Citation : 2011 Latest Caselaw 233 Del
Judgement Date : 17 January, 2011
THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment Reserved on: 13th January, 2011
Judgment Pronounced on: 17th January, 2011.
+ I.A. Nos. 6505/2010 (O.6. R.17 CPC) & 13661/2009
(O. 7. R. 10 & 11 CPC) IN CS(OS) No. 720/2009
M/s Bhatia Industries & Others .....Plaintiffs
- versus -
M/s Pandey Industries & Others .....Defendants
Advocates who appeared in this case:
For the Plaintiff: Ms. Pratibha M. Singh with Mr. Jaspreet
Singh Kapur and Ms. Saya Choudhary.
For the Defendant: Mr. Sanjeev Singh with Mr. Amit Jha.
CORAM:-
HON'BLE MR JUSTICE V.K. JAIN
1. Whether Reporters of local papers may Yes
be allowed to see the judgment?
2. To be referred to the Reporter or not? Yes
3. Whether the judgment should be reported Yes
in Digest?
V.K. JAIN, J
1. This is a suit for permanent injunction. The
plaintiff No.1 claims to be the owner of the trademark TIYA
having acquired it by assignment from plaintiff No.2. It is
alleged that the mark TIYA was registered in the name of
plaintiff No.2 vide registration No.299272 on 13th
CS(OS)No.720/2009. Page 1 of 24
September, 1974. The registration of the trademark in the
name of plaintiff No.1 M/s Tiya Industries was renewed for
some years but the registration discontinued thereafter.
The trademark is stated to have been assigned by plaintiff
No.2 to plaintiff No.1 in the year 1983 and is being used by
plaintiff No.1 since the year 1981 in respect of steel and
rubber parts for the cycle and auto industries mainly of
steel balls, nuts bolts, rings, spoke wires and cycle parts
etc. The plaintiffs claim to be the exclusive owner of the
trademark TIYA with logo on account of its continuous user
since the year 1974. This is also the case of the plaintiffs
that they are selling their products under a distinctive label
and trade dress, which constitute an original artistic work
within the meaning of Section 2(c) of the Copyright Act,
1957 and the copyright in that work vests in plaintiff No.1.
Defendant No.1 has obtained registration of this trademark
in its favour since 19th July, 2004/28th April, 2006. The
case of the plaintiffs is that the defendants having
committed acts of infringement and passing of by adopting
the trademark TIYA and using the trade dress, get up,
colour combination and label identical to that of the
plaintiffs.
CS(OS)No.720/2009. Page 2 of 24
2. As regards jurisdiction of this Court, para 14 of the
plaint, to the extent it is relevant, reads as under:-
"14.....The plaintiff came across the goods
of the defendants towards the end of
March 2008 TIYA with Logo being
imitating trademark and the plaintiff
inquired in the market at its level that the
defendant had started commercially using
the trademark only recently and the
defendants were carrying their activities
in a clandestine and deceitful manner.
...."
Para 58 of the plaint reads as under:-
"58. That where the plaint schedule is
within the jurisdiction of this Hon'ble
Court."
3. The defendants have contested the suit and have
taken a preliminary objection that this Court has no
jurisdiction to try the present suit since no cause of action
arose within the jurisdiction of this Court. It is also alleged
that the business activities of the defendants including the
acts of manufacturing and marketing of their goods are
confined/limited to the territories of the State of U.P. and no
components/parts/goods are being supplied outside the
State of U.P. It has also been alleged that at no given point
of time, the defendants have made any business transaction
within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court and they are
CS(OS)No.720/2009. Page 3 of 24
not passing of their goods and business as that of the
plaintiffs within the jurisdiction of this Court. However, in
para C of the preliminary objections, the defendants have,
inter alia, stated as under:-
"...... The defendants have been
marketing and selling its goods
throughout India since its inception in the
year 1995. The Goods/products of the
Defendants has been always available in
Different markets of India in different
parts and defendants are well known
among big dealers and distributors
dealing in the said goods/products or
allied or cognate goods. Accordingly, the
defendants enjoy goodwill and reputation
throughout the country...."
4. I.A. 13661/2009 has been filed by the defendants
under Order VII Rules 10 and 11 of the Code of Civil
Procedure for rejection of the plaint on the ground that this
Court has no territorial jurisdiction to try this suit as no
cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of this Court.
5. I.A. 6505/2010 has been filed by the plaintiffs for
amendment of the plaint. The plaintiffs wants to amend
para 58 of the plaint as also the prayer clause in the
following manner:-
Existing Paragraph
"That where the plaint schedule is
within the jurisdiction of this Hon'ble
CS(OS)No.720/2009. Page 4 of 24
Court"
Proposed amendment paragraph No.58
"That this Hon'ble Court has got the
territorial jurisdiction to entertain
and try the present suit the plaintiff
has invoked the jurisdiction of this
Hon'ble Court under Section 62(2) of
the Copyright Act, 1957. Further, the
defendants have their business
activities within the jurisdiction of
this Hon'ble Court as they are selling
the infringing goods within Delhi in
clandestine manner without issuing
the cash memo and their Trademark
Application was filed, prosecuted and
registered in Delhi claiming the use
for all over India."
Existing prayer clause
1. "to grant a permanent decree
against the defendants, their
partners/proprietor, assigns in
business, distributors, dealers and
agents are restrained from
manufacturing, selling, offering for
sale, advertising directly or
indirectly dealing in steel balls or
any other cycle parts under the
impugned trademark TIYA or the
impugned label/trade dress
pertaining thereto or any other
trademark/lable/trade dress as
may be deceptively similar to the
trademarks Tiya label of the
plaintiffs Tiya with or without
trademark or part thereof."
2. "To grant a permanent injunction
that goods of all the description in
the name of the TIYA with mark
CS(OS)No.720/2009. Page 5 of 24
shall be restrained from packaging,
manufacturing and confiscating
from the Defendant No. 1 and 2
along with their associates,
dealers, distributor, agent stockiest
and retailers in the channel".
Proposed amended paragraph:-
1. "to grant a permanent decree
against the defendants, their
partners/proprietor, assigns in
business, distributors, dealers and
agents are restrained from
manufacturing, selling, offering for
sale, advertising directly or
indirectly dealing in steel balls or
any other cycle parts under the
impugned trademark TIYA or the
impugned label/trade dress
pertaining thereto or any other
trademark/lable/trade dress as
may be deceptively similar to the
trademarks Tiya label of the
plaintiffs Tiya with or without
trademark or part thereof which
amounting passing off their goods
as that of the plaintiff"
2. "to grant a permanent decree
against the defendants, their
partners/proprietor, assigns in
business, distributors, dealers and
agents are restrained from
manufacturing, selling, offering for
sale, advertising directly or
indirectly dealing in steel balls or
any other cycle parts under the
impugned label/trade dress/TIYA
LOGO placed at page 198 of the list
of document or any other
label/trade dress/logo/device which
may be similar/deceptively similar
CS(OS)No.720/2009. Page 6 of 24
to plaintiffs Tiya logo and or
amounting infringement of
Copyright of the plaintiff
packaging material"
The plaintiffs are also seeking to amend the title of
the suit as under:-
"SUIT FOR PERMANENT INJUNCTION
RESTRAINING INFRINGEMENT OF
COPYRIGHT, UNFAIR COMPETITION,
PASSING OFF AND DAMAGES"
6. Admittedly, a criminal complaint was filed by the
defendants at Varanasi and in para 8 of the complaint, the
defendants, inter alia, alleged as under:-
"...Due to the complainant's ability of
maintaining quality control, the
complainant's goods are demanded in
large quantity and complainant is known
country wide."
7. If para- "C" of the preliminary submissions in the
written statement and the averments made in the criminal
complaint filed by the defendants are read without reference
to other parts of the written statement, they contain an
admission that the defendants have been marketing and
selling their goods throughout India since 1995 and their
goods have always available in various parts of the Country,
which obviously would include Delhi. On the other hand,
the defendants have also alleged in the written statement
CS(OS)No.720/2009. Page 7 of 24
that all their business activities were confined to State of
U.P. and they were neither manufacturing nor selling any
goods outside the State of U.P.
8. In view of these seemingly contradictory pleas
taken in the written statement, it is difficult for the Court to
be certain at this stage as to whether the defendants were
actually selling any goods in the jurisdiction of this Court or
not. If they have been selling goods in Delhi and thereby
allegedly passing off their goods as those of the plaintiffs,
the Delhi Court would obviously have jurisdiction to try the
suit since part of cause of action in that case arose within
the territorial jurisdiction of this Court.
9. In my view, the averments made in para 14 of the
plaint when read with para 58 thereof, can also be taken to
mean that the plaintiffs had come across the goods of
defendants in Delhi and, therefore, the defendants were
carrying their commercial activities in Delhi as well. It
would be pertinent to note here that though in para 14 of
the plaint, the plaintiffs do not specifically claim that they
had come across the goods of the defendants in Delhi and
that the defendants were carrying their activities in Delhi,
they also do not say that the goods of the plaintiffs were
CS(OS)No.720/2009. Page 8 of 24
found by them outside Delhi. The plaintiffs are based in
Delhi and do not claim to have any office in the State of U.P.
In para 58, the plaintiffs alleged that the plaint schedule is
within the jurisdiction of this Court. When read in light of
para 58, the averments made in para 14 of the plaint can
also mean that it was in the jurisdiction of this Court that
the goods of the defendants were found by the plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs can, therefore, explain that the averments
made by them in para 14 of the plaint were intended to refer
the sale of the products of the defendants in Delhi. Of
course, no definite view in this regard can be taken at this
stage.
10. Order XIV Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure
provides that notwithstanding that a case may be disposed
of on a preliminary issue, the Court shall, subject to the
provisions of sub-rule (2), pronounce judgment on all
issues. It further provides that where issues both of law
and fact arise in the same suit, and the Court is of opinion
that the case or any part thereof may be disposed of on an
issue of law only, it may try that issue first if that issue
relates to (a) the jurisdiction of the Court, or (b) a bar to the
suit created by any law for the time being in force.
CS(OS)No.720/2009. Page 9 of 24
Though issues have not been framed in this case
so far, applying the principles contained in sub-rule 2 of
Rule 2 of Order XIV of the Code of Civil Procedure, it can
safely be said that when the issue relating to territorial
jurisdiction of the Court is a mixed question of fact and law
and, therefore, cannot be decided without recording
evidence, the Court will not be justified in taking a final view
on the issue of jurisdiction without giving opportunity to the
parties to lead evidence in this regard.
11. Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
which provides for rejection of plaint, to the extent it is
relevant, empower the Court to reject the plaint where it
does not disclose a cause of action or where the suit
appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by
any law. The cause of action comprises bundles of facts,
which the plaintiff has to prove in order to obtain the relief
claimed by him. If the plaint discloses facts which would
entitle to the plaintiff to the relief sought by him but it is
found that the cause of action did not arise in the territorial
jurisdiction of this Court, it would not be a case of the plaint
not disclosing a cause of action and, therefore would not
entail its rejection under Order VII Rule 11(a) of the Code of
CS(OS)No.720/2009. Page 10 of 24
Civil Procedure. In such a case, the Court, in view of the
provisions contained in Order VII Rule 10 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, is required to return the plaint to the
plaintiff to present it to the Court in which the suit should
have been instituted by him. Rule 10A of Order VII provides
that in such a case, the Court shall, before returning the
plaint, intimate its decision to the plaintiff, who may then
make an application to the Court specifying the Court in
which he proposed to present the plaint after its return,
praying that the Court may fix a date for appearance of the
parties in the Court where he proposes to present the plaint
and requesting that the notice of the date so fixed may be
given to the parties to the suit. Sub-rule 3 of Rule 10A of
Order VII of the Code of Civil Procedure specifically empower
the Court to pass such an order despite the fact that it has
no jurisdiction to try the suit. Therefore, in my view clause
(a) of Rule 11 of Order VII of the Code of Civil Procedure has
no application where plaint does disclose a cause of action
but not in the territorial jurisdiction of the Court where the
suit has been filed. As far as clause (d) of Rule 11 of Order
VII of the Code of Civil Procedure is concerned, that would
apply only where the averments made in the plaint show
CS(OS)No.720/2009. Page 11 of 24
that the plaint is barred by any law. This clause has no
application in a case where the Court has no territorial
jurisdiction to try the suit though the suit is not barred by
any law. Clause (d) would apply only in a case where it
appears on the face of the plaint that the suit is barred
under any law. This clause may apply when the jurisdiction
of civil Court is altogether excluded under a provision of law
but has no application where it is only territorial jurisdiction
of the Court, which is alleged to be absent. Moreover, in
order to ascertain whether the suit is barred by any law or
not, it is only the averments made in the plaint, which have
to be seen. In the case before this Court, the averments
made in the plaint cannot be interpreted to mean that Delhi
Court has no territorial jurisdiction to try this suit.
Therefore, clause (d) of Rule 11 of Order VII of the Code of
Civil Procedure does not apply to this case.
12. It was contended by learned counsel for the
defendants that while deciding an application under Order
VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is only the
averments made in the plaint which can be taken into
consideration and, therefore, it is not permissible to look
into the averments made in the written statement or the
CS(OS)No.720/2009. Page 12 of 24
documents of the defendants to make out territorial
jurisdiction on the Court.
13. In my view, the contention is misconceived in law.
If the defendant claims that the plaintiff had no cause of
action to file the suit and relies on the averments made and
documents filed by him for this purpose, it is open to the
plaintiffs to say that it is only his pleadings and documents
which can be looked into by the Court to decide whether the
plaint discloses any cause of action or not and the pleadings
and documents of the defendants cannot be looked into for
this purpose. This plea, however, is open only to the
plaintiff and not to the defendant. Nothing in law precludes
the plaintiff from relying upon the admission made in the
pleadings and/or documents of the defendant to show that
the Court has territorial jurisdiction to try the suit filed by
him. In fact, if the defendant himself pleads facts which
constitute territorial jurisdiction of the Court, it is not open
to him to claim that the Court has no territorial jurisdiction
or to say that no part of cause of action arose within the
jurisdiction of the Court and, therefore, the Court has no
territorial jurisdiction to try the suit.
14. The learned counsel for the defendants has
CS(OS)No.720/2009. Page 13 of 24
referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Saleem
Bhai and Others v. State of Maharashtra and Others,
(2003) 1 SCC 557. In the case before the Supreme Court,
the appellant, who was defendant in the suit, filed an
application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil
Procedure for rejection under clause (a) and (d) of Rule 11 of
Order VII of Code of Civil Procedure. The respondent, who
was the plaintiff in the suit, filed an application under Order
VIII Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure to pronounce
judgment on the ground that the appellant had not filed the
written statement. An application was also filed by the
appellant/defendant requesting the Court to decide the
application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC first. The learned
trial Judge dismissed the application under Order 8 Rule 10
of the Code of Civil Procedure filed by the
respondent/plaintiff as also the application filed under
Section 151 CPC. As regards the application of the
appellant/defendant, he directed the defendant to file his
written statement. Aggrieved from the order, the appellant
approached the High Court, which confirmed the order of
the learned trial Judge. Setting aside the decision of the
High Court, it was held by the Supreme Court that the
power under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil
Procedure can be exercised by the trial Court at any stage of
the suit including before registering the plaint or after
issuing summons to the defendant on any time before
conclusion of the trial. It was, in this context, that the
Court was of the view that for the purpose of deciding an
application under Clause (1) and (d) of Rule 11 of Order VII,
the averments made in the plaint are germane and the pleas
taken by the defendant in the written would be wholly
irrelevant at that stage and, therefore, the direction to file
written statement before deciding the application under
Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure was a
procedural irregularity. However, in the case before this
Court, no specific direction was given by the Court to the
defendants to file the written statement before they filed an
application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. On 2nd September, 2009 when the defendants
for the first time had put appearance before the Court, their
counsel stated that he would file the written statement
within four weeks. The written statement was accordingly
signed by the defendants on 6th October, 2009, as is evident
from the photocopy of the written statement placed on
record by the plaintiffs and affidavit of Mr. Shashank
Pandey, one of the partners of the defendant firm sworn on
6th October, 2009 was also enclosed to it. Copy of the
written statement was supplied to learned counsel for the
plaintiffs. Of course, the written statement in original is still
not before the Court. Replication to the written statement
was filed by the plaintiffs on 30th November, 2009. The
application under Order VII Rules 10 and 11 of the Code of
Civil Procedure was filed by the defendants on 6th October,
2009. This application is also supported by the affidavit of
Mr. Shashank Pandey on 6th October, 2009. It is, thus,
evident that the I.A. No.13661/2009 as also the written
statement were signed and verified on 6th October, 2009 and
the affidavits in support thereof were also sworn on the
same date. Obviously, either the written statement was
returned by the registry on account of some objection or the
defendants deliberately withheld its filing despite supplying
its advance copy to the plaintiffs.
15. The learned counsel for the defendants has after
arguments submitted photocopies of the decisions rendered
in Sopan Sukhdeo Sable and Others v. Assistant
Charity Commissioner, (2004) 3 SCC 137, K. Narayanan
& another v. S. Murali, 2008 (3) R.A.J. 631 (SC), Archie
Comic Publications, Inc. v. Purple Creations Pvt. Ltd. &
others, 2008 (37) PTC 279 (Del.), A.V.R. Engineers v.
Sharma Moulding Works and others, 2008(38) PTC 243
(Del.) and Dhodha House & Patel Field Marshal
Industries v. S.K. Maingi & P.M. Diesel Ltd., 2006 (32)
PTC 1.
16. In the case of Sopan Sukhdeo Sable (supra), the
Supreme Court referred to its earlier decision in the case of
Saleem Bhai (supra), which I have already dealt with in the
preceding paragraph.
17. In the case of K. Narayanan (supra), the Supreme
Court referred to its decision in the case of Dhodha House
(supra) wherein it had concurred with the view taken by a
Division Bench of the Madras High Court to the effect that
mere filing of a trademark application does not constitute a
cause of action to file a suit for passing off. However, in the
case before this Court, there are specific allegations that the
defendants were passing of their goods as those of the
plaintiffs and, as discussed earlier, the averments made in
this regard in the plaint can also be interpreted to mean
that the goods of the defendants were also being sold in
Delhi. Also, as noted earlier, the defendants themselves
have claimed in their written statement that they were
selling goods throughout the country, which obviously,
would include Delhi.
18. In the case of A.V.R. Engineers (supra), this Court
reiterated the otherwise settled proposition of law that the
Court has to see only the averments made in the plaint, to
decide whether the suit discloses a triable cause of action
and whether the Court has jurisdiction in the matter.
However, as noted earlier, the plea that only the averments
made in the plaint can be looked into by the Court while
considering an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the
Code of Civil Procedure is open only to the plaintiff and not
to the defendant. If the defendant makes averments, which
constitute a territorial jurisdiction of this Court, the plaintiff
is very much entitled to rely on those averments and to
claim that the admission made by the defendant in this
regard is sufficient to prove the territorial jurisdiction of the
Court.
19. For the reasons given in the preceding paragraphs,
I find no merit in I.A. No.13661/2009 and the same is
hereby dismissed.
20. Coming to I.A. no.6505/2010, though the settled
proposition of law is that a Court having no territorial
jurisdiction in the matter cannot allow an amendment,
which will have the effect of conferring jurisdiction on the
court, in case the case before this Court, as noted earlier, it
cannot be said at this stage that the Court has no territorial
jurisdiction to try the present suit. As stated earlier, the
averments made in the plaint are also capable of an
interpretation that the defendants were selling their goods
in Delhi and were thereby allegedly passing them off as the
goods of the plaintiffs in the jurisdiction of this Court. This
is besides defendants' own averment alleging sale
throughout the country, which, obviously, would include
Delhi. Therefore, the Court will not be justified in refusing
amendment on the assumption that it has no territorial
jurisdiction to try the present suit. Of course, the Court
also cannot give a definite finding at this stage that it does
have territorial jurisdiction to try the suit. The question,
which then comes up for consideration, is as to whether the
proposed amendment should be allowed or should be
refused at this stage.
21. As observed by the Supreme Court in Jai Jai Ram
Manohar Lal v. National Building Material Supply,
Gurgaon, AIR 1969 SC 1267 the rules of procedure are
intended to be a handmaid to the administration of justice
and amendments cannot be refused merely because of some
mistake, negligence, inadvertence or even infraction of the
rules of procedure by a party. It was further observed that
the Court always gives leave to amend the pleading of a
party, unless it is satisfied that the party applying was
acting mala fide, or that by his blunder, he had caused
injury to his opponent which may not be compensated for
by an order of costs. The Court was of the view that,
however, negligent or careless may have been the first
omission, and, however, late the proposed amendment, it
may be allowed if it can be made without injustice to the
other side.
22. If the proposed amendment is not allowed, there is
likely to be objection by the defendants to the plaintiffs
producing evidence to prove that the defendants were selling
their goods in the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. In
the event of such an objection being upheld, the plaintiffs
would be denied an opportunity to prove such a sale,
thereby resulting in miscarriage of justice. The defendants
on the other hand are not likely to be adversely affected, if
the plaintiffs are allowed to lead such evidence since they
would have opportunity to lead evidence to rebut the
evidence, which may be produced by the plaintiffs in this
regard. I, therefore, feel that the appropriate course of
action in the facts and circumstances of the case would be
to allow the proposed amendments. In fact, the
amendments proposed by the plaintiffs can also be said to
be clarificatory in nature by clarifying that the sales alleged
in para 14 of the plaint were in Delhi and, therefore, Delhi
Court has jurisdiction to try the present suit. It is settled
proposition of law that an amendment, which is of
clarificatory nature needs to be allowed since it causes no
prejudice to either party.
23. In Ajarjeet Singh v. Municipal Corporation of
Delhi, AIR 1992 Delhi 317, the plaintiff alleging to be an
allottee filed a suit for perpetual injunction against the MCD
seeking injunction against dispossession or demolition of
the stall, which he was occupying. He later filed an
application for amendment of plaint to plead that, in fact,
one Amrik Singh was the tenant of the stall in question
under MCD and he made a WILL thereof in favour of the
plaintiff, who had, thus, been in possession for over 12
years. Noticing that the plea sought to be taken by the
plaintiff was not totally new or inconsistent or contradictory
and the proposed amendment was of a clarificatory nature
to show how the plaintiff became the allottee of the stall, the
amendment was allowed by this Court.
In the case before this Court, the plaintiffs have
already alleged in para 14 of the plaint that they had come
across the goods of the defendants bearing the trademark
TIYA with logo and on enquiry, the plaintiffs came to know
that the defendants had started commercial use of the
trademark and were carrying their activity in a clandestine
and deceitful manner, without issuing any formal
bills/invoices and without even mentioning the address on
the packaging. By way of proposed amendment, the
plaintiffs want only to clarify that the sale referred by them
was being made by the defendants in Delhi and that they
have business activities in the jurisdiction of this Court.
The proposed amendment does not change nature of the
suit or the cause of action on which it is based and does not
prejudice the defendants in any manner. It is also a settled
proposition of law that the Court should allow all
amendments, which are necessary for determining the
matters in controversy between the parties since the object
of the Court is to decide the right of the parties and not to
punish them for the mistake they make in conduct of their
cases.
24. In the case of Archie Comic Publications (supra),
referred by the learned counsel for the defendants, this
Court, referring to its earlier decision in Hans Raj Kalra v.
Kishan Kalra, AIR 1977 NOC 267 (Delhi) and Anil Goel
v. Sardari Lal, 75 (1998) DLT 641, held that if the Court,
on the basis of averments made in the plaint as originally
filed, finds that it does not have jurisdiction to entertain the
suit, the plaintiff's application under Order VI Rule 17 of the
Code of Civil Procedure would not be maintainable and
cannot be entertained. However, as stated earlier, at this
stage, it cannot be said that the averments made in the
plaint do not necessarily make out a case of territorial
jurisdiction of this Court to entertain this suit. These
averments can also be interpreted to mean that the
defendants were passing of their goods as those of the
plaintiffs in Delhi and, therefore, this Court has territorial
jurisdiction to try the present suit. Moreover, in the case
before this court, the defendants themselves have made
averment, which may constitute jurisdiction of this court to
try the present suit.
25. I.A. 6505/2010 filed by the plaintiff is, therefore,
allowed, subject to payment of Rs.10,000/- as costs.
Amended plaint be filed within four weeks from today.
CS(OS) No.720/2009 & I.A. No.5353/2009 (O.39 R.1 & 2 CPC), I.A. No.464/2010 (S. 151 CPC)
26. Written statement to the amended plaint by the
defendants can be filed within four weeks of the filing of the
amended plaint. Replication thereto, if any, can be filed
within four weeks thereafter.
27. List the matter on 22nd March, 2011 for framing of
issues and disposal of applications.
(V.K. JAIN) JUDGE
DECEMBER 17, 2010 vk
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