National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs Smt. Anita Ahuja & Ors
2012 Latest Caselaw 2548 Del

*        IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

                                                  Reserved on: 12th April, 2012
                                                Pronounced on: 19th April, 2012

+        REVIEW PET. 282/2010 in FAO 159/1990

         NATIONAL INSURANCE CO. LTD.            .... Petitioner
                      Through: Ms. Shantha Devi Raman, Adv.

                               versus

         SMT. ANITA AHUJA & ORS.          .... Respondents
                      Through: Mr. Navneet Goyal, Adv.

         CORAM:
         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE G.P.MITTAL

                                        JUDGMENT

G. P. MITTAL, J.

1. The Petitioner seeks review of the judgment dated 25.05.2010 passed by this Court on the ground that a sum of `137/- was charged (towards premium) for Riot and Strike whereas the same was taken towards third party liability by this Court in the impugned judgment. Thus, it is stated that the impugned judgment dated 25.05.2010 suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record and is liable to be reviewed.

2. The power of review can be exercised on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record. A review cannot be claimed or asked for a fresh hearing or arguments or correction of an erroneous view taken earlier, that is to say, the

power of review can be exercised only for a correction of a patent error of law or fact which stares in the face without any elaborate argument being needed for establishing it. In M/s. Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. The Government of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1964 SC 1372, the Supreme Court held as under:-

"There is a distinction which is real, though it might not always be capable of exposition, between a mere erroneous decision and a decision which could be characterized as vitiated by "error apparent". A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent error. Where without any elaborate argument one could point to the error and say here is a substantial point of law which stares one in the face and there could reasonably be no two opinions entertained about it, a clear case of error apparent on the face of the record would be made out."

3. In Lily Thomas Etc. Etc. v. Union of India & Ors., (2000) 6 SCC 224, the Supreme Court observed that a review is not an Appeal in disguise and that the review is permissible only on the ground provided in the Statute. Para 52 of the report in Lily Thomas (supra) is extracted hereunder:-

"52. The dictionary meaning of the word "review" is "the act of looking, offer something again with a view to correction or improvement. It cannot be denied that the review is the creation of a statute. This Court in Patel Narshi Thakersh v. Pradyunman singh ji Arjunsingh ji AIR 1970 SC 1273 held that the power of review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication. The review is also not an appeal in disguise. It cannot be denied that

justice is a virtue which transcends all barriers and the rules or procedures or technicalities of law cannot stand in the way of administration of Justice. Law has to bend before Justice. If the Court finds that the error pointed out in the review petition was under a mistake and the earlier judgment would not have been passed but for erroneous assumption which in fact did not exist and its perpetration shall result in miscarriage of justice nothing would preclude the Court from rectifying the error. This Court in S. Nagaraj v. State of Karnataka (1993) Supp (4) SCC 595 held:-

"Review literally and even judicially means re- examination or reconsideration. Basic philosophy inherent in it is the universal acceptance of human fallibility. Yet in the realm of law the Courts and even the statutes lean strongly in favour of finality of decision legally and properly made. Exceptions both statutorily and judicially have been carved out to correct accidental mistakes or miscarriage of justice. Even when there was no statutory provision and no rules were framed by the highest Court indicating the circumstances in which it could rectify its order the Courts culled out such power to avoid abuse of process or miscarriage of justice. In Prithwi Chand Law Choudhury v. Sukhraj Rai, AIR 1941 FC 1 the Court observed that even though no rules had been framed permitting the highest Court to review its order yet it was available on the limited and narrow ground developed by the Privy Council and the House of Lords. The Court approved the principle laid down by the Privy Council in Rajunder Narain Rae v. Bijai Govind Singh (1836) 1 Moo PC 117 that an order made by the Court was final and could not be altered."

4. Turning to the facts of this case, it would be appropriate to extract the conclusion of this Court where it was held that the liability of the Insurance Company was unlimited. Para 5 of the judgment is extracted hereunder:-

"5. The vehicle involved in this case was an oil tanker thus, the premium charged for insurance to the risk to the vehicle was Rs.1661/- in terms of above tariff and the premium charged for the driver and cleaner was Rs.60/-, and Rs.137/- was the amount charged apart from these two premiums. The tariff very clearly shows that the premium for "Act Only" liability was Rs.84/- and not Rs.137/- which was the premium charged. A perusal of Exh. RW-1/A (Policy) issued for the previous period, which was renewed for the accident period would show that under "Limits of Liability" it was mentioned "As required by law" and it was not mentioned "Act Only" policy. Thus, the limits of liability of the Insurance Company were those which were to be determined by the Tribunal as per law applicable for awarding compensation to the dependents of the deceased. It cannot be said that the liability of the Insurance Company was limited."

5. Although, it is claimed that a premium of `1661/- was charged towards the comprehensive (on damage) coverage. It is no where stated as to how much was the premium charged towards the third party risk. Thus, the premium of `1661/- shall be deemed to be charged for own damage and third party risk (without any bifurcation), in the absence of any specific bifurcation for the third party risk.

6. In the circumstances, there is no error apparent on the face of the record. Rather, there is only a clerical error in the penultimate paragraph of the judgment dated 25.05.2010.

7. Since a sum of `1661/- was charged towards own damage as also towards risk to the third party without any bifurcation, it cannot be said that the liability of the Insurance Company was limited.

8. The Review Petition is devoid of any merit; the same is accordingly dismissed.

9. Pending applications also stand disposed of.

(G.P. MITTAL) JUDGE APRIL 19, 2012 vk