Citation : 2010 Latest Caselaw 677 Del
Judgement Date : 8 February, 2010
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ W.P.(Crl.) No. 861, 884 & 885 of 2009
Date of Order: 8th February 2010
# SOM SUGANDH INDUSTRIES LTD. & ANR. ..... Petitioners
! Through: Mr. Sandeep Bhalla, Adv.
versus
$ UOI & ANR. ..... Respondents
^ Through: Mr. G.S. Kanojia, Adv. for R-1.
Mr. Mukesh Anand, Mr. R.C.
Bhadoria and Mr. Shailesh
Tiwari, Advs. for R-2.
* CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V.K. JAIN
1. Whether the Reporters of local papers
may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes
2. To be referred to the Reporter or not? Yes
3. Whether the judgment should be
reported in the Digest? Yes
: V.K. JAIN, J. (Oral)
1. The petitioners in these petitions under Article 226 of the
Constitution are challenging the order passed by the learned
Metropolitan Magistrate taking cognizance of the complaint filed
by the respondents against them under Section 138 of
Negotiable Instruments Act, on the ground that Delhi Courts do
not have jurisdiction to entertain and try these complaints.
According to the petitioners, they are carrying business in
Kundli, in District Sonepat, Haryana, cheques in question were
issued in Haryana, cheques were drawn at Punjab National
Bank, HSIDC Complex, Kundli (Haryana) and the notice of
demand is alleged to have been sent to the petitioners in
Haryana, though it was not received by them.
2. The respondents have contested the petition and have
claimed that Delhi Court does have jurisdiction in the matter as
Commissionerate, Central Excise falls under the jurisdiction of
Chief Commissioner of Central Excise having office in Delhi and
notice demanding the amount of the cheque was also issued
from Delhi.
3. It is not in dispute that Som Sugandh Industries Ltd., the
company which issued the cheques in question and is the
primary accused in the complaint filed by the respondents, is
having its office works in Village Nathupur, Kundli, District
Sonepat of Haryana. This is not the case of the respondent that
the company also has office, factory or other place of business in
Delhi. There is no allegation to this effect in the complaint filed
by the respondent.
4. According to the petitioners, cheques in question were
issued to Superintendent, Central Excise (Anti Evasion) Rohtak.
This factual assertion has not been disputed by the respondent.
Even otherwise, this fact is evident from the cheques issued by
the company, which have been issued in favour of Pay &
Accounts Officer, Central Excise, Commissionerate, Rohtak.
5. It is also not in dispute that the cheques in question were
drawn on Punjab National Bank, HSIDC Complex, Kundli,
Sonepat (Haryana). This is also evident from a perusal of the
cheques, copies of which have been filed with the petitions, and
has otherwise not been disputed by the respondents.
6. A perusal of the notices sent by the respondents to the
petitioners, copy of which is annexed to the petition and has not
been disputed by the respondents, would show that the notice to
all the accused persons was sent at the address of Village
Nathupur, Kundli, Sonepat (Haryana).
7. The issue involved in these petitions came up for
consideration before the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in a recent
decision - „Harman Electronics Private Limited and Anr. v.
National Panasonic India Private Limited', (2009) 1 SCC
720. In that case, the appellant was carrying business at
Chandigarh. The complainant had its head office at Delhi and a
branch office at Chandigarh. The cheque in question was
issued, presented and dishonoured at Chandigarh. The
respondent/complainant issued notice to the appellant from
Delhi. The notice was served upon the appellant at Chandigarh.
On failure of the appellant to pay the amount of the cheque, a
complaint was filed at Delhi. An application filed by the
appellant questioning jurisdiction of the court at New Delhi was
dismissed on the ground that since the notice was sent by the
complainant from Delhi, the appellant had failed to make
payment at Delhi and the respondent was carrying out business
at Delhi, the Delhi court had jurisdiction to entertain the
complaint.
8. As regard, issue of notice from Delhi, Hon‟ble Supreme
Court held that issuance of notice would not by itself give rise to
a cause of action but communication of notice would give. The
Hon‟ble Court was of the view that for constituting offence u/s
138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, the notice must be received
by the accused, though it may be deemed to have been received
in certain situations. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court also referred
to its own decision in „Mosaraf Hossain Khan v.
Bhagheeratha Engg. Ltd.' (2006) 3 SCC 658. In that case
respondent No.1 issued certain cheques to the appellant from
Ernakulam, which were deposited by him with Suri Branch of
the Bank. The respondent was also having an office at
Ernakulam. On return of the cheques, demand notice was sent
by the appellant to the respondents. On non-payment, criminal
complaint was filed by the appellant in the court of the Chief
Judicial Magistrate, Bir Bhum at Suri. It was observed that
sending of cheques from the Ernakulam or the respondent
having an offence at that place did not form an integral part of
the cause of action for which a complaint petition was filed by
the appellant and cognizance of the offence u/s 138 of
Negotiable Instruments Act was taken by the Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Suri. It was noted that while issuance of notice by
the holder of Negotiable Instrument is necessary, service thereof
is also imperative and only after service of such notice and
failure on the part of the accused to pay the demanded amount,
within a period of 15 days thereafter, the commission of an
offence completes and, therefore, giving of notice cannot have
precedence over the service. The Hon‟ble Court declined to
apply the civil law Principle that the debtor must seek the
creditor, to a criminal case. Holding that jurisdiction in a
criminal case is governed by the provisions of Criminal
Procedure Code and not on common law principle, it was held
that Delhi Court had no jurisdiction to try the case.
9. The following observations made by the Hon‟ble Supreme
Court in this case are pertinent:
"A distinction must also be borne in mind between the ingredient of an offence and commission of a part of the offence. While issuance of a notice by the holder of a negotiable instrument is necessary, service thereof is also imperative. Only on a service of such notice and failure on the part of the accused to pay the demanded amount within a period of 15 days thereafter, the commission of an offence completes."
10. In view of the above referred authoritative
pronouncements of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of
Harman Electronics (supra) jurisdiction of Delhi Courts cannot
be claimed on the ground that notice of demand was dispatched
by the complainant from Delhi. The learned counsel for the
petitioner has relied upon the decision of the Hon‟ble Supreme
Court in „Shamshad Begum v. B. Mohammed.‟ AIR 2009 SC
1355. In that case, the respondent filed a complaint against the
appellant at Mangalore under Section 138 of Negotiable
Instruments Act. Before filing complaint, the respondent had
issued a notice to the appellant from Mangalore and a reply was
sent by her to the complainant at his Mangalore address. The
appellant filed a petition in Karnataka High Court under Section
482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, seeking quashing of the
complaint on the ground that since the agreement between the
parties was entered into at Bangalore and the cheques were
returned from the banks at Bangalore, only Bangalore court had
jurisdiction to try the case. The High Court having dismissed
the petition, the appellant came to the Supreme Court by
obtaining Special Leave. Relying upon its earlier decision in K.
Bhaskaran's case (supra) and referring to the five components
enumerated in that decision, it was held that it is not necessary
that all the five acts should have been perpetrated in the same
locality and it was possible that each of these acts could have
been done at five different localities though in-concatenation of
all the above five is a sine qua non for completion of the offence
u/s 138 of the Act. The appeal was, dismissed, thereby
upholding the decision of the High Court. This judgment was
considered by me in Crl.M.C. 1580/2009 titled „K.O. ISSAC &
Anr. vs. State & Anr.‟ decided on 21st October 2010 alongwith
other judgment on the subject including the later decision of the
Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of Harman Electronics
(supra) and I took the view that mere sending of notice from
Delhi to the accused, who is outside the jurisdiction of Delhi
Court, does not confer jurisdiction of Delhi Court to entertain
and try a complaint under Section 138 of Negotiable
Instruments Act.
11. Proviso (b) to Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act
requires payee of the cheque or its holder in due course, as the
case may be, to make a demand of the amount of the cheque by
giving a written notice to the drawer of the cheque. The
question which arises for consideration is as to whether the
demand is made at the place where the drawer of the cheque
resides or works for gain or it is made at the place from where
the notice of demand is dispatched to the drawer of the cheque.
Since the requirement of the proviso will not be fulfilled without
service of notice upon the drawer and considering the decision
of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of Harman
Electronics (supra) holding therein that civil law principle that
the debtor must seek the creditor does not apply to a criminal
case, the demand shall be deemed to have been made at the
place where the notice is served upon the drawer and not at the
place from where it is dispatched to him. In fact in view of the
decision in the case of Harman Electronics (supra), the notice
shall be deemed to have been given at the place where it is
served upon the addressee and not at the place from where it
was dispatched.
12. In the present case, the respondents have not claimed
before me that cheques issued by the accused petitioner
company were deposited by them in Delhi. But, even if that be
the case, that also would not give jurisdiction to Delhi Court to
try these complaints.
13. In 'Shri Ishar Alloy Steels Ltd. v. Jayaswals Neco Ltd,‟
(2001) 3 SCC 609, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court inter-alia, held
that "The bank" referred to in clause (a) to the proviso of Section
138 of the Act would mean the drawee bank on which the
cheque is drawn and not all the banks where the cheque is
presented for collection including the bank of the payee, in
whose favour the cheque is issued."
It was further observed that "the payee of the cheque has
the option to present the cheque in any bank including the
collecting bank where he has his account but to attract the
criminal liability of the drawer of the cheque such collecting
bank is obliged to present the cheque in the drawee or Payee
bank on which the cheque is drawn within the period of six
months from the date on which it is shown to have been issued."
In para 10 of the judgment the Hon‟ble Supreme Court
further observed that "Sections 3, 72 and 138 of the Act would
leave no doubt in our mind that the law mandates the cheque to
be presented at the bank on which it is drawn if the drawer is to
be held criminally liable."
14. The ratio of the above referred judgment of the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court is that a cheque is deemed to have been
presented to the banker of the drawer irrespective of the fact
whether it is deposited by the payee in his own bank. The
banker of the payee, after receiving the cheque from him, is
required to present it to the banker of the drawer and therefore
if the cheque issued from a bank outside Delhi is deposited in
Delhi, the bank in which it is deposited in Delhi, is required to
present it to the bank outside Delhi, for the purpose of
encashment.
15. For the reasons given in the preceding paragraphs, all the
three complaints, subject matter of these petitions, are liable to
be returned to the complainant, for filing them before a
competent court of jurisdiction. The learned counsel for the
respondents states that in case the complaints are directed to be
returned, they would present the same before Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Sonepat. Hence, the trial court is directed to return
the complaints, subject matter of these petitions, to the
complainant in order to enable it to institute them before Chief
Judicial Magistrate, Sonepat.
The parties are directed to appear before Chief Judicial
Magistrate at 10 AM on 22nd February 2010. If, there are other
accused appearing before the learned Metropolitan Magistrate,
he shall direct them as well to appear before Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Sonepat on the aforesaid date and time.
One copy of this order be sent to trial court, within three
days, for information and compliance.
V.K. JAIN (JUDGE) FEBRUARY 08, 2010 Ag
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