Citation : 2010 Latest Caselaw 563 Del
Judgement Date : 2 February, 2010
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Date of Decision : 02nd February, 2010
+ CRL.A. 339/2008
ASHOK KUMAR & ANR. ..... Appellants
Through: Mr.Vijay Babbar, Advocate
versus
STATE OF NCT OF DELHI ..... Respondent
Through: Mr.M.N.Dudeja, Advocate
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRADEEP NANDRAJOG
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURESH KAIT
1. Whether the Reporters of local papers may be allowed
to see the judgment?
2. To be referred to Reporter or not? Yes
3. Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest?Yes
PRADEEP NANDRAJOG, J. (Oral)
1. Six accused; the husband, the mother-in-law, the
elder brother of the husband, the wife of the elder brother of
the husband and the two sisters of the husband of the
deceased, Bharti were charged for the offence punishable
under Section 498-A/34 IPC. Four of them, the husband, the
mother-in-law, the elder brother of the husband and the wife of
the elder brother of the husband of the deceased were also
charged for the offence punishable under Section 302/34 IPC
pertaining to the death of Bharti, who admittedly suffered burn
injuries in her matrimonial house at around 3:00 P.M. on
28.04.2002. As a result of the burn injuries she died on
05.05.2002.
2. Disbelieving the testimony of Krishan Lal PW-6,
Shanti Devi PW-13 and Sunil Kumar PW-15, father, mother and
brother of Bharti pertaining to dowry demands and cruelty
towards the deceased by the family members save and except
the appellants as also disbelieving the testimony of Krishan Lal
pertaining to the alleged dying declaration made by the
deceased to him and accepting the statement Ex.PW-1/A of
Bharti as made to Sh.V.Valte, SDM of the area (PW-14) on
29.04.2002, all the accused, save and except accused Ashok
Kumar the husband of the deceased and Kaushalya Devi, the
mother-in-law of the deceased have been acquitted. Ashok
Kumar and Kaushalya Devi have been convicted for the
offences punishable under Sections 302/498-A/34 IPC, vide
judgment and order dated 25.03.2008 and vide order on
sentence dated 28.03.2008, for the offence of murder, they
have been sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life. For
the offence punishable under Section 498-A IPC, the two have
been sentenced to undergo imprisonment for a period of two
years.
3. Arguing the appeal today, learned counsel for the
appellants Sh.Vijay Babbar Advocate has restricted
submissions to the appellants being convicted for the offence
of murder, stating that he does not challenge their conviction
for the offence punishable under Section 498-A IPC inasmuch
as the two have already undergone the imprisonment for a
period much in excess of two years.
4. Briefly noted, the prosecution attempted to prove
the dying declaration made by the deceased with reference to
the testimony of Krishan Lal, father of the deceased who
claimed that when his daughter regained consciousness on
29.04.2002, she had disclosed to him that the appellants as
also Anita, sister-in-law of the deceased, her brother-in-law
Shyam Lal and Shyam Lal's wife Gayatri Devi had participated
in the commission of the crime i.e. had set her on fire. In
direct conflict with the testimony of Krishan Lal was the
statement Ex.PW-1/A of the deceased made to Sh.V.Valte, the
SDM of the area who appeared as PW-14. In the said
statement, circumstances and cause of her death as disclosed
by Bharti are as under:-
"Q. What is your name?
A. My name is Bharti Rani.
Q. Are you married?
A. Yes, I got married to Ashok Sharma about
1½ years ago. I got one child, a girl about
three months old.
Q. Are you happy after marriage?
A. No, soon after marriage I was harassed by
my husband and mother-in-law. I was
often beaten and kept in the verandah
outside the house. They kept demanding
for more dowry. Pappu (Jeth), Gayatri
(Jethani), Usha and Anita (both nanads)
influenced my mother-in-law and husband to demand dowry.
Q. How did you get burnt?
A. Yesterday, at about 3.00 P.M., my mother-
in-law poured k. oil over my body near the kitchen and my husband burnt me with matches. Someone informed the police, who took me to the hospital."
5. The defence relied upon the MLC Ex.PW-18/A of the
deceased which contained an endorsement by the doctor that
the history of burn injuries sustained by Anita were as a result
of explosion of LPG gas stove. Noting that the husband of the
deceased was present by her side and had brought her to the
hospital, the learned trial Judge has disbelieved the
endorsement on the MLC Ex.PW-18/A of the deceased giving
an additional reason; that at the spot no damaged or exploded
LPG gas stove was found.
6. The purported dying declaration sought to be
proved through the testimony of the father of the deceased
has been disbelieved by the learned Trial Judge noting that as
told to the police by Krishan Lal, his daughter has only told him
that her mother-in-law had poured kerosene oil on her and her
husband had set her on fire, but while deposing in court he
stated that his daughter told him that her husband had caught
her. Accused Usha and Anita were present. Her mother-in-law
sprinkled kerosene oil on her and when she tried to run away,
her husband closed the door of the room and that her husband
set her on fire.
7. In view of the improvements made by Krishan Lal
while deposing in court and ascribing role to persons whom he
has not named when his statement was recorded by the
police, the learned Trial Judge has disbelieved the testimony of
Krishan Lal.
8. With respect to the dying declaration Ex.PW-1/A
which was proved through the testimony of scribe of the
statement; namely Sh.V.Valte PW-14, SDM of the area, the
learned Trial Judge has held that the same inspires confidence
and is sufficient to nail the guilt of the husband and the
mother-in-law of the deceased.
9. The veracity of the dying declaration Ex.PW-1/A was
questioned before the learned trial Judge with reference to the
site plan Ex.PW-10/A.
10. The learned trial Judge has discussed the argument
of the defence with reference to the dying declaration and the
site plan which is as under:-
"Learned Defence counsel has argued that the dying declaration recorded by SDM is perse contradictory in regard to the place of incident. It has been submitted that as per the dying declaration Ex.PW-1/A the spot of incident is near the kitchen, whereas the injured was found on the first floor. Prosecution has placed on record the site plan prepared by the IO as well as the site plan prepared by PW-10 Tirath Singh. Both the site plan indicate that the kitchen is on ground floor, whereas the injured was found on the first floor in the burnt condition. The site plan Ex.PW-2/A has added to the confusion. Note No.1 on site plan Ex.PW-10/A has shown the place of occurrence on first floor. In support of its contention Ld. Counsel for the accused has cited Shaikkh Bakshu & Ors. Vs. State of Maharastra VI (2007) SLT 373. In this case there were two dying declaration and there was contradiction in respect of the alleged place of occurrence. According to the deceased the occurrence took place in the bed room however, as per pachnama no burn marks were found in the bed room. Rather the burn marks were found in the kitchen. In this case the Apex Court rejected the dying declaration on the ground that it was not reliable.
I have gone through the judgment. With entire humility at my command I consider that the abovesaid case can be respectfully distinguished on the facts and circumstances of the present case. In this case there were two dying declarations recorded in the span of around one hour. The first dying declaration was allegedly recorded at around 6 PM, whereas the information was received at around 6.30 P.M. There were other glaring contradictions also which surfaced in the
prosecution case. In the present case, the deceased only stated in her dying declaration that Smt.Kaushalya Devi poured kerosene oil over her body near the kitchen. Thereafter, the deceased continued to say that her husband burnt her with matches. If this sentence is read as a whole, it does not indicate that the victim was burnt near the kitchen. The photographs proved on record undoubtedly indicates that the burn marks were also found on the first floor. In this regard we have also to understand the topography of the house. The perusal of site plan Ex.PW-10/A indicates that the staircase is just near the kitchen and it opens near the room at first floor. There is a possibility that after the kerosene oil was poured on victim she might have run to save her life on the first floor and then on the first floor she was burnt. Unfortunately, the victim is not before us and only she could have actually told that what had happened at that time. In absence of any direct evidence, the court has to look for the prevailing circumstances. In the present case if we go through the testimony of prosecution witnesses there is nothing to suggest that the deceased was tutored in any manner. The credibility of the dying declaration can also be ascertained from the fact that deceased did not name other relatives of her husband regarding whom she made the allegations of instigating her husband and mother-in-law for the demand of dowry. Had there been any possibility of tutoring, nothing would have stopped the deceased to take the name of other relatives of the husband..."
11. Learned counsel for the appellants and the State
have debated on the issue with reference to the dying
declaration Ex.PW-1/A and the site plan Ex.PW-10/A.
12. Whereas, learned counsel for the appellants has
urged that if there was a possibility as opined by the learned
trial Judge (possibility as noted in the underlined portion
extracted from the impugned decision hereinabove) that
kerosene oil was poured upon the deceased when she was just
near the kitchen on the ground floor and she ran up to the first
floor and entered the bed room of her house when she was set
on fire in the said room, there was also an equal possibility
that whatever happened was in the room on the first floor and
if that be so, the narration of the incident by the deceased as
recorded in Ex.PW-1/A would be incorrect.
13. Counsel urges that it is settled law that if any
blemish is found in a dying declaration, then the principle of
law that a dying declaration does not require any
corroboration is not applicable.
14. With reference to the dying declaration of Bharti, it
is to be noted that she has narrated the circumstances of her
death in extremely brief language. She has simply stated that
at about 3.00 P.M. her mother-in-law poured kerosene oil over
her body near the kitchen and her husband burnt her with a
matches.
15. Bharti does not say that after she was set on fire
she ran up the stairs up to her bed room. Bharti does not say
that after kerosene oil was poured on her she ran upstairs up
to her bed room and that she was set on fire in the said room.
16. At this stage, we may straightaway note the site
plan to scale Ex.PW-10/A. The site plan shows that the
matrimonial house of the deceased has ground floor and a first
floor. The kitchen is on the ground floor. Towards the eastern
wall of the kitchen is the staircase leading up to the first floor.
Towards further east is the toilet. The door of the kitchen
opens onto the compound abuting the kitchen in the northern
side. The room on the first floor is adjoining the landing of the
staircase on the first floor and is just above the kitchen on the
ground floor. Five spots have been marked in the site plan.
The same are as under:-
"No.1 Shows the place of occurrence and one half burnt match-stick was recovered by the police.
No.2 Shows the place from where Kurta was recovered.
No.3 Shows the place from where Salwar was recovered.
No.4 Shows the place where kerosene was sprinkled by the accused Ashok Kumar on Bharti Rani.
No.5 Shows the place from where lamp was recovered."
17. It would be important to highlight that a burnt
match stick has been shown recovered from the spot No.1
which is the space between the landing and the door of the
room on the first floor. The burnt Kurta and Salwar of the
deceased have been shown recovered from the spot No.2 and
3, which spots are in the room on the first floor of the house.
Spot No.5 is the slab of the kitchen wherefrom the lamp was
recovered. Spot No.4 is on the compound just at the door of
the kitchen and is the stated place where kerosene is sprinkled
upon the deceased.
18. With respect to spot No.4 it assumes importance to
note that nothing incriminating has been lifted from the said
spot. It is apparent that spot No.4 has been shown by the
Investigating Officer on his own assumption, for the reason
nobody pointed out the said spot as the one where kerosene
oil was statedly sprinkled on the deceased. It is obvious that
since the deceased stated that her mother-in-law poured
kerosene oil on her near the kitchen the learned Investigation
Officer has opted to show the said spot at serial No.4.
19. From the fact that a burnt match-stick was
recovered from the spot No.1 which is just outside the door of
the room on the first floor, a reasonable presumption would be
that the deceased was engulfed in flames not on the ground
floor but on the first floor moreso for the reason no burnt
pieces of cloth or ash have been recovered on the staircase or
outside the kitchen from spot No.4 till the staircase. Had the
deceased was set on fire outside the kitchen one would have
found either ash or burnt pieces of cloth anywhere between
spot No.4 and spot No.1.
20. The deficiency in a complete narration of what
happened at the spot in the dying declaration of the deceased
has resulted in the receiver of the facts speculating as to what
could have happened. The learned trial judge has speculated
in the following words: "There is a possibility that after the
kerosene oil was poured on victim she might have run to save
her life on the first floor and then on the first floor she was
burnt".
21. It is settled law that the moment, in a criminal trial,
to resolve issues, a Court has to speculate, the benefit of
reasoning has to be in favour of the accused as long as a
reasonable reasoning flows out of what can be speculated
upon. We may clarify that it is not within the province of a
court to speculate or enter into surmises, but if while
reasoning on an issue, it becomes necessary to infer the
existence of a fact which presumably may exist, rival view
points of a fact which may be presumed have to be kept in
mind and a fact which may be presumed in favour of the
accused has to be preferred.
22. The site plan Ex.PW-10/A is clearly indicative of the
fact that Bharti suffered burns somewhere on the first floor
and the said spot could be either inside the room where spots
2 and 3 are shown or it could be at spot No.1 on the first floor.
23. The MLC of the deceased shows that her husband
i.e. Ashok had accompanied her to the hospital.
24. The MLC Ex.PW-16/A of Ashok prepared at the same
hospital shows the following burn injuries on his hand:-
(i) Charred RT. hand distal 1/4th of palmer aspect and
palmer side of four fingers excluding thumb. Distal
¾ of dorsum of hand and almost whole of dorsal
side of medial four fingers.
(ii) Multiple blisters of 2 x 3 cm on the dorsum and
palmar side.
25. It is apparent that Ashok has attempted to stamp
out the fire on his wife. The burn injuries on his right hand are
not superficial. There is charring on the right hand and
multiple blisters thereon.
26. The learned Trial Judge has wished away the said
evidence by recording: "Merely because the accused Ashok
suffered burn injuries on his hand entire story of the
prosecution cannot be thrown out. It cannot be ruled out that a
person after setting on fire would certainly try to do something
to show that he rather tried to save his wife."
27. We may note that when they were examined under
Section 313 Cr.P.C. the appellants stated that the deceased
set herself on fire.
28. The learned Trial Judge, before whom the decision
reported as Shaikkah Bakshu & Ors. vs. State of Maharashtra
VI (2007) SLT 373, (the equivalent citation being 2007 (11)
SCC 269) has observed that the ratio of the said decision was
not applicable as it could be distinguished on account of the
reason that in said case two dying declarations were recorded
within a span of around 1 hour and the Court found material
differences in the two.
29. Having perused the decision in Shaikkah Bakshu's
case (supra), we note that 3 reasons have been given by the
Supreme Court to disbelieve the dying declaration of deceased
Rubina (the victim in the said case). Firstly, the possibility of
Rubina being tutored. The second of material discrepancies in
the two dying declarations made by her within a span of one
hour. Lastly; to quote: "According to the deceased, the
occurrence took place in the bedroom. It is to be noted that
no mark of burn injury was noted in the bedroom, and they
were noticed in the kitchen. The High Court noted, even if the
spot of occurrence has not been correctly stated by the
deceased the same is of no consequence. That certainly has
effect on the credibility of dying declaration, contrary to what
the High Court observed."
30. Though a site plan is not treated as a substantive
evidence, but the evidentiary value thereof cannot be slighted,
for the reason a site plan throws light on the scene of the
crime and sometimes assumes importance as in the instant
case.
31. There is a indeed a handicap with reference to the
cursory dying declaration made by the deceased when she
does not disclose the exact place where she was burnt. She
does not state that she ran up the stairs. Her only statement
that kerosene oil was thrown on her near the kitchen, seen in
light of the site plan, creates considerable confusion as to what
exactly happened at the spot.
32. The conduct of Ashok Kumar of attempting to douse
the fire on his wife and removing her to the hospital has to be
factored in the decision.
33. That Ashok was present in the company of his wife
has not only been admitted by him but is proved
independently when we look at the MLC of the deceased which
shows that Ashok removed his wife to the hospital as also
when we look to the MLC of Ashok which shows his right hand
charred and full of blisters.
34. The learned Trial Judge has discussed the
evidentiary value of Ashok's MLC Ex.PW-16/A by stating that it
could not be ruled out that a person, after setting on fire
another person would try and do something.
35. Let us take the reasoning of the learned Trial Judge
to its logical conclusion. It means that Ashok, after setting fire
to his wife suddenly realized the negative moral worth of his
act and the good in him surfaced or he simply created a drama
to try and save his wife. Yes, this could be a probability. But,
it is equally possible that on seeing his wife on fire, Ashok
proceeded to save his wife. It is in this context it assumes
importance to note that the burn injuries on the right hand of
Ashok are not superficial burn injuries. His right hand has got
charring and blisters. This suggest his earnestness in rescuing
his wife and not an act of simple drama.
36. Yet again, at the second stage, while writing the
judgment we have found ourselves in an area where two
possibilities are emerging.
37. We see no escape from the situation that the
inchoate and brief facts in the dying declaration Ex.PW-1/A
compel us to hold that a benefit of doubt needs to be granted
to the appellants.
38. Before concluding we may note that where there is
evidence of a motive to falsely implicate innocent persons in a
dying declaration, the rule of prudence requires the Court to
look for some corroboration to the dying declaration.
39. The motive for the deceased to inculpate innocent
persons has emerged in this case. In that, we find that in her
dying declaration, though not relatable to the incident and
relatable to the past, the deceased has not only inculpated her
husband, her mother-in-law; the only two persons with whom
she used to reside in her matrimonial house, but even the
elder brother of her husband and the wife of the elder brother
who lived in a different house as also the two married sisters
of her husband. It assumes significance that the father of the
deceased, while trying to prove a dying declaration made to
him by his daughter, inculpated the brother-in-law and two
sisters-in-law of the deceased, who were not even present in
the house when the crime was committed.
40. The appeal is allowed insofar as the appellants have
been convicted for the offence punishable under Section
302/34 IPC. The appellants are acquitted of the charge of
having murdered Bharti.
41. Maintaining the conviction and sentence of the
appellants for the offence punishable under Section 498-A/34
IPC, we dispose of the appeal setting aside the impugned
judgment and order dated 25.3.2008 convicting the appellants
for the offence of murder. We set aside the sentence of
imprisonment for life for the said offence.
42. At this stage, learned counsel for the appellants
informs that the mother-in-law of the deceased namely
Kaushalya has died. Thus, we bring the curtains down by
recording that the appeal insofar as the conviction of appellant
No.2 is concerned stands abated.
43. Appellant Ashok Kumar is acquitted of the charge of
murder. Since the appellant Ashok Kumar is still in jail we
direct that the present decision be sent to Superintendent,
Central Jail, Tihar with a direction that Ashok Kumar shall be
released if not required in any other case for the reason Ashok
Kumar has undergone a sentence much in excess of 2 years
i.e. the sentence which he has to serve for his being convicted
for the offence punishable under Section 498-A/34 IPC.
44. The bail bond and surety bond furnished by
appellant No.2 Kaushalya Devi are discharged.
PRADEEP NANDRAJOG, J
SURESH KAIT, J FEBRUARY 02, 2010 'nks/dk'
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