Citation : 2011 Latest Caselaw 1694 Del
Judgement Date : 25 March, 2011
* THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ CRL. APPEAL NO. 240/2002
Reserved on : 15.03.2011
% Date of Decision : 25.03.2011
RAM RATTAN ...Appellant
Through: Mr. K.S.Chauhan, Mr. Ajit Kr. Ekka and
Mr. Kartar Singh, Advocates.
Versus
STATE
Through Central Bureau of Investigation ... Respondent
Through: Mr. Narender Mann, Advocate.
CORAM :
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.L. MEHTA
1. Whether Reporters of local papers may be YES
allowed to see the judgment?
2. To be referred to the Reporter or not? YES
3. Whether the judgment should be reported YES
in the Digest ?
M.L. MEHTA, J.
*
1. This is an appeal against the judgment dated 21st February, 2002
whereby the appellant/accused was held guilty and convicted of
offences under Section 7 and 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter, for short „the Act‟)
and the order dated 5th March, 2002 where under he was
sentenced to undergo SI for two years with fine of `500/- under
Section 7 and SI for three years with fine of `1,000/- under Section
13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Act. In default of payment of
fines he was ordered to undergo SI of seven days and fifteen days,
respectively.
2. The prosecution case as set up in the complaint against the
appellant/accused in brief is that the complainant, Ashish Kumar
and his brother, Prashant Kumar along with one Santosh Duggal
and her minor daughter, Kavita Duggal were accused under
Section 376/506/34 IPC vide FIR No.312/94 lodged at the
instance of the one Rakesh Jain. The said case was pending before
Addl. Sessions Judge, Karkardooma Courts, Delhi. Kavita being a
minor, her case was being tried separately in the Children‟s Court.
The accused was posted as a Public Prosecutor and was
representing the State in the Children‟s Court in the case against
Kavita. On 3rd June, 1996, the complainant, Ashish Kumar along
with his brother, Prashant and Smt. Santosh Duggal are stated to
have visited the Children‟s Court. There a case under Section
506/34 vide FIR No.191/96 was registered at Police Station
Mukherjee Nagar against them at the instance of the
appellant/accused, Ram Rattan, the Public Prosecutor. The
complainant‟s case was that Ram Rattan had been asking for some
money indirectly for doing favour to Kavita in the said case. On 5th
July, 1996 he met the appellant/accused who demanded `5,000/-
for doing favour to Kavita which would ultimately be of help to
them also in their trial in the Sessions Court at Karkardooma. It is
alleged that the accused assured them that he shall also save them
from the proceedings relating to FIR No.191/96 IPC. On the same
day, i.e. 5th July, 1996, the complainant paid `1,000/- to the
accused and the balance of `4,000/- was to be paid to him in the
Children‟s Court at 4.00 P.M. on 8th July, 1996. Since the
complainant was not willing to pay any bribe, he made a complaint
to CBI on 8th July, 1996, whereupon, this case was registered. CBI
Inspector Rajesh Kumar organized a trap. One independent
witness, Aneesh Kumar and two other members of the raiding
party assembled in the room of CBI Inspector, Rajesh Kumar
where the complainant produced 40 notes of `100/- denomination
each. The numbers of these notes were taken down in the handing
over memo. As per the procedure, the complainant was asked to
hand over the money to the accused only on specific demand and
the public witness, Aneesh Kumar was to act as a shadow witness.
The trap party reached the Children‟s Court at about 3.45 P.M.
The complainant and the shadow witness Aneesh were asked to
contact the accused at 4:20 p.m.. After sometime, the complainant
and PW4 Aneesh were seen coming out along with a person whose
identity later came to be known as accused Ram Rattan. At about
4:25 p.m., PW4 Aneesh gave pre-appointed signal. The accused
got suspicious and started running in the Juvenile Court Campus
and while running, he took out the notes from his pocket and
threw the same on the ground. However, he was overpowered and
caught by Inspectors Rajesh Kumar and S.R. Singh. The notes
were picked up by PW4 Aneesh. The same were compared by PW-
4 and Inspector Mallik with the numbers as noted in the handing
over memo. The numbers were found to be tallying. The washes
of both the hands of accused and that of right pocket of his pant
and the handkerchief were taken separately which turned the
sodium carbonate solution pink. The rest of the investigation was
conducted. The CFSL opinion confirmed the presence of
Phenolphthalein powder and Sodium Carbonate in all the four
washes. After completion of investigation and requisite sanction,
the accused was challaned and sent to face prosecution. He was
charged under the aforesaid Sections of the Act to which he
pleaded not guilty. The prosecution examined as many as 11
witnesses. The accused in his statement under Section 313
Cr.P.C. denied the prosecution case. He stated that on 3rd June,
1996, the complainant with his brother and co-accused, Santosh
had come to the Children‟s Court and threatened the prosecutrix
Priya Jain, her mother and father. On this, the accused made a
complaint to P.S. Mukherjee Nagar whereupon a case was
registered against the complainant and his brother. The accused
stated that thereafter the complainant lodged a complaint against
him on 7th June, 1996 to the Commissioner of Police followed by
another complaint with the Director of Prosecution followed by
reminder dated 24th June, 1996. The accused stated that he
submitted his reply to the Director, Prosecution on 7th July, 1996.
He also stated that since no action was taken on the complaints
against him, the complainant foisted a false case upon him on 8th
July, 1996. The accused also examined one Mukesh as his only
witness from the office of Chief Public Prosecutor to the effect that
a complaint (Ex.PW-5/DA) against the accused/appellant Ram
Rattan was received on 10th June, 1996 which was sent to the
accused for his comments. He stated that another reminder
(Ex.PW-5/DB) was also received on 28th June, 1996 which was
also sent for his comments and that the comments of the accused
(Ex.DW-1/A) were received on 7th July, 1996.
3. It is seen that the learned Special Judge has based his judgment
relying upon the testimonies of the complainant, PW-5, public
witness, Aneesh Kumar (PW4) and the IO Rajesh Kumar (PW10).
He also sought corroboration from the CFSL report (PW2/A).
4. The learned defence counsel, Dr. Chauhan has assailed the
impugned judgment on various grounds. His first submission is
that the accused being a public servant and working as Asstt.
Public Prosecutor with the Govt. of NCT of Delhi, there was no
valid sanction of his prosecution proved on record. This
submission of the learned defence counsel is apparently untenable.
The prosecution examined the Chief Secretary of the Govt. of NCT,
Sh. P.V. Jayakrishnan as PW-1. He was the Appointing-cum-
Disciplinary Authority. He stated that he had accorded the
sanction for prosecution of the accused vide Ex.PW1/A after going
through all the documents and the files put up before him and
after satisfying himself regarding involvement of the accused in the
matter. There is nothing material in the cross-examination of this
witness. The learned Special Judge has relied upon various
judgments to arrive at the conclusion of the sanction being valid
and legal. It is noted in this regard that earlier also, an application
was filed by the accused for his discharge and dropping the
proceedings on the ground of want of valid sanction. The same
was dismissed vide detailed order dated 22nd July, 1999 of the
learned Special Judge. I do not see any infirmity and illegality in
the sanction order Ex.PW1/A and the findings recorded by the
learned Judge in this regard.
5. It was next submitted by the learned counsel that the only public
witness PW4 did not identify the accused and that being so, the
accused was entitled to be acquitted on account of benefit of
doubt. This submission of the learned counsel is also not tenable.
It is seen that when this witness failed to identify the accused
during his examination-in-chief, he was allowed by the Trial Court
to be cross-examined by the Public Prosecutor. It is seen that in
his cross-examination, he not only admitted the prosecution case
and corroborated the complainant/PW5, but also identified the
accused. He had heard the conversation between the accused and
the complainant and was able to reproduce the same verbatim. He
stated that the accused said, "Paise To Laye Ho Na" (Have you
brought the money), to which the complainant said, "Jaise Aap Ne
Mangay The Laaya Hoon" (As you demanded, I have brought). On
this, the accused said, "Lao Do, Abhi Meine Bahut Sarae Jaruri
Kaam Karne Hain" (Give me, I have to do some important works).
In answer to the question put by the Prosecutor in his cross-
examination, this witness stated that he could not identify the
accused due to lapse of time.
6. This witness (PW4) corroborated the complainant by stating that
he (the complainant) took out the tainted money from his pocket
and handed over to the accused in his presence. The accused
accepted the money and kept it in the right side pocket of his pant.
Thereafter, the accused threw the tainted money on the ground.
He (PW4) and Inspector caught hold of the accused. He along with
other members picked up the tainted money thrown by the
accused from the ground. He with the help of one Inspector Sh.
A.K. Mallik tallied the numbers of notes with those as already
noted in the handing over memo and the same were tallied. He
said that the accused got perplexed when he was apprehended.
The suggestions were put to him that he was not present on the
spot and that the accused/appellant did not demand or accept any
money from the complainant or that he has conspired with the
complainant and trapped the accused/appellant. All these
suggestions were denied by him. This witness also supported the
prosecution case in all minute details of the pre-raid and post-raid
proceedings as conducted by the IO. In his cross-examination by
the defence also this public witness maintained that he was
standing close to the complainant. He stated as under:-
"...I heard the complainant saying that only if his work will be done on which Ram Rattan told him that his work will be done and further asked "PAISE LAYE HO" to which the complainant replied that "HAAN LAYA HOON" and Rattan said that his work will be done..."
"...I and Ashish Complainant were standing very closely to each other. The money was accepted in the court compound. I gave the signal near the gate and then the police reached there..."
"...Many people assembled there and accused threw away the GC notes on the ground on seeing the CBI Officials. I do not know how many people assembled there. I was directed by the CBI officials to collect the GC notes from the ground. None else other then me collected the notes. I tallied the number of GC notes by ticking on the handing over memo where the numbers were already noted down in the CBI office and the numbers were found to be the same. All these proceedings were conducted in the Court Compound..."
" ...It is incorrect to suggest that accused Ram Rattan did not demand or accept any money. It is incorrect to suggest that I had conspired with the complainant and got trapped accused Ram Rattan in a false case. It is incorrect to suggest that the complainant is a friend of mine..."
7. PW4 stood lengthy cross-examination of defence. He remained
unshaken in cross-examination and nothing could be elicited to
doubt his testimony. There was no reason as to why this witness
would depose falsely against the accused in such a serious case.
There was not even a suggestion to this witness that he had any
animosity towards the accused. I am left with an impression that
he is a truthful witness and can be relied upon. With regard to the
credence that could be given to such a witness, the law is trite that
there is no rule of law that even if a witness is otherwise reliable
and independent, his association in a pre arranged raid makes him
accomplice or a partisan witness. Conviction is not untenable on
the testimony of such witnesses [vide Maha v. State AIR 1976 SC
449]. The Court may well be justified in acting upon the
uncorroborated testimony of a trap witness, if it is satisfied from
the facts and circumstances that the witness is truthful [vide
Prakash v. State AIR 1979 SC 400].
8. It was next submitted by the learned defence counsel that the
accused was falsely implicated inasmuch as he had lodged a
complaint against the complainant and his brother with P.S.
Mukherjee Nagar whereupon FIR No.191/96 came to be registered
against them since they had threatened the prosecutrix, Priya Jain
and her father and mother on the day when they had come to the
Children‟s Court. It was submitted that, in any case, since the
accused was not the prosecutor in the case pending against the
complainant at Karkardooma Court, there was no reason for the
accused to have demanded from complainant any money as bribe.
9. It is a fact that the complainant with his brother and Santosh
Duggal were present in the Children Court on 3rd June, 1996 and
that subsequently on the complaint of the accused, a case came to
be registered against them at P.S. Mukherjee Nagar vide FIR
No.191/96 under Section 506/34 IPC. It is also a fact that the
complainant also made a complaint against the accused to his
department as stated by DW-1, Mukesh Kumar. Though, there is
nothing on record to substantiate this plea of the accused that the
present complaint was foisted against him as a counterblast, but
keeping in view the fact that the accused had lodged a complaint
against him and his brother at PS Mukherjee Nagar, I have taken a
very cautious approach in analyzing the testimony of the
complainant.
10. The complainant had stated and maintained that the accused had
demanded `5,000/- from him so as to help his co-accused, Kavita
Duggal who was facing trial in the Children‟s Court in FIR
No.312/94 in which they were also co-accused and facing trial at
Karkardooma. He said that on 5th July, 1996, when the accused
had demanded money, he paid him `1,000/- and the balance of
`4,000/- was to be paid on 8th July, 1996. It was only then that
the complainant made this complaint against the accused. The
complainant was put to lengthy cross-examination by learned
defence counsel. He was very categorical in saying that when the
accused demanded, he gave him the money. He has narrated the
verbatim conversation which took place between them. It has been
seen that the conversation as stated was also narrated by the
independent witness, PW4. He stated that the money which he
gave was taken by the accused and kept in his right side pocket of
the pant. After accepting the money, the accused tried to move
towards the Children‟s Court after crossing the iron gate. When
the CBI officials asked him to stop, he became suspicious and
started running and in the meanwhile took out the tainted money
from his right side pocket of the pant and with his left hand
splashed the same in the air. The accused was apprehended and
when interrogated, he remained mum and became nervous. The
conduct of the accused is also one of the relevant and admissible
piece of evidence, the aid of which is available in corroboration of
the testimony of a witness. All the three material witnesses,
namely, complainant (PW5), independent witness (PW4) and IO
(PW10) separately deposed about the accused getting nervous
when challenged by the officers of raiding party. In the case of Rao
Shiv Bahadur v. State of Vindhya Pradesh, AIR 1954 SC 322
and State of Madras v. A. Vidyanatha Iyer, AIR 1958 SC 61, the
Apex Court relied on the evidence relating to the conduct of the
accused when confronted by the police officials with the allegation
that he had received bribe. In the case of Rao Shiv Bahadur
(supra) the evidence relating to conduct on which reliance was
placed was to the effect that the accused was confused and could
not furnish any explanation when questioned by the officer.
Likewise, in the case of Vidyanatha (supra) also evidence to the
effect that the accused was seen trembling and that he silently
produced the notes was acted upon for recording conviction.
11. The complainant further said that PW-4 picked up the money from
the ground and he along with Inspector Mallik (PW10) tallied the
numbers with those mentioned in the Handing Over Memo. He
identified the currency notes Ex.P1 to P-40 taken into possession
vide memo Ex. PW4/2 as the same which were used as trapped
money. He denied the suggestions put to him that the accused did
not demand and accept `1,000/- on 5th July, 1996 or `4,000/- on
8th July, 1996. He also denied that he had threatened the
witnesses as alleged or that this complaint was filed by him on
account of accused having filed a complaint with P.S. Mukherjee
Nagar and because no action was taken on his complaint made to
the department of the accused. Nothing material could be elicited
in his lengthy cross-examination to doubt his testimony. As is
seen, the testimony of this witness finds corroboration from the
testimony of PW-4 on demand, acceptance and recovery of the
bribe by the accused from the complainant. The testimonies of
complainant and public witness PW4 are also fully corroborated
from the testimony of PW10 with regard to the recovery of the
tainted money from the accused.
12. With regard to the testimony of complainant the Apex Court in the
case of State of UP v. Dr. G.K. Ghosh AIR 1984 SC 1453 observed
as under:-
"24. ...In the case of an offence of demanding and accepting illegal gratification, depending on the circumstances of the case, the Court may feel safe in accepting the prosecution version on the basis of the oral evidence of the complainant and the official witnesses even if the trap witnesses turn hostile or are found not to be independent. When besides such evidence, there is circumstantial evidence which is consistent with the guilt of the accused and not consistent with his innocence, there should be no difficulty in upholding the conviction."
13. In the case of Rajender Kumar Sood v. State of Punjab 1983
Crl. LJ 1338 the Division Bench of Punjab and Haryana High
Court while dealing with the proposition whether testimony of
complainant required independent corroboration observed as
under:-
"We are of the opinion that there is no question of the Court insisting upon any such independent corroboration of the complainant in regard to the circumstances of the kind. When a given complainant first visits a public servant for doing or not doing some task for him he does not go to him as a trap witness. He goes there in a natural way for a given task. To require a witness to take a witness with him at that stage would amount to attributing to the complainant a thought and foreknowledge of the fact that the accused would demand bribe."
14. Another submission of the learned defence counsel was that the
place of conversation between the accused and the complainant
was not clear and there was discrepancy in this regard in the
statements of the witnesses. He also submitted that if the money
was kept in the right side pocket of the pant of the accused, how
could he splash the same with his left hand. Both these
contentions are without any merit. PW-4 stated that the accused
did not meet them outside the compound, but inside the
compound while he was talking to someone. On seeing him, the
accused signaled him to stay and then came to him and wished
him. In his cross-examination, the complainant (PW5) stated that
the conversation between him and the accused took place in the
compound near the public witness Aneesh Kumar (PW4), but he
did not remember the distance where Aneesh Kumar was standing.
PW4 also corroborated him stating that when they reached the
Court compound, the accused gave them signal to stay and after
some time he came and asked them to come out of the compound.
He stated that when they were coming out of the Court compound
towards the iron gate, the conversation took place between the
complainant and the accused in his presence. In his cross-
examination also, he maintained that he and the complainant were
standing close to each other when the conversation took place
between them. PW-10 also deposed on the similar lines when he
stated that the complainant (PW5), Aneesh Kumar (PW4) along
with the accused were seen coming out the Children‟s Court at
about 4.25 P.M. and doing a conversation which was in full view of
the members of the raiding party. The fact that the conversation
took place between the complainant and the accused is deposed by
all the three witnesses. The discrepancy sought to be pointed out
as to whether it was inside the compound or outside, was in fact,
no discrepancy inasmuch as both PW-4 and PW-5 have stated that
the accused gave them the signal to stay and came out. This was a
very normal and natural discrepancy if a witness is to depose after
many years of the incident. Likewise, it was also no discrepancy
as to how the accused could have splashed the money kept in his
right pocket of the pant with his left hand. It is not stated by any
of the witnesses that the money lying in the right side pocket was
taken out by the accused with his left hand. What was stated was
that it was thrown by left hand. Taking out the money with the
right hand and transferring the same in the left hand was not a
difficult task which could create any suspicion.
15. With regard to the minor discrepancies, which normally may occur
in the prosecution case, the law is well settled by various
judgments. Reference can only be made to the illustrated
judgment of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of Bharuda
Broginhbai Harjibhai Vs. State of Gujarat AIR 1983 SC 753
wherein it was held that discrepancies which do not go to the root
of the matter and shake the basic version of the prosecution
should not be attached undue importance. Their lordships have
enumerated following reasons for arriving at this conclusion :-
1) By and large a witness cannot be expected to possess a photographic memory and to recall the details of an incident. It is not as if a video tape is replayed on the mental screen.
2) Ordinarily, it so happens that a witness is overtaken by events. The witness could not have anticipated the occurrence which so often has an element of surprise. Thus mental faculties, therefore, cannot be expected to be attuned to absorb the details.
3) The powers of observance differ from person to person, what one may notice, another may not. An object or movement might emboss image on one person‟s mind, whereas it might go unnoticed on the part of another.
4) By and large people cannot accurately recall a conversation and reproduce the very words used by them or heard by
them. They can only recall the main purport of the conversation. It is unrealistic to expect a witness to be a human tape recorder.
5) In regard to exact time of an incident or the time duration of an occurrence, usually, people make their estimates by guess work on spur of moment at the time of interrogation and one cannot expect people make very precise or reliable estimates in such matters. Again, it depends upon the time- sense of individuals which varies from person to person.
6) Ordinarily a witness cannot be expected to recall accurately the sequence of events which takes place in rapid succession or in a short time span. A witness is liable to get confused, or mixed up when interrogated later on.
7) A witness though wholly truthful, is liable to be overawed by the court atmosphere and the piercing cross-examination made by counsel and out of nervousness mix up facts, get confused regarding sequence of events, or fill up details of imagination on the spur of the moment. The sub-conscious mind of the witness sometimes so operates on account of the fear of looking foolish or being disbelieved, though the witness is giving a truthful and honest account of the occurrence witnessed by him, perhaps it is a sort of psychological moment.
16. In another judgment of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case
Boys Ganganna & Anr. Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1976
SC 164, it was held that even in case of trained and educated
person, memory sometimes plays false; that the evidence given by
a witness would very much depend upon his power of observance
and it is possible that some aspects of an incident may not be
witnessed by another though both are present at the scene of
occurrence. It would not, therefore, be right to reject the testimony
of such witnesses merely on the basis of minor contradictions.
17. Section 20 of the Act provides that where at the trial it is proved
that an accused has accepted or obtained or agreed to accept or
attempted to obtain any gratification (other than legal
remuneration), it shall be presumed unless the contrary is proved,
that he accepted or obtained or agreed to accept or attempted to
obtain such gratification as a motive or reward as mentioned in
Section 7 or, as the case may be, without consideration or for a
consideration which he knows to be inadequate. The requirement
of this Section is only that it must be proved that the accused has
accepted or obtained or agreed to accept or attempted to obtain
gratification. It may be proved by direct evidence as in the present
case it has been proved from the direct evidence of testimonies of
PW-4 and PW-5 that the gratification was accepted as a motive or
reward for helping the complainant in the criminal case pending
against him and other co-accused persons. In the case of
Madhukar Bhaskarrao Joshi v. State of Maharashtra (2000) 8
SCC p. 571, the Apex Court held as under:-
"12. The premise to be established on the facts for drawing the presumption is that there was payment or acceptance of gratification. Once the said premise is established the inference to be drawn is that the said gratification was accepted "as motive or reward" for doing or forbearing to do any official act. So the word 'gratification' need not be stretched to mean reward because reward is the outcome of the presumption which the court has to draw on the factual premise that there was payment of gratification. This will again
be fortified by looking at the collocation of two expressions adjacent to each other like "gratification or any valuable thing." If acceptance of any valuable thing can help to draw the presumption that it was accepted as motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do an official act, the word 'gratification' must be treated in the context to mean any payment for giving satisfaction to the public servant who received it."
18. In the case of C.M. Girish Babu v. CBI, Cochin, High Court of
Kerala (2009) 3 SCC 779, it was held as under:-
"21. It is well settled that the presumption to be drawn under Section 20 is not an inviolable one. The accused charged with the offence could rebut it either through the cross-examination of the witnesses cited against him or by adducing reliable evidence. If the accused fails to disprove the presumption the same would stick and then it can be held by the Court that the prosecution has proved that the accused received the amount towards gratification."
19. Though, the burden of proof on the accused to rebut the
presumption under Section 20 is not akin to that of the burden
placed on the prosecution to prove the case beyond reasonable
doubt, but the same, in any case, was required to be discharged at
least by preponderance of probability.
20. In the present case, as is seen above, nothing could be brought out
from the cross-examinations of Complainant (PW5), public
witnesses (PW4) and IO, (PW10) to persuade this Court to doubt
their reliability of untrustworthiness. On the other hand, the
accused has not led any evidence to rebut the presumption. If
there was allegation that the complainant threatened Priya Jain
and her parents and also attempted to win over them, the same
could have been very conveniently proved by the accused.
21. In view of the analysis of the evidence of prosecution witnesses,
namely PW-4, PW-5 and PW-10, I do not see any infirmity and
illegality in the appreciation of the evidence of these witnesses by
the learned Special Judge and therefore I do not see any reason to
interfere with the same.
22. With regard to the quantum of sentence, the learned defence
counsel prayed for lenient view stating that the case is about
fourteen years old and the accused has already gone lots of
hardships. In the case of State of A.P. v. V. Vasudeva Rao,
(2004) 9 SCC 319 also occurrence took place nearly 14 years back
as in the present case. The Supreme Court held in that case that
the protracted trial is no ground to mitigate the gravity of the
offence. However, in the said case, keeping in view the factual
matrix, as in the present case, the minimum sentence of one year
was imposed. Minimum sentence under Section 7 of the Act being
six months and under Section 13(2) one year, I am also inclined to
impose the minimum sentence, as prescribed, in this case as well.
Thus, while maintaining the conviction as recorded by the learned
Special Judge, the sentence under Section 7 of the Act is modified
to six months and that under Section 13(2) to one year. The rest
of the order shall remain unchanged. Both sentences shall run
concurrently. The period of imprisonment already undergone shall
be set off. The accused shall be taken into custody to undergo the
imprisonment as awarded. The appeal is disposed of accordingly.
M.L. MEHTA (JUDGE)
MARCH 25, 2011 skw/AK
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