Citation : 2010 Latest Caselaw 1763 Del
Judgement Date : 5 April, 2010
*IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ WP(C) No.2781/1997
% Date of decision: 5th April, 2010
MRS. S.S. MANOHARA ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. V.K. Rao, Sr Advocate with Mr.
Karan Maini, Advocate.
Versus
DIRECTOR OF EDUCATION & ORS. ..... Respondents
Through: Ms. Avnish Ahlawat with Ms. Latika
Choudhury, Advocates for R-1.
Mr. Anil Srivastav, Advocate for R-
2&3.
CORAM :-
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW
1. Whether reporters of Local papers may
be allowed to see the judgment? Yes
2. To be referred to the reporter or not? Yes
3. Whether the judgment should be reported Yes
in the Digest?
RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW, J.
1. The petitioner by this writ petition seeks direction to the respondents
to pay to the petitioner the pay scale and other allowances and benefits as
of a TGT and a further direction of sanctioning of a post of TGT for the
purposes of grant- in-aid and on such sanction being received, direction for
appointment of the petitioner as a TGT.
2. The petitioner filed the petition stating that the respondents No. 2
being the Andhra Education Society running a chain of schools recognized
and fully aided by respondent No.1 Director of Education had appointed
the petitioner as a TGT in one of the said schools at Janakpuri (impleaded
as respondent No.3) in the year 1986, initially temporarily on a
consolidated pay and after proper selection by duly constituted Selection
Committee, vide appointment letter dated 1st September, 1992 in the pay
scale of Rs.1400-2300. It was the case of the petitioner that though the
petitioner, at the time of filing of this petition in the year 1997 had been
teaching in the said school for more than ten years and had teaching
experience in other schools also, but was being treated as "Society Staff"
because the respondent No.1 Director of Education had not sanctioned the
post of a TGT for grant-in-aid purposes. It is the averment of the
petitioner that though there is a continuous and perennial need for a TGT as
evident from the petitioner having taught in the said school for over ten
years but no such post was being sanctioned for the purposes of grant- in-
aid. It is further the case of the petitioner that the other TGTs in the school
who were performing the same duties as the petitioner but whose salaries
were received by way of aid from the Director of Education were in the pay
scale of Rs. 1400-2600. The petitioner thus on the principle of "equal pay
for equal work" sought the writ/direction aforesaid for payment in the scale
of Rs. 1400-2600.
3. The senior counsel for the petitioner informs that the petitioner has
since superannuated in or about the year 2000. It is contended that the
petitioner is thus not claiming the relief of regularization but is claiming the
relief of grant of the pay scale of a regular TGT for her entire career in the
said school from 1986 till superannuation in the year 2000 or at least from
1992 when she was confirmed and till the age of superannuation in 2000.
4. It was inquired from the senior counsel for the petitioner as to
whether for the appointment of the petitioner the procedure as prescribed in
Rules 96-106 of the Delhi School Education Rules, 1973 had been
followed. The answer is in the negative. Attention of the senior counsel
for the petitioner was then drawn to the judgment dated 26 th April, 2007 of
the Division bench of this court in LPA 1620/2006 titled NCT of Delhi Vs.
Anubha Pant. Ms. Anubha Pant had filed the writ petition seeking a
direction for granting her regular pay scale of Assistant Teacher and for
regularisation of her services in a private unaided recognized school, the
management whereof had been taken over by the Director of Education.
The Single Judge of this court allowed the writ petition and directed the
Director of Education to take a final decision as per Rules 96 & 98 for the
appointment of Anubha Pant. Aggrieved from the said order of the Single
Judge, the LPA was preferred. The Division Bench found that Anubha
Pant was overage at the time of her initial appointment and no
advertisement inviting application had been issued prior to her appointment
and no selection committee constituted for her selection. The Division
Bench thus held that backdoor appointment cannot be regularized and
given legal sanction. The appeal was accordingly allowed.
5. In the present case also the petitioner, at the time of her initial
appointment was overage. No advertisement inviting applications for
appointment was issued and no Selection Committee under the Delhi
School Education Rules was constituted. The present case would thus be
fully covered by the judgment of the Division Bench aforesaid.
6. The senior counsel for the petitioner then contended that even if the
petitioner is not entitled to the relief against the Director of Education, she
would still be entitled to the relief against the respondent No.2 Society
which is running the school, for payment for equal pay for equal work as
the TGTs employed by the school. Attention is also invited to the pleadings
in the petition regarding the petitioner performing the same work and
teaching the same classes as the TGTs who were receiving a higher scale.
Reliance is also placed on Nehru Yuva Kendra Sangathan Vs. Rajesh
Mohan Shukla (2007) 6 SCC 9 where the Supreme Court finding that the
nature of duties being discharged by the Youth Coordinators on deputation
and those who had been directly recruited being the same and the only
difference being their source of recruitment, directed payment of the same
emoluments to the deputationists as to the direct recruits. Reliance is
further placed on Rakhi Sharma Vs. Lt. Governor 1998 (47) DRJ 127
where a Single Judge of this court applying principle of "equal pay for
equal work" directed payment of arrears of difference in the pay to a school
teacher appointed by the Parent Teacher Association and found to be
performing the same job as a teacher appointed by the school.
7. I may notice that in Nehru Yuva Kendra (supra) the rules permitted
deputationists as well as direct recruitment. Thus, it was not that the
appointment of one stream was within the Rules and of the other in breach
of the Rules. It was in that factual background that the Supreme Court
held that the source of recruitment was immaterial. However, in the
present case, though the petitioner claims to be performing the same work
as the teachers appointed under the Delhi School Education Rules, the fact
remains that the appointment of the petitioner is admittedly not as per the
said rules. It was therefore put to the senior counsel as to how the principle
of "equal pay for equal work" could be applied to the present case where
the teachers with whom the petitioner is claiming parity are not at par with
the petitioner. The senior counsel contends that the parity has to be in the
performance of duties and not in appointment. However, the said principle
if applied would run contrary to the judgment of the Supreme Court in
State of Karnataka Vs. Uma Devi (2006) 4 SCC 1 and would tantamount
to permitting first the appointment through means other than those
prescribed in the Rules and then bringing such appointees at par with those
appointed in terms of the Rules. The same cannot be permitted.
8. The counsel for the respondent No.1 Director of Education contends
that the appointment of the petitioner is not against any vacancy to the post
of a TGT in the school. Attention is invited to Rule 75 whereunder the
Director of Education sanctions the post and approves the appointment in
the school. It is contended that neither any approval was sought nor
granted qua the petitioner and thus the petitioner cannot claim any relief
whatsoever of grant in aid qua her salary from the Director of Education.
9. The counsel for the respondents 2 and 3 has besides controverting
that the petitioner was performing the same duties as of TGTs in the school
has at the outset itself drawn attention to State of Haryana Vs. Charanjit
Singh (2006) 9 SCC 321 where after a consideration of a catena of past
judgments it has been held that the doctrine of "equal pay for equal work"
is not an abstract doctrine but equal pay must be for equal work of equal
value; the principle has no mechanical application in every case of similar
work; Article 14 permits reasonable classification based on qualities or
characteristics of persons recruited and grouped together as against those
who are left out; the very fact that the person has not gone through the
process of recruitment may itself, in certain cases, make a difference;
where persons are selected by a Selection Committee on the basis of merit
with due regard to seniority, a higher pay scale granted to such persons
who are evaluated by a competent authority cannot be challenged. It was
further held that nomenclature cannot be determinative and the quality of
work produced may be different and even the nature of work assigned may
be different. It was further held that the application of principle of "equal
pay for equal work" requires consideration of various dimensions of a
given job and before any direction can be issued by a court, the court must
first see that there are necessary averments and proof.
10. Having laid the aforesaid foundation, the counsel draws attention to
the appointment letter of the petitioner where it is expressly mentioned that
the petitioner is as an employee/staff of the society in the aforesaid pay
scale as distinct from employee/staff of the school in the pay scale
prescribed under the Delhi School Education Act. It is also urged that the
pay scale of Rs. 1400-2300 is mentioned in the appointment letter itself and
it has further been clarified that the society/staff shall have no claims to
vacant post in the school receiving grant-in-aid. The counsel for the
society explains that the school caters primarily to the children of natives of
State of Andhra Pradesh settled in Delhi; the said children at times have
difficulty in understanding the English medium of teaching and for that
reason and otherwise need supplementing and for which purpose the
society employs staff such as the petitioner. The counsel describes the
petitioner as a "remedial teacher". It is also contended that the pleadings of
the petitioner qua performing equal work as a TGT are vague and the
documents filed do not prove the petitioner performing equal work as a
TGT. It is argued that though the petitioner has stated that she is teaching
higher classes (though appointed only for primary classes) but has not
made a comparison of the work performed by the TGTs. The contention is
that the petitioner has been performing the work of a TGT not regularly but
only intermittently whenever so required; she has no responsibility for
ensuring the result and is not required to have carried out the assignments
as a TGT is required to carry out. From the documents filed by the
petitioner it is demonstrated that the work of the petitioner as TGT is
periodic and for a few days only in a year. The counsel thus contends that
the petitioner is not entitled to relief against the society also even on the
principle of "equal pay for equal work".
11. The senior counsel for the petitioner in the rejoinder though not
disputing the correctness of the principle laid down in Charanjit Singh
(supra) has also referred to State of Punjab Vs. Surjit Singh (2009) 9 SCC
514 to again buttress that the source of recruitment is immaterial and it is
only the work performed which is to be seen.
12. Applying the principle laid down in Charanjit Singh (supra) I am
unable to hold the petitioner entitled to the relief. The petitioner has failed
to prove that the duties performed by her are same as that of the teachers
whose pay scale she claims. It is not the plea of the petitioner that as a
TGT she was made a class teacher or a subject teacher or responsible for
the result of the students taught by her or taught the said students regularly.
Merely because in the absence of any teacher the petitioner was assigned to
perform her task would not place the petitioner in the same position as the
teachers whose pay scale she is claiming. Moreover allowing the claim of
the petitioner as aforesaid would eliminate the compliance of the Rules
(supra).
The petition therefore fails and is dismissed. However, no order as
to costs.
RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW (JUDGE) 5th April, 2010 M
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