Citation : 2012 Latest Caselaw 2416 Del
Judgement Date : 13 April, 2012
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ EFA Nos.11/2012, 14/2012 and 15/2012
% 13th April, 2012
1. EX.F.A. 11/2012
L & T FINANCE LTD ..... Appellant
Through: Mr. Rajesh Jangra, Adv.
versus
BRAHAM PAL & ANR ..... Respondents
Through:
WITH
2. EX.F.A. 14/2012
L & T FINANCE LTD ..... Appellant Through: Mr. Rajesh Jangra, Adv.
versus
RAJ KUMAR & ANR ..... Respondents
Through:
AND
3. EX.F.A. 15/2012
L & T FINANCE LTD ..... Appellant
Through: Mr. Rajesh Jangra, Adv.
versus
SAHANSAR PAL & ORS ..... Respondents
Through:
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VALMIKI J.MEHTA
To be referred to the Reporter or not?
VALMIKI J. MEHTA, J (ORAL)
CM No.6431/2012(for exemption) in EFA No.11/2012, CM No.6471/2012(for exemption) in EFA No.14/2012 & CM No.6522/2012(for exemption) in EFA No.15/2012
Allowed, subject to all just exceptions.
Applications stand disposed of.
EFA No.11/2012, EFA No.14/2012 & EFA No.15/2012
1. These three appeals are being disposed of by this common
order as the challenge is to the identical orders of the Executing Court. By
the impugned orders dated 9.2.2012, the Executing Court has dismissed the
execution petitions filed for execution of the Awards passed in favour of the
appellant/Finance Company. The Execution petitions were dismissed
without even issuing notices to the respondents.
2. Executing Court has dismissed the execution petitions by
holding that since no disputes had arisen, the Arbitrator could not have
entered into the reference and passed the Awards. It has been held that
since the Awards were passed without disputes existing, the Awards were
null and void/without jurisdiction, and hence the Executing Court could not
implement such Awards. The Executing Court has held that merely because
one person asserts a right and which is repudiated by another is not a
difference, i.e. merely because the appellant/Finance Company sought
payment, and which could not be paid by the borrowers, there is no dispute
or difference by mere non-payment and therefore the Awards could not be
passed. The Executing Court has relied upon two judgments in the cases of
Dilip Construction Company vs. Hindustan Steel Ltd. WIR 1973 Madhya
Pradesh 261 and M/s Pearl Hosiery Mills Ludhiana Vs. Union of India
and Anr.
3. So far as the judgment in the case of M/s Pearl Hosiery (supra)
is concerned, the said judgment was passed under the Arbitration Act, 1940
wherein an application was filed under Section 34 of the Act to stay the suit
on account of the fact that the parties were governed by an Arbitration
Agreement and therefore the disputes ought to be referred to the Arbitration.
It was held by a learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of M/s. Pearl
Hosiery (supra) that since what were the disputes which were sought to be
referred to Arbitrator had not been stated in application under Section 34 of
the Arbitration Act, 1940, therefore, the application did not lie. This
judgment has therefore no application in the facts of the case where Award
has been passed after issuing notices to the respondents in the cases who
were the principle borrowers and the guarantors.
4. So far as the judgment in the case of Dilip Construction
Company (supra) is concerned, the said judgment holds that there is a want
of inherent jurisdiction in Umpire unless there is reference by both sides and
Award can be challenged at any stage even in collateral proceedings. It was
also held in the judgment of the Dilip Construction Company (supra) that
the parties who appear before the Arbitrator after objecting to his jurisdiction
cannot said to have waived their rights to challenge the Award on the ground
of Award being passed by the Arbitrator/Umpire without authority. This
judgment also therefore has no application in the facts of the cases where
Awards have been passed after notices were issued to the principal
borrowers and guarantors who failed to appear after due service, resulting in
passing of the Awards.
5. I am in fact perturbed by not only the procedure adopted by the
Executing Court but also by the impugned order on merits. Firstly, the
Executing Court cannot go behind the judgment and decree, and which are
Awards in these cases. The Executing Court by arriving at a total perverse
finding, to say the least, has held that Executing Court can go behind the
Award because the Award is without jurisdiction inasmuch as no disputes
existed. This line of reasoning is unheard of, if I may say so. Secondly, the
execution petitions were dismissed even without issuing notices to the
respondents in the cases. Finally, if there are non-payment of dues by the
principal borrowers and the guarantors because of which arbitration
proceedings are initiated, and which thereafter results in passing of the
Awards after issuing due notices to the respondents in the proceedings, it
cannot be said that such Awards are without jurisdiction for the Executing
Court to hold the same to be without jurisdiction allegedly because no
disputes exist inasmuch as non-payment of dues is very much a dispute.
6. Appeals are accepted and the impugned orders are set aside.
7. Since the impugned orders are totally perverse and have
absolutely no basis in law, let copies of the impugned orders and a copy of
today's order be sent by the Registry to the Committee of Inspecting Judges
of the concerned ADJ.
VALMIKI J. MEHTA, J APRIL 13, 2012 ak
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