or not at this stage, but, it may be noted that the decision rendered by this Court in Chuni Lal (supra) was on different facts and not applicable to the present case. In the said case, the eviction of the tenant was sought under provisions of Section 14 (1), (b), (d) and (h). The Court had no occasion to consider the applicability of Section 14 (1) (e) therein. However, somewhat similar controversy was before this Court in the case of Madan Mohan Lal Vs. P. Tandon, 21 (1982) DLT 16 wherein the case of Chuni Lal (supra) was also referred to and discussed. In this case while observing that it was section 22 alone and not Section 14 (1)

(e) that would be applicable in the eviction of the tenanted premises for

the use of the employees of the Company, the Hon'ble Mr. Justice B.N. Kirpal reasoned as under:

"The question which arises in the present case is, however, slightly different. What is to be seen is, does Section 22 override Section 14(l)(e) or not, in so far as companies, body corporate or local authorities or public institutions are concerned when they require the premises for use of their employees ? To my mind, (whenever any such type of landlord requires the premises for use of its employees, it is Section 22 alone which would be applicable and not Section 14(l)(e). This does not mean that the other provisions of Section 14 cannot be invoked by such a landlord. As held in Chuni Lal's case (supra), the grounds under Section 14 are in addition to the grounds under section 22. This is because Section 22 is concerned only with specific type of cases, namely, where premises are required by a company for use of its employees. Section 22 is not concerned with the other grounds which are available under Section 14. It may be that some circumstances may exist where a company may require premises, not for its employees, but still for its residence. In such a case Section 14(l)(e) can also be invoked. One such case can be where " the premises are required for residence of the company's Chairman, who may not be regarded as an employee of the company. In such a case the company would be entitled to invoke the provisions of Section 14(l)(e). Where, however, as already observe, the company requires the premises for its employees only the provisions of Section 22, which have been specifically enacted for such a purpose, would be attracted"!

8. From the decision of the Madan Mohan Lal (supra) it would be seen that prima facie the case of the petitioner cannot be outrightly said to be within the ambit of Section 14(1) (e) read with Section 25B of the Act. Further, this was also a matter to be determined as to whether the need so projected by the petitioner was, in fact bonafide for the residence of the employees. In the backdrop of the pleas taken by the tenants that the appointment letters of the employees are forged and fabricated to create need of accommodation and that the petitioners have several other properties in the area of the suit premises, the projected requirement cannot be determined without additional evidence. Similarly, other pleas regarding the petitions being not maintainable due to partial eviction of the tenanted premises as also not being filed by authorized and competent persons, also cannot be outrightly brushed away and need to be determined by adjudication only.

9. In view of my above discussion and having regard to the scope of revisional powers of this Court, as briefly noted above, I do not find any illegality or infirmity in the impugned order of the ARC. The petitions are accordingly dismissed.

M.L. MEHTA, J AUGUST 14, 2012 awanish