Citation : 2010 Latest Caselaw 2768 Del
Judgement Date : 25 May, 2010
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ WP(C) No.623/2009
% Date of Decision: 25.05.2010
Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Ors. .... Petitioners
Through Mr. Anjum Javed, Advocate
Versus
Jag Saran .... Respondent
Through Nemo
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MOOL CHAND GARG
1. Whether reporters of Local papers may be YES
allowed to see the judgment?
2. To be referred to the reporter or not? NO
3. Whether the judgment should be reported NO
in the Digest?
ANIL KUMAR, J.
*
The petitioner, Govt. of NCT of Delhi through Commissioner of
Police and Ors. has challenged the order dated 22nd August, 2007
passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench in OA
2225/2006 titled as HC Jag Saran Vs. Commissioner of Police and Ors.,
whereby the application of the respondent for quashing and setting
aside the order of Disciplinary Authority dated 9th June, 2005 and the
order of the Appellate authority dated 23rd June, 2006, imposing a
penalty of forfeiture of five years of approved service permanently was
allowed and the order of punishment dated 9th June, 2005 and the
Appellate Order dated 23rd June, 2006 were set aside and the
respondent was held to be entitled for all consequential benefits
including regularization of his period of suspension, as per Rules.
The relevant facts to comprehend the controversies between the
parties are that FIR Nos. 1082/1997 and 1083/1997 were filed on 17th
December, 1997 against the respondent, consequently the Disciplinary
Inquiry under Delhi Police (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1980 was
initiated on 15th April, 1999.
Since the allegations in the FIRs filed against the respondent
were the same as the charges made against the respondent, the
disciplinary inquiry was kept in abeyance by order dated 29th October,
1999 till the finalization of the criminal proceedings against the
respondent.
The respondent was acquitted of criminal charges by the order
of the Sessions Court dated 26th April, 2001 and 23rd July, 2001. After
the acquittal of the respondent in the criminal cases, the decision was,
however, taken by the petitioner to re-open the disciplinary inquiry on
the ground that the respondent had been acquitted on account of
prosecution witnesses turning hostile. After the enquiry the respondent
was awarded punishment by order dated 3rd September, 2002 and an
appeal filed by him was also dismissed by order dated 19th February,
2003.
The respondent had challenged the punishment awarded to
him by order dated 3rd September, 2002 and rejection of his appeal by
order dated 19th February, 2003 by filing an original application No.
1296/2003, which was disposed of by order dated 14th January, 2004
quashing the order dated 3rd September, 2002 awarding the penalty
and order dated 19th February, 2003 rejecting his appeal. However, the
petitioners were given liberty to pass a fresh order in accordance with
law and liberty was also given to the petitioner to grant consequential
benefits, if any, if accrued to the respondent.
Pursuant to the order dated 14th January, 2004, a fresh order
dated 9th June, 2005 was passed imposing a punishment of forfeiture of
five years approved service permanently and treating his suspension
period as 'not spent on duty'. The appeal filed against the order dated
9th June, 2005 was also dismissed on 23rd June, 2006, which was
challenged by the petitioner by filing another OA 2225/2006.
Before the Tribunal, it was contended on behalf of the
respondent that from the order dated 31st December, 2001 by the
Sessions Court acquitting him from the criminal charges, it cannot be
inferred that the witnesses had turned hostile on account of
respondent. Referring to Rule 12 of Delhi Police (Punishment and
Appeal) Rules, 1980, it was contended that by order dated 14th
January, 2004 in OA 1296/2003, it was held by the Tribunal that
opening of disciplinary inquiry was in violation of Rule 12 of the Rules
of 1980. Since, the entire disciplinary proceedings were quashed by
order dated 14th January, 2004 in OA 1296/2003, the only recourse left
with the petitioner was to see whether fresh disciplinary inquiry could
be initiated under any of the exceptions contemplated under Rule 12 of
the Rules of 1980.
The plea of the respondents was contested by the petitioner
contending, inter alia, that the acquittal of the respondent in the
criminal cases was not purely on merits and consequently, under
conditions as enumerated in Rule-12, the action could be taken against
the respondent as he had won over the witnesses who had turned
hostile.
After considering the pleas and contentions of the parties, the
Tribunal considered whether by Order dated 14th January, 2004, only
the punishment order was set aside or order dated 31st December, 2001
to re-open the Disciplinary Inquiry under Rule 12(b) was also set aside.
It was noticed by the Tribunal that Rule 12(b) contemplates that if in
the opinion of the Court or by the Dy. Commissioner of Police reaches
the conclusion that the prosecution witnesses have been won over,
action could be taken despite acquittal of the delinquent in criminal
proceedings.
After considering the facts and circumstances, the Tribunal
held that by order dated 14th January, 2004 in OA 1296/2003, even the
order dated 31st December, 2001 by which the disciplinary inquiry was
re-opened, was quashed. The Tribunal also reached the conclusion
about the quashing of order dated 31st December, 2001 on the basis of
detailed appreciation of the order of the Tribunal dated 14th January,
2004. The Tribunal had noticed that by order dated 14th January, 2004
in OA 1296/2003 a clear finding had been given that if prosecution
witnesses turn hostile, it does not mean that the accused/delinquent
can be automatically held responsible for winning over the prosecution
witnesses in terms of Rule 12(b) of Rules of 1980.
The Tribunal thus, came to the conclusion that the respondent
having been acquitted by the Criminal Court, could not be punished
departmentally on the same charge or on a different charge upon the
evidence cited in the criminal cases unless one of the five exceptions
mentioned in Rule 12 is squarely applicable to the case. The Tribunal in
para 24 of the order dated 22nd August, 2007, which is impugned before
us, has categorically held that after re-opening the disciplinary inquiry
in terms of Rule 12 (b) of Rules of 1980 and the Tribunal in the earlier
petition giving a clear finding that the said provision was not applicable
to the facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioner could not turn
around to argue that it was done on some other ground when the only
ground on which the inquiry could be sustained could be under Rule
12(b) of the Rules of 1980. Para-24 of the order of the Tribunal is as
under:-
24. Taking the totality of facts and circumstances of the case into consideration, we come to the inevitable conclusion that the impugned orders of the respondents are misconceived inasmuch as they are founded on misinterpretation of rule 12 (b) of Rules of 1980. The order of this Tribunal in OA No. 1296/2003 (supra) enjoined upon the respondents to proceed strictly within the four corners of Rule 12 of Rules of 1980. The applicant having been acquitted by the Criminal Court cannot be punished departmentally on the same charge or on a different charge upon the evidence cited in the criminal cases unless one of the five exceptions mentioned in Rule 12 ibid. is squarely applicable to the case. It is, therefore, not at issue, as mentioned in the impugned order dated 09.06.2005 (supra), whether the act of the applicant relating to the criminal cases was unbecoming of a police personnel or not. What is important, therefore, is the ground taken by the respondents in terms of the exceptions, mentioned in Rule 12 of Rules of 1980 and relied upon by the respondents, while initiating/continuing with disciplinary enquiry. After reopening the disciplinary enquiry, admittedly in terms of Rule 12 (b) of Rules of 1980 and upon this Tribunal, in OA No. 1296/2003 (supra) giving a clear finding that the said provision was not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case, the respondents cannot now turn around to argue that it was done on some other ground, when the only ground on which the enquiry could be sustained has to be within the four corners of Rule 12 of the Rules of 1980. This conclusion is supported by a conjoint reading of Rules 11, 12 and 17 of the Rules of 1980."
The learned counsel for the petitioner has raised the similar
pleas, which were raised before the Tribunal. The learned counsel for
the petitioner has not disputed that the order of the Tribunal dated 14th
January, 2004, in OA 1296/2003 had become final. By the said order
not only the earlier penalty order was set aside, but order dated 31st
December, 2001, by which the disciplinary inquiry was re-opened, was
also set aside. Thereafter, disciplinary proceedings could be initiated on
some new grounds as contemplated under Rule 12 and not on the basis
of which earlier disciplinary proceedings were initiated.
The learned counsel for the petitioner has not been able to
refute that merely because the prosecution witnesses had turned
hostile, the liability for turning the prosecution witnesses hostile could
be saddled with the respondent in terms of Rule 12(b) of the Rules of
1980.
The learned counsel for the petitioner has also not been able to
show whether the disciplinary proceedings were re-initiated after order
dated 14th January, 2004 on some other new ground. The petitioners
have failed to disclose as to what were the new grounds under which
the disciplinary proceedings could be re-initiated and whether such
grounds are sustainable within Rule 12(b) of the Rules of 1980. The
petitioner, in the facts and circumstances has failed to make out any
case for initiation of disciplinary inquiry against the respondent.
In the circumstances, the petitioners have failed to make out
any ground to interfere with the order of the Tribunal dated 22nd
August, 2007 nor has been able to show any such illegality or
irregularity, which will necessitate any interference by this Court in
exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
Therefore, in the facts and circumstances, the writ petition is
without any merit and it is, therefore, dismissed.
ANIL KUMAR, J.
MAY 25, 2010 MOOL CHAND GARG, J. 'rs'
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