Citation : 2011 Latest Caselaw 3543 Del
Judgement Date : 26 July, 2011
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ CRL.L.P. No.260/2008
Date of Decision : 26.07.2011
STATE ...... Petitioner
Through: Mr.Naveen Sharma, APP
for Mr.Pawan Sharma,
standing counsel for the
State.
Versus
SUNIL DUTT ...... Respondent
Through: None.
CORAM :
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V.K. SHALI
1. Whether Reporters of local papers may be
allowed to see the judgment? YES
2. To be referred to the Reporter or not ? YES
3. Whether the judgment should be reported
in the Digest ? YES
V.K. SHALI, J. (Oral)
1. This is a leave to appeal filed by the State against the
judgment dated 03.07.2008 passed by Shri S.K. Sarvaria,
learned Additional Sessions Judge, New Delhi, acquitting
the respondent-accused of an offence under Section 7 of
the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, in respect of which
he was held guilty by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate.
2. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that the appellant
Food Inspector is alleged to have taken a sample of 18
sticks of ice candy from the freezer of the respondent
accused on 06.04.1989 at about 5 PM with the help of Food
Inspector Rajesh Kumar. The samples of ice candies were
taken with the help of clean and dry 'patilas' and spoons,
and thereafter divided in three equal parts. They were
separately sealed after adding 24 drops of formalin in each
counterpart. Statutory documents are alleged to have been
prepared on the spot and one sample was sent to the Public
Analyst for the purpose of examination. The Public Analyst
after examination, opined that the sample contained dye
content to the extent of 0.27gms/Kg. which was beyond the
permissible limit of 0.20 gms/Kg which was, the fixed
standard under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act.
Accordingly, after obtaining necessary sanction from
Director (PFA), a complaint under Section 7 read with
Section 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act was
filed in the Court of Metropolitan Magistrate on 07.06.1989.
3. The accused has put in his appearance and exercised his
right under Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Food
Adulteration Act to get the second sample of the article of
food examined from the Director, CFL, Mysore.
Accordingly, a second sample of the ice candy was sent to
Director, CFL, Mysore who gave a certificate of examination
dated 27.07.1989 and confirmed the finding that the
sample was not conforming to the standard so far as the
total dye content is concerned. It was opined that the total
dye content was 0.310 gms/Kg. whereas the maximum
permissible limit was 0.20 gms/Kg. Accordingly, a notice
under Section 251 of Cr.P.C. was given to the respondent-
accused.
4. The prosecution in support of its case examined three
material witnesses, namely, PW1 Gopal Singh, complainant,
PW-2 Food Inspector Rajesh Kumar and PW3 R.K. Ahuja
attesting witness.
5. The accused in his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C.
admitted that he had sold the ice candy of which the
sample was taken. However, he took the plea that at the
time when the sample of the ice candy was taken, there
was no electricity supply and, therefore, some of the ice
candy stock were in a solid state while as the other was
melting. He also took the plea that the sample which was
taken was not representative in character because of the
lack of homogeneity in the food article that was obtained.
6. The respondent-accused in support of his case examined
DW-1 Harbhajan Singh and DW-2 Shri S. Mahendru. The
learned Magistrate vide judgment dated 10.08.1999
convicted the accused for an offence under Section 7 of the
Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and by order dated
20.08.1999, sentenced him to undergo simple
imprisonment for one year along with a fine of Rs.2000/-.
7. The appellant, feeling aggrieved by the said conviction and
sentence, preferred an appeal bearing No. 54/1999 titled
Sunil Dutt versus State (Delhi Administration), which was
disposed of on 03.07.2008. thereby acquitting the appellant
of all the charges. The reason for acquittal handed down by
the learned Additional Sessions Judge was that the sample
which was obtained by the Food Inspector PW-2 was not
homogeneous and consequently not representative in
character. For arriving at this conclusion, the learned
Additional Sessions Judge relied upon the values of the
edible article given in the two reports i.e. of Public Analyst
and that of the Director, CFL, Mysore. It was observed by
the learned Additional Sessions Judge that the report of the
Public Analyst showed that the total sugar found in the
sucrose in the sample was 21.2% and the dye content was
0.27 gm/kg. In contrast to this, the certificate given by the
Director, CFL, Mysore showed that the total sugar was
found to be 19.95% by weight while as the total quantity of
artificial colouring was found to be 0.310 gms./Kg. It was
observed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge that
though both the samples had failed so far as the dye
content is concerned, but the sugar content had also
reduced from 21.2% to 19.95%, therefore, there was a
variation in the values and the benefit of the same has to
be given to the accused, as he had taken the plea that the
sample was not representative in character. The learned
Additional Sessions Judge in arriving at such a finding has
taken note of the fact that although statutorily the report of
the Director, CFL supersedes the report of the Public
Analyst, but at the same time, the learned Additional
Sessions Judge considered the Full Bench decision of the
Delhi High Court in MCD and R.N. Gujral versus Bishan
Sarup 1972 FAC 273 (Del) (FB), and observed that the
report of the Director, CFL, Mysore, is obtained by the
accused himself and it gets superimposed on the report of
the Public Analyst. But it has been observed that the report
of the Public Analyst and the Director, CFL can be looked
into for the purpose of arriving at a conclusion as to
whether the sample was representative in character or not.
This will be evident from the variation not only in the values
of the two reports but also the content of the adulterant or
the offending article which has made such edible article
adulterated.
8. The State, feeling aggrieved by the acquittal, has assailed
the judgment passed by the learned Additional Sessions
Judge. However, it must candidly be stated that the
learned counsel for the State was not able to show any
authority contrary to the Full Bench decision in Bishan
Sarup's case (supra), which has been referred to by the
learned Additional Sessions Judge in his judgment in order
to arrive at such a conclusion.
9. I have gone through the judgment passed by the learned
Additional Sessions Judge, which is quite exhaustive and
has referred to a number of judgments of this High Court
and that of the Apex Court. They sum up the legal position
very succinctly. In all such cases, it has been held that
once the accused exercises his right under Section 13(2) of
Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and voluntarily gets the
second sample examined from Director, CFL, he does so at
his own risk. The report in this regard, statutorily
supersedes the report of the Public Analyst for all practical
purposes. However, there have been judgments including
the Full Bench decision in Bishan Sarup's case (supra)
where this Court has observed that although the finality and
conclusiveness is attached to the report of the Central Food
Laboratory, however, the report will still be open to
challenge by the party and it may still have to be
ascertained by the Court as to whether the adulteration is
established in the report or not. It was also observed that
it is open to the accused to show that in the facts of the
given case, the sample which was sent for analysis to the
Director, CFL, could not be taken to be a representative
sample of the food articles that were sent for examination.
Such a defence has been taken by the respondent-accused
in his statement under Section 313, Cr.P.C. and he has also
examined DW-1 who has stated in his statement that at the
time when the sample was taken, there was no electricity
and consequently, some of the ice candies were frozen
whereas others were semi-solid. Similar statement was
given by the other defence witness, though they were not
as favourable to the respondent-accused as DW-1.
10. The learned Magistrate has disbelieved their testimony by
observing that since the witness himself has observed that
some of the ice candies were frozen and some were
melting, there is a contradiction in the statement of fact
itself. The learned Magistrate reasoned that if there was no
light, then all the ice candies ought to have melted. I find
this reasoning to be illogical because when the samples
were taken from the deep freezer, and assuming that there
was no electricity, it is not necessary that all the ice candies
will melt in a uniform manner. The ones which were kept at
the bottom of the freezer would still be slightly frozen
whereas the ones near the opening would start melting
much faster, even if all the ice candies were taken out
simultaneously.
11. The valuation of the two parameters, namely, sugar content
and the content of dye are at a variance in the two reports,
i.e. of the Public Analyst and of the Director, CFL. This has
not been explained by the prosecution anywhere as to why
it has happened so. It is not clear whether this is because
of the lapse of time or because of some other reason. In
such a contingency, the plea of the respondent-accused
that the sample was not homogeneous cannot be said to be
without any merit and hence, cannot be brushed aside. In
a criminal trial when there are two possible views, one in
favour of the accused and the other against him. The court
would invariably lean in favour of the view favouring the
accused. The learned Additional Sessions Judge in my
considered opinion has rightly relied on the view favouring
the accused. Moreover, one must also be pragmatic to the
realities of life. The sample was purported to have been
taken almost 22 years back and, therefore, I feel that
simply by granting the leave to appeal, the final
adjudication of the matter will still kept under suspense. It
is not a case where some adulterant has been mixed from
outside and, therefore, it is better to give quietus to the
matter.
12. For the reasons mentioned above, I am of the considered
opinion that no ground is made out by the State for grant of
leave to appeal against the impugned order dated
08.07.2008 acquitting the respondent accused.
Accordingly, the leave to appeal is dismissed.
V.K. SHALI, J.
July 26, 2011 MA
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