Citation : 2010 Latest Caselaw 4949 Del
Judgement Date : 27 October, 2010
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
W.P.(C) 4800/2008
Reserved on: October 7, 2010
Decision on: October 27, 2010
SHAHID PARVEZ ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. Vinoo Bhagat with
Mr. M.R. Mishra, Advocate.
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS ..... Respondents
Through: Mr. Atul Nanda, Advocate
for R-1 to R-3.
CORAM: JUSTICE S. MURALIDHAR
1. Whether reporters of the local news papers
be allowed to see the judgment? No
2. To be referred to the Reporter or not? Yes
3. Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest? Yes
JUDGMENT
27.10.2010
1. This writ petition has been filed against an order dated 1 st February
2006 passed by the Appellate Tribunal for Forfeited Property („Appellate
Tribunal‟) dismissing the Petitioner‟s appeal against an order dated 7 th
July 1999 passed by the Competent Authority („CA‟) under Section 68-I
(3) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 („NDPS
Act‟).
Background facts
2. The Petitioner‟s brother Mohd. Azad Parvez of Balasore Town, Orissa
was detained on 10th July 1991 for the alleged offence of indulging in
illicit trafficking of drugs punishable under the NDPS Act. This was
subsequent to an order of detention passed against Mohd. Azad on 26th
July 1989 passed by the Joint Secretary to the Government of India. After
Mohd Azad was arrested, he was served with the order of detention and
grounds of detention on 10th July 1991. On 30th July 1991, a reference was
made to the Advisory Board under Section 9 (1) of the NDPS Act. The
Advisory Board held that there was sufficient cause for the detention and
a confirming order was passed by the Central Government under Section
9(1) read with Section 10(2) of the NDPS Act for a period of two years
with effect from 10th July 1991.
3. It is stated that Mohd. Azad served out the entire detention period.
However, while under detention, Mohd. Azad filed a Writ Petition
(Criminal) No. 315 of 1992 in this Court challenging the said order of
detention. However, the said writ petition was not taken up for hearing for
many years and not before he completed the period of detention.
4. Meanwhile, the property belonging to the Petitioner Shahid Parvez,
brother of Mohd. Azad being immovable property located in Balasore
Town, which was purchased in his name under a sale deed dated 11 th
February 1998, was frozen by the Inspector In-charge, Police Station (PS)
Balasore on 18th January 1999. This was confirmed by the CA on 12th
February 1999. The said action was taken on the ground that the order of
detention dated 26th July 1989 against Mohd. Azad had not been revoked
by any Court and the Petitioner being his brother was a person covered
under Section 68-A (2) (d) of the NDPS Act. It was suspected that the
source of the above immovable property at Balasore in the name of the
Petitioner as well as another motor parts shop belonging to the Petitioner
also located at Balasore, Orissa were illegally acquired properties in terms
of Section 68B (g) of the NDPS Act.
5. According to the Respondents, on 17th February 1999 and 9th March
1999, notices were issued to the Petitioner under Section 68-H (1) of the
NDPS Act calling upon him to indicate the sources of his income,
earnings or assets, out of which or by means of which he had acquired the
said two properties, the evidence on which he relies and other relevant
information and particulars. It is stated that the above notices were served
on the Petitioner on 13th May 1999. However, there was no response to
the above notice. Thereafter, a notice under Section 68-I (1) of the NDPS
Act was issued to the Petitioner on 14th June 1999, which was served on
him on 23rd June 1999, informing him of the date of hearing of 5 th July
1999 before the CA. It is stated by Respondents that despite service of
notice the Petitioner did not appear before the CA. Consequently, the
proceedings were concluded ex parte with a presumption being drawn
against the Petitioner that the assets mentioned in the Schedule were the
illegally acquired properties of his brother Mohd. Azad under Section 68-
B (g) of the NDPS Act. The said properties were declared to have been
forfeited to the Central Government free from all encumbrances.
Thereafter, the Petitioner filed an appeal before the Appellate Tribunal
which was pending before it.
6. In the meanwhile, on 16th May 2002 the petition of Mohd. Azad being
Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 315 of 1992 was taken up for hearing by this
Court and disposed of on that date by the following order:
"Crl.W. No. 315/92 It is agreed between the parties that this matter is covered by
the decision of this Court in Akhilesh Kumar Tyagi v. Union of India reported in 1995 IV AD (Delhi) 107. The writ petition is allowed in terms thereof. The initial period of detention of three months is sustained.
It is contended by learned counsel for the Petitioner that the original detention for a period of three months is only valid and any detention subsequent thereto is vitiated. On the contrary, the learned ASG submits that even if there is no declaration of continued detention yet detention of a period of one year would not suffice but further detention would be bad. I have heard the learned counsel, it appears to me that the contention raised by Mr. Sood, learned ASG is not borne out from the law laid down by the Supreme Court. I, therefore, hold that the detention for a period of three months is valid and continue detention is vitiated. The writ petition is allowed accordingly."
7. Meanwhile the Appellate Tribunal, on 1st October 1999, directed that
the Petitioner "should be given an opportunity to produce his evidence
and submit his contentions before the CA." The CA was asked to consider
the documents and submissions and pass fresh orders. Pursuant thereto, on
11th October 1999 the Petitioner appeared before the CA and presented
documents. The CA informed the Appellate Tribunal on 15th October
1999 that the certificates produced by the Petitioner about receipt of salary
and commission from the three different firms in Calcutta could not be
verified as such firms did not exist at the addresses given. However,
before the Appellate Tribunal the Petitioner pointed out that he was an
employee in these concerns during the period 1979-80 to 1985-86 and that
the inquiry was made after a long time-gap of 15-20 years during which
time his employers might have shifted to other places and, therefore, mere
non-availability of the concerns at the addresses given should not have
been a ground for the CA to disbelieve the Petitioner. The Appellate
Tribunal, on 3rd December 2002, passed an order directing the CA to give
a further opportunity to the Petitioner to prove the genuineness of those
concerns. The CA was directed to make further enquiries. The
proceedings were directed to be completed within three months. The
appeal was again taken up before the Appellate Tribunal on 18 th August
2005. It was noted that the supplementary findings of the CA that were
called for by the Appellate Authority in its order dated 3rd December 2002
had not been submitted. Accordingly, a direction was issued to CA to
submit the additional findings.
8. Subsequently, the appeal was taken up for hearing on 1 st February 2006
before the Appellate Tribunal. None appeared for the Appellant
(Petitioner herein). The Appellate Tribunal was informed of the order
passed by this Court on 16th May 2002 setting aside the continued
detention of the Petitioner‟s brother. The further findings of the CA had
been submitted to the Appellate Tribunal. The CA reiterated that the
Petitioner had not been able to produce any fresh document and, therefore,
was unable to discharge the burden under Section 68-J of the NDPS Act.
The Appellate Tribunal then concurred with the findings of the CA that
the evidentiary documents filed by the Petitioner could not be believed. It
was further concluded that the firms which issued the receipts of salary
income and the commission to the Petitioner were shown as not existing at
the given addresses. Consequently, it was difficult to believe that the
Petitioner was having his own valid source of income. The Appellate
Tribunal observed that as regards the second forfeited property, the
Petitioner had taken a plea that he was a tenant. However, in the absence
of any documentary evidence to prove the same, the Appellate Tribunal
refrained itself from making any observations on that plea.
9. Since the appeal was decided ex parte, the Petitioner filed application
MP-ND-29 & ND-30/CAL/2006 before the Appellate Tribunal for
recalling of its order dated 1st February 2006. By order dated 4th October
2007, the Appellate Tribunal held that there is no explicit provision in the
Appellate Tribunal for Forfeited Property Rules, 1989 for recalling of any
order of the Appellate Tribunal passed on merits and no case was made
out for recalling of the order dated 1st February 2006. It was also observed
that since the detention for a period of three months was upheld, "the
provisions of Chapter V-A will continue to apply to the Petitioner."
10. It was noticed by the Appellate Tribunal in the order dated 4 th October
2007 that the Petitioner had initially challenged the order dated 1 st
February 2006 of the Appellate Tribunal before the High Court of Orissa,
but he withdrew the petition which was dismissed as withdrawn on 17th
July 2006. Therefore, the CA took the physical possession of the forfeited
property in terms of the order dated 7th July 1999 of the CA.
11. While directing notice to issue in the present petition on 15 th October
2008, this Court directed that the impugned order dated 1 st February 2006
of the Appellate Tribunal shall remain stayed till the next date of hearing.
The said interim order was continued on 7th August 2009, 26th November
2009 and 5th April 2010.
Submissions of Counsel
12. Mr. Vinoo Bhagat, learned counsel appearing for the Petitioner first
submitted that for the operation of Section 68-A(2)(d) of the NDPS Act,
there has to be a subsisting valid order of detention. The consequence of
this Court‟s order dated 16th May 2002 setting aside the detention order of
the Petitioner‟s brother Mohd. Azad, was that in terms of the decision of
the Full Bench of this Court in Akhilesh Kumar Tyagi v. Union of India
60 (1995) DLT 203 (FB), the detention order was void ab initio. It is
submitted that though the initial period of detention of three months was
sustained, the detention order itself was being set aside from the date of its
passing. It is further submitted that the Respondents had failed to
discharge the initial burden of showing nexus between the properties
acquired by the Petitioner in 1998 with the alleged illegal earnings of the
Petitioner's brother for which the detention order was passed at least nine
years prior to the said acquisition and for which the Petitioner‟s brother
had served term in jail for two years between 1991 and 1993. It is
submitted that unless there was a prima facie material linking the alleged
illegal earnings of the Petitioner‟s brother and the acquisition of the
property in question by the Petitioner, the impugned order cannot be
sustained.
13. On the other hand, it is submitted by Mr. Atul Nanda, learned counsel
appearing for Respondents that as explained by the Supreme Court in
Meena Jayendra Thakur v. Union of India (1999) 8 SCC 177 and Union
of India v. Harish Kumar (2008) 1 SCC 195, the entire detention order
was not held to be illegal by this Court in its order dated 16 th May 2002.
That being the position, the burden shifted on the Petitioner to show that
the property was acquired by him from his own sources of income.
Effect of this Court's order dated 16th May 2002 quashing the detention
14. First the effect of this Court‟s order dated 16th May 2002 quashing the
detention of the Petitioner‟s brother‟s detention requires to be considered.
The decision of the Full Bench of this Court in Akhilesh Kumar Tyagi,
was in the context of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and
Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1975 („COFEPOSA Act‟). The
relevant provisions of COFEPOSA Act are more or less similar to the
corresponding provisions in Chapter V-A of the NDPS Act with which the
present case is concerned. In Maqudoom Meera Hameem v. Joint
Secretary to Govt. of India (Crl Writ Petition No. 83 of 1995 decided on
17th August 1995), the Division Bench of this Court had held that in case
where the reference to the Advisory Board was made beyond 5 weeks and
the Advisory Board gave its opinion beyond 11 weeks, the continued
detention during the extended period became bad. In Akhilesh Kumar
Tyagi, the correctness of the decision in Maqudoom Meera Hameem was
questioned by the Union of India. It was contended that till such time the
detention order was quashed, it remained valid. It was urged by the Union
of India that the respective periods of 5 weeks and 11 weeks in
Maqudoom Meera Hameem which got extended to „4 months and 2
weeks‟ and „5 months and 3 weeks‟ respectively, did not get contracted or
reduced back to 5 weeks and 11 weeks respectively when the declaration
under Section 9 COFEPOSA Act was quashed. Consequently, it was
contended by the Union of India that the detention beyond three months
did not become illegal automatically.
15. It may be recalled that in Akhilesh Kumar Tyagi the detention was set
aside on the ground that the Petitioner had not been informed by the
declaring authority that he had a right to make a representation against the
order of detention to the Advisory Board and the Central Government and
also to the declaring authority. In answering the question whether the
declaration made under Section 9 of the COFEPOSA Act was valid till it
was quashed or whether it becomes void ab initio, the Full Bench of this
Court in Akhilesh Kumar Tyagi v. Union of India held in para 30 as
under ([email protected] p. 213):
"30. If, therefore, there is a violation of Article 22 (5) in not informing the detenu that he had an opportunity to represent to the declaring authority, upon the Court quashing the Section 9 declaration, the order is impliedly declared void from its inception and on that basis, the benefit of extension of the period of 5 weeks to 4 months and 2 weeks, and the benefit of extension of 11 weeks to 5 months and 3 weeks in Section 9 (2), cease to apply. It is indeed not a case of extension of the periods and a later contraction but the order quashing the Section 9 declaration would make the declaration ineffective from the date it was issued and in case either the reference to the Board is beyond 5 weeks and/or the report of the Board is beyond 11 weeks, then the "continued detention" beyond three months would be invalid." (emphasis supplied)
16. Analysing the order dated 16th May 2002 passed by this Court in the
present case, the opening line appears to indicate that this Court held the
initial period of three months‟ detention of the Petitioner‟s brother to be
valid but the remaining period of detention to be invalid in terms of the
judgment in Akhilesh Kumar Tyagi. What is also significant is that the
contention of the learned ASG to the contrary was negatived and it was
held that "the detention for a period of three months is valid and continued
detention is vitiated." Extending the logic of the decision in Akhilesh
Kumar Tyagi to the order dated 16th May 2002, while the detention for a
period of three months was held to be valid, the detention order itself was
held to be void ab intio. It must be noted that the order dated 16th May
2002 passed by this Court attained finality with the Respondents accepting
it. Further, while the period of three months of detention was held valid,
the detention order was itself held to be void ab initio, i.e. from the date it
was issued.
17. The resultant position is that, the order dated 16th May 2002 related
back to the date of passing of the detention order i.e. 7th July 1989. Even if
one were to extend the ratio of Meena Jayendra Thakur or Harish
Kumar the detention order became void three months after the actual date
of the detention of the Petitioner‟s brother on 10th July 1991. The show
cause notice was issued to the Petitioner on 17th February 1999. In terms
of this Court‟s order dated 16th May 2002 the detention order of the
Petitioner‟s brother had been rendered void ab initio, i.e. void from 7th
July 1989 or in any event from a date three months after 10th July 1991.
Viewed from any angle, there was on 17th February 1999 no valid
detention order against the Petitioner‟s brother. Consequently, the
essential condition for invoking Section 68-A of the NDPS Act, had been
rendered non-existent on account of the subsequent development of the
passing of the order dated 16th May 2002 by this Court. The Petitioner is,
therefore, entitled to succeed on this ground.
Impugned order of CA bad even on merits
18. The impugned order of the CA, affirmed by the Appellate Tribunal,
cannot be sustained even on merits. The records of the CA have been
perused by this Court. The relevant period is the one immediately
preceding issuance of show cause notice to the Petitioner under Section
68-H (1) of the NDPS Act. It appears that following certain letters
received from the Income Tax Office, Balasore, on 1st November 1996,
the Investigating Officer/CA at Calcutta made a noting directing the
Department "to ascertain the existence of Shri Shahid Parvez." He
advised: "We may as well write to Branch Manager, Central Bank of
India, Brahamansahi Branch, Soro, Balasore to furnish details of Bank
Account No. 263 such as name of holder and address, name of introducer
and address, date of opening and present position of the account."
19. This was followed by several reminders and the noting dated 17th June
1997 where it was acknowledged that the Branch Manager, Central Bank
of India had furnished address of the brother of the Petitioner and other
required information. However, the notice sent under Section 68-H (1)
NDPS Act appears to have been returned with the remark "left". It
appears that previous to this, an order was already passed against the
Petitioner on 10th August 1992 under Section 68-F (2) of the NDPS Act.
The noting in the file CA/CAL/NDPS-86/92/93 do not show any
investigation having been conducted to co-relate the details received from
the Income Tax office in respect of source of the Petitioner‟s income to
even form a prima facie view that the properties in question were acquired
by him from the earnings of his brother Mohd. Azad on account of illicit
trafficking in drugs. In file CA/Cal/NDPS/31/98-99, there are two
identical notings dated 17th February 1999 and 9th March 1999 by the CA,
Calcutta which reads as under:
"I have perused the relevant records. I have applied my mind to all the facts and circumstances of the case. I have today recorded my reasons in terms of Section 68H (1) of the NDPS Act, 1985 and I am satisfied that this is a fit case for issue of notice under Section 68 H (1) of the NDPS Act, 1985.
Issue notice under Section 68H (1) of the NDPS Act."
20. It is not known what records were perused by the CA before issuing
the above orders. As far as this Court can find, there was no systematic
enquiry or investigation preceding the passing of the above orders. It
appears that prior to issuing a show-cause notice to the Petitioner under
Section 68-H(1) of the NDPS Act, no effort was made by the CA to be
prima facie satisfied that the essential conditions existed to attract that
provision. Even before the CA or the Appellate Tribunal, the initial
burden was on the office of the CA to show that the properties in the name
of the Petitioner were acquired by him through the illegal earnings of his
brother. The Petitioner on his part produced a 1998 sale deed in his favour
in respect of one of the properties. However, the opinion formed by the
CA, as extracted hereinbefore, fails to establish even prima facie any
casual link existing between the Petitioner‟s properties and the illegal
earnings of the Petitioner‟s brother. The order of the CA is a mere
reproduction of the language of the statute which is inadequate for
demonstrating application of mind to arrive at even a prima facie
satisfaction that the essential ingredients of Section 68-H (1) NDPS act
stood attracted.
Conclusion
21. The impugned order passed by the CA dated 7th July 1999 against the
Petitioner and the order dated 1st February 2006 passed by the Appellate
Tribunal affirming the CA‟s order dated 7th July 1999 are hereby set aside.
The Petitioner will be restored the possession of the forfeited properties
within four weeks.
22. The writ petition is allowed in the above terms with costs of Rs.
5,000/- which will be paid by Respondents to the Petitioner within four
weeks from today.
S. MURALIDHAR, J.
OCTOBER 27, 2010 rk
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