The Commissioner Of Income Tax-V vs Citi Financialconsumer Fin.Ltd
2011 Latest Caselaw 1849 Del

            IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

+                       ITA 1820/2010,ITA 1974/2010
                          ITA 01/2011,ITA 05/2011


%                        JUDGMENT RESERVED ON:22.03.2011
                         JUDGMENT DELIVERED ON:30.03.2011


                        ITA 1820/2010


THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX-V        ....APPELLANT
                     Through: Mr. Prem Lata Bansal, Sr.
                              Advocate with Mr. Deepak
                              Anand,    Jr.   Standing
                              Counsel.

                        VERSUS

CITI FINANCIALCONSUMER FIN.LTD          ....RESPONDENT
                     Through: Mr. C.S. Aggarwal, Sr.
                               Advocate with Mr. Prakash
                               Kumar, Advocate.

                        ITA 1974/2010


THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX-V        ....APPELLANT
                     Through: Mr. Prem Lata Bansal, Sr.
                              Advocate with Mr. Deepak
                              Anand,    Jr.   Standing
                              Counsel

                        VERSUS

CITI FINANCIALCONSUMER FIN.LTD        ....RESPONDENT
                     Through: Mr. C.S. Aggarwal, Sr.
                               Advocate    with     Mr.
                               Prakash Kumar, Advocate.




ITA.1820/2010,1974/2010,01/2011,05/2011               Page 1 of 21
                         ITA 01/2011

THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX-V                     ....APPELLANT

                             Through:      Mr. Prem Lata Bansal, Sr.
                                           Advocate with Mr. Deepak
                                           Anand,    Jr.   Standing
                                           Counsel

                        VERSUS

CITI FINANCIALCONSUMER FIN.LTD                    ....RESPONDENT

                             Through:      Mr. C.S. Aggarwal, Sr.
                                           Advocate with Mr. Prakash
                                           Kumar, Advocate.

                        ITA 05/2011

THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX-V                     ....APPELLANT

                                Through: Mr. Prem Lata Bansal, Sr.
                                         Advocate with Mr. Deepak
                                         Anand,    Jr.   Standing
                                         Counsel

                        VERSUS

CITI FINANCIALCONSUMER FIN.LTD                     ....RESPONDENT

                                Through:    Mr. C.S. Aggarwal, Sr.
                                           Advocate with Mr. Prakash
                                           Kumar, Advocate.

CORAM:

      HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE A.K. SIKRI
      HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.L. MEHTA

      1.    Whether Reporters of Local newspapers may be
            allowed
            to see the Judgment?
      2.    To be referred to the Reporter or not?
      3.    Whether the Judgment should be reported in the
            Digest?


ITA.1820/2010,1974/2010,01/2011,05/2011                   Page 2 of 21
 A.K. SIKRI, J.

1. These four appeals are directed against the common order

passed by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal in respect of same

assessee and pertain to the assessment years 2001-02 and 2002-

03. The ITA 1974/2010 and ITA 5/2011 relate to the assessment

year 2001-02 in which the following two questions of law are

proposed:-

"(a) Whether ITAT was correct in law in allowing entire expenditure incurred by the assessee on advertisement u/s 37 (1) of the Act?

(b) Whether ITAT was correct in law in allowing entire expenditure incurred by the assessee on commission, stamping fee and directing selling expenses to the assessee. "

2. In ITA 1820/2010 and 01/2011 one question relating to

expenditure incurred on advertisement is common. Additional

question of law which is raised is in the following terms:

"Whether ITAT was correct in law in allowing a sum of ` 1,52,24,029/- claimed by the assessee as lease hold improvements treating the same as revenue in nature."

3. Final arguments were heard on these three aforesaid

questions at the admission stage itself. We proceed to decide

these questions now.

Re: Expenditure on Advertisement and Publicity; nature of:

4. In the assessment year 2001-02, the assessee company

claimed an expenditure of Rs. 3.93 crores on account of

advertisement and publicity expenditure as revenue expenditure

and the same had been debited to the profit and loss account.

The AO was of the view that this expenditure cannot be termed as

expenditure relevant exclusively for the period of 12 months under

consideration during the said assessment year. Such

advertisement and publicity expenses had bearing on the period

which spreads over a period of five years and, therefore, the

assessee could not claim the benefit in the year in which the

expenditure was incurred. Thus, opining that the benefit was of

enduring nature, he was of the view that it is to be spread over a

period of five years and thus allowed 1/5th of the aforesaid amount

in the year in question. In the next year, the total expenditure

incurred on publicity and advertisement was ` 6.35 crores and

giving identical reason, the Assessing Officer allowed 1/5th thereof

in that year. Before the CIT (A), the assessee argued that the

calculation made by the AO was based on his surmises and

conjectures and without asking the assessee to respond with the

factual information. According to the assessee, this infringed its

right of natural justice. The assessee also submitted that

expenditure incurred on advertisement, publicity and sales

promotion was revenue expenditure and whole of it was to be

allowed in the year in which it was incurred. Some judgments in

supports of this contention were cited by the assessee. Argument

of the assessee did not convince the CIT (A) who reiterated the

view taken by the AO namely the expenditure incurred needed to

be amortized under Section 35 D (2) of the Act. The CIT (A)

referred to and relied upon the judgment of the Madras High

Court in Madras Fertilizers Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Income

Tax, 209 ITR 174 and dismissed this ground taken by the

assessee in its appeal.

5. In further appeal to the Tribunal, the assessee has

succeeded. The Tribunal has held that Section 35 D of the Act

was wrongly invoked as it had no applicability. Reason was

simple, viz., the nature of expenditure does not fall under the

ambit of preliminary expenditure as envisaged under Section 35 D

of the Act. The Tribunal further opined that the advertisement

expenditure had actually been incurred during the year and there

is a nexus between the expenditure of the assessee business and,

therefore, this expenditure was allowable under Section 37 of the

Act having regard to the principle laid down by this Court in the

case of CIT Vs. Salora International Ltd. 308 ITR 199. The

Tribunal further took the view that judgment of the Madras High

Court in Madras Fertilizers Ltd. (supra) had no application to

the facts of this case.

6. Before us, Mrs. Bansal, learned Senior Counsel appearing for

the Revenue did not make any attempt to justify the amortization

of the aforesaid expenditure predicated on the provisions of

Section 35D of the Act. Her arguments rested on the premise that

the expenditure on publicity and advertisement was of enduring

nature and benefit accrued from the same could not be confined

to the year in question when the expenditure was incurred. She

relied upon the judgment of Madras Industrial Investment

Corporation Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, 225 ITR

802 wherein it was held as under:-

"The Tribunal, however, held that since the entire liability to pay the discount had been incurred in the accounting year in question, the assessee was entitled to deduct the entire amount of Rs. 3,00,000 in that accounting year. This conclusion does not appear to be justified looking to the nature of the liability. It is true that the liability has been incurred in the accounting year. But the liability is a continuing liability which stretches over a period of 12 years. It is, therefore, a liability spread over a period of 12 years., Ordinarily, revenue expenditure which is incurred wholly and exclusively for the purpose of business must be allowed in its entirely in the year in which it is incurred. It cannot be spread over a number of years even if the assessee has written it off in his books over a period of years. However, the facts may justify an assessee who has incurred expenditure in a particular year to spread and

claim it over a period of ensuing years. In fact, allowing the entire expenditure in one year might give a very distorted picture of the profits of a particular year. Thus in the case of Hindustan Aluminium Corporation Ltd. v.

Commissioner of Income-Tax, Calcutta-I [1983]144ITR474(Cal) the Calcutta High Court upheld the claim of the assessee to spread out a lump sum payment to secure technical assistance and training over a number of years and allowed a proportionate deduction in the accounting year in question.

Issuing debentures at a discount is another such instance where, although the assessee has incurred the liability to pay the discount in the year of issue of debentures, the payment is to secure a benefit over a number of years. There is a continuing benefit to the business of the company over the entire period. The liability should, therefore, be spread over the period of the debentures.

The appellant, therefore, had, in its return, correctly claimed a deduction only in respect of the proportionate part of discount of Rs. 12,500 over the relevant accounting period in question. In this connection, we agree with the reasoning and conclusion of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of M.P. Financial Corporation v. Commissioner of Income-tax (supra). The view that we have taken is also in conformity with accounting practice of showing the discount in "discount on debentures account" which is written off over the period of the debentures."

She thus submitted that there may be circumstances when

the expenditure incurred in a particular year can be spread over a

period of enduring years. More particularly, when allowing the

expenditure in one year may give a distorted picture of the profits

of a particular year. She bolstered this submission in the present

case on the ground that the assessee on the leasing business was

itself spreading the income over the years keeping in view the

period covered by the lease agreement, in such circumstances,

argued the learned Senior Counsel, allowing the entire

expenditure in one year would give distorted picture and the

„matching concept‟ of income and expenditure would clearly be

attracted.

7. Mr. C.S. Aggarwal, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the

assessee refuted the aforesaid submissions and sought to justify

the approach of the Tribunal allowing the expenditure as revenue

expenditure. His submission was that in order to allow the

expenditure as revenue expenditure, the relevant factor to be

seen was that the expenditure was incurred in the year in

question and the same was for business purposes. The question

of such an expenditure of enduring benefit would not be of any

relevance, in such circumstances, having regard to the judgment

of the Supreme Court in Empire Jute Co. Ltd. Vs.

Commissioner of Income Tax, 124 ITR 01. He further

submitted that accrual of income and incurring of expenditure

were entirely two different aspects and he also submitted that

„matching concept‟ would not apply in the instant case as held in

Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Industrial Finance

Corporation of India Ltd. 185 Taxman 296. He further

submitted that the judgment in Madras Industrial Investment

Corporation Ltd.(supra) relied upon by the Revenue was duly

considered and explained by this Court in the same judgment i.e.

IFCI (supra).

8. From the facts noted above and on the basis of submissions

of learned counsel for the parties, following aspects clearly

emerge as undisputable: -

(a) The expenditure in question is incurred by the assessee in the relevant assessment years in which the assessee is claiming deduction thereof under Section 37 of the Act. Thus there is no dispute that the expenditure is in fact incurred.

(b) It is also not in dispute that the expenditure in question is business expenditure incurred wholly for the purpose of the business of the assessee.

(c) The expenditure incurred in the nature of advertisement and publicity is incurred forever and in no manner any portion thereof reverts back to the assessee.

9. The aforesaid facts would demonstrate that the ingredients

of Section 37 of the Act stand satisfied. Therefore, normally the

expenditure is to be allowed as business expenditure in the year

in question in which the same is incurred. In this backdrop, we

have to consider the arguments of the Revenue predicated on the

so called enduring benefit which is the expenditure on account of

advertisement and publicity confers. This argument is based on

the judgment of the Apex Court in Madras Industrial

Investment Corporation Ltd.(supra). In that case, the Supreme

Court had referred to this „matching concept‟. It was held that

ordinarily revenue expenditure incurred wholly or exclusively for

the purpose of business, can be applied in the year in which it is

incurred. However, the facts may justify spreading the

expenditure and claiming it over a period of ensuing years, where

allowing the entire expenditure in one year could give a very

distorted picture of the profits of a particular year. One such

instance was issuing debentures at discount. The Supreme Court

was of the opinion that though in such cases the assessee had

incurred the liability to pay the discount in the year of issue of

debentures, the payment is to secure the benefit over a number

of years. There was a continuing benefit to the assessee of the

company over the entire period and, therefore, the liability was to

be spread over the period of debentures.

10. We are unable to persuade ourselves by the aforesaid

submission of the learned counsel for the Revenue. Identical

argument was taken by the Revenue in IFCI (supra). Explaining

the ratio of Supreme Court in Madras Industrial Investment

Corpn. Ltd. (supra), the argument of the Revenue was rejected

in the following manner:-

"The judgments on which reliance is placed by the learned Counsel for the Revenue would be of no avail in the instant case. The learned Counsel for the Revenue had strongly argued that matching concept is to be applied, as per which part of the expenditure had to be deferred and claimed in the subsequent years and, therefore, approach of the AO was correct. However, this argument overlooks that even in Madras Industrial Investment Corporation (supra), on which the reliance was placed by Ms. Bansal, the general principle stated was that ordinarily revenue expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively for the purpose of business can be allowed in the year in which it is incurred. Some exceptional cases can justify spreading the expenditure and claiming it over a period of ensuing years. It is important to note that in that judgment, it was the assessee who wanted spreading the expenditure over a period of time as was justifying such spread. It was a case of issuing debentures at discount; whereas the assessee had actually incurred the liability to pay the discount in the year of issue of debentures itself. The Court found that the assessee could still be allowed to spread the said expenditure over the entire period of five years, at the end of which the debentures were to be redeemed. By raising the money collected under the said debentures, the assessee could utilize the said amount and secure the benefit over number of years. This is discernible from the following passage in that judgment on which reliance was placed by the learned Counsel for the Revenue herself:

"The Tribunal, however, held that since the entire liability to pay the discount had been incurred in the accounting year in question, the assessee was entitled to deduct the entire amount of Rs. 3,00,000 in that accounting year. This conclusion does not appear to be justified looking to the nature of the liability. It is true that the liability has been incurred in the accounting year. But the liability is a continuing liability which stretches over a period of 12 years. It is, therefore, a liability spread over a period of 12 years. Ordinarily, revenue expenditure which is incurred wholly and exclusively for the purpose of business must be allowed in its entirely in the year in which it is incurred. It cannot be spread over a number of years even if the assessee has written it off in his books over a period of years. However, the facts may justify an assessee who has incurred expenditure in a particular year to spread and claim it over a period of ensuing years. In fact, allowing the entire expenditure in one year might give a very distorted picture of the profits of a particular year. Thus in the case of Hindustan Aluminium Corporation Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-Tax, Calcutta-I (1983) 144 ITR 474, the Calcutta High Court upheld the claim of the assessee to spread out a lump sum payment to secure technical assistance and training over a number of years and allowed a proportionate deduction in the accounting year in question.

Issuing debentures at a discount is another such instance where, although the assessee has incurred the liability to pay the discount in the year of issue of debentures, the payment is to secure a benefit over a number of years. There is a continuing benefit to the business of the company over the entire period. The liability should, therefore, be spread over the period of the debentures."

Thus, the first thing which is to be noticed is that though the entire expenditure was incurred in that year, it was the assessee who

wanted the spread over. The Court was conscious of the principle that normally revenue expenditure is to be allowed in the same year in which it is incurred, but at the instance of the assessee, who wanted spreading over, the Court agreed to allow the assessee that benefit when it was found that there was a continuing benefit to the business of the company over the entire period."

11. This Court, thus, explained in no uncertain terms that the

normal rule accepted by the Supreme Court in the said judgment

was that the expenditure is to be allowed in the year in which it

was incurred. Only at the instance of the assessee who wanted to

spread over, the court had agreed to allow the assessee the

benefit after finding that there was a continuing benefit to the

company over the entire period. The ratio of this judgment was

thus summarized in the following manner:-

"What follows from the above is that normally the ordinary rule is to be applied, namely, revenue expenditure incurred in a particular year is to be allowed in that year. Thus, if the assessee claims that expenditure in that year, the Income Tax department cannot deny the same. However, in those cases where the assessee himself wants to spread the expenditure over a period of ensuing years, it can be allowed only if the principle of matching concept is satisfied, which upto now has been restricted to the cases of debentures.‟

12. At this stage, it would be of advantage to discuss the

judgment of Supreme Court in Empire Jute (supra) which

repelled the theory of expenditure of enduring nature, in a great

measure. In that case, the Supreme Court noted that by decided

cases, the courts evolved various tests for distinguishing between

the capital and revenue expenditure but no test is paramount or

conclusive. Every case has to be decided on its facts keeping in

mind the broad picture of whole operation in respect of which the

expenditure has been incurred. At the same time, few tests

formulated by the Courts were taken note of. One such test which

was specifically spelled-out and may be relevant for our purpose

was "when an expenditure is made not only once and for all, but

with a view to bringing into existence of an advantage for which

enduring benefit of a trade, the expenditure can be treated as

capital in nature and not attributable to revenue". However,

cautioned the Court, it would be misleading to suppose that in all

cases securing a benefit for business expenditure would be

capital expenditure. The Court added the caution in the following

words:-

"There may be cases where expenditure, even if incurred for obtaining advantage, of enduring benefit, may, none-the-less, be on revenue account and the test of enduring benefit may break down. It is not every advantage of enduring nature acquired by an assesses that brings the case within the principle laid down in this test. What is material to consider is the nature of the advantage in a commercial sense and it is only where the advantage is in the capital field that the expenditure would be disallowable on an application of this test. If the advantage consists merely in

facilitating the assessee's trading operations or enabling the management and conduct of the assessee's business to be carried on more efficiently or more profitably white leaving the fixed capital untouched, the expenditure would be on revenue account, even though the advantage may endure for an indefinite future. The test of enduring benefit is therefore not a certain or conclusive test and it cannot be applied blindly and mechanically without regard to the particular facts and circumstances of a given case."

13. Applying the aforesaid principle to the facts of this case, it

clearly emerges that the expenditure on publicity and

advertisement is to be treated as revenue in nature allowable

fully in the year in which it was incurred. Concededly, there is no

advantage which has accrued to the assessee in the capital field.

The expenditure was incurred to facilitate the assessee‟s trading

operations. No fixed capital was created by this expenditure. We

may also add here that in the Income-Tax laws, there is no

concept of deferred revenue expenditure. Once the assessee

claims the deduction for whole amount of such expenditure,

even in the year in which it is incurred, and the expenditure

fulfills the test laid down under Section 37 of the Act, it has to be

allowed. Only in exceptional cases, the nature mentioned in

Madras Industrial Corporation (supra), the expenditure can

be allowed to be spread over, that too, when the assessee

chooses to do so.

14. We thus are of the opinion that the aforesaid question of law

as formulated by the Revenue has to be answered in favour of

the assessee.

Re: Expenditure on account of stamping fee, direct selling expenditure and commission payment.

15. As per the Assessing Officer, the assessee had been

financing the hire purchase of vehicles and homes etc. and the

period of such financing were ranging from less than one year to

upto 5 years. On such transactions, direct selling expenses,

stamping fee and commission paid to the selling agents could not

be treated as expense relating to the year in which the transaction

took place as the period of financing was normally more than one

year. On this premise, the Assessing Officer took the view that

these expenses could not be termed as having the chargeability in

which they were incurred. He took average of three years for

such agreements and spread the expense over a period of three

years thereby allowing 1/3rd expenditure incurred in that

particular year. The matter was taken up in appeal and before

the CIT (A), the assessee questioned the aforesaid approach of

the Assessing Officer by contending that in the course of its

business, the assessee enters in the loan agreements of hire

purchase which agreements are required to be stamped in

accordance with the provisions of Indian Stamps Act. The stamp

duty paid by the assessee is debited to agreement stamping fee

under the major head of „rates and taxes‟ and is claimed as

revenue expenditure. This entire process of getting stamped the

agreements had been outsourced by the assessee to the Contract

Processing Associates (CPA) and who are paid remuneration as

well. Therefore, the expense towards stamping as well as

commission paid to the agents is debited in whole in the year in

which it is incurred and could not be treated as advertisement

expense.

16. The CIT (A) was unimpressed with this argument and found

that the assessee was spreading over the income during the

number of years that the financing is spread over and, therefore,

expenditure on the aforesaid counts was required to be spread

over. The ITAT, however, denounced this reasoning of the CIT (A)

and accepted the plea that the expenditure incurred had nothing

to do with the period of length of time and had no linkage,

whatsoever, to any period, the entire expenditure was allowable in

the year in which it was incurred. The Tribunal has further held

that the expenditure is incurred once for all in the form of

stamping duty as well as commission paid to the direct selling

agents for procuring the loan assignments and it is not dependent

upon the working out of the agreements ultimately entered into

between the assessee and the customers. Since the commission

is paid to the direct selling agents, for their services in sourcing

hire in the year in which the loan is disbursed, it is to be allowed as

business expenditure. The Tribunal, to arrive at this finding took

into consideration the clauses of the agreement relating to mode

of payment of consideration as well as „termination‟ clause in the

agreement. Thus, as the entire expenditure was incurred which

admittedly have nexus with the business of the assessee, it was

treated as business expenditure allowable under Section 37 of the

Act. The Tribunal also relied upon the judgment of Supreme Court

in the cases of Calcutta Company Ltd. Vs. CIT, 37 ITR 1, CIT Vs.

Associated Cement Companies Ltd, 172 ITR 257, Empire Jute

Company Ltd. Vs. CIT, 124 ITR 01 and judgment of this Court in

CIT Vs. Salora International Ltd. 308 ITR 199.

17. We are in agreement with the aforesaid view taken by the

Tribunal and hold that the expenditure was required to be allowed

as revenue/business expenditure incurred in that year. The

reasons given by us while allowing the advertisement and publicity

expenditure will apply here as well.

Re: Expenditure on lease hold improvements.

18. In the assessment year 2002-03, the assessee had claimed

revenue expenditure amounting to Rs. 1,52,24,029/- on account of

lease hold improvements. The Assessing Officer took the view

that the lease improvements were on account of renovation

carried out in the lease premises and, therefore, had to be

capitalized. More so, when in the earlier year also, the assessee

had capitalized the same and claimed depreciation @ 10% on it.

He thus treated the aforesaid expenditure of lease hold

improvements as capital expenditure and allowed depreciation @

10%. We may note here that the said expenditure of Rs.

1,52,24,029 was incurred by the respondent on account of laying

of cables, electrical connections, installation OVC conduits, CATS,

Sanitary fittings, partitions & pin boards, civil works, brickwork,

water proofing, flooring, false ceiling, wall finishes, toilet

furnishings, paints on walls and ceilings, earthling, switches and

receptacles, glazing on ventilators etc.

19. The CIT (A) went into the expenses incurred on the aforesaid

items details thereof were furnished at pages 282 to 336 in the

paper book filed before him. He noted that the gross amount as

per the bills was Rs 1,92,01,959/-. Out of this, the assessee had

himself capitalized ` 39,77,930/- as furniture and claimed the

balance amount of ` 1,52,24,028/- as leasehold improvements

which were revenue in nature. After verifying the nature of

expenses from the bills and details produced by the assessee, the

CIT (A) was convinced with the justification provided by the

assessee that the expenditure of Rs. 1.52 crores was revenue in

nature and holding that disallowance by the AO was not justified,

deleted the addition by allowing the entire expenditure as

revenue. The Tribunal has upheld this order of the CIT (A).

20. The argument of Mrs. Bansal was that the nomenclature of

items of expenditure namely sanitary, fittings, civil works,

brickworks, flooring etc. would clearly show that this expenditure

could be capital in nature. Her grievance was that the CIT (A) or

the Tribunal did not go into this question at all and simply

accepted the bifurcation given by the assessee in capitalizing the

portion of the expenditure and treating the part of the

expenditure as revenue. Her plea, therefore, was that the matter

be remitted back to the AO. She conceded, at the same time, that

even the AO had not done this exercise. It is clear that the

Assessing Officer had not gone into the question as to whether the

expenditure incurred on leasehold improvements was capital or

revenue in nature. A large number of premises are taken on

lease by the assessee throughout the country and expenditure on

improvements of these lease premises was incurred by the

assessee. The assessee has treated part of the said expenditure

as capital in nature and depreciation thereon. In so far as

expenditure to the extent of Rs. 1.52 crores is concerned, the

same is treated as revenue in nature.

21. Mrs. Bansal may not be correct in her submission that the

CIT (A) simply accepted the assertion of the assessee. The order

of the CIT reveals that the plethora of documents in respect of

expenditure incurred on leasehold improvements to the extent of

Rs. 1.52 crores was filed at pages 282 to 336 of the paper book.

The order of the CIT(A) clearly reveals that he had "perused the

bills filed by the appellant and also verified its various assertions".

Thus the CIT (A) accepted the stand of the assessee only after

verification of the records and arriving at a finding of fact that the

expenditure on the aforesaid account was revenue in nature. In

this backdrop, the ITAT has observed that the CIT (A) had verified

the details produced by the assessee and gave his categorical

finding based thereupon. This would, thus, be a mere question of

fact and no question of law arises thereupon.

22. The upshot of the aforesaid discussion would be to uphold

the order of the Tribunal and dismiss all these appeals.

23. We order accordingly.

(A.K. SIKRI) JUDGE

(M.L. MEHTA) JUDGE MARCH 30, 2011 skb