Citation : 2010 Latest Caselaw 1700 Del
Judgement Date : 26 March, 2010
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of Reserve: February 23, 2010
Date of Order: March 26,2010
+ CM(M) 1042/2008
% 26.03.2010
Sunila Wadhawan & Ors. ...Petitioners
Through: Mr. Anil K. Kher, Sr. Advocate with Mr. Rishi Manchanda, Advocates
Versus
Silver Smith India Ltd. ...Respondent
Through: Mr. Girdhar Govind with Ms. Noorun Nahar Firdausi, Advocates
JUSTICE SHIV NARAYAN DHINGRA
1. Whether reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
2. To be referred to the reporter or not? Yes.
3. Whether judgment should be reported in Digest? Yes.
JUDGMENT
1. By way of present petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the
petitioners have assailed an order dated 26th March, 2008 passed by learned ADJ
dismissing an application filed by the petitioners under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC for
passing a decree of possession of the premises in question in favour of the petitioner.
2. Brief facts relevant for the purpose of deciding this petition are that the
petitioner had let out a premises bearing number M-15, Green Park, New Delhi to the
respondent by way of a lease deed dated 25th January, 1999 for a period of two years
with effect from 1st February 1999. The monthly rent reserved was Rs.30,000/-.
3. The petitioner filed a suit for recovery of possession of the premises,
permanent injunction and recovery of mesne profits alleging therein, apart from other
things, that the lease expired on 31st January, 2001 by efflux of time but the premises
in question was not vacated. The defendant (respondent herein) was also served a
legal notice dated 8th December 2003 terminating the month to month tenancy, if the
defendant (respondent) considered himself to be a tenant in the premises on month
CM(M) 1042/2008 Sunila Wadhawan & Ors v. Silver Smith India Ltd. Page 1 Of 5 to month basis. The tenancy was thus terminated by the said notice giving clear 15
days time and the premises was to be vacated and peaceful possession to be handed
over by expiry of 31st December 2003. The plaintiff, in the notice, also made other
averments regarding damages and rent which are not relevant for the purpose of
deciding the present petition. In application under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC, the plaintiff
made prayer for passing of a decree of possession only on the basis of admission of
relationship of landlord-tenant, valid termination of tenancy and admission that rent
of premises was above Rs.3500/- per month. The defendant (respondent) in the
written statement did not deny factum of it being a tenant, however, denied
ownership of the plaintiffs. The other stand taken by defendant was that plaintiffs had
deliberately not disclosed that the notice sent by plaintiffs dated 8 th December 2003
was duly replied by the defendant vide its reply dated 28th December 2003 and it was
stated by the defendant that lease of the suit premises was extended by the landlady
for a further period of five years on expiry of the earlier period of lease. Since the suit
was filed by all co-owners, it was stated that there was no privity of contract between
plaintiffs no.2 to 4 and the defendant. The other averments made by the defendant
were regarding the rate of rent as well as change of rent. In any case, it was not
disputed that the rent was above Rs.3500/-. In view of this written statement where
the relationship of landlord and tenant in respect of the premises was not denied, the
receipt of notice terminating the tenancy was not denied and the fact that the rent
was above Rs.3500/- and the premises was not covered under Delhi Rent Control Act
was clear, the plaintiffs (petitioners herein) prayed to the Court of learned ADJ that a
decree of possession of the premises be passed on the basis of admissions.
4. The application under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC was resisted by the respondent
herein on the ground that there was no clear admission made by defendant of the
averments of the plaintiff and, therefore, no order under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC could
be passed. The learned trial court observed that from the pleadings of the parties, it
was apparent that a plea was taken by defendant of renewal of lease deed for a
further period of five years and this plea was denied by plaintiffs. It was also stated
CM(M) 1042/2008 Sunila Wadhawan & Ors v. Silver Smith India Ltd. Page 2 Of 5 that plaintiff no.1 was the sole Lessor and plaintiffs no.2 to 4 were not proper parties.
The Court also observed that plaintiff had not mentioned about the reply of notice he
received in the plaint. She observed that the suit was filed on 5th March, 2004 and
according to plaintiffs lease deed was executed on 31 st January 2001 but as per
defendant, the lease stood extended up to 31 st March, 2006. Thus, there was no clear
admission and she dismissed the application.
5. While deciding an application under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC seeking passing a
judgment on admissions for possession of premises on termination of lease, the Court
must not ignore and forget the mandatory statutory provisions regarding termination
of tenancy and creation of lease for a specific period and entertain such defence
which law does not permit. Nor the Court should forget the statutory provisions of
Registration Act and Stamps Act and it should consider, if the defence taken by
defendant was tenable in law. A frivolous defence taken by a party, not tenable under
law, cannot be a basis for denying relief to the plaintiff.
6. Section 17(1)(d) of the Registration Act makes it mandatory that where a lease
is for more than 11 months, it is required to be compulsorily registered under
Registration Act and Section 49 of the Registration Act makes it clear that a
document compulsorily required to be registered if not registered, cannot be read in
evidence. The defendant had not taken the stand that there was a registered lease
deed in respect of the property in question for a period of five years. The documents
relied upon by the defendant was a lease agreement on a Rs.10 stamp paper signed
by the parties. This document could not have been looked into by the learned trial
court under any circumstances, except for collateral purpose and the document
should not have been relied upon by the trial court to deny the relief. The
submissions made in the written statement about creation of a tenancy for a period
of five years without a supporting registered deed could not have been looked into by
the trial court to infer that lease stood renewed for five years.
CM(M) 1042/2008 Sunila Wadhawan & Ors v. Silver Smith India Ltd. Page 3 Of 5
7. Even if the trial court had given credence to the fact that the lease had been
renewed for a further period of five years in view of the averments made in the
written statement, this period of five years had also expired long back, before passing
of the impugned order by the trial court and the trial court comfortably closed its
eyes to this fact. Thus, the lease deed, even as per the defendant's version had come
to an end by efflux of time. There is no denial of the fact that the rent was above
Rs.3500/- and the tenancy can be terminated by giving 15 days notice in terms of
Section 111 of the Transfer of Properties Act, in case the lease was month to month
lease. It is settled law that where a lease is created for a fixed period between the
parties by unregistered document, the Court cannot look into the document as a
document of creation of lease for a fixed period of more than one year but will have
to consider the lease as month to month lease. In view of this legal position, there
was no option available with the trial court but to consider that the lease in question
was a month to month lease determinable by 15 days' clear notice. Since the receipt
of notice was not denied by defendant, terminating the tenancy became obvious. The
defence taken by defendant of creation of a fresh lease for a fixed period of five years
could not have been looked into in view of the provisions of Registration Act. The trial
court ought to have come to conclusion that the contractual tenancy created by the
petitioners came to an end and the petitioners were entitled for a decree of
possession. The plea taken by respondent that plaintiffs no.2 to 4 were not privity of
contract could not be a ground for the trial court to refrain itself from passing a
decree of possession in favour of plaintiff no.1 alone in view of the admission made
by defendant that he had privity of contract with plaintiff no.1 alone.
8. This Court and the Supreme Court have time and again emphasized that the
Courts must do meaningful reading of the pleadings and the grain has to be sifted
from chaff. Today in pleadings many irrelevant and unnecessary things are stated
which have no legal basis. The Courts must be able to sift the material part of the
pleadings necessary for disposal of an application. It is not the duty of the Courts to
simply reproduce the pleadings of the two parties in its order, and without analyzing
CM(M) 1042/2008 Sunila Wadhawan & Ors v. Silver Smith India Ltd. Page 4 Of 5 the facts, in last paragraph write that in his/her opinion, no ground in the application
was not made. The trial court in this case had done the same thing. She did give a list
of judgments referred but unfortunately she had not bothered to refer to the relevant
judgments and see their applicability. In such an application, the Court has to look
into only three facts; (i) whether the relationship of landlord and tenant is
admitted; (ii) whether the lease has been terminated by serving a notice or not; and
(iii) and whether the rent was above Rs.3500/- or not. The Court must keep in mind
that Section 116 of Evidence Act creates an estoppel against the tenant from
challenging the ownership of the landlord/landlady. Where the relationship of landlord
and tenant is admitted, the averments challenging ownership of the landlord are not
to be looked into.
9. Keeping in view the above facts and settled legal position, I allow this petition.
The application for the petitioners under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC is hereby allowed and a
decree of possession of premises bearing number M-15, Green Park, New Delhi shall
be passed by the trial court. The trial court shall proceed with the rest of the issues
raised which are pending before it.
March 26, 2010 SHIV NARAYAN DHINGRA J. rd CM(M) 1042/2008 Sunila Wadhawan & Ors v. Silver Smith India Ltd. Page 5 Of 5
Publish Your Article
Campus Ambassador
Media Partner
Campus Buzz
LatestLaws.com presents: Lexidem Offline Internship Program, 2026
LatestLaws.com presents 'Lexidem Online Internship, 2026', Apply Now!