M/S Patel Engineering Ltd. vs Union Of India & Anr.
2011 Latest Caselaw 3652 Del

*           IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI


%                                          Date of decision: 02.08.2011


+           WP (C) No.4331 of 2011 & CM No. 8869/2011


M/S PATEL ENGINEERING LTD.                                      ...PETITIONER

                                Through:        Mr.Rajiv Nayar, Sr.Advocate
                                                with Mr. Jai Munim, Ms.Shally
                                                Bhasin and Ms.Shikha Sarin,
                                                Advocates.


                                        Versus


UNION OF INDIA & ANR.                                           ...RESPONDENTS

                                Through:        Mr.Neeraj Chaudhri, CGSC
                                                with Mr.Akshay Chandra and
                                                Mr.Mohit Auluck, Advocates
                                                for R-1/UOI.

                                                Mr. Amrinder Sharma, Sr.
                                                Advocate with
                                                Ms. Padma Priya
                                                and
                                                Mr.Somesh     Chandra   Jha,
                                                Advocates for R-2/NHAI.

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KISHAN KAUL
HON‟BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJIV SHAKDHER

1.      Whether the Reporters of local papers
        may be allowed to see the judgment?                             Yes

________________________________________________________________________________________
WP (C) No.4331 of 2011                                                      Page 1 of 25
 2.        To be referred to Reporter or not?                             Yes

3.        Whether the judgment should be                                 No
          reported in the Digest?


SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.

1. The National Highways Authority of India (for short

„NHAI‟)/respondent No.1, issued a request for

qualification in November, 2010 for a six-laning project

of Dhankuni-Kharagpur Section of NH-6 from 17,600 to

1,29,000 in the States of West Bengal and Orissa

under the National Highway Development Projects

Phase-V on design, build, finance, operate, transfer

and toll basis. The petitioner, a public limited

company, submitted its bid on 10.01.2011. The bid

submitted by the petitioner and other bidders were

processed and by a letter of award dated 17.01.2011,

respondent no. 2 informed the petitioner that its bid

had been accepted and that the petitioner should

execute the relevant documents in that regard.

2. It is the say of the petitioner that on account of various

factors including amendments, perceived insufficient

time etc., the bid submitted by the petitioner was ________________________________________________________________________________________

significantly higher than it should have been and thus

the petitioner came to the conclusion on 24.01.2011

that the bid made by it was commercially unviable.

This fact was intimated to respondent no.2 on

24.01.2011 within the period of 7 days prescribed for

the petitioner to execute the necessary documents.

3. As a sequitur to this, respondent no.2 informed other

bidders, and ultimately the contract was awarded to

M/s.Ashoka Buildcon Limited at a much lower premium

of Rs 126.06 crores. We may notice at this stage that

the petitioner had specified a premium of Rs 190.53

crores.

4. All the bidders were to submit a bid security amount of

Rs.13.97 crores. Part „D‟ deals with the bid security

amount. Clause 2.20.6 envisages forfeiture of bid

security amount in the following terms:

"2.20.6 The Authority shall be entitled to forfeit and appropriate the Bid Security as Damages inter alia in any of the events specified in Clause 2.20.7 herein below.

The Bidder, by submitting its Bid pursuant to this RFP, shall be deemed to have acknowledged and confirmed that the Authority will suffer loss and damage on account of withdrawal of its Bid or for any ________________________________________________________________________________________

other default by the Bidder during the period of Bid validity as specified in this RFP. No relaxation of any kind on Bid Security shall be given to any Bidder."

5. The aforesaid amount was agreed as a genuine pre-

estimate of compensation in respect of the eventuality

set out in the clause 2.20.7. The facts of the case fall

within such an eventuality where a contractor fails to

sign and return a duplicate copy of the LOA. Clause

2.20.7 reads as under:

"2.20.7 The Bid Security shall be forfeited and appropriated by the Authority as mutually agreed genuine pre-estimated compensation and damages payable to the Authority for, inter alia, time, cost and effort of the Authority within prejudice to any other right or remedy that may be available to the Authority hereunder or otherwise, under the following conditions:

a) If a Bidder submits a non-responsive Bid, "subject however that in the event of encashment of bid security occurring due to operation of para 2.20.7 (a), the damage so claimed by the authority shall be restricted to 5% of the value of the bid security.;

                 b) If a Bidder       engages in a corrupt practice,
                    fraudulent         practice, coercive practice,
                    undesirably        practice or restrictive practice
                    as specified      in Clause 4 of this RFP;

c) If a Bidder withdraws its Bid during the period of Bid validity as specified in this RFP ________________________________________________________________________________________

and as extended by mutual consent of the respective Bidder(s) and the Authority;

d) In the case of Selected Bidder, if it fails within specified time limit -

                       i)    To sign and return the duplicate
                     copy of LOA;

ii) To sign the Concession Agreement; or

iii) To furnish the Performance Security within the period prescribed therefor in the Concession Agreement; or

e) In case the Selected Bidder, having signed the Concession Agreement, commits any breach thereof prior to furnishing the Performance Security."

6. It is in view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances

that respondent no.2 took a decision to encash the

bank guarantee furnished towards the bid security

amount; however in the meanwhile petitioner

addressed a letter dated 01.02.2011 volunteering to

make the payment of Rs.13.97 crores in return of the

bank guarantee; which amount was duly paid vide a

demand draft on 03.02.2011. Thus, the issue of

encashment of the bid security amount stood

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concluded with the said step and both the parties

accepted the same.

7. The grievance of the petitioner arises out of the

subsequent action taken by respondent no.2 to issue a

show cause notice dated 24.02.2011 to the petitioner

to debar the petitioner for a period of five years from

"pre-qualification, participating or bidding" for future

projects to be undertaken by respondent no.2.

7.1 This show cause notice was replied to by the petitioner

on 01.03.2011, and the impugned letter was issued on

20.05.2011, on the basis of which respondent has

debarred the petitioner for a period of one year

commencing from the date of issue of the letter, i.e.,

20.05.2012 from "pre-qualification, participating or

bidding" for future projects of or to be undertaken by

respondent no.2.

7.2 The petitioner made a representation against such

debarment to the Ministry of Road Transport and

Highways on 28.05.2011, and subsequently filed the

present writ petition on 13.06.2011 under Article 226

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of the Constitution of India making a prayer for

quashing of the letter dated 20.05.2011.

8. The aforesaid grievance has naturally been contested

by respondent no.2. Respondent no.1/UOI has not filed

any separate counter affidavit in this matter.

9. We have heard learned counsel for the parties.

10. It is the say of learned senior counsel for the petitioner

that the forfeiture of the bid security amount

concluded the consequence which the petitioner could

be visited with on its failure to convey the acceptance

in respect of the LOA. In other words the petitioner

could not be penalized any further by being debarred

from participation in future projects undertaken by

respondent no. 2. According to the learned counsel

the order of debarment was in the nature of the

petitioner being blacklisted.

11. The learned counsel in this behalf has drawn our

attention to clause 4.2 which forms part of part 4 with

the heading „Fraud and Corrupt Practices‟. Clause 4.2

reads as under:

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"Without prejudice to the rights of the Authority under Clause 4.1 hereinabove and the rights and remedies which the Authority may have under the LOA or the Concession Agreement, or otherwise if a Bidder or Concessionaire, as the case may be, is found by the Authority to have directly or indirectly or through an agent, engaged or indulged in any corrupt practice, fraudulent practice, coercive practice, undesirable practice or restrictive practice during the Bidding Process, or after the issue of the LOA or the execution of the Concession Agreement, such Bidder or Concessionaire shall not be eligible to participate in any tender or RFP issued by the Authority during a period of 2(two) years from the date such Bidder or Concessionaire, as the case may be, is found by the Authority to have directly or indirectly or through an agent, engaged or indulged in any corrupt practice, fraudulent practice, coercive practice, undesirable practice, or restrictive practices, as the case may be."

12. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner submitted

that the aforesaid clause applied only if the petitioner

indulged in any "corrupt practice", "fraudulent

practice", "coercive practice", "undesirable practice"

or "restrictive practice" during the bid process or after

the issuance of LOA or on the execution of the

Concession Agreement, and that the definition of each

of these expressions provided in clause 4.3 made this ________________________________________________________________________________________

aspect quite clear. Learned counsel thus submitted

that the case of the petitioner does not fall in any of

the aforementioned practices as defined in clause 4.3

read with clause 4.2.

12.1 A reference was made to following paragraphs of the

show cause notice dated 24.02.2011 to buttress this

point:

"AND WHEREAS subsequent to technical evaluation, Financial Bids were opened on 13.01.2011 in the presence of the Bidders representative and it was noted that M/s Patel Engineering Ltd. had offered the highest premium of Rs.190.53 Crore for the said project. Therefore, as per RFP Volume-I, Clause 3.3.1, M/s Patel Engineering was declared by the NHAI as the Selected Bidder and subsequently was issued the letter of Award (LOA), as per clause 3.3.5 of RFP Volume-I. Copy of letter dated 17.01.2011 is enclosed.

AND WHEREAS, M/s Patel Engineering Ltd., vide letter No.Hyd/181/NHAI-DK BOT/3326 dated 24.01.2001, had expressed their inability to accept the LOA, stating that errors have crept in impacting the bid value significantly. Copy of letter dated 24.01.2011 is enclosed.

AND WHEREAS, as per Clause 2.20.07(d) of the RFP, in case the Selected Bidder fails to accept the LOA, the bid security shall be forfeited and appropriated by NHAI as mutually agreed genuine pre-estimated ________________________________________________________________________________________

compensation as payable to NHAI for, inter- alia, time, cost and effort of NHAI without prejudice to any other right or remedy that may be available to the NHAI thereunder or otherwise.

AND WHEREAS, in view of your conduct which has, inter-alia, resulted in delay of execution of a project of National importance, a view is made out not to deal with you in future for participation and/or award of further projects of NHAI. It needs to be appreciated that the projects being undertaken by NHAI are of huge magnitude and both in terms of manpower and finance besides being of utmost National importance, striking at the root of economic development and prosperity and general public and a nation as a whole, the NHAI cannot afford to deal with entities who fail to perform their obligations as in your case.

AND WHEREAS, in the premises it is proposed to debar above named noticee for a period of five years from pre-qualification, participating or bidding for future projects of/or to be undertaken by NHAI, either directly in your name or indirectly in any other name or in association with any other person entity in which you may choose to carry on your business.

In view of the aforesaid, you are hereby called upon to show cause within 14 days of the receipt of this notice as to why action as aforesaid should not be taken against you. If no reply is received within the said period, it shall be presumed that you have nothing to say against the proposed action of NHAI and NHAI shall be free to take appropriate action as may be deemed fit in the facts and ________________________________________________________________________________________

circumstances of the case and as per applicable law."

13. It was contended that aforesaid extract from the show

cause notice would reveal that as per respondent no.2,

it was the failure on the part of the petitioner to enter

into the contract after being declared a successful

bidder which occasioned delay in execution of the

project propelling respondent no.2 in coming to a

prima facie view that it would not deal with the

petitioner in respect of its future projects for a period

of time, which was tentatively proposed as five years.

13.1 Learned senior counsel for the petitioner submits that

such a show cause notice could not have been issued

for the reason that it was not envisaged under the

terms and conditions of the invitation to offer and no

such decision ought to have been taken de hors the

contract. This was more so according to the learned

counsel as no guidelines had been provided.

13.2 Learned senior counsel for the petitioner has also drew

our attention to the contents of the final order of

debarment dated 20.05.2011, to demonstrate that the ________________________________________________________________________________________

debarment order was passed on grounds which did not

find a mention in the show cause notice. The reason

being, according to the learned counsel, to somehow

bring the order of debarment within the four corners of

clause 4.2 read with clause 4.3 of the ITB.

13.3 It is his say that clause 4.3(e) which defines restrictive

practices cannot bring within its ambit allegations of

"pooling" or "malafides":

"restrictive practice" means forming a cartel or arriving at any understanding or arrangement among Bidders with the objective of restricting or manipulating a full and fair competition in the Bidding Process."

14. In other words it was contended that the allegations

pertaining to "pooling" and "mala fides" were

incorporated in the debarment letter dated 20.05.2011

only as an afterthought with a view to bring the

petitioner with the purview of "restrictive practices".

15. In order to appreciate the aforesaid submission, we

consider it appropriate to reproduce the relevant

portion of the letter of debarment dated 20.05.2011

which reads as under:

________________________________________________________________________________________

" In view of your conduct, Show Cause Notice dated 24.02.2011 was issued to you seeking your explanation as to why action should not be taken to debar above named addresses for a period of five years from prequalification, participating or bidding for future projects of / or to be undertaken by NHAI, either directly in your name or indirectly in any other name or in association with any other person entity in which you may choose to carry out your business. In response to the said Show Cause Notice dated 24.02.2011, you vide letter dtd.01/03/2011, inter-alia, stated that minutes of the pre-bid meeting, which included several amendment/queries, were communicated on website of NHAI on 7.1.2011 while bid submission was kept the next date on 10.01.2011. You also stated that in the light of the above notice in the bid clarification, certain anomalies crept up in bid submission, which were only discovered subsequent to the letter of intent being issued.

It is noted that above submission was also made in your letter dated 24/01/2011, wherein you have accepted the fact that other bidders also participated under the similar circumstances. Further the fact remains that clarification/amendments communicated by NHAI were „minor‟ and cannot be attributed as a cause for occurrence of an „error‟ of „major‟ nature and magnitude. With project facilities clearly spelt out in the RFP document, the project cost gets frozen well in advance and similarly traffic assessment ________________________________________________________________________________________

& projections, which largely impact the financial assessment, are also not expected to be left out for last few days of bid submission. Therefore, stating that an „error‟ of this nature and magnitude occurred is neither correct nor justified. It is to be noted that your actof non-

acceptance of LOA has resulted in huge financial loss, to the tune of Rs.3077 crores, as assessed over the life of concession period, in terms of lower premium, apart from cost of the time and effort, to NHAI. It is further noted that this is the first case where a bidder has not accepted the LOA, and warrants exemplary action to curb any practice of „pooling‟, and „malafide‟ in future.

After considering all material facts, and your reply in response to the Show Cause Notice, NHAI is of the considered view that no justifiable grounds have been made out in support of your action of non-acceptance of LOA. Keeping in view the conduct of the addresses, NHAI find that they are not reliable and trustworthy and have caused huge financial loss to NHAI. Therefore, it is hereby informed that without prejudice to any other rights available to NHAI in terms of the provision of RFP document and/or the applicable law, you the above named addresses are hereby barred from prequalification, participating or bidding for future projects of / or to be undertaken by NHAI, either directly in your name or indirectly in any other name or in association with any other person entity in which you may choose to carry out your business for a period

________________________________________________________________________________________

of one year from the date of issue of this letter."

16. The aforesaid apart, the petitioner is also aggrieved by

the website display of respondent no.2 where the

name of the petitioner is shown with the remark „the

applicant has been debarred by NHAI‟. He thus

submits that this may have an effect on the other

tenders issued by third parties, in which, the petitioner

may want to participate.

17. The last aspect urged by learned counsel for the

petitioner is that without prejudice to the aforesaid,

the punishment imposed on the petitioner is

disproportionate, and such a decision of debarment

can form subject matter of adjudication under Article

226 of the Constitution of India in view of the

judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court in

M/s V.K.Dewan and Co. v. Municipal Corporation of

Delhi & Ors.; AIR 1994 Delhi 304.

18. On the other hand, learned senior counsel for

respondent no.2 has pointed out to us that all that the

respondent no.2 has done is to take a decision not to ________________________________________________________________________________________

deal with the petitioner for a period of one year on

account of the petitioner having backed out at the last

minute from entering into the contract. The parties

participating in such bids are well experienced and the

petitioner is one such party, which is in fact a public

limited company, and which has been participating in

various tenders including that of respondent no.2. The

difference between the petitioner as H-1 and H-2 to

whom ultimately the contract was awarded is quite

large (i.e., a differential itself amounting to Rs.64

crores). Since the bid security forfeiture term in the

contract provided for a pre-estimate of damages, only

that amount was forfeited, i.e., a sum of Rs.13.97

crores. Learned counsel has referred to the final order

passed by respondent no.2 to contend that it is a first

case where a bidder has not executed LOA, and

respondent no.2 as a prudent commercial party is

entitled to take a decision to discourage such practice

in future by contractors like the petitioner. The

decision taken by respondent no.2 is a prudent

commercial decision not to deal with a contractor like ________________________________________________________________________________________

the petitioner for a limited period of one year and that

the position could be no different only because

respondent no.2 is a public sector enterprise. A

decision, such as the one taken by respondent no. 2,

would not have been called into question if a private

party had decided not to deal with such relcalcitrant

entity.

19. It is the say of learned counsel for respondent no.2

that the debarment is for a short period of time

keeping in mind the nature of contracts which are

entered into by respondent no.2. Learned senior

counsel for respondent no.2 states that clause 4.2 has

no role to play in the present case, and that the

decision taken by it is de hors the same in view of

clause 2.20.7 which states that the encashment of the

bid security amount is „without prejudice to any other

right or remedy that may be available to the

authority".

20. We find the action of respondent no.2 is completely

justified and in accordance with law. The petitioner, a

corporate entity, knew the nature of bid it was making. ________________________________________________________________________________________

It made a bid for RS 190.57 crores. On having found

out that the next highest bid of H-2 was for Rs.126.06

crores (as revised), though the original bid was even

lower, it had a second thought and under the garb of

ostensibly re-visiting a business decision withdrew

from the tender. It naturally bore the financial

consequences of the bid security amount being

forfeited without any demur or protest. What the

petitioner seeks by way of the present writ petition is a

right to continue to participate in the tenders to be

issued of respondent no.2 in the near future despite

the aforesaid conduct. We cannot lose sight of the

fact that respondent no.2 is dealing with highway

projects all over the country which are of critical

national importance both in terms of their economics

and logistical relevance. Expeditious construction of

road links is an important part of infrastructure

development of the country. Any delay in such

infrastructure projects is a national waste. In such a

situation for the petitioner to have withdrawn at the

last minute, ostensibly on the ground of prudent ________________________________________________________________________________________

commercial decision can certainly invite the

consequences of the tenderer declining to deal with

such an entity for a specified period of time. Learned

senior counsel for respondent no.2 has rightly

contended that but for the fact that the said

respondent is a public sector undertaking such a

decision would have passed muster of the court on the

ground of business expediency. The fact that

respondent no.2 is a public sector undertaking ought

not to disable it from taking a commercially prudent

and if you take an expedient decision in its own

interest. It is not the function of this Court to interfere

with such a decision which impinges on its business

efficacy merely because it happens to be taken by a

public sector undertaking which, in the instant case,

happens to be respondent no.2. The order of the

respondent no.2 also notes that this is a first instance

of its kind. The reference of „pooling‟ and „mala fide‟ is

made in that context, and as clarified by learned

counsel for respondent no.2, not to bring it within the

parameters of clause 4.2.

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21. In our considered view, such an action by respondent

no.2, in the given facts and circumstances of the case,

is a decision which any prudent businessman placed in

a similar situation would naturally have taken to deter

such like entities from conducting themselves in a

manner, to say the least, which is unbusinessman like.

In such circumstances, it would be both unfair and

unreasonable for the court to issue a direction

requiring respondent no. 2 to deal with a person (i.e.,

the petitioner) who had no qualms in ditching the

project at the nth hour.

22. We are also unable to accept the submission of

learned senior counsel for the petitioner that adequate

opportunity was not granted to the petitioner to

defend its case since an oral hearing was not accorded

to the petitioner. A right of personal hearing is not an

inbuilt right in such like proceedings especially given

the peculiar facts of the case, which stand unrebutted.

In this regard, we draw strength from the observations

of the Supreme Court in Union of India & Anr. v. Jesus

________________________________________________________________________________________

Sales Corporation; (1996) 4 SCC 69 where para 5

reads as under:

5. The High Court has primarily considered the question as to whether denying an opportunity to the appellant to be heard before his prayer to dispense with the deposit of the penalty is rejected, violates and contravenes the principles of natural justice. In that connection, several judgments of this Court have been referred. It need not be pointed out that under different situations and conditions the requirement of compliance of the principles of natural justice vary. The courts cannot insist that under all circumstances and under different statutory provisions personal hearings have to be afforded to the persons concerned. If this principle of affording personal hearing is extended whenever statutory authorities are vested with the power to exercise discretion in connection with statutory appeals, it shall lead to chaotic conditions. Many statutory appeals and applications are disposed of by the competent authorities who have been vested with powers to dispose of the same. Such authorities which shall be deemed to be quasi- judicial authorities are expected to apply their judicial mind over the grievances made by the appellants or applicants concerned, but it cannot be held that before dismissing such appeals or applications in all events the quasi- judicial authorities must hear the appellants or the applicants, as the case may be. When principles of natural justice require an opportunity to be heard before an adverse order is passed on any appeal or application, it does not in all ________________________________________________________________________________________

circumstances mean a personal hearing. The requirement is complied with by affording an opportunity to the person concerned to present his case before such quasi-judicial authority who is expected to apply his judicial mind to the issues involved. Of course, if in his own discretion if he requires the appellant or the applicant to be heard because of special facts and circumstances of the case, then certainly it is always open to such authority to decide the appeal or the application only after affording a personal hearing. But any order passed after taking into consideration the points raised in the appeal or the application shall not be held to be invalid merely on the ground that no personal hearing had been afforded. This is all the more important in the context of taxation and revenue matters. When an authority has determined a tax liability or has imposed a penalty, then the requirement that before the appeal is heard such tax or penalty should be deposited cannot be held to be unreasonable as already pointed out above. In the case of Shyam Kishore v.

Municipal Corporation of Delhi (supra) it has been held by this Court that such requirement cannot be held to be harsh or violative of Article 14 of the Constitution so as to declare the requirement of pre-deposit itself as unconstitutional. In this background, it can be said that normal rule is that before filing the appeal or before the appeal is heard, the person concerned should deposit the amount which he has been directed to deposit as a tax or penalty. The non-deposit of such amount itself is an exception which has been incorporated in different Statutes including the one with which are concerned. Second proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 4-M says in clear and unambiguous words that an appeal against ________________________________________________________________________________________

an order imposing a penalty shall not be entertained unless the amount of the penalty has been deposited by the appellant.

Thereafter the third proviso vests a discretion in such Appellate authority to dispense with such deposit unconditionally or subject to such conditions as it may impose in its discretion taking into consideration the undue hardship which it is likely to cause to the appellant. As such it can be said that the statutory requirement is that before an appeal is entertained, the amount of penalty has to be deposited by the appellant; an order dispensing with such deposit shall amount to an exception to the said requirement of deposit. In this back- is ground, it is difficult to hold that if the Appellate authority has rejected the prayer of the appellant to dispense with the deposit unconditionally or has dispensed with such deposit subject to some conditions without hearing the appellant, on perusal of the petition filed on behalf of the appellant for the said purpose, the order itself is vitiated and liable to be quashed being violative of principles of natural justice.

(emphasis is ours)

23. We also do not find that the consequences

stipulated in the impugned letter are disproportionate

when examined in the context of the conduct of the

petitioner. The case referred to by learned senior

counsel for the petitioner in V.K.Dewan and Co. v.

Municipal Corporation of Delhi & Ors.‟s case (supra)

was a case where period of debarment imposed was

________________________________________________________________________________________

three years. The aspect of proportionality has to be

examined in the context of the facts and

circumstances arising in a given case. In the present

case, after proposing a debarment for a period of five

years, the decision taken by respondent no.2 is of

debarment of petitioner for a year from participating in

the tenders to be issued by respondent no.2 within the

said time frame. The effect of the petitioner

withdrawing from the contract is that the respondent

no.2 has suffered a loss of Rs 64 crores per year to

begin with, and thereafter, on an extrapolated scale,

spread over a period of 25 years, the loss is pegged at

Rs.3077 crores; as set out in the final order. The

respondent no.2 was thus well within its rights to take

appropriate action against the petitioner, and taking

into consideration the enormity of the loss, we are of

the considered view that respondent no.2 has dealt

with the petitioner rather lightly.

24. Insofar as the display on website is concerned, the

same is only stating a fact that respondent no.2 has

taken a decision to debar the petitioner from further ________________________________________________________________________________________

dealing for a period of one year. It is not a debarment

qua any third party. It is for the third parties to take an

informed decision whether they would like to deal with

the petitioner keeping in mind the conduct of the

petitioner qua respondent no.2. We can only sum up

by noting that the consequences which flowed in this

case pursuant to the conduct of the petitioner are

those, which are of, the petitioner‟s own making; it has

no one else to blame but itself.

25. We find the writ petition devoid of both merit and

substance and hence dismiss the same with costs

quantified at Rs.1,00,000/-.

26. Interim order stands vacated.

SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.

AUGUST 02, 2011                                         RAJIV SHAKDHER, J.
dm

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