Citation : 2011 Latest Caselaw 3849 Del
Judgement Date : 9 August, 2011
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ RSA No.93/2011
% 9th August, 2011
JAGDISH CHANDER ...... Appellant
Through: Mr. Mohit Ramdeo, Advocate.
VERSUS
SRI CHAND & ORS. ...... Respondents
Through: None.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VALMIKI J.MEHTA
1. Whether the Reporters of local papers may be
allowed to see the judgment?
2. To be referred to the Reporter or not?
3. Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest?
VALMIKI J. MEHTA, J (ORAL)
1. The challenge by means of this Regular Second Appeal filed
under Section 100 CPC is to the two concurrent decisions of the Courts
below, first of the Trial Court dated 4.8.2010, and the second of the
Appellate Court dated 14.3.2011, by which judgments, the plaint of the
appellant/plaintiff has been rejected under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC on
account of the same being barred by time.
2. The facts of the case are that certain parcels of land in village
Rajokri, Delhi were sold by father of the appellant to the respondents in
the year 1993. The appellant thereafter filed an application before the
Revenue Assistant in the year 1997 under Section 11 of the Delhi Land
RSA No.93/2011 Page 1 of 5
Reforms Act, 1954 alleging that the share of his father was wrongly
recorded as 1/6th and 1/4th in two parcels of land whereas the share of the
appellant, and the father and brother of the appellant was 1/18th and
1/12th each. The appellant sought a declaration that he was bhumidar of
1/18th share out of the land khata khatoni no.36/29 and 1/12th share in
khata khatoni no. 37/30 standing in the revenue record by filing an
application. During the proceedings before the Revenue Assistant on
24.6.2004, the appellant entered into a compromise and signed a
memorandum of understanding with the respondents for amicable
settlement of the dispute and the appellant received a sum of
Rs.1,00,000/- towards "cost of the proceedings". However it is not
disputed that by virtue of a compromise it was agreed that the appellant
has no right in the land in question and for which a memorandum of
understanding was executed. Consequently, the appellant withdrew his
application filed under Section 11 of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954 and
which application was signed by the appellant and his counsel.
Subsequently, thereafter on 27.7.2004 the appellant filed an application
under Section 151 CPC stating that a fraud had been played upon him and
that his application under Section 11 of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954
be restored. The Revenue Assistant dismissed the application which
sought recall of the compromise order. The appeal filed by the appellant
before the Deputy Collector was also dismissed. The Deputy Collector
while dismissing the appeal has noted in his order that the father of
appellant had sold his holdings to the respondents through a General
RSA No.93/2011 Page 2 of 5
Power of Attorney and mutation was sanctioned in favour of the
respondents and it appears that there would have been disputes which
led to some dissatisfaction between the two parties with respect to the
value of the land and which were not in the purview of the disputes before
the Revenue Assistant. Further, an appeal filed under Section 66 of Dlhi
Land Reform Act, 1954 before the Financial Commissioner was also
dismissed by a detailed and reasoned order. It was noted in the order of
the Financial Commissioner that when the statement of the appellant was
recorded by the Revenue Assistant with respect to the compromise, his
counsel was also present and the application under Section 11 of the Delhi
Land Reforms Act was withdrawn after receiving the agreed amount from
the respondents. The appellant further challenged the order of the
Financial Commissioner by means of a Writ Petition in the Delhi High Court
and which Writ Petition was withdrawn after addressing arguments
inasmuch as the counsel for the appellant made a statement that the
appellant was in the process of instituting a civil suit to challenge the
settlement as fraudulent. The suit was dismissed as time-barred and the
appeal which was thereafter filed against the order dismissing the suit
under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC being barred by time was also dismissed.
3. The Courts below have held that there is no question of giving
benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to the appellant because
the earlier proceedings which were pending before the Revenue Assistant
were not such proceedings which were initiated in the Court of wrong
jurisdiction. Cause of action had accrued on 27.7.2004 for which the
RSA No.93/2011 Page 3 of 5
limitation period expired on 26.7.2007 and the suit was however filed
much later on 22.12.2008. In fact, the Appellate Court noted that the
appellant did not even file an application under Section 14 of the
Limitation Act. The Appellate Court has taken a view, and with which I
agree, that once a compromise is recorded in a civil proceeding, the spirit
of Order 23 Rule 3(A) CPC applies that no independent proceedings will be
allowed thereafter to challenge a compromise decree and it is only before
the same Court which recorded the compromise that an application for
recall has to be filed. Admittedly this application for recall was filed and
dismissed right till this Court.
4. Learned counsel for the appellant sought to argue that he was
entitled to file a civil suit in order to challenge the memorandum of
understanding which was executed pursuant to which the case before the
Revenue Assistant was compromised on 24.6.2004. Firstly, I have already
observed that the spirit of Order 23 Rule 3(A) CPC applies and it was
before the Revenue Assistant himself that proceedings for recall of the
compromise order should have been filed, and which were in fact filed and
thereafter dismissed right upto this Court. Consequently, the issue is not
of entitlement to file the suit but that the suit was filed beyond limitation.
It is trite that there is no question of condonation of delay under Section 5
of the Limitation Act with respect to a suit filed beyond limitation period
and the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act has rightly been held
not to be applicable in the facts of the present case.
RSA No.93/2011 Page 4 of 5
5. A second appeal under Section 100 CPC, against two
concurrent judgments of the Courts below will only lie if there arises a
substantial question of law. In the guise of the second appeal, matters
which are already argued and held against the appellant by both the
Courts below by means of valid reasons cannot be said to be a substantial
question of law.
6. In view of the above, there is no merit in the appeal. No
substantial question of law arises. Dismissed.
AUGUST 09, 2011 VALMIKI J. MEHTA, J.
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