Delhi High Court
N.N.S. Rana vs Union Of India And Others on 16 September, 2011
Author: J.R. Midha
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ RFA No.757/2010
Date of Reserve : 13th July, 2011
% Date of decision : 16th September, 2011
N.N.S. RANA ..... Appellant
Through : Mr.Aditya Kumar Choudhary,
Adv. along with the appellant
in person.
versus
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS ..... Respondents
Through : Mr.V.S.R. Krishna, Sr. Adv.
with Mr.Abhishek Yadav, Adv.
CORAM :-
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE J.R. MIDHA
1. Whether Reporters of Local papers may
be allowed to see the Judgment?
Not
2. To be referred to the Reporter or not? Necessary
3. Whether the judgment should be
reported in the Digest?
JUDGMENT
J.R. MIDHA, J.
*
1. The appellant has challenged the judgment and decree of
the learned Trial Court whereby his suit for damages has been
dismissed as being barred by limitation.
2. The learned Trial Court has held that the period of
limitation for filing a suit for compensation for libel is one year
from the date of the publication of libel under Article 75 of the
Limitation Act.
3. The appellant was working as Chief Personnel Officer with
the Northern Railways from 13th December, 1965 to 31st
October, 1996. One Kuljeet Kaur working under the appellant
made a complaint of sexual harassment to the Ministry of
Railways on 4th October, 1996 whereupon the appellant was
suspended on 31st October, 1996 and a chargesheet was
issued on 16th December, 1996. The Ministry of Railways
issued a press release regarding the appellant's suspension on
1st November, 1996 followed by a communiqué of 4th
December, 1996. The appellant challenged his suspension
before the Central Administrative Tribunal, which was revoked
vide order dated 30th October, 1997. The disciplinary
proceedings against the appellant were completed on 13th
January, 2000 and he was found not guilty of charges of sexual
harassment. The appellant served a notice dated 30th August,
2000 under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the
respondents and thereafter filed a suit for recovery of damages
on 12th January, 2001. The respondents contested the suit on
various grounds inter alia that the suit was barred by limitation
under Article 75 of the Limitation Act.
4. The learned Trial Court held the suit to be barred by
limitation. The findings of the learned Trial Court are as under:
"Issue No.1
Whether the present suit is barred by
limitation? OPD
Para 22 of the plaint shows that cause of
action to file this suit seeking damages for
defamation of Rs.10 lacs arose on 04.11.96
when a defamatory press communiqué was
issued by defendant which was widely printed
in press media. Article 75 of the Limitation Act
provides that a suit for compensation, for libel
has to be filed within one year from the date of
publication of the libel.
Article 75 of Schedule under Limitation
Act runs as under:
Description of Period of Time from
suit Limitation which period
begins to run
For compensation One year When the libel is
for libel. published
21. As per this statutory provision this suit in
hand could have been filed on or by 04.11.97.
Record shows that this suit was filed on
05.02.2001 almost after 4½ yrs of accrual of
cause of action. As such this suit is hopelessly
time barred. At this juncture plaintiff submits
that he had a continuous cause of action in this
matter in so far as Departmental enquiry was
pending against him. The Language of Article
75 of the Schedule is unambiguous and in case
of defamation there can be no continuous
cause of action. The sheer fact that
Departmental enquiry was going on is not
sufficient in its own wisdom to enhance one
year limitation provided by statute. At this
juncture it is stated by the plaintiff that since
he was falsely chargesheeted and was
prosecuted he deserves compensation on
account of malicious prosecution. Not only
title to the suit but the entire text and the
prayer clause shows that this suit is for
seeking damages for defamation and not for
malicious prosecution. If the plaintiff was
desirous of using the defendants for seeking
damages for malicious prosecution, he could
have framed the suit, accordingly. But after
prolonged trial of 9 yrs. on the date when the
suit is being decided, plaintiff cannot orally
change the nature of the suit. Before parting
with this issue it can be said that it was the
duty of Ld. Counsel for defendant to agitate
the issue of the suit in hand being time barred
as a preliminary issue, when the issues were
framed. The alertness of the defendants could
have saved valuable and precious 9 years time
of the courts since the suit was hopelessly time
barred. With these observations I am of the
considered view that this issue is decided in
favour of defendant and against the plaintiff."
5. The learned counsel for the appellant does not dispute
that the period of limitation for filing of the suit is one year
under Article 75 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act. The
appellant's contention is that one year period has to be
computed from 13th January, 2000 when the appellant was
held to be not guilty of the charges of sexual harassment by
the Disciplinary Authority. The appellant has referred to and
relied upon West Bengal State Electricity Board v. Dilip Kumar
Roy, 2005 (1) ATJ 362; West Bengal State Electricity Board v.
Dilip Kumar Ray, 2006 (12) Scale 559; N. Balakrishnan v. M.
Krishnamurthy, (1998) 7 SCC 123 and Balakrishna Savalram
Pujari Waghmare and Others v. Shree Dhyaneshwar Maharaj
Sanstahn and Others, AIR 1959 SC 798.
6. Article 75 clearly stipulates that the period of limitation of
one year would begin to run when the libel is published. The
language of Article 75 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act is
clear and unambiguous that the period of limitation would start
from the date of publication and it has to be interpreted
according to the Rule of Literal Construction. The appellant's
contention that the period of limitation would run from the
date when he was exonerated of the charges, is rightly
rejected by the learned Trial Court. Section 22 of the
Limitation Act has no application to the present case. None of
the judgments referred to and relied upon by the appellant
reflect upon the appellant's contention that the period of
limitation under Article 75 of the Limitation Act would start
from the date of exoneration of the appellant.
7. There is no merit or substance in the appeal, which is
hereby dismissed.
J.R. MIDHA, J
SEPTEMBER 16, 2011
Dev
