Citation : 2011 Latest Caselaw 2731 Del
Judgement Date : 23 May, 2011
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ Crl. Appeal No.746/2002
Reserved On: 25.03.2011
%
Date of Decision: 23.05.2011
Mehkar Singh .... APPELLANT
Through: Mr.R.N. Mittal, Sr. Advocate with
Mr.Manoj Kumar, Advocate
Versus
Central Bureau of Investigation .... RESPONDENT
Through: Mr.Narender Mann, Special Public
Prosecutor for CBI.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.L. MEHTA
1. Whether reporters of Local papers be YES
allowed to see the judgment?
2. To be referred to the reporter or not? YES
3. Whether the judgment should be YES
reported in the Digest?
M.L. MEHTA, J.
*
1. This appeal is directed against the Judgment dated 20.09.2001
and Order of Sentence dated 24.09.2001, whereby, the
appellant/accused was convicted by learned Special Judge under
section 7 and 13(1)(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988
(hereinafter referred to as „the Act‟) and was sentenced to
undergo rigorous imprisonment for 4 years with a fine of `500/-
on each count. In case of default in payment of fine he was to
undergo rigorous imprisonment for 3 months each.
2. The prosecution case as set up in the complaint(Ex. PW3/A)
against the appellant/ accused in brief is that, Rakesh Kumar, s/o
Jugal Kishore, r/o Bapa Nagar, Karol Bagh, New Delhi (PW-3) was
accused vide FIR No. 304/93 and 435/94 P.S. Nizammuddin
lodged at the instance of his wife. The said cases were pending
before Ms.Sunita Gupta, the then MM New Delhi. The
appellant/accused ASI Mehkar Singh was posted in PS
Nizammuddin and was the Investigation Officer (IO) of FIR No.
304/93, whereas HC Padam Singh was the IO of FIR No.435/94.
The complainant got bail in FIR 304/93, but was allegedly put in
custody by the accused. He had even filed a contempt petition
against accused in that case, but the same was later dismissed
by the court after the compromise was arrived at between the
complainant and his wife.
3. On 20.10.1996 the complainant had gone to attend the case of
FIR 435/93 at Patiala House Court where he met HC Padam Singh
and also the accused. He was told by them to meet two days
before 28.10.96, the next date of hearing in the case when they
would tell him the weaknesses of case against him so that he
could be saved. On 25.10.1996, he went to meet accused at PS
Sriniwas Puri and not finding him there went to PCR Sarai Rohilla,
where he met HC Padam Singh and after some time accused also
reached there. Accused demanded `500 as bribe for each
hearing if he wanted to save himself from the case against him.
The complainant was also assured that the accused would get
the evidence weakened. The accused asked him to come to
Patiala House Courts on 28th October, 1996 and bring `500/-.
Based on this complaint, FIR (PW8/B) was registered. The
necessary arrangements for laying trap were done. Two
independent witnesses, namely, S.P. Gulati (PW-4) and Jai ram
(PW-7) were arranged to attend the trap party. The complainant
arranged `500/- in the currency notes of denomination of `100/-,
the numbers of which were noted down. PW-4 was to act as a
shadow witness, whereas PW-7 was to remain nearby to watch
the proceedings. Pre-trap proceedings were conducted by (PW-
8) the I.O., who was also the Trap Laying Officer (TLO). The
currency notes were given phenolphthalein powder treatment.
With the help of Inspector B.K. Pradhan and PW4, the
demonstration of the manner in which said power will react when
brought in contact with the solution of sodium carbonate was
given to the members of the raiding party including the
complainant and the independent witnesses. All this was
recorded in handing over memo (PW-3/B). The treated notes
were given to the complainant with the instruction to handover
to the accused on specific demand. The trap party left for Patiala
House Courts at about 10am. Both the complainant and the
shadow witness PW4 were sent to the court. Other members of
the party took positions in the area. At about 10:15am, the
complainant contacted the accused whereafter both of them
went into court room No. 2 and PW4 followed them. The
complainant and the accused were seen moving towards the
lawyers chambers. The accused allegedly asked the complainant
to give the money which he had asked for. The money was given
to the accused, who accepted the same with his right hand. At
this, PW4 gave the pre appointed signal to the trap party
whereupon the members of the team rushed to the spot. The
accused was apprehended by his wrists. The complainant as well
as the shadow witness confirmed about accused having received
the tainted money from the complainant with his right hand. The
tainted Government Currency notes were recovered by PW-7 and
he also compared the numbers of notes with the numbers
already noted down in the handing over memo and found the
same tallying. The washes of both the hands of the accused were
taken separately which turned the solution pink. After the
completion of the formalities, the accused was arrested. On
completion of investigation the accused was challaned under
section 7 and 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) of the Act. The accused
denied the charges and pleaded not guilty. At the trial the
prosecution examined as many as 9 witnesses. The accused was
also examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C, wherein he denied all
incriminating evidence. He did not lead any evidence in defense.
4. At the outset, the learned defence counsel submitted that the
accused had arrested the complainant during the existence of
anticipatory bail which led to the filing of a contempt petition
against the accused by the complainant. He submitted that
though the contempt petition was ultimately dismissed by the
High Court and complaint against the complainant was also
dismissed on account of compromise with his wife in the said
case, but the complainant carried out a grudge and animosity
against the accused. The facts that complainant was arrested
during the subsistence of bail and his having filed contempt and
same getting subsequently disposed by High Court, are not in
dispute. These facts alone would not be enough to conclude
outrightly that the complainant was carrying any grudge or he
got planted the present case against the accused. It would be
seen subsequently after discussion of the case in entirety that
this reasoning of the learned counsel is not well founded and is
misconceived. It was submitted by the learned senior counsel
for the accused that the accused has been falsely implicated at
the instance of PW9, S.K. Peshin, in conspiracy with the
complainant. He submitted that the accused was a parokar in
the inquiry relating to death of a person in police lockup against
PW9, S.K. Peshin, and it was at his instance that the present case
was planted against the accused. With regard to the accused
being the parokar in the inquiry against PW9, S.K. Peshin, it may
be stated that though it was admitted by the PW8 to be correct
that he was aware of such an inquiry, but PW8 denied the
suggestion put to him that the present complaint was at the
instance of PW9, S.K. Peshin. Interestingly, nothing of this sort
was put to PW9, S.K. Peshin in his cross-examination. He was
not confronted with any question on this subject relating to
inquiry, nor he was put any suggestion. In fact, he was not
subjected to any cross-examination by the defence.
5. Learned senior counsel for the defence Mr. R.N. Mittal assailed
the impugned Judgment and Order as bad in law and wrong on
facts. Learned Counsel submitted that the learned Trial Court
failed to appreciate that the complainant was carrying grudge
against accused as he was aggrieved of his arrest, during
subsistence of bail by him, and so was not reliable. He
submitted that learned Judge also failed to appreciate that the
prosecution witnesses do not inspire any confidence as their
testimonies are full of doubts. He submitted that the learned
Trial Court failed to appreciate the fact that not only because
PW7 was a stock witness of CBI having appeared already in 4-5
cases, but both PW4 & PW7 were declared hostile and there were
inconsistencies and discrepancies in their statements and other
witnesses. The learned counsel further submitted that no public
witness was associated when the appellant/accused was
apprehended. He also submitted that the complainant PW-3
admitted in his cross-examination that an application was moved
by the Investigation Officer of case i.e. FIR No.435/94 in the court
of learned MM against the complainant for cancellation of his
bail, alleging that the complainant had threatened them to
involve in a false case of bribery
6. As against this, Shri Narendra Mann learned counsel for CBI
submitted that all the essentials, namely, demand, acceptance of
the bribe and recovery of the demanded money have been
proved by the testimonies of by PW-3, PW-5, PW-7 and PW-8. It
was submitted by the learned counsel that all the witnesses
mentioned herein have specifically stated in their examination in
the court that the bribe money was recovered from the right
hand fist of the Appellant/accused. There may be some
contradictions in their examinations, but these are minor and do
not go to the root of the case and minor contradictions are
natural and ought to appear where the witnesses are examined
after a long period of time. Learned Counsel relied on Bharwada
Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai vs. State of Gujarat, AIR 1983 SC 753
and State vs. Zakaullah, 1998 SCC (Cr.) 456.
7. Before proceeding to embark upon the fact whether the learned
Special Judge erred in appreciating the evidence of the
prosecution, it must be kept in mind that while appreciating the
evidence of a witness one may come across certain
discrepancies in his deposition. These discrepancies are really of
no consequence as long as they don‟t go into the root of and
demolish the veracity of the case. These discrepancies can be
due to normal errors of observation, or loss of memory due to
lapse of time or due to mental disposition such as shock and
horror at the time of the occurrence and the like. It must be
remembered that the evidence given by a witness would very
much depend upon his power of observation and it is possible
that some aspects of an incident may be observed by one
witness while they may not be witnessed by another though both
are present at the scene of occurrence [vide Boya Ganganna
and Anr. v. The State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1976 SC 1541].
In the case of Bharwarda Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai (supra), it was
held by the Supreme Court that much importance cannot be
given to minor discrepancies which did not go to the root of the
matter and shake the basic version of the witnesses, therefore
cannot be annexed with undue importance. It has been held
time and again by catena of judgments of Apex Court that
discrepancies do not necessarily demolish the testimony. The
proof of guilt can be sustained despite some infirmities
[Narottam Singh v. State, 1978 Crl.L. J. 1612 (SC)]. In the
case of Ramni v. State, 1999 (6) SC 247, it was held that all the
discrepancies are not capable of affecting the credibility of the
witnesses and similarly all the inconsistent statements are not
sufficient to impair the credit of a witness. I would like to advert
to the discrepancies pointed out by the learned defence counsel
a little later.
8. The learned counsel submitted that the complainant is an
interested person because of his carrying grudge and was not
reliable unless his testimony finds corroboration. In this regard,
reliance was placed on the cases Pyare Lal v. State, 149 (2008)
DLT 425; Jaswant Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1973 SC 707
and Sunil Kumar Sharma v. State, 139 (2007) DLT 407. In the
case of Pyare Lal (supra), appellant was the investigating officer
in the case registered against the complainant. The court found
that complainant wanted the appellant to hush up the case
against him and his family members and on his refusal to oblige
him, slapped false corruption case against the accused. This
was the case based on its own facts and circumstances which led
the court to record such a finding. In both the cases Jaswant
Singh (supra) and Sunil Kumar Sharma (supra), it was held
that in a bribery cases where complainant is an interested
witness, his evidence must be considered with great caution. I
am conscious of this fact that the testimony of such a witness
would require scrutiny with great caution. While noting so, it is
also relevant to note that the mere fact that complainant was
facing prosecution and was arrested at one point of time despite
bail by the accused, would itself may not be enough to throw
away the prosecution case or to discard the testimony of the
complainant. It is also not that in every case the court would
see independent corroboration of such a witness. It would all
depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and the
nature of deposition made by such a complainant.
9. With regard to the testimony of complainant the Apex Court in
the case of State of UP v. Dr. G.K. Ghosh, AIR 1984 SC 1453
observed as under:-
"24. ...In the case of an offence of demanding and accepting illegal gratification, depending on the circumstances of the case, the Court may feel safe in accepting the prosecution version on the basis of the oral evidence of the complainant and the official witnesses even if the trap witnesses turn hostile or are found not to be independent. When besides such evidence, there is circumstantial evidence which is consistent with the guilt of the accused and not consistent with his innocence, there should be no difficulty in upholding the conviction."
10. In the case of Rajender Kumar Sood v. State of Punjab 1983
Crl. LJ 1338 the Division Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court
while dealing with the proposition whether testimony of
complainant required independent corroboration observed as
under:-
"We are of the opinion that there is no question of the Court insisting upon any such independent corroboration of the complainant in regard to the circumstances of the kind. When a given complainant first visits a public servant for doing or not doing some task for him he does not go to him as a trap witness. He goes there in a natural way for a given task. To require a witness to take a witness with him at that stage would amount to attributing to the complainant a thought and foreknowledge of the fact that the accused would demand bribe."
11. In the case of State vs. Zakaullah (supra), it was held by the
Supreme Court that evidence of the bribe giver cannot be
rejected merely because he is aggrieved by the conduct of the
accused. It was further held that nobody over-heard the demand
made by the accused for bribe or the amount was found in the
left pocket of the accused and not in the right pocket, are
flippant grounds which should never have merited consideration.
12. The learned senior counsel, Mr.Mittal, took me through some of
the facts in support of his submission that there was no
allegation of demand of any money by the accused from the
complainant in the meeting which allegedly took place on 22nd
October, 1996. In this regard, he submitted that in fact there
was no occasion or reason for the accused to have demanded
any money from the complainant inasmuch that the case in
which the complainant appeared before the court on 22nd
October, 1996 was FIR No.435/94 in which accused was not the
Investigating Officer. Since he was not the IO in the said case,
he was not required to appear in the case before the
Metropolitan Magistrate, Sunita Gupta, on this date. He
submitted that in fact the accused had gone to Tis Hazari Courts
on 22nd October, 1996 and from there he came back to the Police
Station and so there was no question of his meeting with the
complainant in the Patiala House Court on 22.10.1996 at 11.30
AM.
13. Learned counsel relied upon the decision of Banarasi Dass v.
State, 2010 Crl.LJ 2419; Gopal Krishan v. State, 18 (1980) DLT
11 (SN) in support of his submissions that the mere recovery of
bribe money from the accused was not sufficient to prove
offence and that no presumption of guilt should be raised under
the Act in the absence of proof of demand and acceptance of
money by the accused as a motive or reward. There is no
dispute with regard to the proposition of law as laid down in
these judgments that mere recovery of money, divorced from
the circumstances under which it is paid, is not sufficient to
convict the accused when the substantial evidence in the case is
not reliable. Reliance in this regard is placed on the decision of
the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of M. Narsinga Rao v.
State of A.P., 2001 (1) SCC 691, which has been followed in
catena of judgments. However, in the present case, it would be
seen that there is ample evidence on record to corroborate the
statement of the complainant on the essentials of demand,
acceptance and recovery.
14. It is a fact that the accused was not the I.O. of the case FIR
435/94 and so was not required to be present in the Patiala
House Courts on 22.10.1996. However, it stands proved from
the statement of PW-5, Additional S.H.O., Sriniwas Puri, that the
accused went out of the Police Station to attend the date of
hearing at Tis Hazari along with SI Bansidhar. It is also proved
from the statements of PW3 and PW6 that PW3 complainant
attended the hearing of case FIR 435/94 at Patiala House court
on 22.10.1996 and this case was adjourned to 28.10.1996. PW3
also said that he had met the accused and HC Padam Singh on
this date in the Patiala House Courts and was asked by them to
meet two days before the next date of hearing, i.e., 28.10.1996.
As per DD (Ex.PW5/B) the accused and SI Bansidhar left the
police station at about 8.15 AM for Tis Hazari Courts and Patiala
House Courts respectively. DD (PW5/C) shows the return of
accused back to the police station at 3.31 PM. The fact that he
was not to appear in the Patiala House Courts on 22.10.1996 but
was to go to Tis Hazari Courts would not be sufficient enough to
record that he in fact did not go to Patiala House Court on that
date. Notice can be taken of the fact that Patiala House Court is
on the way to Tis Hazari Courts and while going to Tis Hazari
Courts one can easily stop at Patiala House Court for onward
move to Tis Hazari. SI Bansidhar and the record of the case of
Tis Hazari court where the accused was supposed to appear on
22nd October, 1996, could have thrown some light, but, however,
the accused did not choose to make any effort to lead evidence
in this regard.
15. Learned defence counsel also submitted that the visit of the PW3
complainant to PCR Sarai Rohilla was doubtful inasmuch firstly
because there was no occasion for him to visit PCR Sarai Rohilla
and secondly, it was not possible to reach Sarai Rohilla from
Police Station Sriniwas Puri. In this regard, PW3 stated that on
25.10.1996, he had gone to PS Sriniwas Puri to meet the
accused, but as he did not find him there, he within 15 minutes
reached PCR Sarai Rohilla. The learned Special Judge recorded in
this regard that the complainant seems to be making general
statement about time taken in the journey which involved the
distance of about 20 kilometers. It appears that the complainant
made such a casual statement and tried to exaggerate in this
regard. But, that may not be enough to conclude that he did not
visit PCR Sarai Rohilla. The complainant was very categorical in
his visit to PCR Sarai Rohilla. While observing that one may not
reach in 15 minutes from PS Sriniwas Puri to PCR Sarai Rohilla as
claimed by complainant, it can also be observed that during
noon period the traffic is comparatively less and such distance
could be covered by two wheeler in about 20-30 minutes.
16. At PCR Sarai Rohilla, complainant remained for about 1½ hours
and met the accused and HC Padam Singh. If it was not so, why
would he introduce this as a story. He stated that the money
was demanded in the presence of HC Padam Singh. In such fact
situation, some light could have been thrown on this subject by
HC Padam Singh, who has not been chosen to be examined by
the accused, though, at one point of time, he so desired to
examine him as a witness. In fact, this part of statement of the
complainant that the conversation with Mehkar Singh took place
in presence of HC Padam Singh has not been assailed. The
complainant categorically stated and maintained that the
accused demanded `500 for each date of hearing to ensure that
the evidence gets weakened.
17. The testimony of PW3 on demand by the accused become
reliable when we analyse the entire evidence including the
conduct of the accused to be discussed hereafter. PW3
categorically stated and maintained that on 25.10.1996 at PS
Sarai Rohilla, Mehkar Singh during conversation told him that he
will tell about the loopholes and for that he would have to pay
`500/- for each date of hearing and that he would also ensure
that the evidence in the court gets weakened. Thereafter, he
directed him to meet him in Patiala House Courts on 28.10.1996
so that he can introduce him to the witnesses. He also directed
him to bring the money of `500/-. On 28.10.1996, when he
reached the court of Ms.Sunita Gupta, MM, the accused Mehkar
Singh came there. The testimony of the witness in this regard is
worth noting and is reproduced as under:-
"When we reached at the door of the court of Smt.Sunita Gupta, M.M. accused Mehkar Singh came there, and following conversation took place between us:-
Mehkar Singh:- HA BHAI RAKESH, PAISE LAYA HAIN.
Myself:- HA JI JO AAPNE BATAYE THE UTNE PAISE
LAYA HU.
Thereafter accused went into the court room and signaled me to accompany him. He took me to the seat of the naib court, where police files are kept.
We both sat on the bench and accused read the police file of my case sometime. SP Gulati also came inside the court and sat at a distance of 4-5 paces from us. Shri BK Pradhan also came into the court and sat at some distance. After reading the file for sometime, accused said "CHAL AA BAHAR CHALE". Thereafter, we both came out of the court room. SP Gulati also followed us at some distance. While walking accused said "MAIN TUMHE CASE KI KHAMIYO KE BARE MEIN BATAOONGA, JO PAISE LAYA HAIN, MUJHE DE". On this I took out aforesaid treated GC notes of Rs.500/- from my pocket and passed on to the accused. Accused accepted said money in his right hand."
18. PW4 S.P. Gulati though turned hostile, also deposed to the effect
that though he could not hear the conversation which took place
with the accused in front of the court room, but he heard the
accused asking complainant if he had brought the money and
the complainant confirming that he had brought `500/- as
desired. He corroborated the complainant that the accused took
him in the court room where the accused took the police file from
Naib Court and started reading it. He also testified that he (PW4)
had also gone into the court room and sat at a distance of 4-5
feets and after sometime accused asked the complainant to
come out and further that he followed the complainant and the
accused. He said that while walking accused asked for the
money and thereupon the complainant took out the tainted
money and gave to him, who accepted the same in his right
hand and at this stage he gave pre-determined signal whereupon
CBI officials came and apprehended the accused. He further
stated that when the accused was confronted by Inspector Ved
Prakash, the accused threw the tainted money on the floor which
was later recovered by PW-7 Jai Ram from the fist of the accused.
He also stated that he along with PW7 Jai Ram compared the
tainted money with the numbers of notes already noted in the
handing over memo and found the numbers tallying.
19. Both PW-4 and PW-7 were also cross-examined by the learned
prosecutor. They both have supported the case of the
prosecution in entirety and have identified the accused present
in the court. They are also witnesses to the handing over memo
(Ex.PW3/B) detailing pre-raid proceedings. PW8 also
corroborated the witnesses of recovery stating that he also
followed the complainant, accused and others and noticed that
the complainant took out the tainted money from the pocket of
his shirt and gave to accused Mehkar Singh who accepted the
same in his right fist. He also stated that he challenged the
accused after he had taken the bribe money from the
complainant to which the accused kept mum and thereafter he
directed PW7 Jai Ram to recover the money from his right fist
and that after counting, the numbers of the tainted money were
compared with the numbers mentioned in the handing over
memo. This witness denied the suggestion that the accused
neither demanded nor accepted the money nor did he see the
accused taking money from the complainant. When the
accused was apprehended, he remained mum and became
nervous. The conduct of the accused is also one of the relevant
and admissible piece of evidence, the aid of which is available in
corroboration of the testimony of a witness. In fact remaining
mum or getting perplexed or throwing the money when caught
are significant factors pointing towards the guilt of the accused.
In the normal circumstances, no one behaves in such a manner.
In the case of Rao Shiv Bahadur v. State of Vindhya
Pradesh, AIR 1954 SC 322 and State of Madras v. A.
Vidyanatha Iyer, AIR 1958 SC 61, the Apex Court relied on the
evidence relating to the conduct of the accused when confronted
by the police officials with the allegation that he had received
bribe. In the case of Rao Shiv Bahadur (supra) the evidence
relating to conduct on which reliance was placed was to the
effect that the accused was confused and could not furnish any
explanation when questioned by the officer. Likewise, in the
case of Vidyanatha (supra) also evidence to the effect that the
accused was seen trembling and that he silently produced the
notes was acted upon for recording conviction.
20. In the present case, there is ample evidence on record to prove
the factum of demand, acceptance and recovery of the bribe
money from the accused. In fact PW3, PW4, PW7 and PW8 have
corroborated each other with regard to the pre-raid and post-raid
proceedings and they have stood lengthy cross-examinations by
the defence. Nothing could be elicited in their cross-
examinations to doubt their testimonies. They have deposed on
the lines of the prosecution case as narrated in the handing over
memo PW3/B.
21. Having gone through the testimony of PW3 cautiously, I could
not see anything coming on the record to substantiate the plea
of the accused that it was because of any grievance of the
complainant that the present complaint was made by him
against the accused. Here it is also noted that a plea was also
taken by the learned counsel that an application was also filed by
HC Hukum Singh, IO in FIR No.435/94 before the MM against the
complainant alleging threats to involve them in a false case. In
this regard also, nothing could be brought on record to
substantiate this plea. During the course of arguments, when it
was put to the learned defence counsel as to the time of making
of such an application to see as to whether it was before or after
the trap, the learned defence counsel expressed ignorance and
stated that in any case the timing of such an application would
have no relevance. I am afraid, the timing of making such an
application before the MM was all the more relevant and it
appears that the application came to be filed by HC Hukum Singh
after the trap of the accused. If it was before, the same could
have been so conveniently brought on record by the accused.
The same having not been done, the logical inference would be
that it was got filed after the trap to create defence of the trap
and recovery from accused.
22. Now coming back to the discrepancies as pointed out by the
learned counsel that PW3 stated that money was passed on to
the accused at a distance of about 20-25 yards and PW4 Mr.S.P.
Gulati heard the conversation and saw the whole incident,
whereas Mr.Gulati stated that he could not hear the
conversation. In his cross-examination, he also stated that the
accused threw the money on the floor. It is true that there is
some variance in the testimony of PW4 as pointed out by learned
counsel, but it is noted that this witnesses immediately after his
so stating, stated that PW7 Jai Ram recovered money from the
right fist of the accused and that they both [he and Jai Ram
(PW7)] compared the numbers of the tainted money with the
numbers noted on the handing over memo and found the same
to be correct. So this would hardly be discrepancy of any value.
23. It was next pointed out by the learned counsel that as per PW4,
accused was arrested in the verandah of the court at his signal,
whereas PW8 (TLO) stated about the apprehension of the
accused at the distance of 75 yards from the court room and
PW3 stated about 25 yards. In this regard, he also submitted
that as per the site plan from the position of some members of
the raiding party team they could not have seen and heard
anything between the complainant and the accused except PW4.
I have considered the submissions in this regard very seriously
and do not find any of these to be amounting to a glaring
discrepancy or infirmity. This was natural course of observation
of different persons of different situations in different ways and
particularly when they depose in the court after lapse of long
period of three to five years.
24. It was submitted by the learned counsel that PW7 being a stock
witness of CBI and also hostile was not reliable. I have noted
above that the testimony of PW7 is trustworthy and reliable
though he was not able to identify the accused and was allowed
to be cross-examined by the prosecution. He, however, in his
further statement identified the accused as appearing to be the
same person who was arrested at the spot for taking bribe. May
be that he had appeared as a witness in 4/5 other cases
investigated by the CBI, but that alone would not be enough to
discard him. It is not clear as to in how many years he appeared
in 4/5 earlier cases. Having cautiously scrutinized his evidence, I
do not see any reason to discard him on this ground alone.
25. It was lastly submitted by the learned counsel that no
independent witness was joined by CBI whereas there were
several available in the office of the accused and also in the hall
where the appellant was allegedly caught receiving the money.
Learned counsel in this regard relied upon the judgments of Som
Parkash v. State of Punjab, 1992 CRl. L.J. 490; Ved Prakash
v. State of H.P., II (1998) CCR 317; G.V. Nanjundiah v. State
(Delhi Administration), 1988 Crl.L.J. 152; Gulam Mahmood
A. Malek v. The State of Gujarat, AIR 1982 SC 1558 and
Satbir Singh v. State of Haryana, 2000 (1) C.C. Cases HC
195.
26. There is no dispute with regard to the proposition regarding
desirability of association of independent witnesses by the police
so as to lend more credence and authenticity to the case, but
there is also no dispute that non-association of the independent
witnesses per se for any reason whatsoever was in itself not
enough to discard the prosecution witnesses or throw away the
case as a whole. In the present case, CBI associated two
independent witnesses on the written requisition made in this
regard. Since the prosecution/CBI already had two independent
witnesses, who had been informed and apprised about the
technicalities involved in the procedure during the trap
proceedings, it was not necessary for the IO to have joined other
public witnesses at the time of apprehension.
27. In the case of Som Prakash (supra), there was no independent
witnesses associated and so that case was entirely
distinguishable from the present case. Similarly, the case of Ved
Prakash (supra) is also distinguishable. In that case the
independent witness who was associated was the one who was
brought by the complainant and was already in contact with him
and therefore, was not regarded as independent. In the case of
Gulam Mahmood A. Malek (supra), the testimony of the
complainant was not reliable inasmuch as he himself was an
accused in four cases and though the independent witness was
available, none was joined. The case of G.V. Nanjudiah (supra)
was also on its peculiar facts where the testimony of the
complainant contractor was also found to be not trustworthy and
there was no evidence establishing the factum of acceptance of
bribe. Similarly, in the case of Satbir Singh (supra) also there
was no proof of initial demand of illegal gratification beyond
reasonable shadow of doubt and there was no other evidence to
corroborate the statement of the complainant, that the failure to
join the independent witnesses was held to be an infirmity in the
prosecution case.
28. Learned counsel also challenged the validity of the sanction of
the prosecution of the accused stating that there was no valid
sanction by the competent authority. In this regard, it is seen
that the sanction for the prosecution of the accused was
accorded by PW2, Dharmender Kumar, DCP, vide order
Ex.PW2/A. He affirmed on oath that he had perused the relevant
documents including the statement of witnesses etc. before
according the sanction. Though he did not remember some of
the details of the prosecution file, but he denied that the
sanction was accorded mechanically without going through the
record. The mere fact that he did not remember some of the
details could not create any doubt. The sanction order speaks
for itself and shows that the requisite material had been gone
into before according sanction. There is no reason to disagree
with the finding of the learned Special Judge in this regard.
29. Section 20 of the Act provides that where at the trial it is proved
that an accused has accepted or obtained or agreed to accept or
attempted to obtain any gratification (other than legal
remuneration), it shall be presumed unless the contrary is
proved, that he accepted or obtained or agreed to accept or
attempted to obtain such gratification as a motive or reward as
mentioned in Section 7 or, as the case may be, without
consideration or for a consideration which he knows to be
inadequate. The requirement of this Section is only that it must
be proved that the accused has accepted or obtained or agreed
to accept or attempted to obtain gratification. It may be proved
by direct evidence as in the present case it has been proved
from the direct evidence of testimonies of PW-3 and PW-4 that
the gratification was accepted as a motive or reward for helping
the complainant in the criminal case pending against him and
other co-accused persons. In the case of Madhukar
Bhaskarrao Joshi v. State of Maharashtra (2000) 8 SCC p.
571, the Apex Court held as under:-
"12. The premise to be established on the facts for drawing the presumption is that there was payment or acceptance of gratification. Once the said premise is established the inference to be drawn is that the said gratification was accepted "as motive or reward" for doing or forbearing to do any official act. So the word 'gratification' need not be stretched to mean reward because reward is the outcome of the presumption which the court has to draw on the factual premise that there was payment of gratification. This will again be fortified by looking at the collocation of two expressions adjacent to each other like "gratification or any valuable thing." If acceptance of any valuable thing can help to draw
the presumption that it was accepted as motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do an official act, the word 'gratification' must be treated in the context to mean any payment for giving satisfaction to the public servant who received it."
30. In the case of C.M. Girish Babu v. CBI, Cochin, High Court of
Kerala (2009) 3 SCC 779, it was held as under:-
"21. It is well settled that the presumption to be drawn under Section 20 is not an inviolable one. The accused charged with the offence could rebut it either through the cross-examination of the witnesses cited against him or by adducing reliable evidence. If the accused fails to disprove the presumption the same would stick and then it can be held by the Court that the prosecution has proved that the accused received the amount towards gratification."
31. Though, the burden of proof on the accused to rebut the
presumption under Section 20 is not akin to that of the burden
placed on the prosecution to prove the case beyond reasonable
doubt, but the same, in any case, was required to be discharged
at least by preponderance of probability. The accused did not
lead any evidence in defence and also could not elicit anything
from the cross-examination of prosecution witnesses and thus
could not rebut the presumption of guilt under Section 7 against
him. Insofar as Section 13(1)(d) is concerned, it stand proved
that accused demanded and accepted bribe money for doing of
favour in the exercise of his official function.
32. From the above discussion, the case of the prosecution stands
proved beyond any reasonable doubt. Nothing could be pointed
out by the defence to interfere or find fault with the impugned
judgment or the order of the Special Judge. I have noted at
different places in the preceding discussion that in certain areas
some light on the subject as discussed would have been thrown
by leading some evidence by the accused, but nothing of the sort
was even tried to be done by him. This would lead to draw an
inference that there was nothing in store in defence of the
accused to cause any dent in the prosecution case. There was
no denial of the fact that the corruption by the public servants
and particularly the law enforcers like the accused is an alarming
menace to the society and which is spreading its tentacles in all
walks of life. With regard to the quantum of sentence, nothing
specific was pointed out by the learned defence counsel except
for praying for leniency in view of the protracted pendency of the
case. This was no ground to mitigate the gravity of the offence
as per the catena of judgments of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court
and reference here can be made only to the case of State of
A.P. v. V. Vasudeva Rao, (2004) 9 SCC 319.
33. In the given factual matrix, I am not persuaded to impose the
minimum sentence as prayed by the learned defence counsel. In
the overall circumstances, while maintaining the conviction as
awarded by the learned Special Judge, I am of the view that ends
of justice would be met by sentencing the accused to two years
of rigorous imprisonment on each count. Consequently, the
order of sentence stands modified in the sense that the accused
shall stand sentenced for two years rigorous imprisonment each
under Section 7 and also under Section 13(2). The rest of the
order shall remain unchanged. Both sentences shall run
concurrently. The period of imprisonment already undergone
shall be set off. The accused shall be taken into custody to
undergo the imprisonment as awarded. The appeal stands
dismissed.
M.L.MEHTA
MAY 23, 2011 (JUDGE)
„Dev‟
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