M/S Adarsh Electricals & Ors. vs Sh.Dinesh Dayal
2010 Latest Caselaw 4884 Del

       * HIGH COURT OF DELHI : NEW DELHI

       RC Rev. No. 195/2010 & CM No.14898/2010

%      Judgment reserved on:           22nd September, 2010

       Judgment delivered on:          25th October, 2010


       1.     M/s Adarsh Electricals
              Through its partner
              Sh. S.K.Aggarwal

       2.     Sh.S.K.Aggarwal
              Partner M/s Adarsh Electricals

       3.     Sh.P.K.Aggarwal
              Partner M/s Adarsh Electricals

       4.     Ms. Saroj Gupta
              Partner M/s Adarsh Electricals
              W/o late Sh. Raj Kumar Gupta

       5.     Sh. Adarsh Aggarwal
              Partner M/s Adarsh Electricals

       6.     Sh. Harshit Aggarwal
              S/o late Sh. Raj Kumar Gupta

       7.     Sh. Peush Aggarwal
              S/o late Sh. Raj Kumar Gupta

       8.     Sh. Yogesh Aggarwal
              S/o late Sh. Raj Kumar Gupta

            All at:
            1783/85, Bhagirath Palace,
            Chandni Chowk, Delhi-110006                ...Petitioners


RCR No. 195/2010                                      Page 1 of 28
                           Through:      Mr. Ravi Gupta, Sr.Advocate
                                        with Mr. Manu Bansal,
                                        Advocates
                          Versus

       Sh.Dinesh Dayal
       S/o late Sh. Jagdishwar Dayal
       Karta Dinesh Dayal HUF
       R/o 9, Upper Bela Road
       Civil Lines, Delhi-110054
                                                    .....Respondent
                          Through:      Mr. V.B.AndleySr.Advocate
                                        with Mr.Rajinder Mathur &
                                        Mr. Rajesh Baneya, Adv.

Coram:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V.B.GUPTA

Whether the Reporters of local papers
may be allowed to see the judgment?                  Yes

To be referred to Reporter or not?                   Yes

Whether the judgment should be reported
in the Digest?                                       Yes

V.B.Gupta, J.

Present petition under Section 25-B (8) of Delhi Rent Control

Act, 1958 (for short as „Act) has been filed on behalf of petitioners for

quashing of order dated 23rd March, 2010 passed by Additional Rent

Controller, Delhi (for short as „Controller‟) vide which petitioners‟

application seeking leave to contest the eviction petition was

dismissed and eviction order has been passed u/s 14 (1) (e) of the Act,

in favour of the respondent and against the petitioners.

2. Brief facts as per eviction petition are that respondent

(petitioner in the trial court) is the owner/landlord of property known

as "Kundan Mansion" bearing no. 1769 to 1772 and 1783 to 1785

Bhagirath Palace, Chandni Chowk, Delhi.

3. Petitioner no.1 (respondent no.1 in the trial court) a partnership

firm, is a tenant in the portion consisting of one hall, two rooms, two

verandahs, latrine and open court yard, as shown in red in the site plan

annexed with the eviction petition. The premises in question were let

out for office-cum-showroom and godown purposes at a monthly rent

of Rs.980/-.

4. It is stated that premises are required bonafide by the

respondent for himself for setting up his professional office and he has

no other suitable accommodation for this purpose. Respondent was

enrolled as an Advocate in 1969. He practiced as an Advocate with

Shri Vishnu Bhagwan Andley, Advocate, till he joined Delhi Judicial

Service in 1973. He was working as Additional District & Sessions

Judge, In-charge Karkardooma Court, at the time of his

superannuation on February 29, 2008. Thereafter, respondent started

his own practice as an Advocate. He now requires the premises to set

up his professional office.

5. Thirty six tenants occupy the entire property known as "Kundan

Mansions". Respondent sold some portions of the property during the

period 2000 to 2004, as he had no need of the premises at that time.

Premises in dispute are situated on the ground floor in a busy market

and are most suitable for setting up an office. No other tenant on the

ground floor in the property at Bhagirath Palace has sufficient or

suitable space where the respondent could set up his professional

office.

6. Respondent is residing at 9, Upper Bela Road, Civil Lines,

Delhi, which is a purely residential property. Respondent does not

have enough space to set up an office nor would he like to set up his

professional office at his residence. Respondent has only one drawing

room, one dining room, two bed rooms, one pooja room, kitchen, a

store under the stair case, two bathrooms, one garage and a servant

quarter. A portion of front verandah has been perforce converted into

an ad-hoc study. It measures only 8‟ x 10‟ and has no separate

entrance. As such it is wholly inadequate and unsuitable for use as

professional office. The family of the respondent consists of himself

and his wife. They have two married daughters who stay in Delhi and

often come to stay with the respondent with their family, which

includes their husbands and two children each. Respondent is already

short of one bedroom. Thus, there is no space in the said property to

set up an office.

7. Respondent is also the owner of Flat No.1-E at First Floor,

along with parking in the basement in DCM building, Barakhamba

Road, New Delhi. This property has been in the tenancy of M/s

Cottage Industries Expositions ever since the respondent purchased it,

and at present it fetches a monthly rent of Rs.70,000/-. Respondent

cannot forego the substantial income received from the said property.

The current lease of the said property is up to February 15, 2010.

Even otherwise, the said flat is one of the several flats occupied by

M/s Cottage Industries Expositions and flats on both sides of

respondent‟s flat are in occupation of the said tenant.

8. In affidavit filed along with application for leave to contest, it is

stated by the petitioners that the owner of premises is „Dinesh Dayal

HUF‟, which is by itself a legal entity. Such an „entity‟ (i.e.,

somebody other than a natural person) is not entitled to prefer a

petition under Section 14(1) (e) of the Act, for the need purported of

its Karta. On this score alone, petitioners are therefore, ipso facto

entitled to leave to defend the present eviction petition.

9. It is further stated that premises in suit are situated in a highly

over-crowded and grossly congested area where there are acute

restrictions on traffic - including parking of vehicles. The office of

any successful professional cannot be located in such an area. The

petition has been preferred by the respondent with a malafide

intention to earn „pugree‟ from a commercial area which has

enormous potential for „pugree‟and intellectual property rights. Had

the intention of the respondent been bonafide, he would have

disclosed how much accommodation in this building is already with

him, as also as to how respondent has dealt with the other portions of

„Kundan Mansion‟ as also how he now intends to utilize the vacant

portions of this building, which are lying locked under his own lock

and key.

10. The facts relating to how many portions of this property have

been sold or even let out by respondent after he became the Karta of

HUF and to whom and for what consideration, having not been

disclosed with accuracy only goes to show and establish that

respondent has no intention to personally use the premises in suit. Had

the particulars been disclosed and/or furnished, petitioners would have

had an opportunity to verify the facts from the transferee(s) and would

have been in a position to bring before the Court clear picture that the

petition has not been moved bona fide. In absence of the clear and

cogent facts it only goes to show without saying that the present

petition is based on vague and indefinite averments. Due to the

concealment of these relevant facts, present petition is not

maintainable.

11. It is further alleged that respondent has malafide designs in

getting the premises evicted under the garb of Section 14(1) (e) of the

Act in view of the recent pronouncement of Supreme Court.

Respondent has ill designs to convert the large area of the premises in

suit and particularly the rear court yard into small shops, and then sell

the same on huge prevailing „pugree‟.

12. Further, respondent landlord has deliberately not placed on

record a correct and complete copy of the site plan of the extensive

accommodation actually available to him and which is even today

used and occupied by him.

13. It is further alleged that respondent, who is a practicing

Advocate in the High Court intends to set up his professional office in

the demised premises. Admittedly, respondent/landlord has recently

sold several shops and offices in the vicinity of the premises in suit for

astronomical amounts and has invested the said funds in lucrative

investments and proposals, which are yielding him high returns. He

has admittedly in the year 2007 let out prime office accommodation

on the first floor of a very prestigious office building on Barakhamba

Road, New Delhi, at a rental of Rs.70,000/-per month.

14. It is further alleged that admittedly and apparently respondent

has not furnished the details of the cases handled by him (as an

Advocate) so far, after retirement. He has not annexed with the

petition record of professional work if any, which he is discharging

and which may justify that the purported need of respondent for

professional activity is bona fide. In the absence of details and due

particulars in the text of the eviction petition and particularly on

admitted facts that respondent got enrolled afresh as an Advocate only

on 24th March, 2008, petitioners are entitled to leave to defend to

establish that on facts the alleged need of the respondent is neither

immediate nor bonafide.

15. Lastly the accommodation-residential as well as non residential

- available with respondent is not only sufficient, suitable and/or

reasonable for his needs in the profession more so when his daughters

are married and well settled. They are admittedly living separately and

happily in their respectively matrimonial homes.

16. In reply to the leave application, respondent has controverted

the averments made by the petitioners.

17. It is contended by learned counsel for the petitioners that it is

well settled law that where eviction is sought on the ground of

bonafide requirement in respect of commercial property, then in that

case requirement cannot be ascertained without proper trial in the

matter because, the word „requires‟ as defined and understood under

section 14 (1) (e) of the Act, involves something more than a „mere

wish‟ and it has to necessarily have in it an element of genuine present

need. The whole emphasis of the requirement is on the element of

genuine need which has to be established.

18. It is further contended that where a tenant discloses on affidavit

relevant facts, grounds and pleas which prima facie, establish a triable

issue or a plausible defence, i.e., a cause which prima facie is not

baseless and unreal, the Court is obliged to grant leave to defend his

case against the eviction sought by the landlord. It is also settled law

that the enquiry envisaged for the said purposes is a summary enquiry

to prima facie find out the existence of reasonable grounds in favour

of the tenant. In the present case, petitioners have raised various issues

which clearly entitle the petitioners to the grant of leave to defend the

eviction petition filed by the respondent. Thus, impugned order is

liable to be quashed on this ground also.

19. Further, it is the admitted case that respondent had let out prime

commercial premises situated at Barakhama Road in 2007 itself. Had

the respondent any bonafide need for establishing an office, as

alleged, or that he was seriously desirous of establishing his

professional carrier, he would not have let out the said premises a few

days before attaining superannuation. Otherwise also, the shop in

question is situated in a commercialized area with poor accessibility

and by no stretch of imagination a person having suitable sufficient

accommodation at prime location and in heart of Delhi would like to

have an office in area like Chandni Chowk for running a professional

office. The market in which the premises in question is situated is a

commercial area, where no offices are being run. There are only shops

and godowns which are being run in the entire market. Further, the

shop in question is situated on ground floor of the market from where

an office of a Lawyer, as proposed by respondent, cannot be run

because the same is situated in a highly congested area where there is

no parking facility, nuisance in the sense of noise, pollution,

congestion and no office for any professional purpose can be run from

at such location for want of ingress and egress.

20. It is further argued that on the first floor admittedly, only 2

shops have been sold to some third parties and ownership in respect of

rest of the shops remains with respondent. On first floor, most of the

shops are lying locked and the alleged tenants therein, if any, are not

in actual need of the same. Had been any need in respect of running of

an office, respondent could have filed a petition for eviction against

the alleged tenants at First Floor, as most of the shops on first floor

are admittedly lying locked. A large portion of area on second floor

where one Mr. Shyam K.Gupta is an alleged tenant, is lying locked

and has not been used for years and considering the congestion and

noise on the ground floor in the area, the same portion on the second

floor or first floor could be more beneficial for running an office.

21. Lastly, the eviction petition as per allegations at best discloses a

desire and it does not disclose the bonafide requirement of the

respondent to actually use the premises. Under these circumstances,

petitioners are entitled to leave to contest since they have raised

triable issue.

22. On the other hand, it is contended by the learned counsel for

respondent that there is no dispute with regard to the relationship of

landlord and tenant between the parties as well as there is no dispute

with regard to the ownership.

23. The respondent having retired from the Government Service

now requires to practice as an Advocate, for which he wants to have a

sufficiently large accommodation to accommodate his huge library of

law books. He needs space for waiting area for clients, space for

conference and consultation rooms. The premises at Upper Bela

Road, Civil Lines, Delhi, is a residential one. As far as premises at

Barakhamba Road, New Delhi are concerned, the same are under the

occupation of a tenant and it fetches a rent of Rs.70,000/- per month

to the respondent. It is the choice of the landlord as to which premises

he requires for his personal use and the tenant has got no right to

dictate as to in which premises the landlord should have his office.

24. Other contention is that, respondent has never asked any of his

tenant, either to increase the rent or vacate the premises and has never

taken any premium or pugree from any person. Petitioners have failed

to point out as to which portion in "Kundan Mansion" are lying vacant

or in possession or control of the respondent. It is not for the tenant to

ask how the landlord should deal with the property and which

property is most suitable for his use.

25. In support of its contentions learned counsel for respondent has

cited a decision of this court, Mukesh Kumar Vs. Rishi Prakash,

2009 (2) RCR 485.

26. There is no dispute about relationship of landlord and tenant

between the parties. As far as letting purpose is concerned, same is

for non residential purpose. In Satyawati Sharma Vs. Union of

India, 2008 (5) SCC 287, Supreme Court has held,

"The premises let out either for residential or commercial purposes can be got vacated by the landlord for bonafide requirement".

27. Present petition has been filed under Section 25B (8) of the Act.

A Full Bench of this Court in Mohan Lal Vs. Ram Chopra and

another, 1982 (2) Rent Control Journal 161 exhaustively considered

the provisions of Section 25B of the Act. On the scope of the proviso

to sub-section (8) of this Section, after examining the judgment of

Supreme Court in Hari Shanker and others. Vs. Rao Girdhari Lal

Chowdhury, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 698 and Bell and Co. Ltd. Vs. Waman

Hemraj, AIR 1938 Bombay (223) it was laid down as follows:-

"In our opinion the jurisdiction of the High Court under proviso to section 25B (8) has to be interpreted, keeping in view the legislative intent. The revision under section 25B (8) cannot be regarded as a first appeal and nor can it be as restricted as the revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC. The High Court would have jurisdiction to interfere if it is of the opinion that there has been a gross illegality or material irregularity which has been committed or the Controller has acted in excess of his jurisdiction or has not exercised the jurisdiction vested in him. A finding of fact arrived at by the Controller would not be interfered with by the High Court unless it

can be shown that finding has been arrived at by misreading or omitting relevant evidence and this has resulted in gross injustice being caused. If none of the aforesaid circumstances exist the High Court would not be entitled to interfere with the order of the Controller in exercise of its jurisdiction under proviso to Section 25B (8) of the Act."

28. Upon examination of above judgment it may safely be held that

this court in exercise of the powers vested by proviso to sub-section

(8) of Section 25B of the Act may reappraise the evidence only for a

limited purpose of ascertaining whether the conclusion arrived at by

the Rent Controller were wholly unreasonable that no reasonable

person acting with objectivity could have reached on the material

available to test the order of the Rent Controller on the touchstone of

whether it is in accordance with law.

29. In Praveen Jain & Ors (Shri.) Vs. Dr. Mrs. Vimla, 2009 IV

AD (Delhi) 653, this court observed;

"The powers of this Court under Section 25B(8) are not appellate powers and this Court has only to see that the Trial Court had acted in accordance with law and not transgressed the limits of its jurisdiction.‟‟

30. In Rajinder Kumar Sharma &Ors. Vs. Leela Wati & Ors., 155

(2008) Delhi Law Times 383 the court observed;

"Section 25B was inserted by the legislature in Delhi Rent Control Act as a special provision for eviction of the tenants in respect of specified category of cases as provided therein. Where a landlord seeks eviction on the basis of bonafide necessity, a summary procedure is provided and tenant has to seek leave to defend disclosing such facts which disentitled the landlord from seeking eviction."

31. In Nem Chand Daga Vs. Inder Mohan Singh Rana,94 (2001)

Delhi Law Times 683; it was held;

"That before leave to defend is granted, the respondent must show that some triable issues which disentitled the applicant from getting the order of eviction against the respondent and at the same time entitled the respondent to leave to defend existed. The onus is prima facie on the respondent and if he fails, the eviction follows.

32. In Frank Anthony Public School Vs. Smt. Amar Kaur, 1984

(6) Delhi Reported Judgment 47, it was held;

"The legislature has devised a ''special procedure for the disposal of the application for eviction on the ground of bonafide requirement". It is modelled on Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure. The object is to reduce delays in litigation. The object is to introduce a "summary trial" in place of full length trial."

33. In Sarwan Dass Bange Vs. Ram Parkash, 2010 IV AD (Delhi)

252, observations made by Supreme Court in Baldev Singh Bajwa Vs.

Monish Saini, (2005) 12 SCC 778 have been quoted as under;

"It was held that the legislative intent is of expeditious disposal of the application for ejectment of tenant filed on the ground of requirement by the landlord of the premises for his own occupation; a special category of landlords requiring the premises for their own use has been created; if there is any breach by the landlord, the tenant is given a right of restoration of possession; the landlord who evicts a tenant on the ground of own requirement is not only prohibited from letting out the premises or disposing of the same but also required to use the same for his own residence only. It was held that these restrictions and conditions inculcate in built strong presumption that the need of the landlord is genuine; the conditions and restrictions imposed on the landlord make it virtually improbable for the landlord to approach the Court for ejectment of tenant unless his need is bona fide - no unscrupulous landlord in all probability, under this Section, would approach the Court for ejectment of the tenant considering the onerous conditions imposed on him. It was further held that this inbuilt protection in the Act for the tenants implies that whenever the landlord would approach the court his requirement shall be presumed to be genuine and bona fide. It was further held that a heavy burden lies on the tenant to prove that the requirement is not genuine. The tenant is required to give all the necessary facts and particulars supported by documentary evidence if available to prove his plea in the affidavit itself so that the Controller will be in a position to adjudicate and decide the question of genuine or bona fide requirement of the landlord; a mere assertion on

the part of the tenant would not be sufficient to rebut the strong presumption in the landlord‟s favour that his requirement of occupation of the premises is real and genuine."

34. Trial court in its impugned order observed;

"Though the site plan filed by the petitioner is alleged to be farcical but, on the other hand respondent has not filed any counter site plan to contradict the correctness of the site plan of petitioner therefore, this plea does not carry any weight in the absence of any contrary material/document placed on record. In the circumstances, site plan filed by the petitioner only is to be believed as true and correct."

35. Trial court further held;

"As per the petitioner, Flat No. 1-E at the DCM Building is already in tenancy of M/s Cottage industries Exposition. Now, even if the contention of Ld. Counsel for respondent be assumed as correct that the petitioner is having rental income of 70,000/- per month from the said property, then also it does not give any advantage to the respondent in these eviction proceedings, because as per law, the respondents have no right to argue over the income earned by the petitioner. Conversely, if the petition is earning a huge amount of Rs.70,000/- from a property, then whey he would prefer to get it evicted from the tenants instead of the premises in dispute of which the monthly rent is admittedly Rs.980/- per month only. Besides, as per the petitioner, said tenant occupies the other properties situated on each side of the said flat of the petitioner, therefore, office of

the petitioner would have been sandwiched making it uncomfortable for the petitioner."

36. Trial court further observed;

"Further, it is submitted that petitioner has not furnished the details of the cases handled by him as an advocate so far after retirement. I find this plea ridiculous as in the eviction petition; the respondents/tenants have no right to ask for the petition‟s/landlord‟s assignments or his professional achievements as per settled law."

37. The Court further held;

"In the present scenario, concept of law firms and team work has emerged due to bifurcation of the courts and specialization in the various legal areas e.g. intellectual property rights, cyber laws, corporate laws and arbitration etc. It requires a large space for different activities to be administered/handled in the separate portions like conference room, personal office, meeting room for arbitral proceedings etc;, staff room or small cabins for staff, rest/waiting room, pantry, toilet- bathroom etc. In these circumstances, I observe that petitioner has baonafide requirements for the use and occupation of the tenanted premises to start his legal profession."

38. Respondent/Landlord, in the eviction petition has categorically

stated that;

"Petitioner was enrolled as an Advocate in 1969 with enrolment no. D-177/69. He practiced as an Advocate with Shri Vishnu Bhagwan Andley

Advocate till he joined Delhi Judicial Service in 1973. He was working as Additional District & Sessions Judge, in-charge Karkardooma court at the time of his superannuation on Feb 29, 2008. Thereafter, the petitioner started his own practice as an advocate. He got his license renewed with the Delhi Bar Council and also became a member of the Delhi High Court Bar Association and his membership No. is 3885 dated 24-3-2008.

Petitioner now requires the premises to set up his professional office. He has not other reasonable suitable accommodation for the purposes of setting up his office. 36 tenants occupy the entire property known as "KUNDAN MANSION". The petitioner sold some portions of the property during the period 2000 to 2004 as he had no need of the premises at that time. Premises in dispute are situated on the ground floor in a busy market and are most suitable for setting up an office. No other tenant on the ground floor in the property at Bhagirath Palace has sufficient or suitable space where the petitioner could set up his professional office."

39. Respondent has further stated that he is residing at 9, Upper

Bela Road, Civil Lines, Delhi of which he is the owner of half

undivided share and this is a purely residential property and he does

not have enough space nor would he like to set up his professional

office at his residence.

40. With regard to no other suitable property, respondent has stated

in the eviction petition that, though he is the owner of Flat No. 1-E, at

First Floor in DCM Building at Barakhamba Road, New Delhi but this

property is under tenancy and it fetches a monthly rent of Rs.70,000/-

and he cannot forego the substantial income being received from this

property.

41. All the above averments made by respondent in the eviction

petition, have nowhere been challenged by the petitioners in their

affidavit filed along with the application for leave to defend.

42. Bare reading of above averments made in the eviction petition

goes on to show that respondent requires the tenanted premises;

(i) For himself so as to set up his professional office;

(ii) He has no other reasonable accommodation for the purpose of setting of his office;

(iii) Thirty six tenants occupy the entire property in which disputed premises are situated;

(iv) The premises in dispute are situated on the ground floor in a busy market and are most suitable for setting up an office and no other tenant on the ground floor in the property at Bhagirath Palace has sufficient or suitable space where the petitioner could set up his professional office;

(v) Respondent is residing at 9, Upper Bela Road, Civil Lines, Delhi, which is a purely residential property and in that property

respondent does not have enough space to set up an office at his residence and

(vi) Lastly, the other accommodation owned by the respondent Barakhamba Road, New Delhi is already under the occupancy of the tenant.

43. Respondent in the eviction petition in clear and unequivocal

terms has mentioned about his requirements. It is not only the "mere

desire" of the respondent to get the premises vacated but he needs the

same for above stated requirements. So, it cannot be said that

respondent does not require the premises for himself for the purpose

of opening an office.

44. The concept of alternate accommodation means that

accommodation which is "reasonable suitable" for the landlord, which

in this case is not, as that particular accommodation is a support of

income to the family of the respondent. As to alternative

accommodation disentitling the landlord to the relief of possession, it

has been held time and again that it must be reasonably equivalent as

regards suitability in respect to the accommodation he was claiming.

The court would permit the landlord to satisfy the proven need by

choosing the accommodation which the landlord feels would be most

suited for the purpose; the court would not in such a case thrust its

own wisdom upon the choice of the landlord by holding that not one

but the other accommodation must be accepted by the landlord to

satisfy his such need. In short, the concept of bonafide need or

genuine requirement needs a practical approach instructed by realities

of life. An approach either too liberal or too conservative or pedantic

must be guarded against. It is to be observed that it would be incorrect

to suggest that the question of accommodation, actually in possession

of the landlord, being 'reasonably suitable' is to be judged solely in the

context of physical sufficiency of the accommodation and that the

Court may hold that accommodation is insufficient having regard to

various circumstances, such as, the social status of the family or

traditions and customs observed by it. As long as the landlord is able

to establish that he in good faith and genuinely wishes to occupy the

premises in possession of the tenant and that good faith or

genuineness is of a reasonable man, it would not be open to the

Controller to weigh the claim of the landlord in a fine scale and that

the viability of the other accommodation will have also to be

considered from the stand-point of a reasonable landlord. It is further

to be observed that the law does not require the landlord to sacrifice

his own comforts and requirements merely on the ground that the

premises is with a tenant and for deciding whether or not the

alternative accommodation available to the landlord is suitable or not,

the social customs, conventions and habits, usage and practices of the

society cannot be completely ruled out and termed as irrelevant. The

problem had to be approached from the point of view of a reasonable

man and not that of a whimsical landlord.

45. In S.N.Kapoor v. Basant Lal Khatri AIR 2002 SC 171, the

Court observed;

"No material has been brought on record and no proof has been made by the tenant by any positive material that it is neither genuine nor bona fide or reasonable but a mere excuse to get rid of the tenant. Though the choice or proclaimed need cannot be whimsical or merely fanciful yet certain amount of discretion has to be allowed in favour of the landlady too and Courts should not also impose its own wisdom forcible upon the landlady to arrange her own affairs, according to their own perception carried away only by the interests or hardship of the tenant and inconvenience that may result to him in passing an order of eviction. In adjudging the claim under Section 14-D what is required to be substantiated is that the landlady is a widow and that she wants the premises for her own residence and that the claim by her is bona fide and not a feigned one. So far as a claim under Section 14 (1)

(e) is concerned, the very requirement has to be shown

not only to be bona fide but the move of the landlord/landlady to seek the eviction of the tenant must be genuine."

46. In Sarla Ahuja Vs. United India Insurance Company Limited;

AIR 1999, SC 100, Apex court observed;

"The crux of the ground envisaged in Clause (e) of Section 14(1) of the Act is that the requirement of the landlord for occupation of the tenanted premises must be bona fide. When a landlord asserts that he requires his building for his own occupation the Rent Controller shall not proceed on the presumption that the requirement is not bona fide. When other conditions of the clause are satisfied and when the landlord shows a prima facie case it is open to the Rent Controller to draw a presumption that the requirement of the landlord in bona fide. It is often said by courts that it is not for the tenant to dictate terms to the landlord as to how else he can adjust himself without getting possession of the tenanted premises. While deciding the question of bona fides of the requirement of the landlord it is quite unnecessary to make an endeavour as to how else the landlord could have adjusted himself."

47. In M/s John Impex (Pvt.) Ltd. Vs. Dr. Surinder Singh & Ors.

135 (2006) Delhi Law Times 265 this Court held;

"The conspectus of the aforesaid judgments shows that the broad principles have been set down of the requirement of a landlord not being a mere whim or fanciful but that it should be a genuine need of the landlord. It is only then that the requirement can be said to be bona fide within the meaning of

under Section 14(1) (e) of the said Act. This would naturally require all the necessary matrix in terms of the factual averments and the evidence to be adduced in that behalf. Simultaneously it has to be kept in mind that the landlord is the best judge of his requirement and a tenant cannot dictate the terms on which the landlord should live. The bona fide requirement of the landlord would also depend on his financial status and his standard of living. The ARC found in favor of the landlord/owner and thus what has to be considered is whether there is any illegality or jurisdictional error in the impugned order and not to sit as an appellate court though the scope of scrutiny in a rent revision would be more than a revision petition under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908."

48. In Ram Babu Aggarwarl Vs. Jay Kishan Das, 2009 (2) RCR

455, Supreme Court observed;

"However, as regards the question of bonafide need, we find that the main ground for rejecting the landlord's petition for eviction was that in the petition the landlord had alleged that he required the premises for his son Giriraj who wanted to do footwear business in the premises in question. The High Court has held that since Giriraj has no experience in the footwear business and was only helping his father in the cloth business, hence there was no bonafide need. We are of the opinion that a person can start a new business even if he has no experience in the new business. That does not mean that his claim for starting the new business must be rejected on the ground that it is a false claim. Many people start new businesses even if they do not have experience in the new business,

and sometimes they are successful in the new business also."

49. In Mukesh Kumar (Supra), this court has observed;

" A landlord, while seeking the eviction of a tenant on the ground of bona fide requirement for himself or his family members dependant upon him, is not expected to disclose the manner in which he is utilizing the accommodation available with him, if the accommodation with the tenant in respect of which he files the eviction petition is required by him for a purpose different from the purpose he is occupying and using the accommodation already available with him. For instance the extent of residential accommodation available with the landlord who seeks the eviction of the tenant from a purely commercial or industrial premises, is wholly irrelevant. Similarly, when in the present case, the requirement of the petitioner was for the purpose of setting up of the professional office of his son on the second floor of property no. 3649, it was not necessary for him to have disclosed in the eviction petition the fact that the ground floor, first floor, third floor and terrace floor portions of property no. 3649 were being utilized by him for the purpose of storing and stocking the goods in which he trades. The failure of the petitioner to disclose in the eviction petition itself, the manner in which the other portions of property no. 3649 were being occupied and used cannot ipso facto lead to the conclusion that the requirement of the landlord is not bona fide or that it raises a triable issue."

50. Thus, petitioners have failed to raise any triable issue in this

case, which if proved might disentitle the respondent from getting an

order of eviction in their favour. The trial court has given a detailed

and reasoned order which does not call for any interference nor the

same suffer from any infirmity or erroneous exercise of jurisdiction.

51. Present petition is hereby dismissed. Parties shall bear their

own costs.

CM No.14898/2010

52. Dismissed.

25th October, 2010                                  V.B.GUPTA, J.
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