Delhi High Court

M/S.Gursharan Singh vs M/S.Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd & ... on 23 December, 2011

Author: Anil Kumar

*                 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

+         IA No.9364/1991, I.A 9046/2010 & CS(OS) No.3768A/1991

%                            Date of Decision: 23.12.2011

M/s.Gursharan Singh                           .... Petitioner
                   Through Mr.B.K.Dewan and Mr. Bhavesh Kumar
                           Sharma, Advocates.

                                      Versus

M/s.Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd & ors.                      .... Respondents

                             Through Mr.Manoj Singh, Advocate, Mr. Anil K.
                                     Batra and Mr. Prince Kumar, Advocates
                                     for Respondent no.1/Objector
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR


ANIL KUMAR, J.

1. The petitioner was awarded work for construction of road at LPG plant

at Lucknow and an agreement dated 12th January, 1988 was executed

between the parties. The work was to be completed within four months and

the stipulated date of completion was 14th June, 1988, however, the work

was completed on 21st June, 1988. The value of the work awarded to the

petitioner was Rs.13,64,400/-, however, the scope of work was increased

and work could be completed by the petitioner by 25th November, 1988.

2. In respect of work, construction of road at LPG plant at Lucknow

disputes arose and the petitioner invoked clause 19 of the agreement which

has an arbitration Agreement which is as under:-

"19. Arbitration:- In the event of any dispute or difference at any time arising between the parties here to touching the construction, meaning or effect of these presents or the rights or liabilities of the parties hereunder or any matter arising out of the same or connected therewith, the same shall except where otherwise specifically agreed, be referred, for arbitration in India to a single arbitrator if the parties agree, upon one or otherwise to two arbitrators, one to be named by each party and in the event of the arbitrators differing, to an umpire to be appointed by the arbitrators in writing before entering on the reference. Any such reference shall be deemed to be a reference to arbitration within the meaning of the Arbitration Act, 1940 and the rules made thereunder and to any statutory modification or re-enactment thereof for the time being in force. The decision of the arbitrator(s) and tailing an agreed decision by him/them, the decision by the umpire, shall be final and conclusive and binding on both parties. Any proceedings under the reference to the Arbitrator(s) or umpire shall be held only at ........"

3. The arbitration agreement contemplated two arbitrators one to be

named by each party and, therefore, petitioner appointed Sh.P.L.Saluja,

B.Tech, Civil Engineer as an arbitrator whereas the Respondent no.1 Bharat

Petroleum Corpn. Ltd appointed Sh.P.P.Darundkar, Technical Ex-Chairman

and Managing Director, National Building Construction Corporation as

another arbitrator.

4. Before the arbitrators the parties filed their claims, evidence on

affidavit in support of their claims. A number of hearings took place before

the arbitrators. The parties also submitted written submissions. Arbitrators,

Respondent nos. 2 & 3 also visited the site at Lucknow and examined the

disputes with reference to site, relevant drawings and other documents.

After the hearing the parties were directed to submit the requisite stamp

papers for making and publishing the award and thereafter, the award dated

25th November, 1991 was given by the arbitrators. The arbitrators awarded

Rs.1,07,301.50/- towards final bill recovered; Rs.60,000/- for laying of

stone soling of 230 mm; Rs.36,000/- for laying of stone soling 100 mm,

Rs.2,65,380/- for additional work; Rs.23,300/- on account of excess

expenditure due to abnormal variation. The arbitrators, however, declined to

award interest with effect from 25th November, 1988 and cost of arbitration

proceedings. The Respondent no.1 had also claimed Rs.10,16,030/- towards

the estimated cost of repairs, however, the arbitrators declined the claim of

the Respondent no.1.

5. After the award was given the petitioner filed petition under Section 14

of Arbitration Act, 1940 seeking direction to the arbitrators, Respondent

Nos.2 & 3 to file the award along the depositions made by the parties. On

service of notice of filing of award the Respondent no.1 filed objections under

Section 33 read with 16 & 33 of Arbitration Act being IA No.9364/1991

contending inter-alia that under the agreement, additional work beyond the

scope and sweep of the agreement was not arbitrable. It is contended that

the work had been completed on 21st June, 1988 and a final bill was

prepared.

6. According to the objector/Respondent no.1 on 28th April, 1989 a

meeting was held between the parties after the completion of work by the

petitioner and record notes were prepared. Relying on the record notes it is

contended that instead of removing the defects in workmanship, the

petitioner had agreed for deduction of Rs.1,07,301.50/- and accordingly a

full and final settlement of all the claims of the petitioner was arrived at and

Rs.2,05,724.01/- was received by the petitioner which was accepted by the

petitioner by letter dated 10th July, 1989. The objector/Respondent no.1

contended that in the said letter dated 10th July, 1989 the petitioner

categorically and specifically stated as under:-

"I do not have any further claim."

7. The objector/respondent no.1 has asserted that after receipt of

amount in full and final settlement, the petitioner had raised frivolous

claims which are arbitrated by two arbitrators who passed their non

speaking award dated 25th November,1991. According to the Respondent

no.1/objector seven claims were raised by the petitioner and the Respondent

no.1 also raised the counter claims, however, the amounts as indicated

hereinabove were awarded to the petitioner and the claims of the

Respondent no.1 were dismissed. The objector/Respondent no.1 has

contended that the arbitrators have passed an award on matters which were

not arbitrable being accepted matters or beyond the scope of the contract. It

is also asserted that the award is based on no evidence and it is for those

disputes which had been fully and finally settled by the parties. The further

plea of the Respondent no.1/objector is that after the full and final

settlement of disputes, the matter could not be referred to the arbitrators

nor the arbitrators could award any amount. The Respondent no.1/objector

relied on Associated Engineering v. Government of Andhra Pradesh (1994) 4

SCC 1993; New India Civil Erections Pvt Ltd v. ONGC, (1997) 11 SCC 75;

West Bengal Industrial Infrastructure Development Corporation v. Star

Engineering, AIR 1987 Col.126 and State of Jammu and Kashmir and Anr v.

Dev Dutt Pandit, AIR 1999 SC 3196 and 159(2009) DLT 534, Polytron &

Fragrance Industries (P) Ltd v. National Insurance Co.Ltd. in support of its

contention.

8. The objector/Respondent no.1 also contended that even in a non

speaking award the Court can look into the contract between the parties if

the arbitrators have fallen into jurisdictional error and relied on

T.N.Electricity Board v. Bridge and Tunnel Constructions and Ors, (1997) 4

SCC 121. The objector/respondent no.1 also contended that the issue of

lack of jurisdiction of the arbitrators in respect of additional work beyond

the contract can be raised for the first time in a petition under Section 33 of

the Arbitration Act, 1940 as the challenge to the arbitrators jurisdiction goes

to the root of the matter, even if not taken during the arbitration

proceedings and does not bar the objector/respondent no.1 from taking the

same for the first time in the Court. The Respondent no.1 relied on

Jagannath Kapoor and Anr v. Premia Credit and Settlement Corporation Pvt

Ltd, AIR 1973 Allahabad 49; Khardah Company Ltd v. Raymond and

Company, AIR 1962 SC 1810.

9. The learned counsel for the parties have been heard in detail on

various dates and the record of the Arbitration perused. The learned counsel

for the Respondent no.1 has contended that the Arbitrators could not award

any amount in respect of which the parties had arrived at full and final

settlement. It is contended by the learned counsel that the plea of the

petitioner is not that the full and settlement was arrived under pressure or

petitioner agreed for full and final settlement on account of any coercion of

any fraud played upon the petitioner.

10. Whether there had been a full and final settlement between the parties

pursuant to which the amount which was due to the petitioner was paid and

consequently no dispute survived and the arbitrators could not award any

amount to the petitioner? The Respondent no.1/objector has also relied on

159 (2009) DLT 534, Polytron & Fragrance Industries (P) Ltd v. National

Insurance Co.Ltd; 2008 VI AD (Delhi) 572, R.K.Silk Mills (India) Ltd v.

National Insurance Company Ltd; 1995 Supp (3) SCC 324, Nathani Steels

Ltd v. Associated Constructions and 1994 Supp (3) SCC 126, P.K.Ramaiah

and Company v. Chairman and Managing Director, National Thermal Power

Corpn. in support of his contention.

11. The learned counsel contends that the settlement was arrived at

between the petitioner and the Respondent no.1/objector on 28th April, 1989

and the terms of the settlement including the deduction for which the

petitioner contractor had agreed and the amount payable to the petitioner

was specifically stipulated in the settlement dated 28th April, 1989. The

record note of 28th April, 1989 is as under:-

1. The above job was awarded to M/s.Gursharan Singh as per Agreement No.AEM/87/102 dated 12.01.88.

2. The job was started on 15.02.88 and was completed on 25.11.88. Bill No.1126 dated 12.01.89 for Rs.18,33,954.60 was submitted, which included drains, roads, earthfilling etc. out of which black carpet was of Rs.4,03,261.44 (@ 48/m2 for an area 8401=28 m2) and quality complaint was found in this item only. On measurement at site, an average thickness of the black carpet was found varying 40mm downwards.

3. The contractor has been asked to correct the thickness to which he expressed inability and has proposed for a prorate deductions of the carpet thickness as below:-

4.

           (i).     For average 40 mm thick carpet for an area of 6082.80m,
                   for    12mm      thick   carpet     which    comes     to
                   Rs.67,378.70(48/52x12x6082.80)

           (ii).       For average 26 mm thick carpet for an area of 166.3.45
                       m2, a deduction for balance 26 mm thick carpet which
                       comes to Rs.39,922.80x(48/52x26x1663.45)

          (iii).       Thus, total deduction is of Rs.1,07,301.50.

          (iv).        The balance area of 655.03 m2 is having correct carpet
                       thickness of 52 mm.

           (v).        The   contractor   had   proposed    a   deduction    of

Rs.1,07,301.50 against above bill and to treat it as the

final bill and confirms that he has no further claims beyond the quantities mentioned in the bill.

(vi). The contractor proposed to release the balance payable amount of Rs.1,37,911.10 with details as below:-

                      Total amount of bill:  Rs.18,33,954.63
                                        Say Rs.18,33,954.60

                      Less already paid :    Rs.15,12,000.00

                                  Balance    Rs. 3,21,954.60

                      Less Retention Money
                      (as per Agreement
                      Clause)                Rs.   63,349.00

                      Less 2% Income Tax     Rs.    6,439.00

                      Less 8% S/C on I.Tax   Rs.     515.00

                      Less 2% U.P.S.Tax      Rs.    6,439.00

                                  Payable    Rs. 2,45,212.60

                      DEDUCTIONS             Rs.1,07,301.50

                      Net Payable after
                      Deductions             Rs.1,37,911.10

6. The contractor has confirmed that there will be no further claims against the aforesaid contract for which net payable is Rs.1,37,911.50.

H.P.GUPTA                                              BRIJ MOHAN
For BHARAT PETROLEUM                         .FOR M/S GURSHARAN SINGH
CORPN.LTD

12. According to the learned counsel for the Respondent no.1/objector,

the petitioner had confirmed that he would have no further claim against

the aforesaid contract which was as per agreement No.AEM/87/102 dated

12th January, 1988 after payment of an amount of Rs.1,37,911.50/-. The

learned counsel has also relied on the letter dated 10th July, 1989 sent on

behalf of Respondent no.1/objector to the petitioner forwarding a cheque

No.052086 dated 7th July, 1989 for an amount of Rs.2,05,724.13/- in full

and final settlement of the amount payable to the petitioner for the works

pertaining to road/drain at LPG plant, Lucknow against agreement

No.AEM/87/102 dated 12th January, 1988. The said letter also has an

endorsement regarding the receipt of cheque pursuant to the settlement

arrived at between the parties. The learned counsel, Mr.Manoj Singh has

also referred to letter dated 20th July, 1989 by the Respondent no.1 to the

petitioner categorically refuting the allegations made by the petitioner in its

letter dated 10th July, 1989 demanding interest at 18% per annum and also

claiming an amount of Rs.5,19,774.47/- even after receiving an amount of

Rs.2,05,724.13/-. According to the learned counsel by letter dated 20th July,

1989 it was communicated to the petitioner that after receiving an amount

of Rs.2,05,724.13/- nothing is due from Respondent no.1 to the petitioner in

terms of joint memorandum which was signed on 28th April, 1989. The

learned counsel also contends that after the settlement there could not be

further claims as has been allegedly raised by the petitioner on 19th May,

1989 which was rejected by letter dated 19th June, 1989 by the Respondent

no.1 and consequent thereto the amount was accepted on 10th July, 1989.

13. The learned counsel for the petitioner has refuted the plea of the

Respondent no.1 that the dispute were settled between the parties and the

amounts were paid in full and final settlement as this plea was not raised by

the Respondent no.1 before the arbitrators during the arbitration

proceedings. The learned counsel for the Respondent no.1 has, however,

relied on the reply filed on behalf of Respondent no.1/objector dated 25th

March, 1990 categorically stipulating that the claim of the petitioner are

false, fabricated and vexatious as in terms of record notes dated 28th April,

1989 after deducting an amount of Rs.1,35,911.10 which was admitted by

the petitioner, the balance amount with the other amounts which were due

to the petitioner were paid on 10th July, 1989 which amount was accepted

by the petitioner by making an endorsement on the letter dated 10th July,

1989 and consequently the amount has been paid in full and final

settlement and despite the plea specifically taken by the Respondent

no.1/objector, the learned arbitrators have awarded an amount of

Rs.1,07,301.50/- towards final bill recovery; Rs.60,000/- towards laying of

stone soling 230 mm; Rs.36,000/- for laying of stone soling 100 mm;

Rs.2,05,380/- towards additional work and an amount of Rs.23,318/-

towards excess expenditure due to abnormal variations besides simple

interest @ 13% per annum to the petitioner on account of non-payment of

the amounts awarded within one month from the date of the award dated

25th November, 1991.

14. In Nathani Steels Ltd (Supra) it was held by the Supreme Court that

once the disputes by and between the parties under a contract are amicably

settled by way of final settlement, one of the party to the settlement then

cannot spurn it on the ground that it was on account of mistake and cannot

proceed to invoke arbitration clause. The Supreme Court had held that the

sanctity of the contract and the settlement would be wholly lost and one

party cannot be allowed to take benefit under the settlement and then spurn

it. In the circumstances, the Supreme Court had allowed the appeal and had

set aside the order of High Court holding that a party could invoke the

arbitration clause despite arriving at a final settlement.

15. Similarly, in P.K.Ramaiah and Company (Supra) it was held by the

Apex Court that once a party acknowledges settlement and also accepts

measurement and receives the amount in full and final settlement of its

claims, then there would be accord and satisfaction and no arbitrable

disputes will exist for reference to arbitration. In R.K.Silk Mills (India) Ltd

(Supra) the Court had declined to appoint an arbitrator in a petition under

Section 11(6) of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 as the difference

between the parties with regard to liability as well as to the quantum of loss

were crystallized and consequently no further disputes remained with regard

to that. It was held that the dispute which could be referred to arbitration

could be only one which pertained to the quantum to be paid under the

policy and since the quantum had been crystallized there did not remain

any dispute or difference between the parties and, therefore, the petition

under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act was dismissed. The

learned Single Judge in R.K.Silk Mills (India) Ltd (Supra) had relied on

M/s.P.K.Ramaiah and Company and M/s.Nathani Steels Ltd.

16. In Polytron & Fragrance Industries (P) Ltd (Supra) it was held that

acceptance of amount towards full and final settlement of the claim, even if

it was under any duress or coercion, will not leave any dispute for

arbitration. The Court had held that even if it is contended by one of the

parties that full and final settlement of claim was under duress or coercion,

this will not be a dispute arbitrable under the arbitration clause as the

arbitral Tribunal is not the forum to adjudicate such a dispute and the only

remedy with such a party who could challenge the settlement of claims on

account of duress and coercion was to raise it in some other proceedings

and not before the arbitrators. It was held that if such a plea is allowed to be

taken after acceptance of amount in full and final settlement, the sanctity of

settlement would be wholly lost.

17. The petition under Section 14 of the Arbitration Act was filed on 13th

July, 1994 seeking a direction to the Respondent no.1 Nos.2 & 3

Sh.P.P.Dharwadker and Sh.P.L.Saluja arbitrators to file the award along

with the depositions made by the parties. The objections to the award dated

25th November, 1991 were filed as IA No.9364/1991. The award filed by the

arbitrators Respondent no.1 Nos.2 & 3 was taken on record on 15th

January, 1992 and since then the objections have been pending.

18. The objections were initially filed as IA No.9364/1991, however, that

application was not available on records and as per the directions of this

Court, fresh objections were filed being IA No.9365/1992. However, by

order dated 11th April, 1994 it was held that since IA No.9364/1991 is on

record, therefore, IA No.9365/1992 requires no order and the issues were

framed on 11th April, 1994.

19. Thereafter, by order dated 15th March, 1999 the objections were

dismissed in default and the award was made rule of the Court. An

application IA No.3873/1999 was filed for setting aside the decree passed,

on dismissal of the objections which was allowed by order dated 16th

November, 2000 and order dated 15th March, 1999 was recalled and the

objections were restored to its original number.

20. On 20th February, 2004 the Joint Registrar passed the order to place

the petition before the Court as the value of the matter for the purpose of

pecuniary jurisdiction was noticed to be less than Rs.20 lakhs. Thereafter,

though the matter was placed before the Court, however, none of the parties

pointed out that the jurisdiction value as noticed by the Joint Registrar was

less than Rs. 20 lakhs. Rather the question of jurisdiction was not

considered and on the contrary the arguments were advanced on different

dates and the matter has been adjourned from time to time in detail.

21. After considerable arguments on various dates, the petitioner

apprehended that the objections may be allowed and award may be set

aside, he filed and IA 9046 of 2010 contending that the valuation of the suit

is hardly Rs.4.6 lakhs and on account of enhancement of pecuniary

jurisdiction of the suits of the value of Rs.20 lakhs or less being transferred

to the respective District Courts which had escaped the notice of the

Registry and therefore, the suit be transferred to the District Court and/or

alternatively the matter be assigned to the original jurisdiction of this Court.

22. The application has been contested by the respondent no.1

contending that the suit is within the pecuniary jurisdiction of this Court

and the application is nothing but an attempt on the part of the petitioner to

delay the disposal of the suit. It was also contended that the total amount

involved in the present suit is above Rs.20 lakhs. In order to substantiate

its plea that the amount involved in the suit is above 20 lakhs, the

respondent no.1 contended that the award of the arbitrator in favour of

plaintiff is for Rs. 4,31,999.50/-. The counter claims of the respondent no.1

are for Rs.10,16,030/- besides interest at the rate of 13% per annum with

effect from 25th December, 1991 over the principal amount of

Rs.4,31,999.50/- amounting to Rs.10,67,037.53/- and, therefore, the total

amount involved is Rs.25,15,067/-. Therefore, it was prayed that the

application for transfer of the suit to the district Court be dismissed.

23. Yet another application being IA No.11259/2010 was filed on behalf of

plaintiff under Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure for transfer of case

to District Court on account of pecuniary jurisdiction being Rs.16 lakhs. The

petitioner/applicant contended that the valuation of the present suit is

Rs.16 lakhs. Since the jurisdiction value of the High Court has been

enhanced on account of Delhi High Court (Amendment) Act, 2003 therefore

the petition should not be tried by the Hon'ble High Court.

24. The I.A. No. 11259 of 2010 was later on withdrawn by the petitioner in

view of pendency of I.A 9046/2010 seeking same relief i.e the petition be

transferred to District Court as the jurisdiction of the matter is less than

Rs.20 lakhs. The application being I.A no. 11259 of 2010 was dismissed as

withdrawn by order dated 27th August, 2010.

25. The learned counsel for the plaintiff in support of his plea for transfer

of the present petition has also relied on the decision dated 5th September,

1984 in Suit No.491A/1980 titled as Somnath Verma v. Union of India &

Ors to contend that since the value of the petition is less than Rs.20 lakhs,

therefore, the suit should be transferred to the District Court.

26. The learned counsel for the respondent no.1 has opposed the plea of

transfer at this stage as the objections are pending for almost two decades

and has relied on 127 (2006A) DLT 300, Aviat Chemicals Pvt Ltd & Anr v.

Magna Laboratories (Gujarat); 2009(157) DLT 41, Sunil Dutt & Anr v. Bhag

Singh and 2006(33) PTC 387, Hawkins Cookers Ltd v. Citizen Metal

Industries (India). The learned counsel also contended that since the

arguments on objections have already been almost concluded at which stage

the application has been filed merely with a view to further delay the

disposal of the case. It is further contended that it is a fit case where the

Court should exercise its power under section 24 of the Code of Civil

Procedure to transfer the suit to the High Court, even if it comes to the

conclusion that the petition is liable to be transferred to District Court on

account of valuation of the matter being less than Rs.20 lakhs.

27. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties in detail on

this aspect also. In Sunil Dutt (Supra) this Court had held that the High

Court under Section 24 of CPC has powers to call any suit from the lower

Court to itself. In exercising powers under Section 24 of the Code of Civil

Procedure, the High Court withdraws the suit from the civil Court and

entertains the same and in such a case, it will not be a case of return of

plaint where the power is exercised under Section 24 of the Code of Civil

Procedure. In the instant case relied on by the respondent no.1 after the

trial was over and the case was at the stage of arguments, relying on the

statement of one witness deposing that the suit property was Rs.30 lakhs

and because Civil Judge could try the suits only up to pecuniary jurisdiction

of Rs.3 lakhs, therefore, the District Judge had forwarded the same to the

High Court on the original side. After the case was received on the original

side, a plea was taken on behalf of the defendant that the plaint has been

returned under Order 7 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, therefore, de-

novo trial was claimed by the defendant. This plea was repelled by the Court

holding that when the power is exercised under Section 24 of Code of Civil

Procedure then it is not a case of return of plaint and the defendant could

not ask for de-novo trial. It was also held that a judgment or an order can be

set aside on the ground of lack of pecuniary jurisdiction only if it has

resulted into a failure or miscarriage of justice. Since the case was at the

stage of final arguments and evidence of both the parties had already been

recorded it was held that no prejudice would be caused to the defendant, if

the suit is continued at the level it was received and, therefore, the case

continued from the stage at which it was received in the High Court.

28. In Hawkins Cookers Ltd (Supra) the suit was instituted in the High

Court and after several proceedings, on account of increase in pecuniary

jurisdiction the case was transferred from the High Court to the District

Civil Court. Pursuant to an application for amendment, the value of the suit

was enhanced for the purpose of pecuniary jurisdiction to Rs.21 lakhs and

the file was sent by the District Judge to the High Court. After the suit was

sent on account of increase of jurisdictional value of the suit by District

Judge to the High Court, the plea was taken that it amounted to return of

the plaint. This Court, however, had held that return of the plaint for want

of jurisdiction whether pecuniary or territorial cannot be equated to the

transfer of the suit or proceedings either by virtue of Section 24 of CPC or

owing to any other statutory change. The Court had also observed that in

civil cases where suits had been transferred from the High Curt to the

District Court and the valuation of the suit was revised and the plaintiff

approached the Court under Section 24 of the CPC and the order of the

District Judge to send the file or transmit to the High Court, was

assumption and exercise of jurisdiction under Section 24 of CPC of the High

Court to transfer the suit to itself. Therefore, the plea that this tantamount

to return of the plaint was repelled and the suit was restored to the original

number.

29. In Aviat Chemicals Pvt Ltd & Anr (Supra) the suit was transferred on

account of increase in pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court and the

amendment of the plaint was sought to claim higher amount of damages

and to increase the value of suit for purpose of Court fees and jurisdiction.

The Single Judge of this Court had held that provisions of Section 24(5) of

CPC and Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC are to be constructed harmoniously. It

was further held merely because Court lacks pecuniary jurisdiction and

proceeding under Order 7 Rule 10 or 10A pending before the Court per se

would not oust jurisdiction of Court to pass order under Section 24 of CPC

and it will be a travesty of justice to commence de-novo proceedings from

the stage of filing of written statement. It was further held that no prejudice

would be caused to Respondent no.1s if suit is permitted to be transferred

by itself, which will be a sufficient ground for ordering transfer and

sufficient ingredients of Section 24 of CPC would be made out.

30. From 29th April, 2004 when the petition was listed before the Court

pursuant to the order dated 20th February, 2004 to transfer the case to

District Court, neither the petitioner nor the respondent no.1 sought

transfer of the petition to the District Court rather the petitioner was argued

exhaustively on various dates. After the petitioner concluded his submission

for making the award rule of the Court and the respondent no.1 resisted the

claim on the ground that the disputes had been settled between the parties

and the amounts were paid in full and final settlement and were also

received by the petitioner, the plea was first contested on the ground that

the said plea was not taken earlier. The counsel for the respondent no.1