National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs Rekha Tyagi & Ors
2012 Latest Caselaw 2454 Del

*        IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

                                         Date of decision: 17th April, 2012
+        MAC. APP. No. 852/2006

         NATIONAL INSURANCE CO. LTD.            ..... Appellant
                      Through: Mr. L.K. Tyagi, Adv.

                                    versus

         REKHA TYAGI & ORS.                           ..... Respondents
                      Through             Mr. M.M. Singh Adv. with Mr.
                                          S.K. Singh, Adv.

         CORAM:
         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE G.P.MITTAL

                             JUDGMENT

G. P. MITTAL, J. (ORAL)

1. The Appellant National Insurance Company Limited impugns a judgment dated 20.07.2006 whereby in a Petition filed by the first Respondent, a compensation of ` 4,45,000/- was awarded for the death of her son Amit Tyagi in an accident which occurred on 11.08.2004.

2. The manner of the accident is extracted from Para 2 of the impugned judgment hereunder:-

"2. Shorn of unnecessary details, the case of the petitioner is that on fateful day of 11.08.04 at about 1:00 p.m. deceased Amit Tyagi was coming from Hari Nagar to his house at Lawrence Road, Delhi by driving the motor cycle bearing registration No.DL-8S-AB-1892

(hereinafter referred to as offending vehicle) at a normal speed and when he reached near Gali No.1, Narang Colony, the motor cycle slipped and the deceased was forcefully thrown away on the road with a great force due to which he suffered grievous injuries which subsequently turned to be fatal. He was taken to BJRM hospital from where he was referred to Sushrut Trauma Centre and thereafter got admitted in Maharaja Agrasen Hospital. But despite efforts he could not survive and succumbed to the injuries. An FIR No.401/04 u/s. 279/337/304A IPC with P.S. Keshav Puram, Delhi was registered in respect of accident."

3. The deceased Amit Tyagi is the son of the owner of the two wheeler in question, namely, Nardev Tyagi (Respondent No.2 herein) and the Claimant was his mother (who is Respondent No.1 herein).

4. In Ningamma & Anr. v. United India Insurance Company Limited, (2009) 13 SCC 710, the Supreme Court relying on Oriental Insurance Company Limited v. Rajni Devi, (2008) 5 SCC 736 held that Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be said to have any application in respect of the accident wherein the owner of the motor vehicle himself is involved.

5. Obviously, the Insurance Company indemnifies the owner on the basis of the contract of insurance where a third party is involved. Where an insurance contract provides for own damages or personal accident, the owner would be entitled to compensation in respect of the damage to the vehicle irrespective of any fault as also of the insurance amount upto

the coverage in the contract in respect to the injuries (compensation to Legal Representatives in case of death) received by him in an accident involving his own vehicle. Where the owner himself is a tortfeasor, he cannot claim compensation from his own Insurer for a third party policy. It was in this context that in Rajni Devi (supra) the Supreme Court held that a borrower of a vehicle steps into the shoes of an owner and is not entitled to compensation from his Insurer.

6. Relevant portion of the report in Ningamma & Anr. v. United India Insurance Company Limited, (2009) 13 SCC 710 is extracted hereunder:-

"18. However, in the facts of the present case, it was forcefully argued by the counsel appearing for the respondent that the claimants are not the "third party", and therefore, they are not entitled to claim any benefit under Section 163-A of the MVA. In support of the said contention, the counsel relied on the decision of this Court in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rajni Devi (2008) 5 SCC 736 and New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Sadanand Mukhi, (2009) 2 SCC 417.

19.In Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rajni Devi (supra) wherein one of us, namely, Hon‟ble S.B. Sinha, J. was a party, it has been categorically held that in a case where third party is involved, the liability of the insurance company would be unlimited. It was also held in the said decision that where, however, compensation is claimed for the death of the owner or another passenger of the vehicle, the contract of insurance being governed by the contract qua contract, the claim of the claimant against the insurance company would depend upon the terms thereof.

x x x x x x x x x x x

21.In our considered opinion, the ratio of the decision in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rajni Devi (supra) is clearly applicable to the facts of the present case. In the present case, the deceased was not the owner of the motorbike in question. He borrowed the said motorbike from its real owner. The deceased cannot be held to be an employee of the owner of the motorbike although he was authorized to drive the said vehicle by its owner and, therefore, he would step into the shoes of the owner of the motorbike. We have already extracted Section 163-A of the MVA hereinbefore. A bare perusal of the said provision would make it explicitly clear that persons like the deceased in the present case would step into the shoes of the owner of the vehicle.

22.In a case wherein the victim died or where he was permanently disabled due to an accident arising out of the aforesaid motor vehicle in that event the liability to make payment of the compensation is on the insurance company or the owner, as the case may be as provided under Section 163-A. But if it is proved that the driver is the owner of the motor vehicle, in that liability to pay the same is on him. This proposition is absolutely clear on a reading of Section 163-A of the MVA. Accordingly, the legal representatives of the deceased who have stepped into the shoes of the owner of the motor vehicle could not have claimed compensation under Section 163-A of the MVA.

23.When we apply the said principle into the facts of the present case we are of the view that the claimants were not entitled to claim compensation under Section 163-A of the MVA and to that extent the High Court was justified in coming to the conclusion that the said provision is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case."

7. There is another aspect of the case. A Compesnation under Section 163-A of the Act can be claimed by a person without proving any "wrongful act", "neglect" or "default" of the driver of the vehicle who caused the accident. But at the same time, if the person claiming the compensation himself is responsible for that accident or in other words, where the accident occurred because of the wrongful act, neglect or default of the Claimant or the deceased, the owner of the vehicle would be entitled to escape the liability under Section 163-A of the Act.

8. The distinction between award of compensation on the basis of „liability without fault‟ under Section 140 and payment of compensation under Section 163-A of the Act was drawn by the Supreme Court in National Insurance Company Limited v. Sinitha & Ors., 2011 (13) SCALE 84. I extract Paras 13, 14, 15 and 16 of the report hereunder for ready reference:-

"13. In the second limb of the present consideration, it is necessary to carry out a comparison between Sections 140 and 163-A of the Act. For this, Section 163-A of the Act is being extracted hereunder:

Section 163-A. Special provisions as to payment of compensation on structured formula basis - (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force or instrument having the force of law, the owner of the motor vehicle or the authorized insurer shall be liable to pay in the case of death or permanent disablement due to accident arising out of the use of motor vehicle, compensation, as indicated in the

Second Schedule, to the legal heirs or the victim, as the case may be.

Explanation - For the purposes of this Sub-section, "permanent disability" shall have the same meaning and extent as in the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923).

(2) In any claim for compensation under sub- section (1), the claimant shall not be required to plead or establish that the death or permanent disablement in respect of which the claim has been made was due to any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the vehicle or vehicles concerned or of any other person.

(3) The Central Government may, keeping in view the cost of living by notification in the Official Gazette, from time to time amend the Second Schedule.

A perusal of Section 163(A) reveals that Sub- section (2) thereof is in pari materia with Sub- section (3) of Section 140. In other words, just as in Section 140 of the Act, so also under Section 163-A of the Act, it is not essential for a claimant seeking compensation, to "plead or establish", that the accident out of which the claim arises suffers from "wrongful act" or "neglect" or "default" of the offending vehicle. But then, there is no equivalent of Sub-section (4) of Section 140 in Section 163-A of the Act. Whereas, under Sub-section (4) of Section 140, there is a specific bar, whereby the concerned party (owner or insurance company) is precluded from defeating a claim raised under Section 140 of the Act, by "pleading and establishing", "wrongful act", "neglect" or "default", there is no such or similar prohibiting clause in Section 163-A of the Act. The additional negative bar, precluding the defense from defeating a claim for reasons of a

"fault" ("wrongful act", "neglect" or "default"), as has been expressly incorporated in Section 140 of the Act (through Sub-section (4) thereof), having not been embodied in Section 163-A of the Act, has to have a bearing on the interpretation of Section 163-A of the Act. In our considered view the legislature designedly included the negative clause through sub-section (4) in Section 140, yet consciously did not include the same in the scheme of Section 163-A of the Act. The legislature must have refrained from providing such a negative clause in Section 163-A intentionally and purposefully. In fact, the presence of Sub-section (4) in Section 140, and the absence of a similar provision in Section 163-A, in our view, leaves no room for any doubt, that the only object of the Legislature in doing so was, that the legislature desired to afford liberty to the defense to defeat a claim for compensation raised under Section 163-A of the Act, by pleading and establishing "wrongful act", "neglect" or "default". Thus, in our view, it is open to a concerned party (owner or insurer) to defeat a claim raised under Section 163A of the Act, by pleading and establishing anyone of the three "faults", namely, "wrongful act", "neglect" or "default". But for the above reason, we find no plausible logic in the wisdom of the legislature, for providing an additional negative bar precluding the defense from defeating a claim for compensation in Section 140 of the Act, and in avoiding to include a similar negative bar in Section 163A of the Act. The object for incorporating Sub-section (2) in Section 163A of the Act is, that the burden of pleading and establishing proof of "wrongful act", "neglect" or "default" would not rest on the shoulders of the claimant. The absence of a provision similar to Sub-section (4) of Section 140 of the Act from

Section 163A of the Act, is for shifting the onus of proof on the grounds of "wrongful act", "neglect" or "default" onto the shoulders of the defense (owner or the insurance company). A claim which can be defeated on the basis of any of the aforesaid considerations, regulated under the "fault" liability principle. We have no hesitation therefore to conclude, that Section 163A of the Act is founded on the "fault" liability principle.

14. There is also another reason, which supports the aforesaid conclusion. Section 140 of the Act falls in Chapter X of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Chapter X of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is titled as "Liability Without Fault in Certain Cases". The title of the chapter in which Section 140 falls, leaves no room for any doubt, that the provisions under the chapter have a reference to liability "... without fault ...", i.e., are founded under the "no-fault" liability principle. It would, however, be pertinent to mention, that Section 163A of the Act, does not find place in Chapter X of the Act. Section 163A falls in Chapter XI which has the title "Insurance of Motor Vehicles Against Third Party Risks". The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 came into force with effect from 1.7.1989 (i.e., the date on which it was published in the Gazette of India Extraordinary Part II). Section 140 of the Act was included in the original enactment under chapter X. As against the aforesaid, Section 163A of the Act was inserted therein with effect from 14.11.1994 by way of an amendment. Had it been the intention of the legislature to provide for another provision (besides Section 140 of the Act), under the "no-fault" liability principle, it would have rationally added the same under Chapter X of the Act. Only because it was not meant to fall within the ambit of the title of Chapter X of the Act "Liability Without Fault in Certain Cases", it was purposefully and designedly not included thereunder.

15. The heading of Section 163A also needs a special mention. It reads, "Special Provisions as to Payment of Compensation on Structured Formula Basis". It is abundantly clear that Section 163A, introduced a different scheme for expeditious determination of accident claims. Expeditious determination would have reference to a provision wherein litigation was hitherto before (before the insertion of Section 163A of the Act) being long drawn. The only such situation (before the insertion of Section 163A of the Act) wherein the litigation was long drawn was under Chapter XII of the Act. Since the provisions under Chapter XII are structured under the "fault" liability principle, its alternative would also inferentially be founded under the same principle. Section 163A of the Act, catered to shortening the length of litigation, by introducing a scheme regulated by a pre-structured formula to evaluate compensation. It provided for some short-cuts, as for instance, only proof of age and income, need to be established by the claimant to determine the compensation in case of death. There is also not much discretion in the determination of other damages, the limits whereof are also provided for. All in all, one cannot lose sight of the fact that claims made under Section 163A can result in substantial compensation. When taken together the liability may be huge. It is difficult to accept, that the legislature would fasten such a prodigious liability under the "no-fault" liability principle, without reference to the "fault" grounds. When compensation is high, it is legitimate that the insurance company is not fastened with liability when the offending vehicle suffered a "fault" ("wrongful act", "neglect", or "defect") under a valid Act only policy. Even the instant process of reasoning, leads to the inference, that Section 163A of the Act is founded under the "fault" liability principle.

16. At the instant juncture, it is also necessary to reiterate a conclusion already drawn above, namely, that

Section 163A of the Act has an overriding effect on all other provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Stated in other words, none of the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act which is in conflict with Section 163A of the Act will negate the mandate contained therein (in Section 163A of the Act). Therefore, no matter what, Section 163A of the Act shall stand on its own, without being diluted by any provision. Furthermore, in the course of our determination including the inferences and conclusions drawn by us from the judgment of this Court in Oriental Insurance Company Limited v. Hansrajbhai v. Kodala, (2001) 5 SCC 175, as also, the statutory provisions dealt with by this Court in its aforesaid determination, we are of the view, that there is no basis for inferring that Section 163A of the Act is founded under the "no-fault" liability principle. Additionally, we have concluded herein above, that on the conjoint reading of Sections 140 and 163A, the legislative intent is clear, namely, that a claim for compensation raised under Section 163A of the Act, need not be based on pleadings or proof at the hands of the claimants showing absence of "wrongful act", being "neglect" or "default". But that, is not sufficient to determine that the provision falls under the "fault" liability principle. To decide whether a provision is governed by the "fault" liability principle the converse has also to be established, i.e., whether a claim raised thereunder can be defeated by the concerned party (owner or insurance company) by pleading and proving "wrongful act", "neglect" or "default". From the preceding paragraphs (commencing from paragraph 12), we have no hesitation in concluding, that it is open to the owner or insurance company, as the case may be, to defeat a claim under Section 163A of the Act by pleading and establishing through cogent evidence a "fault" ground ("wrongful act" or "neglect" or "default"). It is, therefore, doubtless, that Section 163A of the Act is founded under the "fault" liability principle. To this effect, we accept the contention

advanced at the hands of the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner."

9. In this case, the accident took place on account of the neglect or default of deceased Amit Tyagi himself. His legal representatives, therefore, would not be entitled to the grant of compensation from the owner under Section 163-A of the Act also. Similar view was taken by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in FAO No.1413/2000 titled General Manager, Chandigarh Transport Undertaking-I, Chandigarh & Anr v. Kanwaljit Kaur & Ors., decided on 09.05.2011.

10. The Claims Tribunal erred in observing that the Respondents (the Claimants) were entitled to the compensation or that the deceased would be considered to be a third party vis-à-vis the owner of the vehicle.

11. The Appeal is, therefore, bound to be allowed.

12. The execution of the impugned judgment was stayed by order dated 06.11.2006 passed by this Court on deposit of the award amount along with interest with the Claims Tribunal within four weeks.

13. The Appellant Insurance Company would be entitled to claim refund of the compensation amount deposited along with interest accrued, if any, during pendency of the Appeal.

14. The Appeal is allowed in above terms.

15. The statutory amount of ` 25,000/- shall also be refunded to the Appellant-Insurance Company.

16. Pending applications also stand disposed of.

(G.P. MITTAL) JUDGE APRIL 17, 2012 vk