Citation : 2010 Latest Caselaw 2537 Del
Judgement Date : 12 May, 2010
*IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ WP(C)6890/2003
% Date of decision: 12th May, 2010
SH. RAM KISHAN ..... PETITIONER
Through: Mr. S.K. Anand, Advocate
Versus
M/S RENUTROL LIMITED & ANR. ..... RESPONDENTS
Through: Ex parte.
CORAM :-
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW
1. Whether reporters of Local papers may
be allowed to see the judgment? No.
2. To be referred to the reporter or not? No.
3. Whether the judgment should be reported
in the Digest? No.
RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW, J.
1. The petitioner workman impugns the order dated 4th March, 2003 of
the Industrial Tribunal dismissing the complaint of the petitioner against
the respondent employer under Section 33A of the I.D. Act. The petitioner
in the complaint stated that the respondent employer, during the pendency
of industrial dispute No.76/1991 & industrial dispute No.77/1991, with the
following reference:-
"Whether there was a lock out with effect from 15th March, 1991? If so, whether the workman shown in Annexure-A are entitled to wages for the lock out period and if so, what directions are necessary in this respect?"
without holding any enquiry or serving any charge-sheet on the petitioner
workman had dismissed him from employment to victimize him because of
trade union activities. It was further stated that though an application under
Section 33(2)(b) of the Act had been filed by the respondent employer on 3rd
September, 1991 but the same had been withdrawn in or about the year 1996
and as such the respondent/employer had violated the provisions of Section
33 of the Act.
2. The Tribunal found -
A. that while the dismissal of the petitioner was on 15 th March,
1991, the reference order in Industrial Disputes No.76/1991 &
77/1991 was of 10th April, 1991. It was thus held that no case
of violation of Section 33 was made out.
B. that the plea of the respondent employer in Industrial Disputes
No.76-77/1991 was that the same did not constitute an
industrial dispute and the said plea had been accepted and in
those disputes award had been made holding that there were no
industrial dispute. The Tribunal thus held that it having been
held that the dispute on the basis whereof complaint was filed
was not an industrial dispute, Section 33 was not attracted.
C. that the application under Section 33(2)(b) was filed by the
respondent employer because of pendency of another Industrial
Dispute No. 526/1983. However, in that also, an award had
been made on 1st December, 1995 holding the same also to be
not an industrial dispute. It was also noticed that the complaint
of the petitioner under Section 33A was not based on the said
reference.
D. It was thus held that the respondent employer was justified in
withdrawing the application under Section 33(2)(b).
The Tribunal thus held that no case of violation of Section 33 was
made out and accordingly the complaint under Section 33A was not
maintainable.
3. The petitioner has neither pleaded that any of the factual findings
aforesaid of the Tribunal are incorrect nor filed any document to controvert
the same. The argument of the counsel for the petitioner is single point. It
is stated that the complaint under Section 33A of the Act and Industrial
Disputes No.76-77/1991 had been consolidated vide order dated 5th July,
1999 of the Tribunal and copy whereof has been filed as Annexure-H to this
petition. The counsel contends that the Tribunal has not only dismissed the
complaint under Section 33A vide order impugned in this petition but also
made the award on Industrial Disputes No.76-77/1991 for the reason of no
evidence having been led thereon. It is argued that the order is thus bad in
law.
4. It was put to the counsel for the petitioner as to whether the petitioner
has challenged the award of the Tribunal in Industrial Disputes No.76-
77/1991. The counsel states that he has no knowledge in that regard. He
further contends that even in the complaint case under Section 33A of the
Act, subject matter of this petition, the following issues were framed by the
Tribunal:-
"(i) Whether the complaint / petition under Section 33A of the Industrial Dispute Act is maintainable or not (OPM)?
(ii) Whether the dismissal of workman is unjustified, illegal and against the principles of natural justice?
(iii) Relief, if any."
He contends that the Tribunal has in the impugned order only
answered the issue No.(i) and not answered the issued No.(ii) (supra).
5. The Supreme Court in Punjab National Bank Ltd Vs. All India
Punjab National Bank Employees' Federation AIR 1960 SC 160, relied
on by the counsel himself had held that "In an enquiry under Section 33A
the employee would not succeed in obtaining an order of reinstatement
merely by proving contravention of Section 33 by the employer; after such
contravention is proved it would still be open to the employer to justify the
impugned dismissal on merits; that is a part of the dispute which the
tribunal has to consider because the complaint made by the employee is
treated as an industrial dispute and all the relevant aspects of the said
dispute fall to be considered under Section 33A". Even though the said
judgment is now no longer good law in view of pronouncement in Jaipur
Zila Sahakari Bhoomi Vikas Bank Ltd. Vs. Ram Gopal Sharma (2002) 2
SCC 244 but it explains the framing of issue (ii) (supra). In fact, the only
prayer of the petitioner in his complaint under Section 33A was for his
reinstatement with full back wages.
Be that as it may, even as per the judgment (supra), the question of
the Tribunal to go into the validity of action of employer of dismissing the
petitioner was to arise only in the event of contravention of Section 33
being established. In the present case, the Tribunal having found Section
33 to be not attracted, the need to adjudicate issue No.(ii) supra did not
arise.
6. As far as the contention of the counsel for the petitioner of the
proceedings in the Industrial Dispute No. 76-77/1991 and in the complaint
under Section 33A having been consolidated, the counsel for the respondent
controverts the same. A reading of the order dated 5 th July, 1999 also does
not show that there was any such order of consolidation. Moreover, even if
there was consolidation and the same has resulted in any error in the
disposal of the industrial dispute, the same would be a case for challenging
the award in the industrial dispute and will not be a ground for impugning
the order on the complaint under Section 33 A of the Act. I may mention
that the petitioner has not even bothered to place before this Court, the
award on the Industrial Dispute No. 76-77/1991.
7. The petitioner has in the petition also sought to raise a bogey of the
impugned order not recording that Industrial Dispute No. 77/1991 had been
adjudicated by the date of the impugned order. However, the impugned
order records in para 13 thereof that Industrial Dispute No.77/1991 was
given to the order under Section 10(3) of the Authorities; and the same
cannot be termed as a reference and the dispute referred was Industrial
Dispute No.76/1991 only, the terms of reference whereof had been
amended in terms of order of this court in earlier writ petition challenging
the order under Section 10(3) of the Act. The said facts have not been
controverted.
8. Similar complaints under Section 17 B of the I.D. Act were filed by
three other employees also of the respondent and which were also dismissed
vide identical orders dated 4th March, 2003 of the same Industrial Tribunal.
WP(C) No.2166/2004, WP(C) No.8422/2003 & WP(C) No.6214/2003
preferred by the said other three employees of the respondent through the
same advocate as the advocate for the petitioner in the present case have
been dismissed vide order dated 12th March, 2010, 27th April, 2010 & 28th
April, 2010. It has been enquired from the counsel for the petitioner as to
whether there is any difference in the present matter, for this Court not to
pass the same order as in WP(C) No.2166/2004, WP(C) No.8422/2003 &
WP(C) No.6214/2003. The counsel for the petitioner has not been able to
point out any distinguishing feature. Resultantly, the order dismissing
WP(C) No.2166/2004, WP(C) No.8422/2003 & WP(C) No.6214/2003 has
been followed in the present case also.
9. The writ petition is misconceived. The counsel for the petitioner at
this stage states that the petitioner has certain financial claims for his dues,
against the respondent. It is clarified that this order shall not come in the
way of the petitioner instituting any proceedings for any claims against the
respondent and such proceedings shall be decided in accordance with law.
In the circumstances, I refrain myself from imposing any cost on the
petitioner. The petition is dismissed.
RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW (JUDGE) 12th May, 2010 gsr
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