Citation : 2011 Latest Caselaw 1631 Del
Judgement Date : 22 March, 2011
R-199
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment reserved on: 17.03.2011
Judgment delivered on: 22.03.2011
+ RSA No.34/2006
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. ...........Appellants
Through: Ms. Anjana Gosain, Advocate.
Versus
SHRI SUSHIL KUMAR ..........Respondent
Through: Dr. Nepal Singh, Advocate.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE INDERMEET KAUR
1. Whether the Reporters of local papers may be allowed to
see the judgment?
2. To be referred to the Reporter or not? Yes
3. Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest?
Yes
INDERMEET KAUR, J.
1 This appeal has impugned the judgment and decree dated
06.08.2005 which had reversed the findings of the trial Judge dated
20.07.1998. Vide judgment and decree dated 20.07.1998, the suit
filed by the plaintiff Sushil Kumar seeking a declaration and
mandatory injunction to the effect that his termination of service
vide order dated 31.10.1988 be declared null and void had been
dismissed. The impugned judgment had reversed this finding. The
suit of the plaintiff stood decreed.
2 The plaintiff had joined the service of the Central Reserve
Police Force (CRPF) as a Head-constable in 1969. At the relevant
time i.e. on the date of the alleged offence, he was a Sub-Inspector.
The charge leveled against him was that while serving as a Sub-
Inspector between 12.01.1984 to 14.03.1984 he had committed
serious negligence of his duties; he had left his duty for a volley
ball match on 14.03.1984 without his personal weapon (stengun)
which attributed in snatching away of fire arms by the extremists
and causalities of CRPF and civilians; he had failed to exercise
control and supervision in the said capacity and deliberately did
not accompany his section as a member of force to control the
heavy crowd in a sensitive area; his act was a show of cowardice
violating the provisions of Section 11 of the CRPF Act, 1949 read
with Rule 27 of the CRPF Rules, 1955. On 16.06.1987, the
defendant department initiated an enquiry against the plaintiff. On
22.07.1987, the plaintiff refuted the charges leveled against him. It
was stated that copies of statements of six persons who had
deposed against him had not been furnished. The Enquiry Officer
submitted his report. Penalty of dismissal was awarded vide order
of the Disciplinary Authority dated 31.10.1988. The appeal filed
against the order of the Disciplinary Authority was rejected on
04.04.1989; revision was also dismissed. Present suit was
accordingly filed. Contention of the plaintiff was that there has
been a violation of the principles of natural justice inasmuch as
admittedly the report of the Enquiry Officer had not been furnished
to him; there was no explanation for the delay in the initiating
enquiry; incident was of the year 1984; enquiry had been initiated
after a gap of three years i.e. in the year 1987 which gap remained
unexplained; legal assistance i.e. assistance of an Advocate had not
been furnished to the plaintiff; a show cause notice prior to the
imposition of penalty had also not been given; the Enquiry Officer
was also the Presenting Officer; bias of the Enquiry Officer was
writ large. Punishment imposed was very severe. For all the
aforestated reasons, the order of Disciplinary Authority is liable to
the set aside.
3 In the written statement, the defence was that there has
been no violation of natural justice; enquiry had been conducted as
per rules and regulations of the CRPF. The plaintiff had committed
acts of serious negligence in the discharge of his duties when he
left for the venue of the volley ball match without his personal
weapon (stengun) which attributed in snatching away of fire arms
by the extremists and the resultant causalities of the CRPF
personeel and civilians. There is no provision for advancing legal
assistance to CRPF personnel who are facing enquiry; rules do not
permit it.
4 Trial court had framed seven issues. Oral and documentary
evidence was led. Trial court was of the view that the civil court is
not a appellate authority and cannot sit over and above the orders
of the Disciplinary Authority unless the departmental enquiry is
vitiated; the enquiry proceedings had complied with the rules and
regulations applicable; there had been no violation of natural
justice; suit of the plaintiff was dismissed.
5 The impugned judgment had reversed this finding. Report of
the Enquiry Officer had not been furnished to the plaintiff; in view
of the judgment of the Apex Court reported in AIR 1999 SC 471
Union of India & others Vs. Mohd. Ramzan Khan non-supply of the
report of the Enquiry Officer to a delinquent amounted to a
violation of natural justice. Enquiry was vitiated. Deletion of Rule
27 (7) of the CRPF Rules, 1955 also did not come to the aid of the
department. Delay in institution of the enquiry i.e. a delay of 3- ½
years was also unexplained. On this count also, it was held that the
enquiry is vitiated. Dismissal of the plaintiff was accordingly set
aside. Decree of declaration was granted in favour of the plaintiff
who was declared to be in continuation of service from the date of
his termination; decree of mandatory injunction was also passed in
his favour of the plaintiff directing the defendants to reinstate him
with all consequential benefits. This judgment is now impugned
before this Court.
6 This is a second appeal. Although formal order of admission
was not passed but on 10.08.2010 the two substantial questions of
law had been formulated. They read as under:-
"1. Whether the reliance by the first appellate court in its impugned judgment dated 06.08.2005 on the proposition reported in Union of India & Ors Vs. Mohd. Ramjan Khan AIR 1991 SC 471 was a misappropriation of law, if so, its effect?
2. Whether the impugned judgment dated 06.08.2005 holding that the delay of more than three years in initiating disciplinary enquiry against the delinquent official vitiated the enquiry, if so, its effect?"
Another following additional substantial question of law had
been formulated on 17.03.2011:-
"Whether the findings in the impugned judgment is perverse and if so its effect?"
7 It has been urged that the impugned judgment suffers from
an illegality in view of the fact that the ratio of judgment of Mohd.
Ramzan Khan (Supra) has not been correctly appreciated. It is
pointed that a five bench judgment of the Apex Court reported in
AISLJ XII 1993 (3) Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad Vs. B.
Karunakar had in fact set the controversy at rest as to from which
date the judgment of Mohd. Ramzan Khan (Supra) would be made
applicable. It had been held that it would have a prospective
operation only and would not apply retrospectively. This judgment
of the constitution bench was delivered on 01.10.1993 upholding
the ratio of Mohd. Ramzan Khan (Supra) wherein it was held that a
delinquent has a right to receive the Enquiry report; it is necessary
for an effective defence; however the ratio of Mohd. Ramzan Khan
would have a prospective operation; it would be applicable to
orders of punishment passed after 20.11.1990; this law would not
be applicable to the orders of punishment passed before that date
notwithstanding the fact that the proceedings arising out of the
same were pending in the court after that date. For the same
proposition, reliance has also been placed upon a division Bench
judgment of this Court in W.P.(C) No. 2646/1990 decided on
30.07.2010 in the case of Arun Kumar Nigam Vs. DIG Genl. Central
Industrial Security Force & Ors.
8 There is no dispute to this proposition. Admittedly the
enquiry in this case had been initiated and completed much prior
to the passing of the judgment in Mohd. Ramzan Khan; the
Disciplinary Authority had awarded the punishment to the
delinquent on 31.10.1988; there is also no dispute that the CRPF
Rules did not postulate the giving of an enquiry report to the
delinquent. In these circumstances, non-furnishing of the enquiry
report to the plaintiff was not a violation of the rules of natural
justice.
9 Substantial question of law No. 1 is answered accordingly.
10 Learned counsel for the appellant has next submitted that the
impugned judgment also suffers from an infirmity in holding that
there has been a delay; delay has been explained. It is pointed out
that under orders of this Court, an additional affidavit had been
filed by the appellant which is on record. Each and every day's
delay has been explained in the said affidavit which an only
expansion of the averments of the written statement. Reliance has
been placed upon 1995 (1) SCSLJ 233 State of Punjab & Ors Vs.
Chaman Lal Goyal to support a submission that even a delay of 5-½
years had stood condoned. The instant is also one such case where
the delay is liable to be condoned.
11 Arguments have been countered. It is pointed out that
Chaman Lal Goyal (Supra) has no application; it is distinct on its
facts; in that case there was a delay in serving the charge-sheet
whereas in the present case the delay is in initiating the enquiry. It
is further pointed out that the report of the Enquiry Officer suffers
from perversity as admittedly the service of a legal assistant had
also not been given to the delinquent which action is violative of
natural justice; further the Enquiry Officer was also the Presenting
Officer which is a clear example of the bias of the Enquiry Officer
qua the delinquent; show cause notice was also not served upon
the delinquent before the penalty of dismissal had been imposed
upon him.
12 This Court has now to address itself on substantial questions
of law and the additional substantial question of law. The affidavit
of the appellant has been perused. Incident is dated 14.03.1984.
Enquiry has been initiated on 16.06.1987. Delay as explained in the
affidavit is for the reason that the State Government had initiated
an enquiry against the delinquent and the department was advised
not to proceed in the matter of a departmental enquiry till the
pendency of the state enquiry. This is by and large the reason for
delay. These notings/advise have not been filed. These are all
procedural details and do not in any manner make out a sufficient
cause for explaining the delay of more than three years in initiating
the enquiry against the plaintiff. In 1980 (1) SLR Gujrat 324
Mohanbhai Dungarbhai Parmar Vs. Y.B. Zala & Others where the
departmental proceedings had been initiated against a constable
who had remained unauthorizedly absent after a delay of 1- ½
years, the Gujrat High Court had come down heavily on the
department and held that such an unexplainable delay of 1- ½
years would constitute a denial of reasonable opportunity to the
delinquent to defend himself; no person can have a computer like
memory to maintain a day to day diary in which every small matter
is meticulously recorded in aniticipation of future eventualities of
which he cannot have a prevision. Nor can be be expected to
adduce evidence to establish his innocence for after inordinate
delay; this delay was found to be valid being violative of principal
of natural justice.
13 Admittedly in this case, the incident had occurred on
14.03.1984; this incident was well within the knowledge of the
department on that day itself; no promptitude was shown to initiate
the enquiry; department was not diligent; the explanation
furnished in the written statement and in the affidavit filed before
this Court is neither reasonable not justified. It is also not in
dispute that after the date of incident on which date the plaintiff
was serving as a Sub-Inspector, he was subsequently promoted to
the rank of Inspector w.e.f. 24.03.1986. Even up this date, no such
fault was found in the conduct and behavior of the plaintiff;
promotion was a reward to the plaintiff; there was nothing adverse
against him at this time. The initiation of enquiry one year later
after his promotion i.e. in 1987 appears to be unreasonable; delay
of more than 3- ½ years after the date of incident in initiating this
enquiry is not explained. The judgment of Chaman Lal Goyal is
distinct; in that case there was a delay of 5- ½ years in serving the
charge-sheet which in the peculiar facts of the said case was held
to be justified.
14 The impugned judgment has rightly held that the principles
of natural justice had been violated. Doctrine of natural justice
which has been incorporated in a catena of judgments is not an
empty formality. It has to be adhered to in true letter and spirit.
These are principles which are necessary for a just and fair
decision making; whatever is unjust and not fair is opposed to this
principle.
15 Admittedly the plaintiff had also been denied an opportunity
of a legal assistant. This was also taken as a ground of appeal in
the first appeal. In (1983) 1 SCC 124 Board of Trustees of the Port
of Bombay Vs. Dilipkumar Raghavendranath Nadkarni & Others
where the respondent who was pitted against two legally trained
persons and he was asked to defend himself in person and
assistance of legally trained person was denied to him; it was held
to be a one sided enquiry was violative of rules of natural justice. In
the present case, also admittedly the assistance of a legal
personnel had been denied to the plaintiff; the Enquiry Officer who
was also the Presenting Officer was an I.P.S. Officer of the rank of
Deputy Inspector General Police.
16 It is also not in dispute that the Enquiry Officer was also the
Presenting Officer. For this reason, the plaintiff had suffered bias.
In Ridge Vs. Baldwin 91963) 2 AER 66 (HL), Lord Hudson had
carved out the following three features of natural justice:-
(i) The right to be heard by an unbiased Tribunal,
(ii) The right to have notice of charges of misconduct,
(iii) The right to be heard in answer to that charge.
17 The Enquiry Officer was nothing short of an interested
person; it has to be borne in mind that justice must not merely be
done but must be seen to be done as well. The undisputed fact that
the Enquiry Officer was also the Presenting Officer spells bias.
18 Admittedly the show cause notice had also not been given to
the plaintiff before the penalty was imposed upon him by the
Disciplinary Authority; this was denial of a fair hearing. Prejudice
had been contended by the plaintiff all along and this grievance
appears to be substantiated. Examining this last submission on the
touch stone of prejudice, there appears to be a violation of nature
justice.
19 The order of the Enquiry Officer suffers from a perversity.
The impugned judgment had correctly noted all these facts and
decreed the suit of the plaintiff entitling him to a decree of
declaration and mandatory injunction as granted in his favour. This
finding suffers from no infirmity. Substantial questions of law and
additional substantial question of law are answered accordingly.
20 There is no merit in the appeal. Dismissed.
(INDERMEET KAUR)
JUDGE
MARCH 22, 2011
A
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