Govt. Of Nct Of Delhi & Anr. vs Sant Gurbaksh Singh
2012 Latest Caselaw 2367 Del

*      IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

                                          Date of decision: 12th April, 2012

+                         LPA No.383-84/2006

%      GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI & ANR.              ....Appellants
                    Through:  Ms. Rachna Srivastava, Adv.

                                   Versus

    SANT GURBAKSH SINGH                ..... Respondent
                  Through: None.
CORAM :-
HON'BLE THE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW
                                 JUDGMENT

RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW, J.

1. This intra-court appeal impugns the judgment dated 07.11.2005 of a

Single Judge of this Court allowing W.P.(C) No.719/2003 preferred by the

respondent by directing the appellant to allot an alternative plot of land to

the respondent in lieu of the acquired land.

2. The sole ground on which the appellant impugns the said judgment is,

that the Supreme Court in UOI Vs. Shiv Kumar Bhargva 1995 (2) SCC 427

and in Sneh Prabha Vs. State of U.P. (1996) 7 SCC 426 has held that only

those persons are eligible for benefit of the Scheme of Alternative Land in

lieu of Acquired Land, who were recorded owners of the acquired land

when the Notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act is issued

and that the persons who become owners subsequently, though may be

entitled to claim compensation for acquisition, but are not entitled to the

benefit of alternative plot. It is contended that though the respondent had

entered into an Agreement dated 13.02.1974 for purchase of the subject land

and which Agreement contemplated execution of Sale Deed by 30.04.1975

but neither any Sale Deed was executed in favour of the respondent nor had

the respondent filed any suit for specific performance, till the issuance of the

Notification under Section 4 of the Acquisition Act on 13.02.1981. It is

further argued that the suit for specific performance was filed much later in

the year 1986 and which was decreed in terms of compromise on

18.09.1991. It is thus argued that the respondent is not eligible for

alternative land.

3. It is the admitted position in the present case that the compensation

for acquisition of the subject land was received by the respondent.

4. We also find that the respondent had earlier filed Civil Writ petition

No.1743/2000 impugning the rejection on 09.06.2000 by the appellant of his

application for alternative land on the ground that the respondent was not

the recorded owner of the acquired land at the time of issuance of the

Notification under Section 4 of the Acquisition Act. The said writ petition

was disposed of vide judgment dated 16.05.2002 holding that ownership

could have been either by virtue of purchase or by virtue of being the

recorded owner of the land; that if after purchase, for some reason the land

is not entered into the name of the purchaser in the revenue records, that

cannot be a ground for depriving such purchaser from the benefit of the

Scheme of allotment of alternative land; it was thus held that the respondent

was eligible to be considered for allotment of alternative plot of land and his

application could not have been rejected on the ground that he was not the

recorded owner of the acquired land before the issuance of the Notification

under Section 4 of the Acquisition Act. A direction was issued to the

appellant to consider the application within three months.

5. We have enquired from the counsel for the appellant as to whether

any appeal was preferred against the aforesaid judgment dated 16.05.2002;

the counsel candidly admits that the said judgment has attained finality.

6. Once we find the aforesaid to have attained finality, we fail to

understand as to how the issue, finally decided by the said judgment, can be

re-agitated. The same would constitute res judicata between the parties,

even if erroneous in law. The Supreme Court in Mathura Prasad Bajoo

Jaiswal Vs. Dossibai N.B. Jeejeebhoy (1970) 1 SCC 613 held that in

determining the application of the rule of res judicata the Court is not

concerned with the correctness or otherwise of the earlier judgment; the

matter in issue, if it is one purely of fact, decided in the earlier proceeding

by a competent court must in a subsequent litigation between the same

parties be regarded as finally decided and cannot be reopened; a mixed

question of law and fact determined in the earlier proceeding between the

same parties may not, for the same reason, be questioned in a subsequent

proceeding between the same parties; but, where the decision is on a

question of law, i.e. the interpretation of a statute, it will be res judicata in a

subsequent proceeding between the same parties where the cause of action

is the same. Similarly in V.S. Charati Vs. Hussein Nhanu Jamadar (1999)

1 SCC 273 it was held that a decision, simply because it may be wrong

would not become nullity; it would continue to bind the parties unless set

aside.

7. The Supreme Court in M. Nagabhushana Vs. State of Karnataka

(2011) 3 SCC 408 reiterated that the principle of res judicata is based on the

age old principles of it being in the interest of the State that there should be

an end to litigation and that no one ought to be vexed twice in a litigation if

it is for one and the same cause. The principle of finality of litigation is

based on high principle of public policy and to promote honesty and a fair

administration of justice. Recently in Indian Council for Enviro-Legal

Action Vs. Union of Indian (2011) 8 SCC 161 also it was observed that it is

rare that in an adversarial system, despite the judges of the highest Court

doing their best, one or more parties may remain dissatisfied with the

decision; however opening door for re-arguing in such cases would be

opening a flood gate which will cause more wrongs in the Society at large at

the cost of rights. The Supreme Court noticed that strict observance of the

said principles may occasionally entail hardship upon individual litigants,

but the mischief arising from that source will be small in comparison with

the greater mischief which would necessarily result from doubt being

thrown upon the finality of the decisions.

8. When we test the facts of the present case in the light of the law

aforesaid, we find that even if the issue of entitlement to alternate land were

to be held to be a question of law only, the cause of action for the writ

petition from which the present appeal arises was the same as for the earlier

writ petition No.1743/2000 and thus the decision in the earlier writ petition

is res judicata.

9. We therefore do not find any merit in this appeal and dismiss the same.

No order as to costs.

RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW, J

ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE

APRIL 12, 2012 'gsr'