Citation : 2011 Latest Caselaw 3626 Del
Judgement Date : 1 August, 2011
THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment Reserved on: 28.07.2011
Judgment Pronounced on: 01.08.2011
+ CS(OS) No. 1208/2011
BRAHAM SINGH .....Plaintiff
- versus -
SUMITRA & ORS ....Defendants
Advocates who appeared in this case:
For the Plaintiff: Mr. Pankaj Vivek and Mr. Atul
Tripathi, Advs.
For the Defendant: Mr Sandeep Sethi, Sr. Adv, Mr
D.K. Devesh, Adv.
CORAM:-
HON'BLE MR JUSTICE V.K. JAIN
1. Whether Reporters of local papers may
be allowed to see the judgment? Yes
2. To be referred to the Reporter or not? Yes
3. Whether the judgment should be reported
in Digest? Yes
V.K. JAIN, J
IA 8087/2011 (O. 39 R. 1&2 CPC)
1. This is a suit for specific performance of an
agreement to sell dated 20th September, 2006, alleged to
have been executed by defendant No. 1 in favour of the
plaintiff. Late Shri Kude Ram, father-in-law of defendant
CS(OS)No. 1208/2011 Page 1 of 17
No. 1, and grandfather of defendants No. 2 to 4, whose
agricultural land in village Kakrola of Delhi was acquired for
planned development of Delhi, applied for allotment of an
alternative plot under the scheme of Government for
allotting such plots to those whose land is acquired for
planned development of Delhi. Late Shri Kude Ram,
however, died before any plot of land could be allotted to
him though a file had been opened by Land & Building
Department of Delhi Government in his lifetime. This is also
the case of the plaintiff that sometime in October, 2004,
Shri Rambir, husband of defendant No. 1 and father of
defendants No. 2 to 4, alongwith other sons of late Shri
Kude Ram, offered to sell yet to be allotted plot to him for a
consideration of Rs 12 lac and the cost of allotment. Some
legal heirs of Shri Kude Ram executed a relinquishment
deed in favour of Shri Rambir Singh, who executed a
receipt-cum-agreement in favour of the plaintiff on 25 th May,
2005, after taking the sale consideration of Rs 12 lac from
him. Shri Rambir expired on 11th August, 2005 and
thereafter other legal heirs of late Shri Kude Ram executed
the relinquishment deed in favour of the defendants,
thereby entitling them to obtain allotment in their favour.
CS(OS)No. 1208/2011 Page 2 of 17
On August 17, 2006, Land & Building Department
recommended allotment of a plot of 250 square yards to the
defendants. Defendant No. 1 then approached the plaintiff
and sought increase of the sale consideration. The parties,
therefore, agreed to a total sale consideration of Rs.12 lac
and a fresh agreement was executed by defendant No.1 in
favour of the plaintiff on 20th September, 2006 after taking a
sum of Rs 2 lac from him. The original recommendation
letter was handed over by her to the plaintiff. Another sum
of Rs 3 lac was paid by the plaintiff to defendant No 1. On
06th October, 2009. Plot bearing No. 61 in Pocket-9, Block-
B, Sector 23 of Dwarka, measuring 250 square yards, was
allotted to the defendants in a draw of lots. The plaintiff
paid another sum of Rs 50,000/- to defendant No. 1 on 22nd
February, 2010 and she handed over demand-cum-
allotment letter to him in July, 2010. The plaintiff deposited
a sum of Rs. 3,93,200/- with DDA on 22nd July, 2010 and
another sum of Rs 9,83,000/- on 21st August, 2010.
According to the plaintiff, the defendants, thereafter, turned
dishonest and filed a suit for injunction claiming that the
agreement was obtained by fraud and that she had never
signed or delivered any blank documents to the plaintiffs.
CS(OS)No. 1208/2011 Page 3 of 17
After filing of the aforesaid suit, the plaintiff paid the
remaining cost of plot on 21st December, 2010. The plaintiff
has now sought execution of the sale deed in his favour,
after converting the aforesaid plot into freehold. In the
alternative, the plaintiff has sought a decree for Rs
3,53,24,000/-. IA 8087/2011 has been filed seeking
interim injunction against creation of third party rights in
the aforesaid plot.
2. The suit has been contested and the application
was opposed by the defendants.
3. The plaintiff in the suit is seeking specific
performance of the agreement to sell dated 20th September,
2006, alleged to have been executed by defendant No. 1
Smt. Sumitra on her behalf as well as on behalf of
defendants No. 2 to 4, who are here minor children. It is an
admitted case that no specific plot of land had been allotted
to the defendants by the time this agreement purports to
have been executed, though a recommendation had been
made by Delhi Government to DDA on 17 th August, 2006 for
allotment of a plot measuring 250 square yards to them
against acquisition of agricultural land in Kakrola. The plot
CS(OS)No. 1208/2011 Page 4 of 17
in question was allotted jointly to the defendants, vide
allotment letter dated 15.06.2010/25.06.2010.
4. Some of the essential ingredients of an Agreement
to Sell an immovable property are (i) identity of vendor and
purchaser (ii) complete description of the property subject
matter of the agreement (iii) amount of consideration to be
paid by the purchaser to the seller (iv) time within which the
agreement is to be performed and (v) earnest money if any
paid to the vendor, if one of these essential ingredients are
missing, the agreement between the parties would not
amount to concluded contract. A Division Bench of this
Court in Mirahul Enterprises & Ors. Vs. Mrs. Vijaya
Srivastava AIR 2003 Delhi 15 referring to the provisions
contained in Section 10 of Specific Relief Act, observed that
a true contract requires the agreement of the parties, freely
made with full knowledge and without any feeling of
restraint and the parties must be ad-idem on the essential
terms of the contract and in case it is an Agreement to Sell
of immovable property, the law requires that it must
certainly identify the property agreed to be sold and the
price fixed as consideration paid or agreed to paid.
CS(OS)No. 1208/2011 Page 5 of 17
5. In Aggarwal Hotels (P) Ltd. vs. Focus Properties
(P) Ltd., 63(1996) Delhi Law Times 52, this Court, inter alia,
observed as under:
"The four ingredients necessary to make
an agreement to sell are: (i) particulars of
consideration; (ii) certainty as to party i.e.
the vendor and the vendee; (iii) certainty
as to the property to be sold; and (iv)
certainty as to other terms relating to
probable cost of conveyance to be borne
by the parties, time, etc. If these
ingredients are lacking in the agreement,
the obligations contemplated under
Section 16 for specific performance for
Immovable property would not arise. It is
in this background that the receipt dated
June 17, 1995 has to be examined."
This judgment was relied upon by this Court in
CS(OS) No. 82/1997, Sardar Gurbachan Singh and Ors.
vs. Sardar Avtar Singh and Ors. while deciding IA No.
5955/2004.
6. The agreement, alleged to have been executed by
defendant No. 1 in favour of the plaintiff on 20 th September,
2006, does not identify and in fact could not have identified
the property subject matter of the agreement for the simple
reason that no plot of land had been allotted to the
defendants by that time. At the time this agreement is
alleged to have been executed in favour of the plaintiff, it
CS(OS)No. 1208/2011 Page 6 of 17
was not known in which colony plot would be allotted to the
defendants, when the allotment would take place what
would be the size of the plot and which particular plot
would be allotted to the defendants. Therefore, the property,
subject matter of the agreement, was incapable of
identification at the time the agreement is alleged to have
been executed. It is, therefore, difficult to deny that the
agreement dated 20 th September, 2006, does not constitute
a valid and concluded contract for sale of an immovable
property to the plaintiff.
7. The learned Counsel for the plaintiff has relied
upon the provisions of Section 13 of Specific Relief Act,
which deal with right of purchaser or lessee against a
person, who at the time of contract has no title or has an
imperfect title but subsequently acquires an interest in the
property. The reliance on this provision is wholly misplaced
since in the case before this Court there was no valid
agreement to sell in favour of the plaintiff as at the time, the
agreement is alleged to have executed. The learned Counsel
has also relied upon Pundlik Daryaji v. Jainarayan
Maliram Shop & Ors AIR 1949 Nag 83, Round The Clock
CS(OS)No. 1208/2011 Page 7 of 17
Stores Ltd. v. Aggarwal Entertainment Private Limited
MANU/DE/2147/2008 and Indraraj Singh v. Chaitram &
Anr. AIR 1929 Nag 194. None of these judgments deal with
the issue involved in this case and therefore these
judgments are of no help.
8. It was also contended by the learned counsel for
the defendants that defendant No. 1, despite being natural
guardian of defendants No. 2 to 4 was not competent in law
to enter into an agreement to sell their immovable property,
without prior permission of the Court. In support of his
contention, he has relied upon Section 8(2) of Hindu
Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, which, to the extent
relevant, provides that the natural guardian of a Hindu
minor shall not, without previous permission of the Court,
mortgage, charge or transfer by sale, gift, exchange or
otherwise, any part of the immovable property of the minor
and any disposal of immovable property in contravention of
this requirement, would be voidable at the instance of the
minor or any person claiming under him.
9. In my view, entering into an agreement to sell an
immovable property does not constitute mortgage, charge or
CS(OS)No. 1208/2011 Page 8 of 17
transfer of the property by sale, gift, exchange or otherwise
and therefore, is not covered without the prohibition
contained in Section 8(2) of Hindu Minority and
Guardianship Act. An agreement to sell, by itself, does not
transfer ownership in the immovable property. It only gives
a right to the purchaser to obtain execution of a sale deed of
the immovable property in his favour. But, there is no sale
or transfer as such till the sale deed is actually executed in
favour of the purchaser. It also cannot be said that entering
into an agreement to sell an immovable property amounts to
a mortgage or a charge. In my view, it is within the
competence of the natural guardian of Hindu minor to enter
into an agreement to sell the immovable property of the
minor provided the transaction is for the benefit of the
minor or in the realization, protection or benefit of his
estate, but, the guardian cannot execute a sale deed in
favour of the purchaser, without prior permission of the
Court. Of course, such an agreement if entered into by the
guardian on behalf of the minor would be voidable at the
instance of minor, who will be entitled to show that the
contract was not for his benefit but it is difficult to accept
that a guardian cannot enter into an agreement to sell the
CS(OS)No. 1208/2011 Page 9 of 17
immovable property of the minor even if such a transaction
is for the benefit of the minor or in the realization,
protection or benefit of his estate.
10. In Biswanath Charit v. Damodar Patra & Ors.
AIR 1982Cal199, the plaintiff/respondent instituted the suit
on the allegation that defendant No.1, the mother and as
such natural guardian of minor defendant Nos. 2 to 7
entered into an agreement with the plaintiff for self and on
behalf of the minors to sell the suit property to meet certain
antecedent debts during the last illness of her deceased
husband, the father of defendants No. 2 to 7. Later on the
defendants suffered a collusive compromise decree
purporting to surrender possession of the suit land in
favour of defendant No. 8 for defeating the right of the
plaintiff. Defendants No. 1 to 7 not only refused to execute
the sale deed but defendant No.8 threatened to disturb
plaintiff's possession of the suit land. Hence the plaintiff
sued for specific performance of the contract for sale and for
injunction restraining the defendant No.8 from interfering
with his possession of the suit property. The suit was
contested by defendant No.8 who not only denied the
agreement but further pleaded that such an agreement
being contingent upon permission of the Court and being
otherwise invalid and void is not enforceable. He further
claimed that in any event such an agreement is not
enforceable against him. The two Courts on evidence
concurrently found that defendant Nos. 1 to 7 did execute
and register the agreement for sale which was for legal
necessity and for the benefit of the minors and that the
plaintiff was put into possession of the suit property on the
basis of a settlement. Both the Courts overruled the plea
that the defendant No.8 was a bona fide transferee for
consideration without notice. The trial Court found the
decree which was entered into a few days after the plaintiff's
agreement to be collusive. So far as the contract was
concerned, the two Courts held that it was competent for
the natural guardian mother to enter into such a contract,
made for the benefit of the minors and though it may be
voidable at the instance of the minors, it is not otherwise
void or invalid and is specifically enforceable when the
minors are not coming forward to avoid it.
It was contended before the Division Bench of the
High Court that Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act,
1956, having introduced material change by way of
restricting the powers of the natural guardian to effect any
mortgage or charge or transfer by sale, gift, exchange or
otherwise the immovable property of the minor, no court
could specifically enforce an agreement for sale said to have
been executed by the natural guardian for and on behalf of
the minor. The Division Bench took the following view in
the matter.
"Section 8 of the said Act has rendered the powers of the natural guardian substantially the same and subject to the same limitations as are imposed on the powers of a guardian declared or appointed by a court under the Guardians and Wards Act. Sub-Section (2) has taken away the independent power of alienation originally possessed by the natural guardian under the Hindu Law and forbids mortgage or charge or transfer by sale, gift, exchange or otherwise or even lease for a term exceeding 5 years or for a term extending one year beyond the date on which the minor will attain majority, any part of the immovable property of the minor except with the previous permission of the court. We feel no hesitation in agreeing with and accepting the view that it was competent for the natural guardian to enter into and execute an agreement for sale as in the present case for the benefit of the minors and such an agreement will not be void
altogether but only voidable at the instance of the minor if it can be shown to be not for his benefit. But in our view the mere fact that the agreement is not void would not by itself render it straightway specifically enforceable at the instance of the purchaser by the natural guardian. It could have been so enforceable if, as the law stood before, the natural guardian himself could have fulfilled the contract by executing the conveyance. But that power has since been made subject to the previous permission of the court. Complying with a decree for specific performance as made in the present case would constitute contravention on the part of the natural guardian of Sub-section (2) of Section 8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, and it is settled principle that no court should compel a person to contravene the law. The matter can be looked at from another angle, namely, that even where the court grants such a decree and the natural guardian, executes the conveyance in terms of that decree, that transfer can be set at naught at the instance of the minor merely on the ground that such transfer is in contravention of Sub-section (2). No court is expected to pass such an infructuous decree. But the question still remains what would happen to such an agreement, particularly when as has been found in the present case the agreement is within the competence of the natural guardian and is for the benefit of the minor. Would it remain an agreement not enforceable in law? In our view the legal position is that such an agreement is enforceable but only upon a previous permission being obtained from the court. Where the natural guardian in
exercise of his powers under Sub-section (1) of Section 8 of the said Act enters into such an agreement for the benefit of the minor he by necessary implication enjoins himself to take the necessary permission from the court and then execute the conveyance which would not contravene in any manner Sub-section (2) thereof. The decree in such a case, therefore, should be in terms similar to the one as the Supreme Court indicated in the case of Messrs. Chandnee Widyavati Madden v. Dr. C.L. Katial, MANU/SC/0257/1963 : [1964]2SCR495 .
The decree must direct the natural
guardian to seek the necessary
permission from the court as
contemplated by Sub-section (6) of Section 8 and such permission being obtained to effect the conveyance."
11. In Darbara Singh Vs. Karminder Singh and Ors.
AIR 1979 Punjab & Haryana 215, a judgment relied upon by
the defendant, the Court referring to the provisions of sub-
Section 8(1) of Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, which
provides that the guardian can, in no case, bind the minor
by a personal covenant, inter alia, observed as under:
"The provision of sub-section (1) of Section 8 of the Act makes it expressly clear in unqualified terms that no personal covenant of the guardian shall be binding on the minor. It means only this that, when looked from the stand point that the aforesaid interdiction is added at the fag-end of Section 8(1) by way of proviso to the clause that preceded
it, a guardian though well within his right to enter into a contract for the benefit of the minor, but the said contract would not be enforceable against the minor even when it was entered for his benefit and would be voidable at his instance.
Learned counsel for the appellant also placed reliance on a Single Bench decision of this Court reported in Paras Ram v. Bhal Singh 1973 RLR 37.
The decision in Paras Ram's case does not go any farther than this that the provision of sub-section (1) of Section 8 of the Act does not prevent a guardian to enter into a contract regarding the property of a minor for his benefit without the prior permission of the Court but that is not the same thing as saying that such a contract would be binding upon the respondent. That was a case in which the decree was sought against the guardian and not against the minor and the decree was not the decree for specific performance but for the return of earnest money received by the guardian and damages envisaged in the contract, in the failure of the contracting party to fulfill its own part of the contract."
This judgment does not support the proposition
that in no case can a guardian enter into an agreement to
sell the immovable property belonging to the minor. There
is no legal bar to the guardian entering into such a
transaction provided it is for the benefit of the minor though
he cannot complete the transaction by executing a sale
deed/transfer deed in favour of the purchaser, without
permission of the Court. Of course, such a contract being
voidable at the instance of the minor, it would be open to
him to show that the contract was not for his benefit and
therefore does not bind him.
12. The learned Counsel for the plaintiff has referred to
Roomal & Ors. v. Siri Niwas AIR 1985 Delhi 153, Sri
Narayan Bal & Ors. v. Sridhar Sutar & Ors. AIR 1996 SC
2371 and Ansal Properties & Industries Pvt. Ltd. v.
Anand Nath & Ors. ILR 1992 Delhi 540. In Roomal & Ors.
(supra), the Court held that the guardian of a minor is
competent to enter into an agreement to purchase property
on his behalf and his authority and competence can be
challenged only by the minor and not by the vendor, who is
not the keeper of the minor. In Sri Narayan Bal (supra), it
was held that Hindu joint family being a separate entity can
dispose of the family property including undivided interest
of the minor in it. In Ansal Properties & Industries Pvt.
Ltd. (supra), the Court was not required to deal with the
power of a natural guardian to transfer the immovable
property belonging to the minor. The Court in this case was
of the view that Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956
does not extend to the administration of an undivided
interest of a minor in a joint family which can continue to
be administered by a de facto guardian. This judgment also
does not help the plaintiff in any manner.
13. For the reasons given in the preceding paragraphs
I am of the view that since prima facie there was no valid
and concluded contract between the parties, no case for
grant of injunction against creation of third party interest in
the suit property is made out. The application is
accordingly dismissed. The observations made and the view
taken in this order will not affect the final decision of the
suit on merit.
(V.K. JAIN) JUDGE AUGUST 01, 2011 BG/VN
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