Citation : 2010 Latest Caselaw 2002 Del
Judgement Date : 19 April, 2010
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ RC.REV.No.60/2006
Reserved on : 18.3.2010
Pronounced on : 19.4.2010
IN THE MATTER OF :
SHRI RAMBIR SINGH ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. S.C. Singhal with
Mr. S.R. Sharma, Advs.
Versus
SMT. BALWANT KAUR CHOUDHARY & ANR. .....Respondents
Through: Nemo.
CORAM
* HON'BLE MS.JUSTICE HIMA KOHLI
1. Whether Reporters of Local papers may
be allowed to see the Judgment? Yes
2. To be referred to the Reporter or not? Yes
3. Whether the judgment should be
reported in the Digest? Yes
HIMA KOHLI, J.
1. Challenge has been laid in the present petition to an order
dated 19.7.2006 passed by the learned Additional Rent Controller
dismissing an application filed by the petitioner/tenant praying inter
alia for issuance of fresh summons to him under the Third Schedule of
the Delhi Rent Control Act (in short 'the Act') ; or in the alternate, for
grant of 15 days time to file a leave to defend application to be
reckoned from 13.7.2006 ; or permit the written statement filed by
him to be taken as the grounds for leave to defend the eviction
petition filed by the respondents/landladies under Section 14D of the
Act. By the same order, after holding that the petitioner/tenant had
failed to seek leave to defend the eviction petition within the
prescribed period of limitation upon receipt of summons under the
Third Schedule, the statement made by the respondents/landladies in
the eviction petition was deemed to be admitted and an eviction order
was passed in respect of the tenanted premises bearing House
No.31/7, Ramesh Nagar, New Delhi.
2. Before examining the submissions made by the learned
counsel for the petitioner/tenant, it is worth mentioning that though
the present petition has remained on the regular board since
7.12.2009, none has been appearing for the respondents/landladies.
This is despite the fact that on the basis of an application for early
hearing filed by the respondents/landladies on the ground that both of
them are widows and additionally, the respondent No.1 is a senior
citizen, which was allowed vide order dated 15.1.2009, hearing of the
present case was expedited and on 17.02.2009, it was directed that
the matter be listed for final hearing, subject to overnight part-heard.
3. The sequence of events relevant for deciding the present
case are that upon receiving the eviction petition filed by the
respondents/landladies under Section 14D of the Act, the same was
registered by the learned Additional Rent Controller on 01.03.2006 and
summons were issued to the petitioner/tenant by ordinary process
returnable on 18.5.2006. As a result, summons for settlement of
issues under Order V Rules 1 & 5 of CPC, dated 9.3.2006, were issued
to the petitioner/tenant calling upon him to appear in court on
18.5.2006. The said summons were received by the petitioner/tenant
on 17.3.2006. On 5.5.2006, the petitioner/ tenant filed his written
statement accompanied by an application under Section 148 CPC
praying inter alia for enlargement of time and for condonation of delay
of 19 days in filing the written statement.
4. A perusal of the trial court record shows that an
endorsement dated 5.5.2006 was made on the margin of the aforesaid
application to the effect that the same may be put up with the file on
the date fixed. On 18.5.2006, an application was filed by the
respondent No.1/landlady under Sections 25B(2) & 25B(3) of the Act
read with Section 151 CPC stating inter alia that a perusal of the
application filed by the petitioner/tenant under Section 148 of the CPC
revealed that the summons of the eviction petition filed under Section
14D of the Act had not been issued by the court staff in the prescribed
format of the Third Schedule of the Act, which is mandatory. It was
further prayed that the period of filing the leave to defend application
may be computed from the date of expiry of 30 days as mentioned in
the summons served upon the petitioner/tenant, or the said period be
computed from the date when the petitioner/tenant put in appearance,
i.e., 5.5.2006 or 18.5.2006 ; or in the alternate, fresh summons be
issued in the prescribed format of the Third Schedule of the Act.
5. As the Presiding Officer was on leave on 18.5.2006, the
Ahlmad of the court endorsed a note on the margin of the aforesaid
application filed by respondent No.1/landlady that the same be put up
with the file on 22.5.2006 at 2.00 PM. Pertinently, a copy of the said
application was not served upon the petitioner/tenant or his counsel.
On 22.5.2006, the aforesaid application filed by the respondent
No.1/landlady was taken up by the Additional Rent Controller in the
absence of the petitioner/tenant and his counsel. After recording the
statement of the counsel for the respondents/landladies to the effect
that ordinary summons had been issued to the petitioner/tenant
instead of summons under the Third Schedule of the Act, fresh
summons were directed to be issued under the Third Schedule of the
Act, returnable on 13.7.2006.
6. In terms of the aforesaid order, fresh summons were issued
under the Third Schedule of the Act on 23.5.2006, which were duly
received on behalf of the petitioner/tenant on 27.5.2006. On
13.7.2006, the petitioner/tenant filed an application under Section 151
CPC stating inter alia that he had telephonically informed his counsel
that he received summons from the court, upon which the counsel
informed him after checking the records, that the written statement
and application had already been filed and, therefore, nothing further
needed to be done. It was further stated that a couple of days prior
to the date of hearing, i.e., on 12.7.2006, the petitioner/tenant
brought the copy of the summon so received by him and showed the
same to his counsel and only then did it dawn on the counsel that
summon had been issued under the Third Schedule of the Act.
Immediately thereupon, the said application was drafted stating inter
alia that the written statement had already been filed by the
petitioner/tenant along with an application for condonation of delay,
which was duly served upon the other side and that the application
filed by the respondents/landladies for issuance of fresh summons was
not served on the petitioner/tenant or his counsel, who remained
under the bona fide impression that as summons received
subsequently were with regard to the same case, no further steps
were required to be taken by the petitioner/tenant.
7. In the aforesaid circumstances, it was prayed by the
petitioner/tenant that fresh summons be issued to him under the Third
Schedule, or he be granted 15 days time for filing a leave to defend
application, which period may be reckoned from 13.7.2006; or in the
alternate, the written statement filed by the petitioner/tenant may be
taken as grounds of leave to defend the eviction petition filed by the
respondents/landladies. The aforesaid application however came to be
dismissed by the learned Additional Rent Controller, who passed the
impugned order. On the same date, an eviction order was passed in
favour of the respondents/landladies and against the petitioner/tenant,
which has resulted in filing of the present petition by him.
8. Counsel for the petitioner/tenant states that the learned
Additional Rent Controller did not appreciate the fact that the
summons directed to be issued, vide order dated 1.3.2006, were not
in proper format under the Third Schedule of the Act and when the
aforesaid mistake on the part of the court staff was pointed out by the
respondents/landladies, who filed an application dated 18.5.2006, the
said mistake ought to have been rectified by affording a proper
opportunity to the petitioner/tenant to file an application for leave to
defend. It was contended that the petitioner/tenant having already
filed his written statement on 5.5.2006 along with an application
seeking condonation of delay and enlargement of time for filing the
same, with an advance copy to the other side, it was incumbent on the
part of the respondents/landladies to have furnished a copy of the
application dated 18.5.2006, whereby fresh summons under the Third
Schedule of the Act were sought to be issued to the petitioner/tenant.
9. Counsel for the petitioner/tenant stated that his client
ought to have been afforded an opportunity to reply to the application
moved by the respondents/landladies under Section 25B (2) & (3) of
the Act, particularly when they had themselves stated that the mistake
of issuing the summons in the wrong format had occurred on account
of an oversight on the part of the court staff and also, in view of the
fact that the petitioner/tenant had already filed his written statement.
It was argued that the entire confusion in the mind of the
petitioner/tenant occurred on account of the mistake on the part of the
court staff, for which he cannot be made to suffer as there was no
negligence attributable to him. To fortify his submissions, counsel for
the petitioner/tenant relied on a judgment in the case of Shri Rishi
Prakash vs. Shri Raghbar Dayal, reported as 1979 (1) R.C.R. 730
and an order dated 8.2.2010 passed by the Division Bench of this
Court in FAO(OS) No.67/2010 entitled Srei Venture Capital Ltd. &
Anr. vs. Vijay Gopal Jindal.
10. As noted above, none has appeared for the
respondents/landladies. However, written submissions filed by them
on 9.9.2008 have been duly perused. The respondents/landladies
have supported the impugned order and stated that both of them are
widows and that the petitioner/tenant is trying to prolong the case so
as to defeat the intention of the legislature as contained in Section
14D of the Act, which requires a summary procedure for cases
involving widows. It is further stated that though the statutory
provisions provide that summons are required to be sent in the
prescribed format under Section 25B of the Act, on account of
oversight by the Rent Controller in issuing the summons, in the first
instance, the same were issued under Order 5 of the CPC. Reliance is
placed on a judgment of this Court in the case of Shri Rishi Prakash vs.
Shri Raghbar Dayal, reported as 1979 (1) RCR 730 to state that non-
compliance with the provisions for issuance of summons in the format
prescribed in the Third Schedule is a material irregularity in the
disposal of a petition for eviction filed under Section 14(1)(e) or 14A
read with Section 25B of the Act and that when such a defect is
brought to the notice of the court, it ought to have rectified the
proceedings by serving the summons in the proper format upon the
tenant to enable him to take steps for his defence under Sub-section 4
of the Act. In the written statement, the respondents/landladies have
stated that they had pointed out the mistake in issuance of summons
in the ordinary process and upon so, intimating the learned ARC, he
had rectified the defect by issuing fresh summons under the Third
Schedule of the Act and that even thereafter, as the petitioner did not
seek leave to defend within the period prescribed under the Act, the
learned ARC was justified in passing an order of eviction against him.
11. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner/tenant,
considered the written submissions filed on behalf of the
respondents/landladies and also perused the record of the court below,
including the order sheet and the relevant applications filed by the
parties.
12. It is undoubtedly true that the requirement of issuance of
summons in the prescribed format is a procedural one as the intention
is to apprise the defendant/respondent of filing of the petition and at
the same time, calling upon him to take steps to defend the same.
However, Section 25B of the Act has been legislated in such a manner
that keeping in view the summary procedure prescribed for certain
type of cases as specified under Section 14(1)(e), Section 14A, B, C
and D, the statute has provided special safeguard to the respondents
in such like cases. Sub-section (2) of Section 25B of the Act mandates
that the Controller shall issue summons, in relation to every
application referred to in sub-Section (1), in the format prescribed in
the Third Schedule. The said summons notifies the respondent that
he has to file an application for leave to appear and contest within the
prescribed period and in a prescribed manner. Sub-section (4) of
Section 25B of the Act lays emphasis on the fact that the tenant on
whom the summon is duly served in the format specified in the Third
Schedule, shall not contest the prayer for eviction without obtaining
such leave. In other words, any non-compliance of the aforesaid
provisions would amount to a material irregularity in the disposal of
the eviction petition filed under Sub-section (1) of Section 25B of the
Act. Thus, while the combined effect of Section 25B (6),(7)&(8) of the
Act is that it would lead to expeditious disposal of an eviction petition
so as to ensure that a landlady need not wait or suffer for a long time,
it is only such a tenant on whom summons have been duly served in
the prescribed format as envisaged under Sub-sections (2),(3) & (4) of
Section 25B of the Act who is precluded from contesting the petition
for eviction, when leave to appear and contest the same is not filed by
him within the prescribed period within the prescribed period.
13. In the present case, the factual position is undisputed. In
the first instance, when the eviction petition was filed by the
respondents/landladies, vide order dated 1.3.2006, the learned ARC
issued summons to the petitioner/tenant by ordinary process instead
of under the Third Schedule, as prescribed under Sub-section (2) of
Section 25B of the Act. The said summons also called upon the
petitioner/tenant to appear in the court on a specified date, i.e., on
18.5.2006. The petitioner/tenant filed his written statement on
5.5.2006, duly accompanied by an application seeking enlargement of
time and condonation of delay. Pertinently, copies of the said written
statement as also the application were duly served upon the other
side. The said application was however directed to be put up with the
file on the date fixed, i.e., on 18.5.2006.
14. On 18.5.2006, the respondents/landladies became aware of
the fact that summons were issued in ordinary process and they filed
an application before the learned ARC under Section 25B(2) and (3) of
the Act. While filing such an application, they chose not to serve a
copy thereof on the petitioner/tenant or his counsel. It was a matter
of chance that on the said date, the Presiding Officer was on leave. As
a result, the Ahlmad of the court took the application on the record
and made a note that the same be put up with the file on 22.5.2006.
On 22.5.2006, when the aforesaid application filed by the respondent
No.1/landlady came up before the learned ARC, in the absence of any
intimation of the said date and in view of failure to serve a copy of the
application on the petitioner/tenant, none was present on his behalf.
On the said date, fresh summons were directed to be issued as per the
prescribed format to the petitioner/tenant returnable on 13.7.2006.
The said summons were received on his behalf on 27.5.2006. It was
at this stage that some confusion arose at the end of the
petitioner/tenant who remained under the bona fide impression that
having filed a written statement in response to the first set of
summons issued to him under ordinary process, along with an
application for enlargement of time, he had done all that was required
of him in law. It is further stated that the petitioner/tenant made
doubly sure that no further act was required to be done on his part by
informing his counsel as to the receipt of the second set of summons,
upon which his counsel assured him that nothing further needed to be
done as necessary steps had already been taken by them in the
matter.
15. It was submitted by the counsel for the petitioner/tenant
that only upon the petitioner/tenant contacting his counsel a couple of
days prior to the date of hearing, i.e., on 12.7.2006 and showing him
a copy of the summons received by him, did it dawn upon the counsel
that the second set of summons had been issued as per the prescribed
format under sub-section (2) of Section 25B of the Act. It was at that
stage that an application was filed by the petitioner/tenant explaining
the circumstances in which he did not file any application for leave to
defend the eviction petition within the prescribed time. Apart from
requesting that fresh summons be issued to him or he be granted 15
days' time to file a leave to defend application while reckoning the
period of 15 days from 13.7.2006, an alternate prayer was made by
the petitioner/tenant that the written statement already filed by him
on the record, may be taken as grounds for leave to defend the
eviction petition.
16. Having regard to the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the
petitioner/tenant is justified in taking a stand that he cannot be made
an scapegoat for a mistake committed by the court and the court staff.
Undoubtedly, grave prejudice has been caused to the petitioner/tenant
on account of the said mistake. Issuance of summons by ordinary
process resulted in him filing a written statement. Failure on the part
of the petitioner/tenant to file a leave to defend application even after
receipt of the second set of summons pursuant to order dated
22.05.2006, occurred due to the aforesaid mistake and under a
bonafide impression that he had already taken necessary steps by
filing a written statement. Such a mistake cannot be treated as mala
fide or deliberate, nor can it entitle the respondents/landladies to steal
a march over the petitioner/tenant by insisting that in the given
circumstances, the consequences as prescribed under sub-section (4)
of Section 25B of the Act ought to follow as a natural corollary.
Interestingly, even the respondents/landladies were conscious of the
fact that such a stand if taken by them, would be fallacious. This is
borne out by the fact that in the application filed by respondent
No.1/landlady on 18.5.2006, the blame was not sought to be placed at
the door of the petitioner/tenant. Rather, it was correctly stated that
summons were sent in the ordinary process on account of an error on
the part of the court staff.
17. In such circumstances, no mala fides can be imputed to the
petitioner/tenant. Nor has any reason been shown as to why the
petitioner/tenant would not want to contest the eviction petition, had
he been aware of the fact that on non-filing of his leave to contest
within the prescribed period, would result in such a grave consequence
of an eviction order being automatically passed against him. This is
more so, when the petitioner/tenant had not dragged his feet and had
already filed his written statement on the record, with a copy to the
other side. It can also not be said that the said mistake on the part of
the petitioner/tenant was not bona fide or was a deliberate attempt on
his part to prolong the litigation. Nor can it confer an undeserved
benefit on the opposite party, at the cost of the petitioner/tenant.
18. Clearly, in the present case, the fault lay at the door of the
court when summons in the eviction petition filed under Section 14D of
the Act were issued to the petitioner/tenant by ordinary process,
instead of under the Third schedule. It is well settled that no man
should suffer because of the fault of the court or on account of delay in
the procedure : "actus curiae neminem gravabit" - an act of court
shall prejudice no man. (Ref.: Vineet Kumar vs. Mangal Sain
Wadhera, (1984) 4 SCC 284 and Suresh Chand vs. Gulam Chisti,
AIR 1990 SC 897).
19. In the aforesaid circumstances, the impugned order cannot
be sustained as the same is not in accordance with law. The learned
ARC ought to have exercised his discretion in favour of the
petitioner/tenant and accepted the explanation offered by him. He
however fell in error by refusing to accept the written statement filed
by the petitioner/tenant and treating the same as his application for
leave to contest the eviction petition. In the given circumstances, no
ulterior motives can be attributed to the petitioner/tenant for
intentionally trying to prolong the proceedings or causing any delay.
Rather, he has been gravely prejudiced. Accordingly, the impugned
order is set aside and the present petition is allowed. The written
statement already filed by the petitioner/tenant shall be treated as his
application for leave to contest the eviction petition. Pleadings in the
said application shall be completed by giving liberty to the
respondents/landladies to file their reply thereto.
20. Parties are directed to appear before the learned ARC on
3.5.2010. As none has appeared on behalf of the
respondents/landladies in the present proceedings, the learned ARC
shall issue notices for appearance to them in accordance with law.
Considering the fact that the eviction petition of the
respondents/landladies filed under Section 14D of the Act has been
considerably delayed for no fault of the respondents, the learned ARC
is requested to dispose of the eviction petition as expeditiously as
possible, and preferably within a period of six months from the date of
completion of pleadings.
21. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, while
allowing the present petition, there shall be no order as to costs.
(HIMA KOHLI) JUDGE APRIL 19, 2010 sk
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